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Over the past 15 years, mine action has evolved into an established
component of the relief and developments sectors, supported by more than
250 million US dollars each year. Over this period, projects and programmes
for demining, mine risk education, victim assistance, advocacy, and stockpile
destruction have all been discussed, refined and improved by operators,
programmers, diplomats and activists.
A landmark treaty banning the production, stockpiling, transfer and use
of anti-personnel mines has entered into force, and already binds more than
three-quarters of the world’s nations. Since 2003, the world also has an
international legal instrument — a new protocol to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons —  allocating responsibility for action to counter the
threat posed by other explosive remnants of war.
International mine action standards have been adopted and are being
translated into national realities. Most mine action programmes have a national
authority and mine action centre that uses advanced geographic information
system (GIS) based information management systems. Priorities are being
better managed, employing socio-economic criteria to determine them. In
turn, comprehensive landmine impact surveys are being carried out in affected
States to assist in the identification of priorities. Standards for mine risk
education have been developed, and guidelines for victim assistance have
been finalised. Management training courses are being offered regularly for
national mine action staff and a mine action exchange programme between
mine-affected countries is progressing well.
As part of its ongoing concern to reinforce the effectiveness and
efficiency of mine action, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining commissioned contributions from development and mine action
experts on the many lessons that have been learned over the past 15 years
— and the challenges that remain to be met. These have been brought
together in this work: Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges. We hope that it
will contribute to debate on the future of mine action and its role within
relief and development more generally.
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Introduction
On 18 September 1997, the Oslo Diplomatic Conference formally adopted
new international law — the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel
Mines — which outlawed the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of
anti-personnel mines. In December 1997, at the subsequent treaty signing
ceremony in Ottawa, States pledged a total of US$500 million over five years
to the global response to the landmine problem. Since 1989, the world has
spent more than US$2.5 billion in seeking to rid the world of the scourge of
mines and abandoned or unexploded ordnance.
Humanitarian responses to the landmine problem have existed as a distinct
discipline since 1989, but a comprehensive technical review of lessons learned
and future challenges has not yet been conducted. With the First Review
Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines in
November-December 2004, the international community seized the
opportunity to take stock of progress made in reducing the threat posed by
anti-personnel mines and other explosive remnants of war and to help map
the path for the remainder of the decade.
Certainly, the international mine action community has learned a great
deal over the past 16 years. This work, Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges,
represents the views of selected experts as to what some of the key lessons
have been, and what challenges remain for the future.
Following an Executive Summary of its main conclusions and findings,
this work is laid out in two parts. Part I looks at the core activities — the
“pillars” — of mine action: advocacy, victim assistance, mine risk education,
demining (survey, marking and clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance)
and stockpile destruction. Part II looks at key management issues, specifically,
programme coordination and management, information management and
capacity development. This work concludes with a thought-provoking
assessment of what mine action has actually achieved.
4
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Over the past 15 years, mine action has evolved into an established
component of the relief and developments sectors. It benefits from an accepted
international definition that comprises five main pillars: demining
(encompassing survey, marking and clearance), advocacy, mine risk education,
victim assistance and stockpile destruction. These activities are underpinned
by international law, especially the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and
a recent protocol governing explosive remnants of war (ERW, covering
abandoned explosive ordnance — AXO, and unexploded ordnance — UXO).
In addition, internationally agreed standards, as well as a model legal and
institutional framework, exist to guide the effective coordination, management
and implementation of national mine action programmes. Today, the world
understands how these weapons affect the lives of civilians and the civilian
population in a far more accurate and sophisticated way.
Thus, from the shaky foundations of unadapted military breaching
procedures in the late 1980s, demining has evolved rapidly into a distinct
and refined discipline. The disjointed approaches of individual organisations
converged as, beneath an intense media spotlight, conferences and other liaison
brought productive exchanges of information. As the Ottawa Process that
led to the adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention captured the
public imagination, governments throughout the world became involved, with
many donating funds or contributing resources to this growing industry.
The creation of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) brought
proper oversight, along with a more detached and objective approach to
management. Regulation has been applied primarily to working standards
(in the form of the International Mine Action Standards — IMAS) and
information technology (provided by the Information Management System
for Mine Action — IMSMA). This has helped standardise diverse programmes
and allowed a host of other benefits, ranging from better working conditions for
deminers to the ability to assess programme efficiency. The pool of accumulated
knowledge is also being better managed to allow new programmes to benefit
from the lessons of previous operations and to further enhance the equipment
and procedures in use.
Executive summary
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The evolution of the five pillars of mine action
Demining and demining technologies
At a relatively early stage in the evolution of mine action, scientists and
engineers became interested and began to contribute, unproductively at first,
but with increasing benefit as relationships with the demining community
improved. Necessity has been the mother of invention throughout the
evolution of mine action and many recent developments have been prompted
by requirements from the field, and then accomplished using sound scientific
research. Yet, despite the substantial and well-focused development work,
there have been few changes to the fundamental nature of mine clearance,
which remains dangerous, labour intensive and slow. Most people now accept
that there will be no “silver bullet” or one unique answer to solve the many
practical problems of demining.
In contrast, the exploitation of existing technologies has been more
successful, and new and improved mine clearance machinery is being
produced and fielded on a wider scale than ever before. Techniques for the
training and use of mine detection dogs have also been improved, thanks to
some original research carried out under the GICHD mine detection dog
programme.
One difficulty is that there is no single “mine problem”, a fact not
understood by most researchers. Each minefield or mined area may present
a series of unique problems to the clearance staff. And clearance tools that
work well in one area may be useless in another, even in the same country or
region. User requirements may vary subtly in each place, so single solutions
may not work as well in another location. This leads to the question whether
research and development of new technologies is cost effective.
From the researcher’s point of view, it is difficult to get from the
deminers a consolidated set of quantified performance requirements for
new equipment. Each mine action organisation has its own opinions on
performance specifications, but these would be better coordinated to cover
the whole demining community rather than one specific programme. Most
armies and industries have well-tried routines for establishing customer
needs for equipment performance. The mine action community needs the
same.
Also, although incremental improvements are being made in the cost-
effectiveness of mine action, there has been little success in developing a
stand-off detector to remotely locate the presence of mined areas. This alone
could improve the efficiency of technical surveys by a very large amount. It
can be argued that success in this area of research would find a ready market
and it is highly probable that military demining organisations would wish to
acquire the same capability. Military purchases would change the pattern of
the market completely and would probably give the return on the investment
that is currently sought.
In terms of survey — a major component of demining operations — the
landmine impact surveys (LIS) moved survey away from “chasing minefields”
to providing a better assessment of the impact of landmines on communities.
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The LIS gives an overview of the national landmine situation, and allows a
ranking of communities based on the severity of mine impact (and hence guidance
on the allocation of priorities and resources). However, ongoing data collection
is required to avoid a static view, the impact scoring system needs adaptation
to local situations, and the LIS does not provide data on contamination of
infrastructure.
There is a need for a greater focus on incorporating survey results into the
activities of potential end users — in order to maximise benefits from survey
projects. In the wake of national surveys, for instance, the transfer of survey
information to the IMSMA database is often considered the end-goal of the
project, but it is the activities that follow that define the success of the project.
Greater effort should be placed on the integration of survey information into the
activities of stakeholder groups through organised presentations, workshops,
training and dissemination of tailored data. Where appropriate, survey results
can also be used for strategic planning where the strengths and weaknesses of
the data are fully understood.
There are weaknesses in approaches of both hazard-focused and impact
surveys. Both can benefit from a more deliberate attempt at integrating their
findings. Better quality assurance procedures in emergency surveys could be
introduced and impact surveys could be adapted to capture impact associated
with blocked infrastructure. If it is indeed necessary to undertake additional
surveys it may be possible to avoid full duplication by retrofitting existing
information into the new format, allowing only new data fields to be
addressed. If surveys have followed a common gazetteer or use IMSMA as a
mutual database, then the possibilities of this are greater.
In addition to emergency surveys with socio-economic components, there
may, at the other extreme, be more comprehensive surveys that correlate
aspects of landmine and UXO contamination with information bodies from
other sectors — using data that have a focus on agriculture, land use or poverty
mapping. Agricultural surveys for instance, could supply values of land
productivity that would better support cost-benefit models for demining sites
that have a defined land use potential. Database and geographic information
system (GIS) efforts for mine action could be shared with other sectors during
post-conflict rehabilitation with diverse information-gathering bodies
expanding the potential for data analysis in mine action.
Advocacy
Advocacy has been a major factor in achieving a comprehensive international
legal prohibition of anti-personnel mines in the space of only a few years and
has promoted the commitment of significant resources to mine action. A side
benefit has been the promotion of the development and implementation of
international humanitarian law more generally.
The Landmine Monitor, issued by the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, is an example of a mechanism that has been effective in
monitoring the progress made on landmines. It has become an essential
element in advocacy on the landmine issue. While many of its reports provide
a glimpse into the UXO problem, their primary focus is on the policies and
Executive summary
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activities related to landmines. More detailed information on other forms of
UXO would be useful.
In learning the lessons of the past decade, it is clear that part of the
success of the campaign against anti-personnel mines was the
unprecedented degree of coordination among the variety of actors involved
in advocacy activities. Although the main actors came from a range of
disciplines, operated under different mandates and played different roles
in the advocacy work, they nevertheless closely coordinated and supported
each other’s activities.
However, the same level of cooperation and coordination has not been as
evident in the efforts to improve the international law on ERW, anti-vehicle
mines and cluster munitions in the context of the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW). While some bodies and organisations have
worked closely in these areas, other organisations involved in the anti-
personnel mine issue have been less active. As compared with meetings on
landmines, fewer organisations have participated in the meetings of the States
Parties to the CCW or its Group of Governmental Experts. In addition, the
proposals on ERW and anti-vehicle mines have not been as extensively raised
in capitals by advocacy organisations.
One explanation is that many of the relevant organisations remain focused
on the anti-personnel mine problem and the implementation of the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention. With the Convention’s Standing Committees,
the Meeting of States Parties and implementation work at the national level,
most organisations are fully occupied throughout the year. It is often difficult
for them to follow developments in the parallel processes in the CCW with
their existing resources. As a result, there has been less public and political
pressure on governments for a positive result on ERW, anti-vehicle mines
and cluster munitions.
As work continues on these issues, cooperation and coordination will need
to be enhanced if the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War is to be widely
ratified, and effective measures are to be adopted on anti-vehicle mines and
cluster munitions. The mobilisation of public pressure, political will and
dialogue with the armed forces will be essential parts of the advocacy work.
Greater cooperation and coordination in these areas will maximise the
effectiveness of the messages and activities. The organisation of an NGO
campaign on cluster munitions and ERW will improve the capacity for
cooperation and coordination on these issues. Formed in November 2003,
the Cluster Munitions Coalition needs to become an important actor and a
focal point in the advocacy efforts on these issues.
Mine risk education
The mine risk education (MRE) sector has slowly begun to professionalise
— a process marked by the development of guidelines, the introduction of
training protocols and the development of IMAS standards incorporating
MRE. Having said that, given the size of the MRE industry, there has been a
relative dearth of quality information for training and programme
management. The recent development of IMAS Best Practice Guidebooks by
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UNICEF in partnership with the GICHD should help to fill at least some of the
gaps.
Indeed, by far the most potentially important development of recent years
has been the development of the International Mine Action Standards for
MRE. These standards are intended to replace the existing UN guidelines
and include standards on data gathering, accreditation, programme planning,
implementation, management, training, monitoring and evaluation. The MRE
standards were formally adopted in June 2004.
The standards are welcome in that for the first time a generally supported
definition of MRE — what it is and what it is not — is codified in the document.
This alone is no small feat and, by clearly highlighting the public education
component and the community liaison function in unambiguous terms, it is
extremely useful. How quickly the standards effectively will impact on practice
in MRE organisations, though, will depend to a large extent on how aware
the operators are of the standards and their implications.
Yet, given the amount of funding made available to MRE programmes
(probably between US$10 million and US$15 million each year), it is extremely
surprising that donors have not been more insistent on being shown
substantive proof of efficacy. To date, operational efficiency and effectiveness
have largely been evidenced by questionable indicators such as the counting
of outputs — a particular favourite being the quantity of posters printed and
the number of individuals “briefed” or “reached”.
For, as has become better understood in recent years, factors such as mine
clearance and population movements may be responsible for a reduction in
mine and UXO casualties with no input from MRE programming. Similarly,
MRE may result in increases in casualties, or at least an increase in reported
casualties, as systems are put in place for recording these. In the same way as
mine clearance is seeking to look beyond simple quantitative measurements
of progress (such as numbers of mines and quantities of square metres of
land cleared) to assess the social and economic impact of its work on
communities, so MRE evaluations must seek to judge success on the basis of
more representative proxy indicators.
So, in seeking to coordinate and integrate with other mine action and
development intervention, MRE must also do much better than it has done
so far to demonstrate its effectiveness (and efficiency) as a means of reducing
casualties.
It can be argued that one reason for the lack of respect at times shown
for the profession is that the sector has poorly marketed itself, including
its relevance and proof that it works. MRE, and for that matter the clearance
side of mine action as well, has been guilty of assuming funding will remain
available, and that it was more important to deliver rather than waste
time in retrospective measurement activity. This view was convenient in
that it allowed for focusing on the delivery rather than on the search for
evidence of behaviour change among the target group. It also reflected a
naivety that funding would continue. As the funding environment has
become more formalised, so MRE organisations have realised this is no
longer the case and increasingly, organisations are undertaking more
meaningful evaluations of their work.
Executive summary
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In addition, mine action, including MRE, must improve its accountability to
the communities it serves. Completed general surveys, detailed maps of
contaminated, suspected and known cleared areas, clearance reports, etc., are
rarely shared with communities. Where such material exists, MRE organisations
should be tasked with ensuring its regular effective dissemination. In
communities where mine clearance is being undertaken the focus should be on
MRE through community liaison, managed and tasked as part of the clearance
operation.
Victim assistance
In terms of responding to the needs of one of the fundamental reasons for
its existence, mine action and the broader health sector have made relatively
little headway in improving the provision of assistance to mine and UXO
victims, despite it being a “pillar” of mine action. Broadly the same actors —
medical centres under national ministries of health, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, Handicap International, and the Vietnam
Veterans of America Foundation, to name some of the key service  providers,
are engaged in various aspects of assistance, notably in physical
rehabilitation.
The vast majority of the affected countries have to deal with specific needs
of landmine victims while struggling with fundamental challenges of economy,
employment, health, education, and basic human rights at the same time,
some amid internal or international conflicts or post-conflict reconstruction.
Three main issues identified by States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention in 1999 still pose a challenge to victim assistance today: how to
collect and share needed information on victims; how to gain sufficient
attention from donors; and how to coordinate victim assistance activities
more effectively. The world still has much to do in repairing the many wounds
of war.
Stockpile destruction
The fifth pillar of mine action — stockpile destruction — is also its most
recent, having been added to the definition of mine action only five years
ago. However, the world has made inroads into global stockpiles, estimated
at more than 250 million anti-personnel mines prior to the entry into force of
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Sometimes progress has been slow,
but generally the obligation has been implemented in good faith. In the past
decade, more than 60 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines have been
destroyed, according to the Landmine Monitor.
But most stockpiled anti-personnel mines remain outside the purview of the
Convention. China and the Russian Federation hold the bulk of these and neither
appears ready to accede to the Convention at an early stage. Despite apparently
destroying many millions of stockpiled anti-personnel mines that did not comply
with Amended Protocol II, the Russian Federation has continued to use
landmines in its military operations in Chechnya. Getting these and other major
military powers, such as India, Pakistan and the US, to destroy their stockpiles
will demand greater political will than has so far proved to exist.
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The coordination and management of mine action
programmes
Overall, the international community has learnt — and agreed upon —
many of the requirements for successful coordination and management of
national mine action programmes. Central to that learning experience has
been the work of the national authorities of affected States, the United Nations
and key donors to mine action.
Wherever there is significant contamination or impact from mines, UXO
or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), a national mine action authority
and a mine action centre can play an effective role in ensuring the proper
coordination and management of a mine action programme. These institutions
should be mandated and regulated by domestic legislation to bring clarity,
coherence and transparency to the sector.
Information management
Central to effective mine action management is the management of
information. The first five years of mine action information management
systems — the period pre-IMSMA — saw the development of databases in
large programmes that had a requirement but, more importantly, the capacity
to devote significant resources to this task. These databases were not well
rounded — they focused on the particular sort of data and reporting that
were of specific interest to the individuals working in the programme at the
time and did not benefit from a wider body of experience.
The next five years saw the development of IMSMA through three major
versions and, with the exception of the northern Iraq programme, very little
database development elsewhere. As IMSMA progressed from v1 to v3 it
grew in size, complexity and capability. Important new functionality included
robust decentralised data entry, integrated coordinate transformations and
the addition of mine risk education. IMSMA is now the de facto standard
database for mine action. For the most part mine action programmes have
warmly embraced this standardisation effort.
The current course of the IMSMA version 4 project marks a sharp turn from
that of the previous five years. The GICHD’s creation of regional IMSMA
representatives addresses one of the main points highlighted by Price
Waterhouse Coopers in their review of mine action information management.
Namely, that far more attention has been given to developing the IMSMA
software than to assisting users in the field in making appropriate use of it.
Rather than relying on technical advisers — a resource many programmes
cannot afford — GICHD has stepped forward to directly provide this service
to the users of its software.
However, the balance of power between headquarters staff and
information management professionals seems to be firmly weighted towards
headquarters staff, given the experience during the design of recent surveys.
Important lessons learned during the landmine impact survey process seem to
have been forgotten. By focusing on data rather than data use, surveys such as
the Emergency Survey in Iraq have degraded their effectiveness by failing to
Executive summary
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focus on analysis. Fielding data collection forms that do not have a focused
intent yields poor quality data.
Geographic information systems are now widely used in mine action. For
most programmes this means that they have the capability to print maps
showing the mine threat. While automated mapping is a very modest use of
the geographic tools made available by IMSMA, it is a huge advance from
what was available before and places mine action among a very select group of
GIS users in many of the countries where it is used.
Capacity development
The UN and its many partners can play a major role in developing an
indigenous capacity to run national institutions to plan, direct and coordinate
mine action operations efficiently, while at the same time maintaining safety
standards as high as possible. However, the effort to foster indigenous mine
action capacities in developing countries and economies in transition is very
much a glass half-empty/half-full story. International assistance generally
has succeeded in developing the capacities of individuals for the front-line
tasks relating to mine clearance, survey, quality assurance, medical support
of clearance operations, MRE and victim assistance. In most cases where the
contamination is likely to require a sustained effort, indigenous capacity for
continuing these training programmes has also been developed. These
achievements provide benefits in particular to the successful trainees (at least
those obtaining employment).
Where the incentives are right, some of the more entrepreneurial of these
individuals will go on to establish local organisations (even though, in
competitive environments, the unlucky and incapable will cease operations).
In short, the transfer of technical skills to individuals is fairly easily
accomplished and the problems that have occurred have in the main stemmed
from coordination failures among the donors and with the government. In
the case of Angola, for example, this led to an inordinate delay in mounting
the training programmes; in Bosnia’s case, donor competition led to grossly
excessive investment in basic capacity development activities such as training
and equipping people for manual demining. A further concern is that
sometimes a notable lack of political will to address the issue exists within
the government of an affected country.
The development of individual capacities, together with the provision of
equipment, funding and the like, is also a boon to existing organisations that
have established capacities and can absorb new responsibilities when assisted
appropriately. However, capacity development of the type needed to establish
new organisations or to improve the management cadres and systems of
poorly performing organisations has been much more hit-and-miss. In the
first decade, the failures at this level of capacity development outweighed
the successes, in part because short-term emergency thinking dominated, no
successful models existed in the new field of mine action, and most of the
early programmes began in the difficult situations of complex emergencies and
failed states.
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More fundamentally, donors and the UN organisations could not muster
the extra individual and collective capacities for capacity development required
in such trying circumstances. After the excellent Development of Indigenous
Capacities study, the UN addressed many of its shortcomings, most
fundamentally by establishing the coordination structures required to learn
from experience and then to apply these lessons.
But enhanced donor coordination will also be necessary in one of the
frontier issues for capacity development in mine action; the transition of mine
action programmes from donor dependence to sustained financing by the
local government. This is likely to involve downsizing of most programmes,
both to match the government’s fiscal capacity and in recognition that the
most pressing contamination priorities will have been addressed in many
cases, leaving a “residual” contamination problem. Ideally, the transition
should not be abrupt, but the experience from other humanitarian and
development sectors that have gone out of fashion or “off the boil” suggests
that a dignified disengagement of donors is more likely to be the exception
than the rule.
The need for better coordination within the donor arena is also one of
many frontier issues concerning capacity development of networks, which is
needed to ensure that a group of otherwise capable organisations works
effectively in concert. There is a general awareness of the institutions and
processes required to make the organisations within a country’s mine action
arena function as a reasonably coherent network (donor support groups,
steering committees, technical working groups for clearance, MRE, and the
like, plus a national strategic plan), although of course these elements are not
fully in place in all programmes and most programmes exhibit some common
weaknesses, such as failure to truly integrate MRE with the survey, marking
and clearance functions.
So, has mine action really made a difference?
After all the work that has been carried out and all the money that have been
expended, it is still necessary to ask whether mine action has really made a
significant, long-term difference to the lives of the people it is trying to help. For
few things in mine action cause more frustration and misunderstanding among
donors, recipient governments and programme managers than the question:
what results has the programme achieved? Study after study has decried the
fact that, while there is abundant data detailing the number of landmines
destroyed, the area of land cleared and the number of people receiving mine
risk education (“doing the job right”), there is little data allowing an assessment
of whether these achievements have enhanced the well-being of people in mine-
afflicted communities.
Simply put, mine action practitioners often cannot demonstrate that they
are doing — or even aiming at — “the right job”. This deficiency will pose
ever greater problems as donors seek an accounting of the benefits generated
with their funds and as host governments try to gauge what mine action
(relative to other claims on the public purse) promises for their citizens and for
the country’s overall development.
Executive summary
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There are numerous attempts under way to rectify this shortcoming, but for
the most part these represent only partial measures — pieces of a larger puzzle.
In fairness, the mine action puzzle is unusually complex. The community faces
the challenges that always arise when trying to focus more tightly on results —
what might be termed “garden variety” management problems. But it also faces
“exotic” challenges because many mine-afflicted countries represent such
difficult and rapidly changing environments.
What is certain is that mine action programmes in heavily contaminated
countries will almost certainly not be able to declare victory in the short- to
medium-term. Therefore, they need to equip themselves adequately for the
long haul. This implies something more fundamental than new tools for their
tool kits: it implies learning how to learn. This ability is required if
programmes are to assess their performance in terms of results that make a
difference to people in mine-afflicted communities, which is necessary to
maintain the support of donors and, increasingly, of host governments. Even
more critically, the ability to assess performance in terms of meaningful results
is necessary to improve such performance over time. In sum, the learning
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1 The demining toolkit
Colin King
Introduction
From its inception in the late 1980s, mine action has developed into a
global activity with an entire industry built up around it. The growth and
rate of change within mine action is almost unparalleled among international
aid efforts, and the expansion has occurred simultaneously on several fronts.
Not only have programmes emerged in dozens of different countries, but
the extent and complexity of those programmes have increased beyond the
wildest expectations of the early days.
A network of activities has developed in support of this expansion, ranging
from the provision of specialist equipment and information technology to
systems for regulation and global management. The explosion of activity has
attracted a great deal of media attention, raising the profile of mine action
and stimulating broad interest and support. In turn, the heightened awareness
has helped to attract the substantial levels of funding needed to sustain
operations on this scale.
As a result of its accelerated development, mine action organisations1 have
achieved tangible results in countries throughout the world; they have also
evolved a template for providing rapid and effective mine action in new
Summary
From the shaky foundations of military breaching procedures,
demining has evolved rapidly into a separate, refined discipline.
Maturity occurred during the 1990s with the integration of mine risk
education, minefield survey, marking and clearance, victim assistance,
advocacy and stockpile destruction into the broader discipline of mine
action. This rounded approach now takes its place as a major
component of humanitarian aid to mine-affected regions, particularly
in the immediate post-conflict period. Yet, despite substantial research
and development work, there have been few changes to the fundamental
nature of mine clearance, which remains dangerous, labour-intensive
and slow. Most people now accept that there will be no “silver bullet”
to solve the many practical problems of demining.
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programmes or post-conflict situations. Part of the approach involves the
selection of proven equipment and techniques for demining tasks, together
with the knowledge and experience to use them effectively.
Demining is the clearance of land to internationally agreed standards.
This means that the objective is to clear given areas of land of all explosive
devices — mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and any other explosive
remnants of war (ERW).2 The term “demining toolkit” is often used to describe
the range of options available to the mine action programme manager. The
elements of the toolkit, which have been adapted (from military applications),
invented, developed and refined over the last 15 years or so, now offer
workable solutions to most demining challenges.
However, despite the many accomplishments of mine action, progress has
not always been smooth and success has been achieved at considerable cost.
The evolution of mine action has been punctuated by hard-learned lessons,
personal tragedies and, occasionally, outright failure. This chapter explains
the impetus behind global mine action and outlines the evolution of the
demining toolkit over the last 15 years.
Mines and mine warfare
The characteristics of mines
The need for mine action owes a great deal to the characteristics of the
mines themselves. Ever since the development of explosive munitions there
has been danger from UXO, but landmines are unique in their ability to inflict
casualties long after their deployment.
Most munitions are targeted towards the intended “victim” — this entails
a degree of selectivity and is intended to produce a destructive effect at, or
shortly after, the time of impact. In contrast, the typical mine waits for its
victim to arrive, completely removing the element of selectivity. This method
of operation also requires the mine to remain functional for an indefinite
period, often extending its lifespan way beyond the conflict in which it is
used. More recently, “smart” mines with pre-determined life spans and greater
selectivity have been produced, but these are the preserve of wealthy nations
and few have been used operationally.
Mines are inherently simple munitions and require few components. The
casing may be of virtually any material and the mechanism is often little
more than a spring-loaded striker retained by a pin. This means that mines
are inexpensive and easy to produce, resulting in universal availability and
(prior to the entry into force of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention)
widespread use. With little to go wrong and virtually guaranteed operation,
mines are highly efficient defensive weapons.
Mine warfare
The availability, efficiency and versatility of the mine have led to its
adoption by military forces throughout the world. Originally, mines were
used mainly for the defence of borders and installations, but then spread to
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more offensive use in ambushes and isolated attacks. The potential of mines
for insurgent or terrorist use soon became clear, and the ease with which
mines could be made or acquired meant that they were readily available to
any hostile faction.
Mines are made in a number of different configurations, with hundreds
of individual designs and fuze combinations. Although many are designed
to be buried, others are placed on short stakes or positioned well above the
ground, creating a three-dimensional threat. The use of tripwires, linked mines
and improvisation adds further complications. All in all, the variety of mine
types, fuzes and means of positioning leads to countless permutations, making
it impossible to evolve a single foolproof clearance process.
While well-trained military engineers generally used mines in a systematic
and disciplined manner, many forces did not. In many countries, mines were
laid in vast numbers by untrained soldiers, militias or insurgent groups with
little or no thought for the long-term implications and, more importantly,
without recording their locations. In most cases, the urgency of the conflict
overwhelmed any other consideration and, even within otherwise responsible
governments, few people considered the devastating consequences of
extensive and indiscriminate mine-laying.
Minefields
For most people, the term “minefield” conjures up an image of a discrete
area of flat agricultural land crossed by neat rows of mines. The reality is
very different, for a variety of reasons. To begin with, mines have been used
in every type of environment, from the deserts of North Africa to the jungles
of South-East Asia. Even where mines have been laid on agricultural land,
their denial of access over the land means that it can no longer be used for
grazing animals or growing crops. It therefore quickly becomes overgrown,
particularly in fertile regions, with thick vegetation and trees creating major
obstacles after a few years.
Other natural obstacles (such as steep slopes, rocks and water courses)
contribute to the complexity of the minefield and greatly complicate the
clearance process. Battlefields often contain earthworks (such as trenches and
mounds), wire (barbed wire, communications line and missile guidance wires)
and a great deal of metallic military scrap, including live UXO and other
ERW. In some cases, mines are also present in and around settlements,
bringing the added complication of man-made structures and underground
services. In sum, there is no such thing as a standard minefield and, therefore,
no single approach to a clearance task.
The British Army was reintroduced to the realities of mine warfare during
the Falklands campaign of 1982, where minefields proved to be formidable
and demoralising obstacles. Despite their relative simplicity,3 the minefields
defied clearance once the conflict had ended. As casualties mounted during
the initial attempts at clearance, the British government recognised the
inherent difficulties of the task and halted demining operations. The
minefields still remain in place, with little prospect of clearance in the
foreseeable future.
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Minefield breaching
The ability to clear mines is a fundamental component of mine warfare, but
is tailored to the requirements of military formations during combat. The objective
is normally to overcome the obstacle in the most efficient manner possible: for a
minefield, this means crossing it rather than removing it. It also means taking the
shortest practical route and clearing as little area as possible.
The sole aim of minefield breaching is to create a (relatively) safe lane for the
movement of troops. The work will always have a strict time limitation and
might be carried out under enemy fire; these limitations demand some compromise
in the standard of clearance, which cannot be guaranteed completely under
combat conditions. Modern surveillance equipment has virtually eliminated the
utility of the early manual breaching techniques (performed by soldiers equipped
with metal detectors and probes). Current methods (including explosive line
charges, ploughs and rollers) use equipment that can be deployed from behind
armour and yield rapid results.
Many of the considerations for breaching are different from those in demining
and, in some cases, the two are in direct conflict. While calculation of “acceptable
losses” of troops is part of planning a military operation, there can be no acceptable
losses, and therefore no missed mines, in a humanitarian context: there can be no
“acceptable” loss of life or limb, and any future accident would destroy the
confidence of local people, in using the land (as we know, people often do use the
land despite the danger). It soon became obvious that existing military minefield
breaching techniques and equipment would be of little value for demining.
The beginnings of demining
Afghanistan, 1989
The first major humanitarian demining programme was part of
Operation Salam, an ambitious United Nations (UN) aid project aimed at
restoring normality to war-torn Afghanistan following many years of Russian
occupation.
Extensive mine clearance operations had taken place after the 1939-45 war,
especially in Europe, but most were conducted by troops and many units
suffered heavy casualties. Most mines had been recently laid and were readily
detectable because of their substantial metal content. In many cases the
minefields were well-recorded and could be identified or cleared by those who
laid them.
In contrast, the situation in Afghanistan was awkward and confused.
The casualty rate among the local population was appallingly high,4 with
the very few medical facilities hopelessly unable to cope with increasing
numbers of mine victims. Countless refugees were unable to return to
their homes and many of the surviving communities had been denied the
use of their land.
A wide variety of mines had been used by both sides, including a number
of “minimum-metal” types designed to defeat metal detectors. Few records
of the minefields existed, and some mines had been scattered from the air or
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positioned randomly without any form of marking. No formal organisation
existed for the clearance of mines and the workforce had to be drawn from
Afghans with little or no relevant experience. The scale of the problem was
daunting, yet similar situations would be soon encountered in regions
throughout the world.
At this time, the only people with any relevant expertise were army
personnel trained in mine warfare. A number of Western countries, including
Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, the UK and the US, sent
training teams to teach the would-be Afghan deminers. The most immediate
problem was that many of these trainers had never cleared live mines
themselves. Most were military engineers, but only a few were trained in
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); the US contingent, for example, were
Special Forces personnel who had only just received superficial training in
mine clearance.
Further problems immediately became apparent.5 Not only did the trainers
lack credibility among their Afghan trainees, but they also lacked the depth
of knowledge to address new or unforeseen issues. Training was firmly based
on military breaching procedures, yet there was no attempt to standardise
practices between national contingents. Some of the techniques taught (such
as probing in rocky ground) were completely impractical, while others (such
as throwing a grapnel hook to clear tripwires) were downright dangerous.
Even as training was going on (and training was held in camps in neighbouring
Pakistan, not in the minefields of Afghanistan), some instructors began to
recognise serious shortcomings; however, it was not until the “trained” Afghan
teams were deployed to begin demining that the inadequacies of the system
became truly apparent.
Despite its many weaknesses, Operation Salam did establish some important
and enduring principles of mine action. To begin with, the work would be
carried out entirely for the benefit of the local population, not for military
expediency. The programme attracted international support and some of the
best “technical advisers” available at the time, while the deminers were drawn
from the host nation and would remain there to build an indigenous capacity.
It was also the first humanitarian programme to make extensive use of mine
detection dogs and demonstrate their potential for demining applications.
From these shaky beginnings, the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan
(MAPA) developed into one of the most successful long-term mine action
programmes in the world.
Kuwait, 1991: international contract clearance
The clearance of Kuwait following the first Gulf war was the second major
demining programme of recent times. But while the scale of the problem was
comparable to Afghanistan, the approach was entirely different. In Kuwait,
the ready availability of funding meant that massive resources could be
committed to hire commercial operators to complete the job quickly. While
the majority of Afghanistan is expected to be demined within another ten
years6 (making nearly 25 years in total), Kuwait was cleared in less than four
years. The work was performed by expatriates, recruited from virtually any
The demining toolkit
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ordnance-related field, although very few had any operational experience of
mine clearing.
While the basic aim was achieved, the cost of clearing Kuwait was high in
terms of both funding and casualties. According to reports, the Kuwaitis
employed 4,000 contractors at a cost of US$800 million,7 a level of funding
unlikely to be available to most national programmes. During the clearance,
84 deminers were killed and a further 200 injured,8 a casualty level that was
widely regarded as unacceptably high. Unfortunately, some of the military
contingents accepted their casualties as the inevitable price of a high-risk
operation and continued their approach to clearance throughout the operation.
However, among the civilian contractors a series of investigations and
conferences prompted a major re-evaluation of working practices; the resultant
changes were to permanently alter the conduct of demining.
Although some would take years to evolve, a number of common-sense
and innovative measures were implemented as the clearance progressed. An
interesting example was the adoption of a “sapping” technique used by soldiers
of the French Foreign Legion in preference to traditional military probing.
They found that it was faster and more thorough to scrape away sand as
they progressed down their clearance lane, allowing the loose surface to fall
back to its natural angle of repose. As the edge fell away, mines were exposed
and could be dealt with easily.
Both the British and American contingents experimented with new
explosives, machines and personal equipment; although there were few major
breakthroughs, a great deal was learned about the limitations of new
techniques. One example was a mine flail brought in to clear beach areas of
anti-personnel mines. The machine was well designed and engineered, and
should have been a major asset in this particular task, but operational use
soon proved otherwise. Not only was the machine routinely halted by wire,
which it tended to reel onto the rotating spindle, but it scattered live mines
into previously cleared areas, resulting in an operator losing a leg.
Fundamental flaws in the early programmes
For all their differences, the demining programmes in Afghanistan and
Kuwait demonstrated many of the same shortcomings. Perhaps the most
significant weakness was that both programmes focused on the clearance of
mines while largely overlooking other mine-related issues. Both were primarily
“demining” programmes and had little or no linkage with other components
of what is now called “mine action”.
Mine risk education
While some mine risk education (then called “mine awareness”) was
conducted in both regions, the activity was never an integral part of the
demining programme. There was no concerted education campaign and
efforts by individual departments and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) were largely sporadic, disjointed affairs. Even in these early days,
it should have been apparent that mine risk education could have had a
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far more immediate impact on casualty rates than demining, yet this option
was largely overlooked.
Victim assistance
The situation regarding victim assistance was similar to that with mine
risk education; some work was being done, but there was little linkage with
the demining programme. Agencies such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) treated the casualties who survived long enough to
reach them, but many mine victims had no access to effective first aid in the
immediate aftermath of an incident. There were also few provisions for long-
term aid, such as prosthetic limbs or facilities for continuing care in the
community.
Survey
No process existed to conduct a comprehensive survey of the countries in
order to establish which areas had suffered the highest humanitarian impact.
In Kuwait, since all work began more or less simultaneously, nations
participating in the clearance effort were simply allocated sectors of the
country. In Afghanistan, the first demining teams were expected either to
return to their home communities or work wherever their help was sought.
Since there was no comprehensive overview of the mine problem, it was
impossible to prioritise tasks or allocate resources efficiently.
Stockpiles
In the meantime, while the demining continued, substantial stockpiles of
mines remained available to the many hostile factions in Afghanistan. These
would continue to be used in the many territorial disputes and power struggles
between warlords, even as mines were being lifted in other parts of the
country. This situation has occurred in many other unstable areas, and in
some cases cleared ground has been re-mined when hostilities resumed.
Practical issues
Besides the strategic “mine action” issues highlighted above, a host of
technical problems emerged during the early demining programmes. These
were issues that directly affected the deminers and indicated that operational
reality would involve a steep learning curve. One example was the minimum-
metal mines that were now widely encountered; these became the misleading
stereotype image that the scientific community, media, public and even
deminers themselves would associate with mines. Among the many categories
of mine, the small buried blast mine attracted all the attention, despite the
fact that, for example, a fragmentation stake mine is far more lethal and takes
far longer to clear.9
Many minimum-metal mines were barely, if at all, detectable by the location
equipment of the time, and they became such an obsession that, for many
years, the development of mine detectors addressed little else. Other detection
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issues, such as locating tripwires or minimising false-alarm rates, were virtually
ignored in the relentless pursuit of ever-more sensitive metal detectors.
Unfortunately, increasing sensitivity without any corresponding increase in
selectivity raised the false alarm rate still further.10 With most detectors now
capable of locating 0.1 grams of metal, it can be extremely difficult and time-
consuming for operators to identify the object that is causing their detectors to
alarm.
Good training or reference material could have mitigated the lack of
operational expertise among the expatriate “technical advisers” and
deminers, but this too was unavailable. At the time, Western military
intelligence was largely focused on the Warsaw Pact countries, while many
of the mines were from Europe (East and West) or other parts of the
world. Of the information that was available, much was classified and
most concentrated on weapon characteristics and capabilities rather than
disarming procedures.
The lack of technical knowledge was the direct cause of numerous
accidents as operators (many of whom had never touched a live mine, let
alone cleared a minefield) attempted to lift, disarm and dismantle mines
that they knew little about. Few, for example, understood the difference
between percussion detonators and the far less stable “stab-sensitive”
detonators used in many mine fuzes.11 One organisation issued its deminers
with needle-nosed tweezers, with instructions to extract “stab-sensitive”
detonators from the bounding mines they recovered, a practice that caused
at least one fatality.
The issue of weapons intelligence was not confined to mines. In
Afghanistan and Kuwait, as with many other mine-affected regions, many
other types of UXO were present in and around the minefields. Unexploded
submunitions were a particular threat and were often likened to mines
because of their sensitivity and the numbers in which they were encountered.
The UXO problem led to the formation of EOD teams, often created by
providing existing deminers with more advanced training.
The rising number of accidents revealed many weaknesses in basic
working practices, but also highlighted the urgent need for effective
personal protective equipment (PPE). Early deminers were issued little, if
any, PPE; helmets and flak jackets were provided in some programmes
but provided inadequate protection for the special needs of the deminer.
Eye protection also became a major issue after an expatriate deminer was
blinded during an accident in Kuwait.
At the time, most of the available protective equipment was military issue
body armour, which had been designed for a completely different role. It
soon became apparent that specialist equipment would be needed to protect
deminers, while allowing them sufficient comfort and freedom of movement
for sustained work.
A further lesson from the ever-increasing casualty list was the need to
insure all deminers. While the expatriate workers were generally provided
with adequate cover, host-nation workers were not. Litigation following mine-
related accidents also acted as a stark reminder to employers that they had a
duty of care towards their workers, no matter how inherently dangerous the
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task. By law, failure to provide adequate equipment, protection or even
information might be regarded as negligence. This realisation may have been
instrumental in prompting programme managers to anticipate problems rather
than simply reacting to them.
Reflection and adaptation
The experiences and casualties from the early programmes had given the
growing demining community much cause for reflection. It was obvious that
addressing a mine-affected region required something more than a prolonged
clearance project and that the elements of an aid package should be integrated
into a more coherent effort. Clearly, the removal of mines would remain a
fundamental component of the new rounded approach to “mine action”, but
the adaptation of military breaching procedures and equipment had proven
inadequate for the job.
Cambodia
Even as the clearance programme in Kuwait proceeded, new approaches
were beginning elsewhere. The programme in Cambodia (started in 1991)
brought together a diverse range of managers and technical advisers into a
new environment that demanded innovation. Although the new Cambodian
Mine Action Centre was firmly based on a military structure, procedures had
to be adapted or formulated to address problems such as probing in hard
ground and moving through heavy vegetation.
In the dry season, much of the ground in Cambodia becomes so hard that
conventional probing techniques are impossible. However, deminers found
that if they soaked the earth with water, it became soft enough to probe.
Unfortunately, there were two major disadvantages to this process: the first
was that large amounts of water were needed and the second was that it
took some time for the water to soak in sufficiently. Although the technique
was used with some success, no measures were introduced to mitigate the
logistic and time penalties.
Undergrowth was cut, by hand, in a painstaking process that had to
allow for the possible presence of tripwires among the vegetation. In some
areas, technical advisers estimated that 80-90 per cent of their deminers’
time was used simply to clear vegetation and gain access to the ground.
Although many organisations still endure this major penalty, it prompted
consideration of mechanical assistance to accelerate the process. A British
demining organisation, the HALO Trust, bought local tractors with brush
cutters and armoured them to protect the operator. In 1994, they began
the first mechanically-assisted manual demining operations and saw a
substantial increase in productivity.12
Mozambique
The UN programme in Mozambique (where planning started in 1992) saw
the introduction of numerous refinements to address common problems.
The demining toolkit
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Mozambique was among the first programmes to identify the inadequacy of
existing metal detectors in magnetic soils, which were encountered in around
one third of the clearance tasks. This situation threatened a key component
of the deminers’ toolkit and soon stimulated research into “all-terrain”
detectors capable of operating effectively in magnetic soils.
Since the inability to use metal detectors often resulted in continuous
prodding, a second effect from the Mozambican experience was to prompt a
faster and more refined probing technique. New probes were produced from
disused bayonets and were slightly longer than previous versions. This
allowed prodding in the kneeling position, which had proven the most stable
and comfortable position for sustained work. A simple wooden guide
eliminated guesswork and increased consistency by marking the correct
prodding intervals and unwinding lane-marking tape as it was moved
forwards. Having seen the advantages of using water to soften hard ground
for probing in Cambodia, programme managers in Mozambique formally
incorporated water supply into their logistic system to ensure that their
deminers always had an adequate supply.
During the early days of the programmes in Cambodia and Mozambique,
the only protective equipment in use was industrial glasses. These were worn
at all times and, in addition to being very cheap, did not impair the
performance of the operator. Although the visors being adopted elsewhere
offered much better facial protection, they quickly became scratched and their
cost prevented regular replacement. This, together with their added
inconvenience, meant that visors were often raised or absent altogether when
accidents occurred. Acknowledging these practical considerations, the first
demining standards permitted the use of goggles.
Angola
Some of those involved in Mozambique went on to work in Angola, where
they continued to build upon their experience. PPE was becoming an obvious
priority and, while protective goggles had been tolerated at first, the
additional protection offered by full-face visors was undeniable. The deminers
in Angola opted for a long visor, which offered protection over a range of
movement and positions: it also tied in better with body protection to give
continuous coverage over the front of the neck. Meanwhile, the importance
of good equipment “husbandry” was driven home and more care was taken
to keep visors in good condition.
Operators were no longer expected to work in the prone position and,
since most explosions were likely to occur around ground level, it was
important to offer protection from below. Protective clothing, such as flak
jackets developed for the military, simply did not cater for this, so programme
managers began to design their own. An unexpected bonus of this move was
that goods from the commercial companies they approached were
substantially cheaper than those from companies used to supplying the defence
industry.
Manual demining procedures were further refined in Angola, including
more thorough and precise methods of searching and marking. New detectors
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were also adopted: these had no external cables to snag or break, were extremely
simple to use and had external speakers, which eliminated the need to wear
headphones. As the French Legionnaires had done in Kuwait, the managers in
Angola questioned the efficiency of probing and established that excavation or
“sapping” was often faster.
Although none of these measures was particularly momentous in isolation,
the constant refinement of existing techniques, together with the gradual
development of new equipment, was continually enhancing the demining
process. As managers migrated between national programmes, new ideas
spread throughout the mine action community, further stimulating the
refinement process.
The media spotlight
Throughout the early 1990s, a combination of influences accelerated the
pace of change within demining. New programmes were beginning all over
the world, drawing in technical advisers from elsewhere and forcing them to
adapt their experience to different situations. The increased activity also
generated media interest, particularly after October 1992, when the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was formed by a steering
committee of six NGOs.13
The unprecedented success of the ICBL advocacy and the subsequent
Ottawa Process launched by the Canadian government captured the
imagination of people throughout the world. While some argue that this
diverted potential funding from the operational programmes, there is little
doubt that it also drew attention to their existence. With many nations under
intense pressure to join the Ottawa Process, some of the more astute
administrations realised that demining exemplified the popular struggle
against the now stigmatised mine and began to increase their  support.
The slow progress and problems associated with demining also became a
source of fascination among academics and equipment developers. A large
number of mine action conferences were organised throughout the 1990s but,
at least initially, few deminers attended and many events lacked purpose or
direction. Few of the early conferences yielded any significant progress but
gradually, as more programme managers and technical advisers began to
attend, there was some useful exchange of information and topics identified
for further action.
Some of the conference discussions indicated a need for further research
or development in particular areas. The subjects were diverse, ranging from
a need to understand more about the mechanism by which a dog locates a
mine to the collection of data on mine accidents in order to develop more
effective PPE. In some cases, separate working groups were organised to
focus on specific issues, such as the employment of machines or future trends
in detection. In others, leading stakeholders were asked to confer on more
academic projects, such as drafting safety standards or “statements of user
requirement”.14
Among the short simplistic media articles on demining, it was common to
blame the so-called “non-metallic” mine for the slow and costly progress of
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clearance. This, together with endless technical discussions at the conferences,
led many to the conclusion that the key to the problem would be equipment-
based. At this stage, many believed that the answer lay in one of two options:
either a new generation of detector or a clearance machine that processed
ground with no requirement for detection at all. So began a number of parallel
research and development programmes in the relentless pursuit of a “solution”
to the mine problem.
Seeking new solutions
A prime example of this mindset was the establishment of a humanitarian
demining equipment programme within the US Army’s Night Vision and
Sensors Directorate (NVESD) at Fort Belvoir in 1995. Initially, the programme
was heavily criticised by the operational community for its isolation from
reality and relentless, misguided pursuit of inappropriate equipment. It had
also raised the expectations of many observers, only to disappoint them by
failing to deliver any significant progress. However, despite its initial
shortcomings, this project had realistic funding levels and talented, enthusiastic
engineers who were willing to learn. Gradually, they would reach out to the
demining programmes and involve them in migrating new equipment to the
field. At last, the scientific, engineering and operational communities were
beginning to combine their resources productively (although the concrete
achievements remained difficult to quantify).
Heavy machinery
Humanitarian demining was (and still is) primarily a manual task and it
was difficult for most people to understand why the process could not be
mechanised. There were countless examples of machines that had assisted or
replaced people in routine, laborious or dangerous work ranging from
harvesting crops to mining coal. Besides this, the military had all but
abandoned manual minefield breaching in favour of mechanical expedients
or explosive devices. Logically, the use of a demining machine would not
only make the work safer, faster and cheaper, but would also render the
entire detection process redundant.
Variations on military equipment — ploughs, rollers and flails — were
researched extensively and even used for clearing mines by some
organisations. The problem was basically one of perceptions: for those who
had never worked in mine-affected countries, the stereotype image of a
minefield was based on agricultural fields or open plains. The reality in most
places was very different, with heavy vegetation, watercourses, steep slopes
and a variety of other obstacles. In many developing countries, the
infrastructure could not even cope with the transportation of large heavy
vehicles from site to site. There was also a wide variety of mines, some more
resistant to detonation by standard mechanical demining equipment than
others.
Much of the research and development (R&D) effort during the early 1990s
was ill-conceived and misdirected. Equipment of all types was developed,
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often in isolation, based on flawed perceptions of the problem. In many cases,
the deminers were not consulted until the prototype stage, when they were
invited to trial the equipment within their programme. A succession of
inventions ranging from the bizarre to the suicidal quickly eroded deminers’
confidence in the ability of the scientific community to help. Not surprisingly,
many engineers became disheartened and some despaired of the deminers’
seeming unwillingness to accept change.
It was only when engineers and operators began working together
closely that there was genuine progress in equipment development. As
engineers accompanied their machines to overseas programmes, they began
to see the reality of the environment and understand the limitations of
their designs. Meanwhile, the operational demining community became
better at articulating its problems and defining its needs. Over recent years,
an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation has gradually replaced
the contempt and suspicion.
One outcome has been the widespread acceptance that, used in isolation,
machines are unlikely ever to achieve sufficiently high levels of confidence to
be used for mine clearance (although recent research has questioned even
this assertion).15 But it was soon apparent that they could make a major
contribution by cutting vegetation, preparing ground and eliminating the
tripwire threat ahead of manual or dog clearance. Towards the end of the
1990s designers once again went to work on heavy machines, but this time
with a better sense of direction. Having seen the environment where the
machine would work and understanding the limited facilities for repair in
the field was a tremendous advantage. By the end of the 1990s, a variety of
purpose-built machines had been fielded, many of which were embraced by
the operators, who had been consulted during their design. In addition, there
had been some useful, local adaptation of heavy machinery, notably
construction equipment, for use in demining.
Detection
The progress of detection equipment has followed two distinct paths. The
established manufacturers of metal detectors have continually refined their
products, gradually incorporating new technology while improving
ergonomics and robustness. Successive generations of metal detectors have
been developed with assistance and feedback from the operators, and most
have been adopted by demining programmes as soon as they are fielded.
During the same period, a number of organisations with no previous
involvement in demining began to design other high-technology detection
options. Here, the story is similar to that of the heavy machinery engineers,
with many of the systems developed in isolation from the demining
community. Once again, high expectations were dashed and field operators
became disillusioned with the scientific community, while many scientists
were frustrated by their inability to translate good science into usable
equipment.
Some equipment was successfully developed for military use but proved
too costly, too unreliable or too inflexible for demining. Examples include
The demining toolkit
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aerial detection systems16 that can identify patterns of mines in lightly-vegetated
areas but cannot locate individual mines that are deeply buried or obscured by
undergrowth. Many of these long-range “stand-off” systems also lack the spatial
resolution to identify small mines. Early multi-sensor systems were incapable
of instant signal processing and were so bulky and power-hungry that they
had to be vehicle-based, severely limiting their versatility.
Mine detection dogs
Mine detection dogs (MDDs) were trialled in the early days of the Afghanistan
programme and, having shown their potential, were gradually adopted in many
other regions. Dogs have proven valuable not only for the detection of mines
but also for “area reduction”, the term used for narrowing down a suspect area
to the section actually containing mines, or eliminating it (confirming the
absence of mines) altogether. The speed with which dogs can cover ground
makes them particularly suitable for both area reduction and rapid confirmatory
checks: this offers enormous savings in time and resources by eliminating the
need to undertake completely redundant work.
Since there were no existing guidelines on the use of MDDs, a variety of
techniques evolved in parallel. These procedures required substantial
modifications to existing clearance methods (such as working in “boxes” rather
than parallel “lanes”) and there are still major differences in the techniques
employed by organisations using MDDs. The subject remains highly
controversial among deminers and the fundamental capabilities of MDDs are
still disputed, as are the safest and most effective ways to employ them.
Demilitarisation
Just as inappropriate military equipment had been rejected, many
organisations began to question the suitability of their procedures, many of
which had also been based on the military principles of minefield breaching.
One example, common to many organisations, was the withdrawal of the
deminer on identifying a suspect signal, handing over to another team member
to continue the investigation. A handover at this critical stage was clearly
dangerous and illogical, but had somehow been perpetuated from its origins
in the military chain-of-command, where the team leader would confirm any
finds.
There was no longer a blind adherence to outdated practices but, instead,
an atmosphere in which each and every aspect of procedure was open to
question. In fact, particularly where accidents had occurred, it became
necessary to actively review and justify every component of a standing
operating procedure (SOP). Before awarding contracts or accepting NGOs,
mine action centres (MACs) now began to study the SOPs of prospective
demining organisations to ensure that they were both current and practical.
A further aspect of demilitarisation was the gradual rejection of combat
body armour in favour of purpose-built PPE. The Kuwait experience had
driven home the requirement for PPE, not only from a common-sense point
of view, but also from a legal perspective. Yet, other than eye protection, the
only items widely available to the early programmes were military flak jackets
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and helmets. Sleeveless waist-length jackets
provided hopelessly inadequate protection,
particularly in the kneeling or squatting position
adopted by most deminers. Helmets did at least
provide a mounting point for a visor (which
offered far superior protection to goggles), but
were excessively hot and heavy for sustained
use in tropical climates.
The use of dogs for detection in demining
was another departure from routine “Western”
military procedures. The ability of dogs to detect
mines had been recognised for many years but,
although detection dogs had been incorporated
into former Warsaw Pact mine clearance teams,
they were not widely used by US forces or those
of most Western European countries.
Practical innovation
Much of the new equipment of the early 1990s
had been developed in isolation. Not only did this result in misguided efforts,
it often wasted resources by duplicating effort. Some of the ideas were feasible
but all too often they worked best where they were needed least. Most of the
detection and clearance equipment was designed for flat open ground with
loose, uncontaminated soil. In these conditions most options, including
straightforward manual clearance, would be quick and effective. It was in
the rocky, steep, heavily-vegetated or contaminated areas where help was
needed.
The many technical conferences not only provided direction but also
increased awareness of other projects: some even managed to inject a reality
check by giving deminers the opportunity to show their working environment
and explain their problems. Although some designers were more willing to
share their ideas than others, the general effect was a trend towards more
focused equipment development programmes. Above all, many of the newer
ideas were driven by the requirements of the operational demining community
instead of being based on flawed assumptions.
The scientific community also contributed through their systematic analysis
of demining. This was one area where lack of prior knowledge proved to be
a positive advantage by eliminating preconceptions and preserving objectivity.
One of the most revealing studies has been on the types and causes of injuries
sustained during demining. Injury statistics were drawn from accident
investigations17 among a number of demining organisations, most of which
cooperated fully in the study.
Actual blast testing began on simulated limbs and dummies and culminated
in a “Lower Extremity Assessment Programme”, conducted by the US
Department of Defense (DoD) in 2000. This controversial project used full-
body human cadavers and high-speed radiographic  imaging to fully evaluate
the mechanism of injury and determine the degree of protection provided by
The demining toolkit
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commercially-produced protective footwear.
Such information has allowed the development of better tools and PPE
based on hard science, rather than instinct or expedience. The resultant
equipment revisions have also prompted or allowed innovative and
unconventional departures from traditional designs. In one example, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) demonstrated that a probe with
an oval cross-section requires less force than a round one — an observation
that was initially met with derision but has proved significant.
There has been widespread adoption of aprons for PPE to replace fitted
suits. Not only do these provide greater freedom of movement, they also
offer better protection. Systems are also becoming better integrated to
complement one another: for example, overlapping the visor and body armour
to ensure complete neck protection.
A great deal of new demining equipment has been fielded recently for
detection, demolition and mechanical vegetation clearance and most has been
carefully designed around the needs of the user. Those needs include not
only the ability to locate and clear mines but also less obvious requirements
such as ease of training and simple maintenance. This revolution in common
sense and practicality has done much to restore the relationship between the
equipment developers and the demining community. It has also ensured that
the dialogue and atmosphere of cooperation will continue to refine the
demining process in years to come.
Not all of the news is good, however. The one area where new
development consistently fails to meet the needs of the user is cost. By itself,
demining rarely offers a large enough market to justify major commercial
development costs or mass production. Although some inventions are spin-
offs from other projects and others are funded under national development
programmes, many reflect the substantial outlay for development and
production costs in the price. This often makes them disproportionately
expensive for programmes struggling to survive on minimal funding and the
sad fact is that most mine action organisations cannot afford the equipment
that they would like.
Mine action comes of age
During the late 1990s, mine action began to gel into a cohesive international
industry. Not only had many lessons been learned but they had also been
broadly disseminated via networks, conferences and the movement of
technical advisers between programmes. For many years, the various elements
of mine action had progressed in isolation but the quantum leap in
communication brought a flurry of productive activity, which resulted in a
series of important milestones.
Particularly significant was the unification of mine action to incorporate
five fundamental pillars or core components in pursuit of its aim to reduce
the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and UXO. These are:
mine and UXO awareness and risk reduction education;
minefield survey, mapping, marking, and clearance;
victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;
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advocacy to stigmatise the use of landmines and support a total ban on
anti-personnel landmines; and
stockpile destruction, to ensure that stockpiles of landmines are
destroyed.
Another, less obvious form of engagement has occurred between the
demining community and the military. After the early split between combat
breaching and demining, one accepting casualties as a reality of life, the other
striving for clearance of all mines and UXO from a given area, it appeared
that the two would continue to diverge, the only link being the large numbers
of military personnel who went on to work in mine action. Yet, ironically, the
two now work side by side in many areas.
Not only are the military increasingly involved in humanitarian operations
but the deminers have based much of their heavy mechanical assistance
equipment on the breaching equipment designed for the battlefield. The US
routinely sends army personnel to train foreign national deminers18 and works
closely with NGOs and other civilian mine action specialists. In Kosovo and
Iraq, the military established the initial systems to collate and provide
information, while military EOD teams from several countries coordinate
closely with humanitarian agencies to undertake clearance operations.
Regulation
With the integration of mine action came both the opportunity and the need
for regulation. In October 1997, the United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) was formed to coordinate all aspects of mine action within the UN
system. This was followed by the establishment of the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in 1998, tasked with supporting
the mine action efforts of the international community and the United Nations
via mine action research, operational support for demining in the field and
advocacy of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.19 These two organisations
brought a more detached and objective approach to management onto an
industry that had been heavily biased toward field operations. They have been
instrumental in unifying and regulating programmes and organisations that
had neither the time nor the resources to do so for themselves.
Perhaps the greatest practical milestone was the production of the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the first edition of which was
officially adopted on 1 October 2001.20 These lay down standards for virtually
every aspect of mine action — minimum norms to which every UN-supported
programme should aspire. The broad consultation with operational mine
action organisations has resulted in a highly practical approach. IMAS has
even won favour with programmes outside the UN system, many of which
now adhere to the same standards.
The IMAS do not attempt to dictate every procedure in detail but rather
to specify aims and (where appropriate) how these should be achieved. A
good example is the use of mine detection dogs — a subject which continues
to cause disagreement and defy detailed regulation. IMAS lay down guidelines
for the employment of dogs but make no attempt to impose rigid or detailed
procedures for their use.
The demining toolkit
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In many ways, the agreement and international acceptance of common-
sense rules signalled the coming of age of an industry that had remained
immature for far too long. It has also helped to demystify an activity that
once thrived on its image as a “black art”. No longer perceived as a stand-
alone function, mine action often has to compete with other aid programmes
for donor funding and must demonstrate value for money. In addition to
laying down basic safety requirements, standardisation was necessary to
establish meaningful performance indicators on which programmes could be
assessed or compared.
Further refinements
It is difficult to say whether regulation hastened the integration of mine
action or vice versa but the maturing process has stimulated — and in some
cases demanded — further refinements. A prominent example is information
management, which had to be improved and standardised to keep pace with
the new generation of mine action programmes. The Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) became the UN-approved standard in
January 1999. The system was developed by the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETHZ) for the GICHD, at the request of UNMAS, to help programmes
coordinate, prioritise and execute their mine action activities.
Additional benefits from the introduction of IMAS and IMSMA have
included the standardisation of terminology and improved transparency
within national programmes. In turn, the enhanced oversight of decision-
making and the ability to assess progress has led to greater accountability.
Not only is this important for the credibility of the programme but it is crucial
to donors, who require evidence that their money is being well spent.
At the operational level, the systematic approach to mine action has led to
genuine capacity-building within the host nation. This means that, in addition
to the individual skills provided, an infrastructure is created to sustain the
activity or organisation. An important aspect of capacity-building is the
preparation of indigenous people to assume the various management functions
when expatriate staff and technical advisers leave. This tended to be a
weakness of earlier programmes but has now become a fundamental
component of most new mine action programmes.
Problem areas
Although there has been phenomenal progress since the early days of
mine action, the process is far from perfect. Demining is still inherently
dangerous and most tasks are labour intensive and painfully slow. Most
programmes have funding problems of some kind and some are so chronically
under-funded that they continually struggle for survival. One of the
disadvantages of integration with other international aid initiatives is that
mine action is continually competing for funds.
The shortage of money means that many organisations are ill-equipped,
or at least unable to acquire the equipment best suited to their task. This
undermines the widely-held concept that organisations are free to select from a
demining toolkit. Although an enormous range of equipment is available
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globally, very few organisations have the luxury of picking the items they require
at will. The problem is most acute among the poorer, military-run programmes,
many of which still have to make do with obsolete and unsuitable military-
issue equipment.
Several national demining programmes are conducted by the country’s
own armed forces with little or no NGO involvement. Often, they do not
have the benefit of accumulated experience and, being outside the UN system,
they are not subject to IMAS regulation. While some have chosen to adopt
the IMAS, many fail to meet the standards set: not only is the level of clearance
unacceptable by UN standards but injury rates among deminers are also often
alarmingly high. A number of military clearance programmes have been
influenced by US training programmes, but many are still reminiscent of the
early days, including the focus on demining to the exclusion of the other
components of mine action.
Another problem area is the exit strategy, which is rarely satisfactory.
Very few programmes have either fully achieved their aim or successfully
handed control to the host nation and, in many of the earlier programmes,
there was no realistic plan for the “end game” at all. The first exception was
the Kuwait clearance, which was unique in having virtually limitless funding
to achieve its ambitious aims. More recently, the clearance of Kosovo was the
first major UN mine action programme to “achieve completion” and hand
control to the local authorities.21
It has also been accepted that the absolute clearance of all mines is rarely
possible. No matter how thorough the demining, there will always be the
possibility that some may have been missed for one reason or another. In
recognition of this fact, the terms “mine safe” or “impact free” have been
adopted in preference to “mine free”. In Kosovo, for example, completion
signified that every marked minefield had been cleared, but recognised that
some areas were known to contain so-called nuisance minefields.22 Even within
the “cleared” areas, it was considered likely that some mines and submunitions
had been missed.
Conclusions
From the shaky foundations of outdated military breaching procedures,
demining has evolved rapidly into a separate, refined discipline. The
disjointed approaches of individual organisations converged as, beneath
an intense media spotlight, conferences and other liaison brought
productive exchanges of information. As the Ottawa Process captured the
public imagination, governments throughout the world became involved,
with many donating funds or contributing resources to this growing
industry.
Scientists and engineers also became interested and began to contribute,
unproductively at first, but with increasing benefit as relationships with the
demining community improved. Necessity has been the mother of invention
throughout the evolution of mine action and many recent developments have
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Yet, despite the substantial and well-focused development work, there
have been few changes to the fundamental nature of mine clearance, which
remains dangerous, labour intensive and slow. Most people now accept
that there will be no “silver bullet” to solve the many practical problems of
demining.
Maturity occurred during the 1990s with the integration of mine risk
reduction education, minefield survey, marking and clearance, victim
assistance, advocacy and stockpile destruction into the broader discipline of
mine action. This rounded approach now takes its place as a major component
of humanitarian aid to mine-affected regions, particularly in the immediate
post-conflict period.
The creation of UNMAS and GICHD brought proper oversight, along
with a more detached and objective approach to management. Regulation
has been applied primarily to working standards (in the form of IMAS) and
information management (provided by IMSMA). This has brought diverse
programmes into line and allowed a host of other benefits, ranging from
better working conditions for deminers to the ability to assess programme
efficiency. The pool of accumulated knowledge is also being better managed
to allow new programmes to benefit from the lessons of previous operations
and to further enhance the equipment and procedures in use.
There is an enormous range of equipment available to the demining
community but the term toolkit is, perhaps, a misnomer. It implies that each
programme can assess the problem it faces and select the appropriate
resources, much as a mechanic would pick the tools needed for a particular
repair. The reality is that few programmes have the luxury of access to the
most appropriate tools. Having made their initial choices of detector, PPE,
hand tools and so forth, most are constrained to use them for each and every
situation they face, until a periodic enhancement or fleet replacement can be
made.
Funding is the major limitation but not the only one. A change of equipment
or technique often involves a major training burden (during which work
ceases) and may well demand additional logistic support. Individual
organisations cannot justify the purchase, operation and maintenance of
expensive assets, such as heavy machinery, unless they will see extensive use
coupled with demonstrable increases in productivity. In future, it may be
feasible for mine action centres to control centrally-held equipment for loan
to the organisations under their control, as and when it is needed. Such
coordination at national level would ensure the most efficient use of resources
and allow the transfer of equipment to new programmes when no longer
needed.
There continue to be problems and frustrations, including the continuing
shortage of funds and the limitations that this imposes on field operations. A
number of programmes outside UN control fail to achieve accepted safety or
clearance standards and many do not adequately address the other pillars of
mine action, such as victim assistance. However, the overall picture is one of
success: the evolution of mine action has been tremendously fast and has
brought tangible benefits to people living in mine-affected regions throughout
the world. It should not be forgotten that the cost has been high, in both casualties
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and financial terms, but mine action continues to make substantial progress
towards reducing the threat of mines and UXO.
The demining toolkit
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Endnotes
1. Most of the organisations directly involved in mine action are UN agencies, national
and international NGOs and commercial contractors. Military forces frequently
provide individual specialists or technical advisers.
2. ERW are defined under international law as abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO)
and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
3. Only nine types of mine were used throughout the Falklands, all of conventional
mechanical design. Most of the minefields were laid in consistent patterns and many
were marked and recorded.
4. Early surveys indicated casualty rates of 14-24 mine victims per day.
5. First-hand accounts of the author, who was a training team leader during Operation
Salam.
6. MAPA plans, UN Mine Action Service website (www.mineaction.org), September
2003.
7. ICBL (1999: 891), citing the UN.
8. Roberts and Williams (1995: 261).
9. Stake mines are initiated by tripwires, which must be traced (often through
vegetation) to both ends before they can be neutralised. Most stake mines have a
lethal radius in excess of 10 metres.
10. Estimated at around 1,000 false alarms per one live mine in parts of Cambodia.
11. Percussion detonators require a substantial blow from a blunt striker on a specific
point. This distorts a protective metal layer and crushes a friction-sensitive compound
onto an anvil. In a stab-sensitive detonator, the friction-sensitive compound is exposed,
and is therefore vulnerable to initiation by contact with any foreign object.
12. Increased productivity is estimated to be up to 300 per cent, with a single brush-
cutting machine allowing approximately 60 deminers to proceed with the detection
and removal of mines.
13. Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines
Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and the Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation.
14. An element of the military procurement process in which the user defines the
capabilities (rather than the characteristics) desired from a new item of equipment.
15. See GICHD (2004b).
16. Including the COBRA system developed for the US Marine Corps, and LAMD,
developed for the US Army as part of the ASTAMIDS programme.
17. “Database of demining victims” sponsored by the US DoD, 2000.
18. The US Department of State publication, To Walk the Earth in Safety, (US DoS, 2002)
notes DoD assistance to 30 countries between 1994 and 2001.
19. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention, opened for signature in Ottawa in December 1997.
20. See www.mineactionstandards.org.
21. Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,
15 January 2002.
22. Particularly border areas and tracks in the Dulje Pass, where clearance work is
scheduled to continue for several years. Remaining tasks in MNB order, amendment six,







Chapter 1 described the evolution of the demining toolkit. The slow
progress of demining can be largely attributed to the level of technology of
the tools that mine action managers have at their disposal. Accordingly, this
chapter attempts to look at historical efforts, both military and humanitarian,
to create technologies to detect and destroy landmines.
Detection is considered to be the process by which mines are detected,
which may mean the exact location of single mines or the less precise
location of groups of mines. Destruction refers to the destruction of
previously detected and located mines in the ground or in special
destruction areas, and also the destruction of mines which have not been
detected but are destroyed by actuation leading to detonation or by
physical disruption. The word “mines” is taken to include other explosive
munitions found on the battlefield which have to be detected and removed.
Anti-tank mines are referred to as anti-vehicle mines.
After this introduction, this chapter addresses the following issues:
close-in detection (the detection and location of individual mines);
stand-off detection (the detection of mined areas);
Summary
The processes of the detection and destruction of mines and munitions
for humanitarian purposes has come a long way since 1989, but
arguably not far enough. Reliance still has to be placed on “classical”
methods of mine detection: few new technologies have been introduced
into demining, despite the expenditure on research. In contrast,
exploitation of existing technologies has been more successful, and
new and improved mine clearance machinery is being produced and
fielded on a wider scale than ever before. Techniques for the training
and use of mine detection dogs have also been improved.
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the destruction of individual mines after location;
the destruction of mines by machine, using physical detonation or
disruption; and
the destruction of unexploded ordnance (UXO).
The chapter concludes with suggestions on where mine action might need
new technologies and how the introduction of new technologies could be
speeded up.
The challenge for detection and destruction technologies
As we saw in Chapter 1, landmines, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle,
were not extensively used until the 1939-45 war. This was one of the first
major wars in which armoured vehicles were used extensively and many
large-scale minefields were laid, especially in Eastern Europe and North
Africa. By the end of the war, hand-held mine detectors were widely used,
and early versions of tank-mounted mine destroyers such as flails and
armoured hoses had also been deployed.
The mines of the 1940s were predominantly metal-cased, although some
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were made of wood, especially those
improvised from munitions or local explosive. In the mid-1940s, the
development of plastics allowed the first generation of plastic mines to be
developed,1 and plastic mines proliferated rapidly in the immediate post-
war period. By the start of mine action in 1989, almost all anti-personnel
mines and many anti-vehicle mines were plastic-cased — which were detected
by the metallic or magnetic mine detector and by the prodder.
Following the 1939-45 war, a large amount of mine clearance took place in
Europe and the Far East, mostly carried out by military units, which in some
countries (such as Germany and Poland) continue to clear mined areas from
that war. The detection and destruction equipment remained similar to that
used during the war itself, and this situation remained almost unchanged
until the start of humanitarian mine clearance in 1989. This caused many
problems because the military detectors were heavy and unreliable, being
designed for intermittent use in minefield breaching rather than continuous
use in mine clearance. The same applied in mine destruction equipment such
as flails or explosive hoses. Though adequate for minefield breaching, their
ability to detonate or remove mines and their reliability under continuous
operation were insufficient for humanitarian use. Some early mechanical
equipment was based on tank platforms, making it expensive to buy and
maintain, and cumbersome to use.
The size and complexity of the world mine and munition problem, and its
effects in post-conflict environments, began to come to light after the end of the
Cold War. The true situation began to emerge when nations in Africa, Latin
America and South-East Asia which had adopted or been pushed into warring
ideologies began to seek assistance in removing their mine and munition
problems. From a single national clearance programme in Afghanistan in 1989,
there are now over 30 countries which have identified mine or munition problems
needing clearance to humanitarian standards.
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 As humanitarian mine clearance has developed and the true nature of the
world’s mine problem has become apparent, a pressing need has developed to
make best use of scarce resources by increasing the efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of clearance. Since, in practice following limited conflicts, many
declared mined areas or minefields actually contain few mines, greater effort is
being exerted to find where mines are NOT within the suspected area, to reduce
expensive and time-consuming mine clearance to genuinely contaminated
areas. This has led to the need for two different types of detector — the “close-
in” detector, often hand-held, locating the exact position of the mine, and the
“remote” or “stand-off” detector, to remotely determine where mines are, but
with no great positional accuracy. The two types of detector may be different in
concept.
Close-in detection
Close-in detectors exist in many forms. In general, detection is done either
by pushing some form of energy at the mine and measuring the response
(prodders, eddy current, radar, infrared, nuclear, etc.) or by detecting any
disturbance caused to the natural conditions by the mine (disturbance of
magnetic fields, disturbance of soil, detection of explosive vapour from the
mine and its filling). Below are some of the more common forms used or in
development.
The mine prodder
The prodder, still  in use as the final
physical check of the presence of the mine,
has gone through much development, but in
most areas remains in its basic form. Prodders
were conceived as simple, cheap and effective
tools. They have been made from many
materials, from expensive plastics down to
small-gauge reinforcing bar retrieved from
broken concrete buildings. Experimental
prodders (with acoustic sensors to detect the
materials being encountered by the noise of
impact)2 and vibrating prodders (to allow
hard soil to be pierced more easily) have rarely
been introduced into service because, in the
hands of a skilled operator, the ordinary
prodder can give information of size and
shape of the target and sometimes even the
toughness of its casing.
The disadvantage of the prodder is that it
brings the hands and sometimes the face of the
operator close to the mine. In some theatres, the stoniness of the soil demanded
that the prodders were stiff, to pierce through stony soil, and short military
bayonets were used, which led to injuries to hands and eyes. Prodders can also
Landmine detection and destruction technologies
A deminer in Afghanistan.
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become hazardous to use against any mines such as the Chinese T72B with a
tilt or anti-disturbance fuze.
Another disadvantage of the prodder is that to engage the side of the mine,
it has to be inserted at a shallow angle, usually about 30° to the ground. Since
many prodders are around 30 centimetres in length, this means that they cannot
penetrate more deeply into the ground than about 10-14 centimetres. In many
cases, anti-personnel mines are found buried at about this depth or more, while
anti-vehicle mines are often deeper. To insert the prodder at a steeper angle may
risk impacting the top cover or actuating surface of the mine which, in the case
of the anti-personnel mine, might cause it to detonate.
Mines can also rotate in the ground due to soil movement, so that the top
face of the mine can end up being hit by the prodder, even though inserted at
the correct angle. In the same way, mines in the “windrow” of soil produced
by a mine plough can be at any orientation, which makes detection by prodding
potentially hazardous. Despite these shortcomings, the mine prodder is likely
to remain a useful tool for the deminer for many years to come.
The magnetic or metallic mine detector
The metal-cased mines of the 1945 period were comparatively easily
detected by the metal-detecting mine detectors of the day, although they
were often heavy, cumbersome, insensitive, uncomfortable to use and
unreliable. With the increasing use of plastics in mine construction, the metal
component of the mine decreased sharply. Soon the metal components were
confined to the firing pin and spring, and parts of the arming mechanism. To
match the decreasing metal content, the detectors had to be increased in
sensitivity and, with the high usage found in humanitarian mine clearance,
detectors also improved in lightness, reliability and ease of use.
Unfortunately, as sensitivity increased, so
did the susceptibility of metal detectors to
false alarms from small fragments of metal in
the ground, sometimes splinters from
exploding shells or rocket warheads, or food
and beverage cans. Sensitivity also increased
to metallic compounds found in certain soils,
such as laterite, a common road-making
material in South-East Asia and Africa.
Despite these limitations, metal mine
detectors remain the most commonly used
form of detectors, and considerable
improvements in their design continue to be
made.
There are various types of metal detector,
but the most common is based on
electromagnetic induction. The sensor head
sends a primary magnetic pulse or continuous
wave which creates eddy currents in the buried metallic object, creating a
secondary magnetic field. This in turn is detected by coils in the search head.
Hand-held metal detector. ©EIA
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Other types are usually used to detect buried munitions. These are most
commonly based on magnetometers, which measure alterations to the earth’s
magnetic field, or gradiometers, which measure the magnetic field gradient,
again altered by the presence of a metallic object.
Major advances have been made in the sensitivity of these detectors and
their capability of detecting metal items in laterite soils without major loss of
sensitivity. Several types of detector are on the market which can “tune out”
or “compensate” for background magnetic returns. Developments have also
indicated the possibility of giving an estimation of the depth of the mine or
munition target, and even a definition of the shape of the metal piece within
the object. Should this become a feature of future metallic mine detectors, it
could radically decrease the false alarm rate in soil contaminated by metal
scrap.3 Thus the metal detector has by no means reached the end of its
development potential.
Other technologies
Even in 1992, the reducing amount of metal in anti-personnel and anti-
vehicle mines was causing concern, and it was rumoured that totally non-
metallic mines were in development or even in production, which would
render metal detectors useless against such mines.
In Stockholm in May 1994, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (then
FOA), together with the UN, organised what was probably the first major
meeting between mine clearers and research scientists. The aim was to assess
what technologies existed, how they could be used, and roughly when
“fieldable” new technology detectors would appear. This produced some
interesting results. A table of different technologies was drawn up, showing
which was more likely to produce fielded equipment within five years. The
most promising detection technologies at the time appeared to be ground
penetrating radars and infrared detectors.
Ground penetrating radars
The ground penetrating radar (GPR) consists of a transmitter which pushes
into the ground a pulse of energy or a continuous wave at a certain given
range of frequencies. This is matched to a receiver, which takes in the reflected
radar signals. The radar energy passes through the ground and is reflected
back, at different speeds, depending on the material through which the radar
energy is passing. If the radar detects that there is a sub-ground object which
is of a different material (or more strictly material of a different permittivity
or dielectric constant), the object can be detected. This means that plastic or
totally non-metallic objects can be detected by GPR.
In theory, GPR can present indications of the location and the depth of the
target object, and sometimes even the shape. This, however, depends to an
extent on the frequencies used: to get good definition of small objects, a high
transmitted frequency must be used. It also depends on whether the output
of the radar is in the form of an audio signal or an image on a screen. To get
good penetration of soils, a lower transmitted frequency has to be used. Current
GPRs work between about 0.4 MHz and 6.0 MHz.
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Unfortunately, despite being the most likely technology to be fielded by
1999, GPR detectors are only just becoming fieldable. The problems surrounding
their development have been more difficult than was originally thought and
totally non-metal mines have not yet been used in conflicts, so the need to
establish them as a primary detector has not been great. GPR performance can
be limited by soil humidity and type, and under certain circumstances can give
false alarms. At present their likely cost is still several times higher than the
equivalent metal detector. Fieldable radars are being used in conjunction with
metal detectors, and can significantly improve the false-alarm rate of the detection
system. Despite the significant improvements already achieved, such combined
detectors have not yet found a significant market in humanitarian mine
clearance.
At least some of the problems of current GPRs can be resolved by better
detection computer algorithms and faster processing, especially with visual
output detectors, and antenna development is still in progress. Ultimately,
GPR might develop the capability to provide three-dimensional images, and
even provide some indications of the material of which the detected target is
made.
The development of GPRs has been concentrated on detecting anti-
personnel mines. There is still a need for the rapid and reliable detection of
anti-vehicle mines in roads, and anti-vehicle mines present a larger target
than anti-personnel mines and thus can be detected using lower frequencies.
Anti-vehicle mines such as the Chinese T72 mine (not to be confused with the
T72A and T72B anti-personnel mines) have very small amounts of metal in
the firing mechanisms, and many Italian mines, such as the Valsella VS 2.2
and 3.6, are also difficult to detect using metal detectors. If funds can be
found to continue development, GPR may yet become a major element in the
toolkit of the humanitarian deminer.
Infrared detectors
Initial tests of infrared (IR) detectors were encouraging, and IR detectors
were also considered to be fieldable by 1999. In addition, IR was seen as a
possible technology to locate the edges of mined areas, a capability that is
vital to “technical survey”, which can greatly increase the efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of clearance.
In fact, the resolution of current IR cameras is insufficient to identify the
very small areas of changed temperatures, and it is currently unlikely that
sufficient resolution will be obtained to identify small targets such as the US
M14 anti-personnel mine4 under four centimetres of soil, topped with
vegetation and under tree canopy, scenarios which are fully representative
of actual field conditions. The target is so small that even when there are
major changes in ground temperature, the “thermal inertia” of the mine will
not be sufficient to give sufficient cooling or heating to the soil above it to
provide a patch of soil that will be detectable. It was also hoped that IR could
identify the edges of minefields by locating at least some of the mines, but
performance of this resolution has not yet been achieved. Many well
established minefields are by now heavily vegetated, which makes detection
even more difficult.
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Anti-vehicle mines can be detected under certain circumstances, especially
when they are newly-laid and the disturbed ground above them gives a different
IR response. There may also be a role for IR in the detection of submunitions
such as the US BLU 975 (used in the first and second Gulf wars, Afghanistan
and Kosovo), or even the M75 and M85 artillery-launched submunitions (used
in the second Gulf war), because they have a high metal content and are usually
found on or near the surface of the ground. But small submunitions, such as the
M75 and M85, might require a high-resolution camera to identify them at
anything but close range.
Consideration has also been given to artificially heating the ground, to
show up “cool spots” caused by the presence of mines. In practice, the heating
system might well require large amounts of energy, especially to achieve a
temperature difference from mines buried below ten centimetres deep. Such
power requirements could prove difficult to provide in a man-portable detector
system and difficult to apply in areas with heavy vegetation.
In general, there have been few major improvements announced in IR
sensor sensitivity and resolution, and the widespread use of IR for the
detection of individual anti-personnel mines is unlikely, although its use
against anti-vehicle mines and submunitions remains a possibility.
Nuclear detection
Neutron-based techniques
Most explosives contain specific identifiable elements, including
nitrogen. When activated with thermal neutrons, various elements in the
target produce small but characteristic levels of radiation, usually gamma-
ray activity. This can then be detected by gamma-ray detectors such as
scintillometers, which in principle can give a relatively precise location of
the concentration6 of the element concerned, usually nitrogen in the case
of explosives. Explosive detection is widely used in airport security but
can also be adapted for the detection of landmines.
In principle, all nuclear detection methods require a neutron generator,
often a Caesium or Californium source to irradiate the target area, and a
method of slowing the neutrons down and collimating them in the direction
of the target. The various elements in the explosive respond to neutron
bombardment in different ways, but often they emit some form of identifiable
reaction. These returning signals are then detected by a detector, the results of
which are analysed, giving an indication of the chemical composition of the
material detected.
There are various types of neutron-based detection systems, and eight
have been patented7 but none has as yet been sufficiently developed to be
fielded for humanitarian mine detection.
Although the technology is thought to be relatively straightforward,
turning the technology into a hand-held working tool has proved more
difficult. Nuclear technology-based detectors are better suited to static large-
scale installations, such as those used to examine baggage at airports. The
practical requirement to produce a neutron generator with long service life,
and which is safe and simple to use by local mine clearance staff, has not yet
been achieved. The requirements to keep the neutron generator at some distance
Landmine detection and destruction technologies
46
Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges
from the user may also pose a problem. In summary, although research is
continuing, no recent new developments have been fielded in this technology
area.
Nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR)
Some of the nuclei found in explosives, such as molecular groups containing
nitrogen, oxygen and chlorine, respond in a particular way when bombarded
by radio frequency radiation, and their responses depend on the chemical
structures within which they are bonded. This means that the response of
some explosive compounds can be detected by a technique called nuclear
quadrupole resonance (NQR).8
This technology has had some success and is being explored to meet a
military requirement, but a humanitarian version of any forthcoming
equipment is probably not yet planned.
In some experiments, NQR has given clear responses for the detection of
explosives such as RDX and HMX, but not for the more common explosive,
trinitrotoluene (TNT). Although some mines, such as the Italian anti-personnel
mine VS50, are made of RDX and others use an RDX/TNT compound, most
of the simpler and cheaper mines are filled with cast TNT. This means that
unless NQR responses to TNT can be enhanced during development, NQR
detectors may not be suitable for humanitarian mine clearance for some time.
NQR is also being considered as a component of an integrated mine
detector, using more than one sensor. This concept is discussed below.
Other radiation detectors
There are a number of other ways in which explosive materials can be
“interrogated” by inputs of energy. Among these are the following:
X-ray backscatter
As with neutrons, materials bombarded with x-rays may cause photons
to be scattered at differing angles from them and these photons can be
detected. Although experiments have been carried out on the use of x-rays in
baggage search devices, the power consumption and size of the equipment
make them difficult to develop into a fieldable mine detector.
Acoustic detectors
Acoustic detection is used in the mining industry and the development of
acoustic detectors was suggested in a meeting at the University of Colorado
in Denver in 1994. Various experiments have been tried and methods have
been evolved where geophones can be in contact with the ground outside
the immediate area of the minefield being cleared, which would be acceptable
from a safety standpoint. Although research continues, no prototypes have
yet been presented for field trials, and it is suspected that acoustic detectors
are still some years away from being fielded.
Animal antibodies
Animals, if injected with some chemicals, can develop sensitive antibodies
which can detect and indicate the presence of such chemicals. This process,
called Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) can apparently be made
highly sensitive, but no development has yet shown how such detection can be
used in the field.
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Laser detection
Laser energy can be used to cause the breakdown of TNT vapour into
chemicals that fluoresce or glow at specific frequencies. Again, this process
may be developed into a form of detector for bulk explosive, but at this stage
it is hard to see how it can be developed into a fieldable detection system
Ultraviolet detection
Efforts were made to detect mines in roads by spraying with ultraviolet
sensitive material and looking for anomalies or disturbances in the road
surface after a period of time. The system proved cumbersome to use and the
experiments were discontinued.
Vapour detectors
Another way of detecting mines is by detecting their smell. This smell,
undetectable to humans but detectable by some animals and by sophisticated
chemical detection equipment, can lead to detecting the mines sufficiently
accurately to locate their individual positions. The vapour produced by a mine
can vary and its components are at present not fully understood.
The amount of vapour given out by a chemical depends on its vapour
pressure or volatility. Some explosive compounds have impurities produced
during the manufacturing process, such as dinitrotoluene (DNT) which occurs
as an impurity in TNT, which has a lower vapour pressure and is in theory
more detectable. Explosive vapours can also be changed by molecular action
as the vapour passes through soil: the new compounds (including amino-and
di-amino compounds of DNT and TNT) may also have a lower vapour pressure
and be more detectable.
There are currently two main methods under development for detecting
explosive vapours — chemical sensors, and animals or insects.
Chemical analysis detectors
There are a number of chemical analysis techniques in existence, but the
method showing the greatest practicability and resolution is that of gas
chromatography. In this method, a sample of the target substance in the form of
gas or liquid is moved by a carrier gas along a column containing on its inner
surfaces a chemical liquid in a solid supporting structure. The various
components of the sample interact with the chemical liquid, a process which
takes varying amounts of time. When the components of the sample emerge
from the column, they are detected and the time they have taken to move down
the column varies according to the chemical nature of the components, thus
discriminating between them and identifying them. The components are then
detected in a way that measures their relative quantity, so the final readout can
separate the component parts of the sample which can be identified for chemical
composition and quantity.
The actual detection is either done by measuring the extent to which the
components capture electrons (Electron Capture Detection or ECD), which
happens if the components are nitro-explosives or compounds such as
carbonyls, or by measuring their thermal energy when they decompose
(Thermal Energy Activity or TEA detector). Unfortunately the electron
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capture detectors are poor at specifically identifying explosive components,
but TEA detection is nitrogen specific.
Most gas chromatographs are more suited for laboratory use rather than
field use, as they are large, delicate, and require supplies of electricity and
gases. They could be built into a mobile laboratory which could be taken into
the field, where vapour samples could be
brought for analysis. This would require
use of remote explosive scent tracing, a
technique which will be described later.
Animals and insects
Animals have a keen sense of smell
and their powers of scent detection
exceed those of humans by many orders
of magnitude. A human may be able to
detect one part of contaminant in 10,000
(1 in 10—4), and some gas
chromatographs may be able to detect
down to one part in 1,000,000,000,000 (1 in 10—12) but dogs and rats are
believed to be able to detect to 1 in 10—15 or less.
The animal most commonly used for mine detection is the dog, mainly
because of its ability to work in conjunction with humans. Dogs can be
trained to detect odours from specific vapours. Dogs have been used for
tracking and hunting for many years, but also for the detection of landmines
since the 1939-45 war. Dogs can also detect drugs, explosives, weapons,
specific foodstuffs, metals such as mercury,
wood rot, and human beings buried in snow
or rubble.
In the past, the experience of using mine
detection dogs (MDDs) proved highly
variable. Even the performance of individual
dogs varied considerably and detection dogs
were not universally used except by a few
commercial companies for many years. Many
mine action programme managers would not
trust dogs sufficiently to allow them to be
used. In September 1999, a meeting was held
in Ljubljana, at which the GICHD was asked
to take the lead in carrying out a study into the breeding, training and use of
MDDs, and the study was started soon afterwards.
The study soon showed how little was known about dogs, what vapour
they were detecting and at what concentrations, and how vapour was emitted
from mines in the first place. It also studied what weather conditions permitted
or inhibited vapour detection, and at what levels weather features such as
humidity and wind speed began to erode the performance of detection dogs.
The study assembled many of the MDDs breeders and trainers, and the
mine action groups who were using the trained dogs, to try to work out some
best-practice procedures for training, licensing, accreditation, testing, daily
An NPA mine detection dog. ©M. Kelly
An APOPO's mine detection rat.
©GICHD
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checking and use. This study is still ongoing but much information is already
available. The use of MDDs is increasing and their cost-effectiveness is becoming
more widely acknowledged.
As part of the study, the GICHD looked at work being done under the Belgian
APOPO project into the use of rats for explosive detection. Early experience
with African pouched rats showed that they could be sociable, easily trained
and that their ability to detect specific odours was possibly as good as, or better
than, that of the dog. The APOPO project is still ongoing in Tanzania and the
results are encouraging. Rats can breed quickly and successive generations
become increasingly tolerant to humans and easier to train. Basic training can
be carried out in small multi-choice cages and results can be collected directly
by computer — so that identifying the better rats becomes a quick and effective
process.
If scents can be brought to rats, the detection can be simply carried out,
with one or more animals sampling each vapour target. Rats have not yet
been extensively used in a free-running mode and techniques for free-running
are under development. Although rats are considered as food in some
countries and condemned for religious reasons as unclean animals in others,
it has to be remembered that the same can be said of dogs, which are widely
used even in those countries where they are declared unclean. Rats cost
between one tenth and one thirtieth of the cost of dogs to buy, train and
keep. They are often indigenous to the country of use, so are less prone to
local disease or climatic effects than dogs, which are usually imported. Rats
could provide a highly cost-effective part of the mine clearance toolkit.
Experiments have also been carried out with insects such as flies or bees.
While the insects may be bred to have excellent detection capability and
sensitivity, how they can be used repeatedly in the field has not yet been
made clear.
Remote explosive scent tracing (REST)
There are two ways in which explosive vapour can be detected; first by
taking the detector to the source of the scent, and second by taking the scent to
the detector.
In the late 1980s, a South
African commercial company
developed a method of
“sniffing” roads by sucking
vapour from the road surface
through filters, mounted in cups
that were hung just above the
road surface. The sampling
filters were replaced in the cups
at measured and recorded
intervals, and the removed filters
were put into surgically clean
containers and taken back to base. Up to four sampling filters were used for
each stretch of road, which might be between a half-kilometre and two kilometres.
The sampling filters were then mounted on holders and MDDs were trained to
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walk along the row of holders to identify which filters had the scent of  explosive
vapour. A positive identification implied that within the stretch of road on
which the filter was installed in the cups, there was probably a mine. Free-
running dogs then returned to that stretch, to identify if there was a mine and
locate it.
This system was first deployed successfully in South Africa and later for
UN contracts in Mozambique and Angola in 1994 and 1995 (and more recently
in Afghanistan in 2003 and Sudan in 2004). The GICHD dog study has
undertaken research into this technique to refine and validate it. The research
has concentrated on finding the best filter material, optimum air speeds through
the filter, effect of dust and many other criteria. The result is potentially a very
powerful technique which can be used to bring explosive scent to any form of
detection system, whether a gas chromatograph in a laboratory, a dog in the
field or a rat at a base camp.
The REST technique was originally designed for the clearance of relatively
narrow linear targets such as roads or railways, but tests are now in progress
to see if it can be adapted for searching or checking wider areas, as part of
area reduction (eliminating areas of suspect land which are not in fact mined).
If this is the case, the REST technique will become a powerful method of
increasing the cost-effectiveness of mine clearance.
System integration
At the 1994 meeting in Stockholm, it was agreed that it was unlikely that
any one sensor would ever be able to provide the degree of definition required,
but that two or more should be linked together to provide complementary
output.
For simplicity, detection can perhaps be divided into four categories of
capability:
Category 1:  A target of some kind has been detected, which may be a
false alarm.
Category 2:  A target has been detected, which appears to have a man-
made shape, which is probably not a false alarm.
Category 3:  A target has been identified, which is of man-made shape
and contains explosive, which is probably a mine.
Category 4:  A mine has been identified at 5.5cm depth, the type of
which can be identified by the on-board computer.
 It was generally agreed at the Stockholm meeting that no one sensor of the
types considered above would ever progress beyond the first two categories of
detection without being integrated with another form of sensor. Much research
effort has gone into systems integration, but the problems of linking two
completely different types of sensor input have not yet been sufficiently resolved
to allow an example to be fielded.
The nearest to an integrated system to have been produced in a fieldable
state so far is a hand-held detector with two sensors, magnetic and GPR, but
even here the two systems are independent and the outputs are not mixed.
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Stand-off detection
All the detector technologies mentioned above have been designed for close-
in detection, for either hand-held use or to be mounted on a vehicle platform.
The efficiency of mine detection could be greatly increased if some detector
system could indicate where mines were, or were not, from a remote or stand-off
position. This presents an even greater technical challenge but could provide
greater rewards. Some systems have shown potential in this area.
Visible light imagery
Obviously normal airborne or space-borne photography cannot detect mines
or submunitions below the surface, unless they have recently been laid and the
disturbed earth shows up clearly,  or if the mines or submunitions are on the
surface. On the other hand, if the minelaying has been recent, or fences have
been erected, it may be possible to detect the laying activity for some time after
the event, although this may require some skilled interpretation to derive full
benefit from the imagery.
Although not fully relevant to detection as such, air and space photography
can play a major role in providing detailed imagery of the ground conditions,
and possibly even the position of military defences around which mines may
have been laid.9 If old satellite imagery can be obtained from the archives of
Cold War satellite users, comparisons with up-to-date imagery might show
how cultivation, ground and road use may have changed or villages have been
destroyed or moved. Although this is no proof that the use of mines prompted
the changes, such anomalies can show areas which might merit further
investigation. The absence of any changes in land use patterns might indicate
that the areas can take lower priority in the survey process.
Air and space imagery is therefore a useful tool in minefield survey, although
under certain conditions the possession of air or satellite photos can be militarily
and politically sensitive. It is also important for the making and updating of
maps, which are key to mine action or any kind of mine activity. One of the key
elements of a mine action programme is a standard and up-to-date map, which
can be the basis of all mine action, aid and redevelopment activity. Such imagery
can be produced for mapping at any scale and can be part of the graphical
output obtainable from current information management software.
Infrared detectors
These have already been mentioned in the close-in detection section above,
but are better suited to stand-off use. As stated, the resolution of current IR
cameras is insufficient for detecting small anti-personnel mines, although even
minute differences in temperature are now becoming detectable. Surface-
laid anti-vehicle mines and certain submunitions should be identifiable, but
this depends on the vegetation and tree cover.
IR detectors may well prove to be difficult to use in the field, as they often
require aerial platforms, which are not only expensive to operate and maintain
but militarily and politically unpopular. Aerial surveillance may require specific
Landmine detection and destruction technologies
52
Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges
authorisation from national governments, especially in areas of national
sensitivity such as international borders (frequently areas contaminated by
mines), which may further limit its use. Although optical wavelength images
have been produced with high resolution, space-borne IR cameras available
for humanitarian use are unlikely to achieve the necessary resolution to identify
anti-personnel-mine-sized targets in the near future.
Air or satellite radar imagery
Air and space visual light imagery is much limited by cloud cover in many
areas of the globe but radar is not so badly affected. At present, the resolution
of space radars available for humanitarian purposes is not sufficient to identify
anomalies on the ground which can be detected by visual imagery — although
radar images could perhaps be used to verify previously obtained
photographic imagery, or identify changes to it. Future developments may
need to be monitored, perhaps if military-grade radar images become
available for humanitarian use.
Remote explosive sensing
It has been suggested that vapour sensors, placed downwind of suspected
mined areas, may detect explosive vapour over a period of time. This could give
a general indication that the area was in fact contaminated without the need to
enter the suspect area. This method has not yet been tried under field conditions
but might be adaptable, possibly using REST techniques.
In the same way, explosive molecules escaping from mines or munitions
can leach into ground water, and it has been proposed that water extracted
from small tube wells near the suspect site might contain traces of explosive.
Unless there was some knowledge of how the ground water moved, the
indication might prove too general to be of value, but some research might
still be merited.
Detector platforms
Much research resources have been expended on platforms for carrying
mine or explosive detectors to allow mine clearance without putting mine
clearers into active mined locations. Some mine destruction equipment can
already be used remotely, either using a simple controller at the end of a
cable or some form of radio control.
Remote sensing using robot-mounted sensors (usually conceived without
user advice) has not yet been fielded — because of the difficulties of knowing
exactly where the robot platform is and when a target has been identified, and
because of the poor vision capabilities of robot-mounted television cameras.
Mine clearance uses visual cues such as disturbance to earth or vegetation,
tripwires, bits of plastic or metal packing material, boxes, protective caps
removed before mines are laid, or even the canisters from which submunitions
are released. Experiments have shown that the human eye is more capable and
versatile when collecting data than was first imagined and no television imagery
can currently match the wide angle stereo imagery built into the human head.
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Another problem with unmanned platforms is the difficulty of retrieving
such platforms in the event of breakdown or mine damage. Retrieving broken
machinery from active minefields is a hazardous and unpleasant process. It
is not hard to create safe protective cabs for human operators — and human-
operated machines are much easier to control, retrieve and repair than robots.
In the opinion of many deminers, the first priority for development funding
must remain the two types of detector, close-in and stand-off. This opinion has
been reflected in the GICHD study into operational needs, which showed
improvements in detectors has the potential to provide the greatest operational
advantage.10
Many development projects for mine action equipment insist on designing
new platforms for detection equipment, ignoring the fact that sensors would
perhaps be better mounted on proven mine-protected vehicles, several types
of which are commercially available. Illustrations of such equipment can be
found in the GICHD Mechanical Equipment Demining Catalogue.11
Practical limitations to detector technologies
Many detector technologies are technologically complex and this can present
difficulties to field operators. In some countries, trained operators are often
highly astute and skilled at interpreting the audio or visual signals from the
detectors on which their personal safety may depend, although they may not
be literate.
Some new technologies require relatively large amounts of power, which
are difficult to provide using current battery technology without making the
detection device heavy and unwieldy, or giving it a short operating life
between battery changes. Commercial standard batteries are considered by
many operators to be better than rechargeable ones, partly because of
uncertainty with the life of rechargeable cells, and partly because the
continuous supply of electrical power in the field cannot be guaranteed. All
hand-held detection equipment must also be ergonomically designed, so that
operators can work for many hours without undue stress, even at extremes
of temperature.
Maintenance and repair of complex equipment is also a major problem
in the field, especially when the mine clearance work site may be many,
even thousands of kilometres from the nearest source of spare parts.
Modular construction can make maintenance and repair a more simple
matter and the modules can be sent for repair to the manufacturer.
Simplicity has to be built into design as early as possible or the resulting
equipment will be found to be unsuitable for field use and represent a
major waste of development resources.
Individual destruction equipment
Once mines have been detected and located, they can be destroyed.
Destruction is either done in place, to prevent any dangers of moving the mines,
or mines can be defuzed on the spot and removed to central destruction areas
for disposal. The procedure to be used depends on many factors, such as the
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stability of the mines, the number of mines to be destroyed, the proximity of
buildings or infrastructure and the skills level of the workforce.
Some mines, such as the Soviet PMN1 anti-personnel mine and Czech
PTMi BAIII anti-vehicle mine, can become dangerously sensitive and
hazardous to handle, as can some
submunitions such as the BLU97.
Old munitions with nitro-glycerine
in their propellant should be moved
as little as possible before
destruction. Some mines and
munitions are relatively stable and
can be carefully defuzed and
moved with comparative safety to
a central destruction area.
Whether destroyed in place or in
bulk, mines are often destroyed by
open burning or by detonation where
the environmental circumstances
allow. Open burning can be achieved
by using a pyrotechnic charge to burn through the case of the mine and ignite
the main explosive change. Detonation is achieved by exploding a charge in
close proximity to the mine, or piercing the case of it with a shaped charge and
achieving a sympathetic detonation.
Pyrotechnic charges
These function by directing a jet of high temperature flame at the mine,
burning through the case and igniting the main charge. Typical flame
temperatures are over 1,800°C, while the ignition temperatures of TNT and
RDX are both about 300°C.12 A minimum burning temperature of 850°C is
advised.13 Pyrotechnic charges work best for mines with plastic or wood cases,
but can penetrate metal cases as well. A number of such pyrotechnic devices
are available commercially from countries such as the UK and US.14
Pyrotechnic charges can only be used if the mine is on the surface or is
sufficiently exposed to enable the flame to play directly on the mine casing.
Such charges can also be used for starting open burning of mines collected at
a destruction point, including for the destruction of anti-personnel mine
stockpiles in accordance with Article 4 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention.15
Pyrotechnic charges are useful when the noise of detonation may cause
alarm or the detonation blast may harm surrounding buildings or services.
In some cases, the heat generated by the ignition of the main charge may
cause the detonator to explode and the mine to actuate, detonating any
un-burnt portion of the main charge. The destruction of individual mines by
burning is a slow procedure and may delay the clearance process as all mine
action staff have to leave the minefield until all burning is completed.
Destruction of mines in Albania, 2001.
©ICRC/Sidler
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Use of fire for mine clearance
In some countries, local people have tried to clear mines by igniting dry
vegetation or undergrowth. Although fire has value in removing such vegetation,
buried mines are rarely affected by surface fires but could be made more sensitive
by heating, as happened to mines laid near oil fires in Kuwait in 1991. Fire will
destroy the wooden stakes on which some tripwire-actuated blast mines are
mounted and may melt, but not necessarily ignite, their main charge, rendering
them more difficult to dispose of. Such methods of attempted clearance are not
usually recommended.
Explosive charges
The most common way of destroying mines is by placing a charge of
explosive in close proximity and detonating it, causing a sympathetic
detonation in the detonator, booster or main charge of the mine. For mines in
place, destruction is done by exposing the edge or surface of the mine, placing
a charge of plastic explosive such as C4, PE4 or block TNT in direct contact
with the mine and detonating it. A charge of about 250gm of conventional
explosives will normally detonate any anti-personnel mine. If moulded into or
around the fuse pocket of an anti-vehicle mine, full detonation will also usually
occur.
For the destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, bulk explosive is
often used because, if the mines are sensitive enough, they can be detonated
when packaged in boxes, which eases the handling of the mines at the
demolition site. One nation completed the destruction of its anti-personnel mine
stocks using a mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO). Some care is
needed in setting up large-scale demolitions for destruction of mines, because
shock wave effects can vary and some parts of the demolition may not be
destroyed but ejected some distance from the demolition site.
Explosive charges can also take the form of shaped charges, fired through
the side of the mine. This can have the advantage that the mine itself need
not be touched once it has been located. And, if the mine has been located
accurately enough, the shaped charge can be fired into the mine through the
earth above it. Provided that the explosive jet has sufficient energy as it passes
through the main charge of the explosive, a high order detonation will occur.
For munitions, the shaped charge can be “tuned” to cause a low order
detonation (“deflagration”), which reduces the explosive effect.
Shaped charges can be quicker, safer and easier to transport than bulk
explosive charges. Mines with sensitive explosive, or with anti-handling fuses,
need not be touched, as the shaped charge is fired from the stand-off position.
It is also quicker and safer to destroy a mine underground, without exposing
it, but it does require a detector of sufficient accuracy to locate the mine to
fine limits (within 1cm or less for anti-personnel mines). Shaped charges are
produced commercially in a number of countries including Austria, Germany
and Switzerland.16 The only hindrances to their more widespread use are their cost
compared with standard charges and lack of experience with their use.
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Where the transportation of explosive is difficult due to legal restrictions,
explosives can be produced in binary form, where they consist of two stable
and transportable compounds which, when mixed, form a normal liquid
explosive. Explosive can also be produced in the form of foams, which can be
placed over exposed mines without contact with their surface. The foam can
then be detonated using standard electrical or safety fused detonators. Both
foam and binary liquid explosives have considerably lower power than
conventional explosives and have a higher cost, which makes them more
suitable for specialised use only.17
Environmental issues
Much comment has been made on the environmental issues surrounding
the destruction of mines and munitions, especially during stockpile
destruction in accordance with Article 4 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention. Where mines are destroyed by open burning or open detonation
the gaseous products of detonation or burning are released to the
atmosphere.
In reality, the detonation products of most TNT- or RDX-filled mines are
similar in nature to the combustion products of fuels for cars and aircraft, but
the polluting cloud of a large-scale demolition is instantaneous and
conspicuous, which makes it more dangerous in the eyes of some
environmentalists. This has led to recommendations for the use of elaborate
forms of destruction or demilitarisation, often using very high temperature
burning and the scrubbing of the gases formed in the combustion process.
These methods are relatively expensive and destruction or demilitarisation
costs can vary between US$0.50 per mine to more than US$12 per mine in
countries where environmental laws are at their strictest, a sum which most
countries cannot afford.
Other commercial destruction or demilitarisation techniques favour
dismantling of the mine, removal of the bulk explosive for commercial use
and the recycling of some of the plastics used in the mine bodies. Despite the
income generated by the recycling process, the costs per mine are usually
well in excess of open detonation techniques. Since long-term burial in moist
soils can lead to explosive products leaching into the ground water, the
delaying of clearance and destruction due to the imposition of stringent
environmental regulations may not in the end be the best environmental
solution.
There is one case where controlled destruction must take place, which is
the destruction of munitions filled with liquid explosive or propellant. One
form of anti-personnel landmine, the Soviet PFM1, contains a liquid filling
that is toxic and corrosive, and whose products of combustion or detonation
are also toxic. These mines are the subject of a special study into the most
cost-effective methods for their destruction.
In general, most countries have opted for the simplest and cheapest methods
of landmine stockpile destruction using open burning or detonation and so far
no reports of environmental consequences have been reported.
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The bulk destruction of UXO poses a different series of problems, due to the
dense metal casing of some of the munitions involved. Extraction of the explosive
then becomes a more favoured option, unless the country concerned has few
environmental laws and many sparsely inhabited areas where pollution by
metallic fragments would not pose a major problem. This was the case in Kuwait
in 1991, where open detonation was frequently used for the destruction of tank
and artillery ammunition, mortars and rockets. Care and specialist knowledge
were needed to ensure that the detonation drove the metal fragments downwards,
to limit the spread of metallic fragments.
Mechanical destruction/disruption
Mines can be destroyed in place by causing them to actuate or by physically
disrupting them. Destruction by actuation is achieved by pressurising them
beyond the actuation pressure, which should cause the mines to explode.
This is usually done by an explosion or by rollers.
Explosive disruption
Many variants of mine clearance explosive devices have been produced for
military purposes. Many of them are based on thrusting explosive pipes, or
firing rockets towing hoses full of explosive across the mined area. The explosive
pipes or hoses, when detonated, are intended to cause either sympathetic
detonation or disruption of any mines below or nearby.
This procedure has not been adopted for humanitarian purposes because it
is many times more expensive than manual mine clearance18 and because the
clearance capability of even heavy explosive hoses depends on the vegetation
in the mined area. Bushes can prevent the hose from reaching the ground and
the detonation of every mine under the linear hose cannot be guaranteed. Rocket-
pulled hoses rarely land in a straight line and even a successful detonation of
an explosive charge may not be sufficient to make a safe lane. This is of less
importance in military minefield breaching because the track made by the
explosive hose is usually immediately augmented by a mine plough to make a
track for the armoured vehicles following it.
A variant of the explosive hose is the polythene tube filled with an explosive
mixture of gas and air. The polythene tube rolls out across the mined area as
it fills and is then detonated. For military use, charges of fuel/air explosive
(FAE) can be used, but both these and the explosive tube above rely totally
on the shock and pressure effect of the gas/air detonation.
Mines do not always detonate under explosive hoses and the fuses of
some mines, such as the TS50 anti-personnel mine and PTMi BAIII anti-vehicle
mine, are specifically designed against them, especially the very rapid
explosive pressure pulse produced by the explosive hose. This can limit the
use of hoses still further under certain conditions. Explosive hoses have
received limited use in mine action, although they have been tried in South
Africa with some apparent success.
Landmine detection and destruction technologies
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Mine rollers
A more reliable way of detonating mines is to pressure them with a roller,
pushed in front of a vehicle. This again is mainly used by military forces, often
in conjunction with a plough, but rollers have been used to destroy anti-
personnel mines and are available commercially. Military mine rollers have
often been mounted on armoured vehicles and cover the rack width only, whereas
humanitarian rollers need to cover the entire front of the pushing vehicle and
are usually propelled by a modified agricultural vehicle or construction
equipment such as a bulldozer.
Rollers are moderately effective but their performance can be degraded by
uneven ground or ground that is so soft that the mines are pushed deeper into
the soil without exploding. In addition, some mines do not respond when
pressurised only once as they require two or more efforts to actuate the detonator
system. Even so, rollers have a use in rapidly checking cleared land or in area
reduction where a suspect area can be tracked by the roller until the edge of the
mined area is found. Only military rollers can withstand repeated blasts of
anti-vehicle mines.
A successful variant of the
mine roller is the protected
vehicle fitted with steel roller
wheels. Vehicles of this type
have been produced and
successfully used in South
Africa and have been trialled in
Croatia. So far, little use has
been made of them by mine
clearance NGOs, possibly
because of the cost of the
protected vehicles, but their
performance merits further use
in other and non-African
theatres. 
Anti-personnel mines were also successfully detonated in large numbers in
Kuwait in 1992 using a digging rake on an armoured excavator. The anti-
personnel mines were dug up and one claw of the rake was used to press on
them until they detonated. If they failed to do so, the next mine found would be
placed on top and the two detonated together. This method was suited to sandy
soils with patterned minefields but would be difficult to use for isolated mines
in soft or heavily vegetated soils.
Experiments were also conducted where anti-vehicle mines were pressured
using a steel rod mounted on an armoured excavator. This system worked but
it was impossible to find steels strong enough for the pressure rod to withstand
the repeated heat, blast and shock of the anti-vehicle mine detonation without
cracking or spalling away. A similar but smaller-scale experiment for detonating
larger anti-personnel mines such as PMN was tried in Cambodia using a
wooden rod mounted on two bicycle or agricultural wheels. The success of this
low-cost experiment is not known.
Pearson mine roller. ©Pearson
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Flails
One of the earliest devices to be used
against anti-vehicle mines was the flail,
first developed in 1942. This tank-
mounted device had a rotating shaft
mounted at the front, with weights on
chains slung from it. When the shaft
rotates, the weights beat the ground
with the aim of detonating any mines in
the path of the flail. The flail concept
was rapidly revisited following the
Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982 and
versions were produced for military
trial. These were taken into
humanitarian use in 1991 but early models proved underpowered and
unreliable, and prone to throw anti-personnel mines out of the beaten zone of
the flail. The machines were also easily damaged by repeated detonations of
anti-vehicle mines.
Since then, a number of humanitarian versions of the flail have been
produced, of varying sizes.19 The larger flails mounted on heavy tracked chassis
are still too cumbersome for field use
and difficult to transport on country
roads and bridges. They are also
extremely difficult to extract from
active minefields if they are damaged
or break down. Some of the smaller
mini-flails are proving successful for
vegetation clearance in heavy
undergrowth and limited mine
clearance against anti-personnel
mines only. A number are now
produced with remote or radio control
and some are mounted as attachments
onto the arms of hydraulic excavators,
which makes them able to clear corners that cannot be reached by vehicle-
mounted flails. Some of the bigger wheeled versions of the flail are proving to be
robust, reliable and very effective.
Despite the increasing and long-term use of flails, comparatively little is
known of the precise interaction between the flail weight (also called the pick or
bob) and the ground. Research has shown that different shapes of weight transfer
different degrees of energy in different directions when they hit the ground,
which can affect their capability for applying the necessary pressure to the
target mines. Different sizes and shapes of weight are now being used but
further research is needed to optimise the flail weights to the soil conditions
and the types of mine being cleared.
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Earth tillers
The principle of the earth tiller
is to beat or till the ground with
steel teeth to such an extent that
any mines are either detonated or
physically broken to the stage that
they are no longer able to
detonate. Earth tillers require
high power to turn the tilling shaft,
which, like the flail shaft, is
mounted at the front of the vehicle.
An early model had two engines,
both of about 900bhp, and the
tilling head was mounted on a
tank. This design was
unfortunately too heavy to be practicable in the field, even in Europe with its
full network of high capacity roads and bridges.
Several types of tilling machine have been produced and are available
commercially20 but are still large, heavy and ungainly and show few advantages
against the better types of flails. Tillers are usually heavier, more expensive
and need greater maintenance and repair than their flail counterparts.
Tilling machines can leave broken fragments of explosive in the soil after
the tilling process. This makes it difficult to employ dogs in the quality
control process that has to follow the primary clearance.
Some smaller tilling machines have the tilling head mounted on the
hydraulic arm of a tracked or wheeled excavator. These, like the arm-
mounted flails, are very effective at removing vegetation and preparing the
ground for manual or dog clearance and are being increasingly used for
humanitarian mine action.
An environmental disadvantage with both flails and tillers is that the
cohesion of the soil is disrupted and the roots of any vegetation are destroyed.
In areas with thin layers of topsoil, any form of earth-processing equipment
must be used with care or the pulverised soil may be blown or washed away,
leaving the area completely barren.
Sifters
The aim of mechanical sifters is to cut a layer of soil from the ground
and pass the soil through a sifter process to sift out mines from possibly
contaminated soil. This is not easy to achieve because of the amount of
other material in or on the cut soil such as stones, roots or lumps of
vegetation which also has to pass through the sifter. Sifters are best working
in dry and sandy soils as clay or wet loam can quickly clog the sifting
system. Early sifters tended to build up soil in front of the cutter blade
which, due to the sideways movement of soil along the blade, could leave
mines at the edges of the sifter path.
Sifters need a relatively powerful base machine and require that the
sifted soil is examined for mines among the rocks, stones and roots that
Rhino system in operation. ©Rheinmetall
Landsysteme GmbH
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have not passed through the sieve mesh. Sifters will probably be capable of
withstanding the blast of a small anti-personnel mine, but repeated blasts,
or the explosion of an anti-vehicle mine, might cause extensive damage. The
sifting process is thorough but slow. Specialised sifters mounted on wheeled
plant are in operational use in southern Africa and are available
commercially.21
A method of mine detection and
destruction allied to the sifting
process is the procedure used by
one NGO using standard wheeled
bucket loaders. The top layer of soil
is excavated from the suspected
minefield, then removed and
spread out over a hard bare earth
surface. The deposited soil is raked
over by hand by mine clearance
staff in full protective gear, which
exposes the mines among the roots,
rocks and vegetation. When the
mines have been raked to one side and removed the soil is returned its original
location and the next bucket-load of topsoil is collected and examined. This
method has the benefit of using equipment commonly found in commercial use
in many countries, unlike the specialist machinery mentioned above.
Ploughs
Although used by military formations to clear routes through mined
areas, ploughs do not destroy mines but merely remove them from one place
to another — at the same time turning them over so that the top actuating
cap may be facing in any direction, thus increasing the hazard of prodding
for them. Ploughs are only of use in humanitarian mine clearance for gaining
access to mined areas or in conjunction with some types of sifter. Sifters
work best with broken ground and can sift the windrow produced by a
plough easier than undisturbed earth.
Detection of UXO
This chapter has linked the clearance of mines and UXO together under
the term “mine clearance” because in most cases they present a similar problem
and both forms of munition are often cleared by mine clearance staff. The
clearance of certain types of UXO can pose special problems, which require
specialist clearance skills.
UXO are usually either munitions fired from artillery, rocket or mortar
weapons, or are aerially delivered, like submunitions or bombs. These can
pose specific hazards for clearance staffs. Unexploded artillery, rocket or
mortar rounds can either end up on the surface or buried. Fortunately, most
have a high metal content, especially artillery and mortar rounds, which makes
them detectable by magnetic mine detectors. Some aerial delivered bombs can
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end up deeply buried and specialist detection techniques are used for their
detection.
Once detected, many unexploded munitions are relatively inert but some
have sensitive fuzing systems which render them dangerous to normal
clearance methods. Bombs with delayed-action fuses have to be treated with
caution. Deep-buried shells and bombs have to be dug out before they can be
destroyed and if they are close to buildings, services or infrastructure, they
must be defuzed before removal, a highly specialised task.
Some missiles, especially the larger surface-to-air or surface-to-surface
missiles, are powered by liquid propellant which is toxic and corrosive, and
leakage or spillages of these substances can be hazardous to those near to the
missile or who approach without adequate protection. Clearance should not be
attempted without specialised advice. Some guidance is given in IMAS or their
Technical Notes on the handling of liquid-fuelled munitions. Although not
classed as explosive, depleted uranium-cored bullets or anti-tank projectiles
can be toxic, especially if they have passed through armour plate. The absorption
of uranium oxides by contact or inhalation of uranium oxide dust is hazardous
because of its toxicity.
Many mine clearance groups have ordnance specialists who should be
consulted if unidentified munitions are discovered during the clearance process.
Conclusions
The processes of the detection and destruction of mines and munitions
for humanitarian purposes have come a long way since 1989, but arguably
not far enough. Reliance still has to be placed on “classical” methods of
mine detection. Research and development (R&D) of new technologies
has been disappointingly slow: there is little doubt that few new
technologies have been introduced into demining, despite the expenditure
on research.
In contrast, the exploitation of existing technologies has been more
successful, and new and improved mine clearance machinery is being
produced and fielded on a wider scale than ever before. Techniques for
the training and use of mine detection dogs have also been improved,
thanks to some original research carried out under the GICHD mine
detection dog programme.
It is arguable that R&D has been taking place on two parallel tracks. On
one track, new technologies have been the subject of many millions of dollars
or euros on research but little has come from the expenditure. On the other
track, incremental user-led evolution of mechanical equipments, and the use
of detection dogs, is leading to increasing efficiency and effectiveness. The
reasons for the imbalance are worth examining.
Generation of new technologies
Of the new technologies mentioned above, only one GPR handheld detector
is ready for full-scale field trials for humanitarian use. Many scientists and
engineers have attacked the “mine problem” with vigour, but without
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continuous discussion with the users. As a result, they have decided for
themselves what the problem is and have tried to adapt their technologies to
it. The pursuit of an elegant technological answer has in some cases become
an end in itself, divorced from the pressing user need to increase safety and
productivity in the effort to save lives and livelihood.
Many scientists are exploring exactly similar areas and the amount of
repetition in research has been considerable and wasteful. Repeated warnings
from the user community have had little effect. In a recent case one short
visit to one minefield cemented the perceived user need into the minds of the
researchers and further user input seemed to be considered unnecessary. As
a result, the mine clearance users are beginning to doubt the capability of the
scientific community to do anything but promote their own research, with a
consequent waste of scarce resources better employed elsewhere. This is a
heavy indictment but one that is hard to refute.
One difficulty is that there is no single “mine problem”, a fact not
understood by most researchers. Each minefield or mined area may present
a series of unique problems to the clearance staff. And clearance tools that
work well in one area may be useless in another, even in the same country or
region. User requirements may vary subtly in each place, so single solutions
may not work as well in another location.
As a result, it is difficult to decide whether to try to drag the scientific
community into the mine clearers “real world” or dismiss the whole idea as
a waste of time and money. This leads to the question of whether R&D of new
technologies is cost-effective.
Cost-effectiveness of research and development
It is not often appreciated that research into any new technologies is rarely
cost-effective until one of the ideas thrown up in the research programme
gets to the full development stage and a potential market can be identified.
In mine action, the matter is complicated still further by the fact that there is
no identified humanitarian mine clearance market — and mine clearance teams
are notoriously conservative and slow to trust new technologies. This means
that predicting the business return on research and development investment
is almost impossible.
The basic research into a detection system may cost at least US$3 million to
take from concept to prototype. Full development can take five to ten times that
amount and gearing up for large-scale production a further ten times more. It
would take a large production run to give a reasonable return on so heavy an
investment, a return that is unlikely to occur in the present mine action world.
This has always been recognised and it has been consistently urged that
governments would have to support R&D  into mine action technologies, or no
research will take place. Unfortunately, much research funding is wasted by the
failure of research organisations to work together, which is not an encouragement
to governments or donors to provide such funding.
From the researcher’s point of view, it is difficult to get from the
deminers a consolidated set of quantified performance requirements for
new equipment. Each mine action organisation has its own opinions on
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performance specifications, but these would be better coordinated to cover
the whole demining community rather than one specific programme. Most
armies and industries have well-tried routines for establishing customer
needs for equipment performance. The mine action community needs the
same.
NGOs frequently assert that R&D money would be more profitably spent
on mine clearance, but this fails to recognize that R&D funds come from different
funding envelopes that are not transferable. This attitude is hardly helpful or
encouraging for the researchers concerned. Though ridiculing the value of
research, it is quite possible that the same NGOs would criticise the research
organisations for their lack of new technologies if the NGOs were faced with
entirely metal-free mines.
Also, although incremental improvements are being made in the cost-
effectiveness of mine action, there has been little success in developing a
stand-off detector to remotely locate the presence of mined areas. This alone
could improve the efficiency of technical surveys by a very large amount. It
can be argued that success in this area of research would find a ready market
and it is highly probable that military demining organisations would wish to
acquire the same capability. Military purchases would change the pattern of
the market completely and would probably give the return on the investment
that is currently sought.
Optimisation of existing technologies
As mentioned, many new mechanical equipments are in use and the numbers
are slowly increasing as their safety and cost-effectiveness become better known.
In the same way, the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) is increasing. In both
cases the demand for improvement is user-driven and the user is closely
involved with the development process.
Interestingly, in the use of some GPR mine detectors and MDDs,
researchers and developers have worked alongside the users and have entered
minefields to see for themselves what problems the users are facing. The
result has been highly focused and productive research on animal vapour
detection with dogs and rats and the generation of equipments that are ready
for large-scale acceptance trials. We therefore know that full-scale
collaboration with the user during the R&D process produces the right results.
Meeting the users’ needs
Mine clearance is developing but needs to develop still further. Cost-
effectiveness, safety and quality have all much improved since 1989 but are
not yet good enough. At the same time, the generosity of  the donors may be
waning and their expectations for cost-effectiveness are rightly increasing.
The GICHD User Needs Study22 identified that the greatest improvements
to efficiency in the opinion of programme managers would come from close-
in detectors with a lower false-alarm rate and effective stand-off detectors
for area reduction. The situation has not changed since the study was published
in 2002. So far, the mines and munitions found in conflict areas have not changed
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much — but new totally non-metal mines and munitions with sensitive fuzes
are available on the market and, despite the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention, may yet appear in the ground. In addition, the current
international circumstances suggest that the permanent end to all warfare
seems as far away as ever.
In this case, it would be short-sighted for the user community to ignore the
potential for technical advance or naively demand that R&D money be somehow
transferred to mine action programmes. Research budgets seem to have a life of
their own and the user community might be better employed seeking to gain
from them rather than ignoring them. At the same time, some of the users’ needs
are increasingly being met by extending the development of existing equipment.
Such development must be encouraged as a way of increasing the cost-
effectiveness of the mine clearance process.
One of the difficulties of establishing the cost-effectiveness of a single
piece of mine-clearance equipment is that few clearance organisations carry
out stringent cost calculations on the elements of their clearance process,
such as the machines, dogs, survey teams, etc. More work needs to be
done to prepare simple software that will allow mine clearance groups to
perform such calculations. At the same time, data on the operating costs
of demining tools need to be better collected. At present it is difficult for a
programme manager to estimate what cost savings could be achieved under
particular project conditions — or use such estimates to ask donors for funding
for better equipment.
In the early days of demining, derivatives of military equipments were
the only options available and these often proved unworkable due to the
practical differences between the military act of minefield breaching and the
humanitarian act of minefield clearance. Recent military interventions in
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo have required
soldiers to carry out mine clearance operations closely related to humanitarian
operations and many armies have re-equipped with detectors originally
developed for humanitarian use. These are encouraging signs. Research into
military hand-held and vehicle-borne detection systems is under way in many
countries. This means that the chances of using the results of such research
for humanitarian purposes may be increasing and the divergence between
military and humanitarian requirements may reduce.
New technologies
It must be accepted that the mine action community, with the right equipment,
can make further advances in cost-effectiveness, which will be keenly sought
by donors. As part of the search for greater efficiency, the community needs to
promote new technologies and R&D must continue. The mine action community
cannot alter or control the R&D community but perhaps should seek to advise
and assist them by clarifying the users’ needs and insisting that the users’
views are kept in mind throughout the development process. This can in part
be done by seeking greater participation in equipment development fora, such
as EUDEM (European Union in Humanitarian Demining), HUDEM (Belgian
joint research programme for humanitarian demining), and others.
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Clarification of user needs must take the form of consolidated statements of
operational requirement. The preparation of operational requirements will be
difficult and will require negotiation with, and cooperation between, the UN,
NGOs, commercial companies and the managers of mine action programmes.
But it will be worth the effort. It is possible that the GICHD could assist in a
project to study how such operational requirements could be formulated,
possibly as an extension to the User Needs Study.
Every opportunity must be made to get R&D staff to visit the field, to talk
with field staff, see actual mine clearance terrain and conditions, and observe
working practices. Such visits may be time-consuming for field staff but,
without a greater understanding of the user needs and working environments,
usable and effective equipment will never reach the field.
The search for new technologies for mine and munition detection should
continue. It would be over-optimistic to assume that there will be no more
wars or that, during these wars, landmines will not be used. They have been
a weapon of choice for irregular forces or small armies for many years and
their effectiveness, especially for controlling or harassing the civilian
population, has been proven. New and non-metal mines exist but fortunately
have not yet been widely deployed. It might be foolish to assume that they never
will be, thus it is better to search for a solution for their clearance before, rather
than after, they have arrived.
Existing technologies
The development of existing technologies has been successful, but the new
improvements for increasing cost-effectiveness must become more widely
used. One way of ensuring this is to have better methods for informing mine
action programme managers and donors of the benefits of the new
developments and this can come through better measurement of these benefits.
With clearer statements of benefit, and increasing field experience in varied
terrains, there will be increasing acceptance of mine dog detection and
mechanical techniques.
It is suggested that more information on good results with proven
equipment is made available — possibly via the UN, GICHD or James Madison
University23 — to ensure that more donors and programme managers are
informed on the latest equipment developments.
Improvements in efficiency will be better understood if they can be
quantified and more performance-calculation software needs to be developed
and circulated to programme managers. More information needs to be
gathered on the efficiency and capabilities of new types of equipment, but
this information will have to derive from the field, not from the manufacturers.
Calculations will need to be linked to specific types of equipment working in
specific scenarios. Software for such calculations has already been developed
within the GICHD and should possibly be made available to programme
managers and their technical staffs.
Donors should support the managers of the programmes they are funding
in striving to increase productivity. They should also be dissuaded from
purchasing equipment for these mine action programmes on the basis of
supporting national industry without first obtaining the agreement from the
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programme manager that the equipment will meet the needs of the programme
in a cost-effective way.
As with new technologies, users with practical experience must provide
feedback to the developers of improved equipments and procedures. This
will encourage further iterative improvement and refinement, and result in
wider applicability. There is not a major market in the mine action world, but
good equipment will still find buyers.
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Introduction
In order to plan and prioritise mine action activities it is necessary to
quantify the scope and nature of the threat posed by landmines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO). The term survey1 is used to describe a set of
activities that endeavours to achieve this (for brevity, hereinafter, the term
mine encompasses also UXO). In addition to large-scale assessment projects it
also includes projects with a more technical focus — those which better define
areas of contamination — and site surveys conducted after a demining task
has been completed. In some literature, evaluations that review whether
cleared land is being used as envisaged have also been included in the survey
process.
A project to characterise the unknown on a scale that is required for many
landmine surveys is a daunting task. The extent and nature of contamination
presents considerable challenges for the design of surveys attempting to
capture and record wide-ranging aspects of the contamination within a
relatively short time. Survey is, perhaps, the most challenging and most





Discrete survey projects in support of clearance operations began
to appear from 1990. Since then, countries considered to be severely
affected by landmines have seen a host of assessments and surveys
during the history of their mine action programmes. In general,
however, most surveys have focused on either the hazards or the
impact; there are weaknesses in approaches of both. Indeed, survey
is, perhaps, the most challenging and most critically debated aspect
of mine action.
During the development of landmine surveys, projects have benefited
from advances in technologies, particularly in the fields of GPS and
digital photography. A new generation of technologies is now reaching
the market with considerable implications for future survey work.
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This chapter reviews the development of survey activities, exploring the
limitations of various methodologies and discussing adaptations in
approaches that have occurred to address shortfalls in stakeholder
expectations. The development of survey terminology is first reviewed with
an outline of current definitions. This is followed by an examination of
aspects that contribute to the survey environment — which is unique in
every country and can challenge certain survey approaches. The expectations
of key stakeholders are then reviewed to set the scene for a wider discussion
of the survey projects undertaken to date and the potential for further
improvements.
Primary survey data (i.e. initial non-technical assessments) focus on
gathering information about the location and scale of hazardous areas and
the social and economic impact of mine contamination. It is used to help shape
mine action strategies, allowing rational decisions to be made on the allocation
of resources and the targeting of mine action tasks according to clear priorities.
Such survey data are collected by a variety of activities, described variously as:
level 1 survey, general survey, landmine impact survey and emergency survey.
These surveys, which are arguably the most vital in the planning of a
well-targeted and cost-efficient mine action programme, are accorded
particular attention in the chapter.
Survey definitions and terminology
The development of survey terminology
Discrete survey projects in support of clearance operations began to appear
at the beginning of the 1990s. It began with so-called level 1 (general) surveys,
a term used to describe the process whereby mobile teams recorded mine-
related information on questionnaires. This was distinct from level 2
(technical) surveys that relied on a technical approach using demining
equipment to confirm the existence of mines and to better define the extent
and boundaries of the contamination.
Later an additional term, level 3, came into use — representing survey
activities associated with recording the boundaries of completed clearance
tasks — to document demining efforts better and to improve the process of
formal handover of clearance sites to beneficiaries.
Although now obsolete, the survey terminology based on levels one to three
was used throughout the 1990s, and was referred to in the first International
Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations, released by the Mine
Clearance Policy Unit of the UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs in March
1997.
United Nations survey definitions in 1997
Level 1 (general) survey
The objective of a level 1 (general) survey was to collect information on the
general locations of suspected or mined areas. Information was collected on
areas affected by mines and on areas not affected. Areas were supposed to be
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categorised and the reliability and credibility of data recorded. A level 1 survey
was a prerequisite for the planning of a level 2 (technical) survey.
Level 2 (technical) survey
The objective of a level 2 (technical) survey was to determine and delineate
the perimeter of mined locations initially identified by a level 1 survey. The
marked perimeter formed the area for future mine clearance operations.
Level 3 (completion) survey
The level 3 (completion) survey was conducted in conjunction with the mine
clearance teams and accurately recorded the area cleared.
Terminology problems
The 1997 level 1 survey definition did not accurately represent the full data
content of most survey questionnaires used during the 1990s. The definition
did, however, reflect the general sentiments of many in the demining community
at the time — that the unit of focus in survey activities should be the minefield,
described in terms of type of ordnance, density of ordnance and area of
contamination.
A small number of surveys during the 1990s were not well described
by the 1997 level 1 survey definition. These were surveys that were more
impact oriented — looking at socio-economic aspects of the contamination
rather than focusing on the type, density and area of contamination.
Examples of this were the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 1991 survey The
Report of the Afghanistan Mine Survey, the Handicap International (HI) Laos
1997 survey Living with UXO and the MCPA/UNOCHA 1999 Afghan survey
Socio- Economic Impact Study of Landmines & Mine Action.
Where certain aspects of a particular project were to be emphasised,
expansions of the level 1 term occurred. For instance, where a focus was to
be placed on impact, the term level 1 impact surveys appeared and when an
emphasis was on the duration of the project, such as in a rapid assessment in
the immediate aftermath of a conflict, then the term level 1 emergency surveys
appeared.
The terminology of landmine impact surveys (LIS), as defined by the
Survey Working Group and first implemented in 2000 in Yemen, provided
the most consistent understanding of a particular methodology. This survey
initiative made a concerted effort to develop a standard implementation
approach that used the community as the main target of the assessment rather
than the minefield, and recorded the impact on communities through victims
and blockage of access to resources.
Formerly known as level 1 impact surveys, the Survey Action Center (SAC)
readdressed the survey terminology in the light of the revised IMAS (2001) and
has since removed all level 1 references. Since the completion of the first SAC
LIS in Yemen, there has been a remarkable expansion of this type of survey
approach and hence a wider usage and understanding of the landmine impact
survey terminology.
The terminology for level 2 (technical) surveys created confusion
throughout the 1990s. A key theme of the level 2 surveys was to define
the boundaries of a suspected mined area through “area reduction” using
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technical teams to delineate the perimeter of minefields and to mark them as
an intermediate measure pending future clearance. The theory of this
approach, however, did not translate well into a practical activity in many
mine clearance settings and was not seen by some as a discrete activity. The
definition has since been amended in IMAS 08.20, describing a broader
activity with greater application.
The level 3 (clearance) surveys as defined in the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs 1997 standards were largely considered an activity
conducted by clearance teams themselves — after a task had been completed.
The terminology of level 32 surveys therefore was not used as much as level
1 and level 2. Although the site completion map depicting land cleared remains
a vital activity at the end of a demining task, the level 3 terminology has been
lost and the clearance map is simply a component of the post-clearance
documentation (PCD) as outlined in IMAS 08.30.
Although not addressed in any published standards to date, reference is
sometimes made to a level 4 survey or post-clearance evaluation (PCE). This
activity is understood as an assessment that is undertaken sometime after
the cleared area has been handed over to local authorities (or other
beneficiaries) in order to determine whether the cleared land is being used
as envisaged. Such a survey would represent a logical final stage.
Current survey terminologies and IMAS definitions
In October 2001 the first edition of the IMAS removed all reference to
level 1, 2 and 3 surveys and although they still remain in common use today
the numerical reference for a survey level is now obsolete. IMAS now uses
terminology that makes reference to a General Mine Action Assessment
(GMAA) that is a continuous process incorporating data from a combination
of activities including emergency surveys, LIS and technical surveys.
General Mine Action Assessment (IMAS 04.10 & 08.10)
According to the IMAS Glossary, a General Mine Action Assessment is
“the process by which a comprehensive inventory can be obtained of all reported and/or
suspected locations of mine or UXO contamination, the quantities and types of explosive
hazards, and information on local soil characteristics, vegetation and climate, and an
assessment of the scale and impact of the landmine problem on the individual,
community and country”.
The important difference from many previous terms describing information-
gathering activities is that the GMAA relates to a continuous process of
collecting, evaluating and analysing data to assist and update strategic
planning, and provide support to mine action authorities (Figure 1). In addition
to field surveys it consists of many different types of information-gathering
activities including sourcing of available satellite imagery, aerial photographs,
military dossiers and hospital records.
There can be some confusion in the concept of the GMAA as some activities
that remain functional areas of the overall mine action assessment, such as




The 2003 version of IMAS contains no definition for emergency surveys but
they are generally understood to be a rapid process of gathering data on
suspected hazardous areas, to assess safe routes, and provide an inventory of
reported or suspected areas of contamination. This type of activity normally
takes place in the period immediately following the end of a conflict. The
approach and content has considerable overlap with earlier level 1 (general)
surveys.
There is also potentially an overlap with impact surveys as some recent
emergency surveys have incorporated a greater impact component. In this
chapter, however, all survey approaches that focus on the suspected hazardous
area (SHA), rather than the community as the main focal point are termed
SHA-focused surveys.
Impact survey (IMAS 04.10 & Technical Notes for Mine Action
[TNMA] 08.10 series)
“An assessment of the socio-economic impact caused by the actual or
perceived presence of mines and UXO, in order to assist the planning
and prioritisation of mine action programmes and projects.”
Technical survey (IMAS 04.10 & 08.20)
“The detailed topographical and technical investigation of known or
suspected mined areas identified during the planning phase. Such areas
may have been identified during the general mine action assessment or
have been otherwise reported.”
Landmine surveys
Figure 1. Schematic representation of a GMAA as a continuous activity —
 illustrating a functional flow with various surveys approaches
(adapted from IMAS 08.10)
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Figure 2. Illustration of the progressive developments from initial site identification
gleaned through early stages of the general mine action assessment, through
technical survey and clearance, to post-clearance documentation and evaluation
General Mine Action Assessment - GMAA (a continuous activity) LEVEL 1: general survey
Including: review of military records, hospital records, emergency and impact survey data
Technical survey (a continuous activity) LEVEL 2: technical survey
(Technical investigation of a known mined area (may also include exploratory clearance)
(Post-clearance evaluation - PCE) (LEVEL 4)
Asessment that cleared land is being utilised as envisaged — not currently addressed in IMAS
Post-clearance documentation - PCD LEVEL 3: completion survey
Including maps of cleared area, post-clearance inspection details, SOPs and handover
documentation
Clearance activities
























































Post-clearance documentation (IMAS 08.30)
Post-clearance documentation refers to a “comprehensive” set of documents
relating to clearance operations. During the process of handing over a cleared
site, this documentation is provided to a recipient authority, organisation or
individual. A critical item in the documentation is a map of the completed
clearance site. A copy of any technical survey undertaken prior to the clearance
is also included with further documentation such as the standing operating
procedures (SOPs) of clearance methods used and any quality assurance
activities, such as post-clearance sampling.
A general illustration of the complete survey process is contained in
Figure 2.
Evolution of general landmine assessments
Historical background
Survey operations
Demining has its roots in the late 1980s within several pioneering
programmes in Afghanistan. During the first two years or so, however, survey
activities were limited to reconnaissance in support of clearance operations.
But from 1990 onwards discrete survey projects began to materialise that
Notes:
a. The sequential stages from initial GMAA to post-clearance documentation may not always be
followed as presented here. A technical survey, for instance, can take several forms and in some
situations, especially where clearance follows immediately from an emergency or impact survey, it
may not be clearly differentiated as a separate activity. Furthermore, post-clearance documentation
(IMAS 08.30) can in practice be limited, depending on the size of the clearance site, type of task, the
clearance contract, implementing organisation or operational setting.
b. Post-clearance evaluation illustrated here represents a logical final stage in the process, however,
it is not currently recognised or addressed in IMAS documentation.
c. Outdated survey terminology using the levels 1-4 are indicated in the right of the table, although
care should be taken as representation of these levels in line with new terminology suggests that
they are equivalent — which is not strictly the case.
Photos from left to right:
GMAA:
• Villagers indicating area of mine threat during a general survey at Cassua, Ndalatando, Angola. ©G.
Rhodes
• Liaison officers from the Royal Thai Army assist information gathering on the Myanmar border. ©G.
Rhodes
• Map showing some general suspected areas of contamination, Kosovo. ©VVAF
Technical survey
• Mine warning sign on the Thai Cambodian border. ©G. Rhodes
• Detailed avaluation of a minefield undertaken from an exploration lane, Ndalatando, Angola. ©G.
Rhodes
• Map showing better defined perimetres of the reported sites of contamination, Kosovo. ©VVAF
Post-clearance documentation
• Site clearance map (incomplete) from ongoing task at Toco, Huila Province, Angola.  ©G. Rhodes
• Trench around the borders of a cleared site to indicate extent of safe area after clearance has been
completed, Malanje, Angola. ©G. Rhodes
• Map showing the boundaries (in green) of the areas cleared, Kosovo. ©VVAF
Post-clearance evaluation
• Cleared land being ploughed by oxen, Figueira, Huila Province, Angola. ©G. Rhodes
• Former mined paddy fields on the Thai Cambodian border now under cultivation. ©G. Rhodes
• The completion of a bridge on the Lubango-Menongue road, Angola. ©G. Rhodes
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aimed at making broader geographic assessments of the nature of mine
contamination. Perhaps the most prominent NGO conducting surveys in the
1990s was the British organisation, the HALO Trust, which undertook surveys
in many countries.3
Although the terminology of the survey titles differed slightly, the content
was similar in the level 1 (general) surveys conducted in Afghanistan 1991-
92, Cambodia 1992, Mozambique 1993-94, Nagorno-Karabakh 1995-96,
Chechnya 1997, Abkhazia 1999-2000. Since the late 1990s, however, there has
been a tendency to emphasise this type of survey intervention as “more rapid
assessments”, using terminology such as level 1 danger area survey (Kosovo
2000) or level 1 mine and danger area survey (Sri Lanka 2002), although the
underlying methodology is the same.
The emergency survey is a more recent term that is likely to now supersede
previous terminology; this has been used in both the Eritrean (2000) and
Ethiopian (2001) survey projects. Other such surveys conducted by NGOs
and mine action organisations all have a similar theme — recording the location
of areas and features such as roads suspected or known to be contaminated
by landmines. Field teams sometimes also operate in a reconnaissance capacity
describing road conditions, access routes and assessing security
considerations.
Although the focus of the HALO Trust and others was very much on
conventional minefield surveys during the 1990s, there were also surveys
that were incorporating a greater focus on socio-economic considerations. In
1991, for instance, the early work of MAG, although limited in its geographic
extent, culminated in The Report of the Afghanistan Mine Survey, which placed
an emphasis on socio-economic aspects of landmine contamination. Also in
Afghanistan, the 1999 report of MCPA/UNOCHA Socio-Economic Impact Study
of Landmines & Mine Action used existing information, supported by further
field assessments, to evaluate, on a greater scale, the negative affects of mine
contamination in the country.
In 1997, the Handicap International survey of Laos, whose final report
was titled Living with UXO, was from the outset a national project focused on
the community as the unit of assessment. This was partly necessary because
of the nature of the UXO contamination in Laos that blanketed much of the
country and the limited application of more conventional general survey
mapping techniques. The Laos survey nevertheless marked a milestone in
surveys becoming more community-oriented — with socio-economic factors
being increasingly taken into consideration.
Much of this shift in focus of survey approaches can be attributed to the
progressive integration of mine action into a broader field of development.
The limelight that was enjoyed by mine action as result of the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention signed by 122 nations in Ottawa in 1997 and the rise in
public awareness provided by prominent celebrities further diluted mine
action’s traditional staffing by military and ex-military deminers. This
inevitably brought in new ideas and a shift of emphasis away from the
minefield as the focus of many survey activities.
The idea of a global landmine survey was conceived in 1998 and later that
year the Survey Working Group (SWG), composed of key actors in mine
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action and the Survey Action Center (SAC) as a focal point for coordination,
embarked on an ambitious programme to survey mine-affected countries using
a standard methodology focusing on community assessments. The first LIS
was completed in Yemen in 2000. Since then similar projects have been
conducted in more than a dozen countries.
In total, more than 30 major mine action surveys have been completed
over the past 15 years and a dozen or so more are either underway or planned.
There are countless more survey projects that have been conducted over the
years on a smaller scale in support of clearance initiatives and larger
development or emergency relief work.
The development of organised databases to support mine action4
The earliest mine action database was established in 1990 to store survey
data from the Afghanistan “Landmine Survey”. It was based on FoxPro, a
database system, and initially had no geographic information system (GIS)
functionality to view information spatially on a digital map. (See Chapter 9 for
a detailed discussion of information management technology.) Three years later, the
Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) also established a FoxPro database
initially to store mine information from the United Nations peace-keepers
within the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Since then, other
databases began to appear using various database software and with an
increasing GIS functionality.
In 1999, however, the UN approved an information management system
called IMSMA (the Information Management System for Mine Action) and
most mine action programmes are now using IMSMA to manage their demining
information.
IMSMA was developed to meet two specific requirements identified by
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The primary requirement
was to provide a ready-made application to meet the data-recording needs
of a newly established mine action centre. The field module (FM) was
designed to be used at a national level in any country affected by landmines.
It combines a relational database with GIS functionality and has successfully
met this first requirement. The second requirement was to collate data from
the national mine action centres and to provide aggregate information to the
UN and donors. A global module (GM) was designed to facilitate the collection
and aggregation of global information.
IMSMA has been designed as an information management tool to improve
decision-making and coordination in mine action by collecting data in a
standard format and incorporating statistical and geographical tools to
improve data evaluation. IMSMA as an information management tool has
considerable possibilities. However, in many situations the coordination of
mine action activities based on IMSMA functionalities is weak. In most mine
action programmes today decision-making on priorities and the monitoring
of field activities take place outside information management systems. Some
programmes have developed add-on or parallel modules for operational
management, to compensate for their absence in IMSMA.
The potential for IMSMA to be used in combination with other database/
GIS applications to improve information exchange and coordination in post-
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conflict environments has already been demonstrated. Humanitarian mine
action information can therefore be enhanced when combined with or compared
to other socio-economic, health and environmental data in an analysis process.
Technology advances in support of field operations
Survey operations have benefited considerably from improvements in
technology and the introduction of new tools to assist field activities. Early
in the 1990s coordination of field operations by high-frequency (HF) radios
was enhanced by additional modems to allow reports and position data to
be transmitted to base receivers if required. In the mid-1990s satellite phones
started to appear and, although expensive to operate, were used as substitutes
for HF communications in some instances. By 2000, mobile phones also proved
valuable in countries or regions that had supporting networks, particularly
around urban areas affected by landmines and UXO.
Since 1989 laptops and improved software to support survey requirements
have slowly been introduced and are now standard equipment at a supervisor
level. Along with the development of databases and the increased use of
computers, digital cameras have become a tremendous tool for providing
information on vegetation cover, topography and land use that can be linked
to a SHA and stored alongside IMSMA. Digital cameras also allow ordnance
identification to be undertaken remotely where skills are not present in field
teams.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) for fixing sites of contamination or
community centres, or for plotting roads and tracks not represented on
available topographic maps, are now invaluable and are standard issue in
most surveys. The dimensions of GPS units have also shrunk from those that
were the size of house bricks in the early 1990s to more efficient and durable
pocket-sized models. The accuracy of the regular GPS units also took a leap
forward in May 2000 when the US discontinued its policy of degrading GPS
signals, and accuracies of these devices improved to about 10-20 metres —
compared with 100 metres prior to 2000.
Sub-10-metre accuracy can now be achieved by GPS with Wide Area
Augmentation Systems (WAAS) and about one metre for Differential GPS
(DGPS). Most significantly, however, the prices of the useful technical devices
to support surveys have dropped consistently and are now readily affordable.
Perhaps the equipment that still remains out of reach for most survey
budgets are suitably protected vehicles. Survey teams are vulnerable in
Emergency Survey situations particularly where there is a significant anti-
tank mine threat or where field teams are exposed to risks from undisciplined
factions and militia that may oppose peace-keeping activities. Some attempts
have been made to improve protection from anti-tank mine detonations
through adaptations to standard vehicles such as Land Cruisers and Land
Rovers, but these only provide limited superficial protection at best.
Emergency and general surveys
Apart from a few isolated projects of community-focused surveys, the
vast majority of surveys during the 1990s were focused on collecting data on
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suspected areas of contamination and undertaking reconnaissance. Projects
such as the survey of Mozambique in 1993-94 typically used a one-page
questionnaire for each suspected area reported, recording information on
location, density, type and number of mines suspected and type of land
affected, number of victims and distance to nearest town (with population).
If appropriate, a sketch map was attached. In parallel to the questionnaire a
topographic map was updated with information of access roads — both those
closed due to suspected mines and those considered open.
Although approaches were adapted to some degree and variations of
questionnaires occurred between countries and organisations, the survey
approach known as level 1 (general) survey was implemented by many
organisations including leading NGOs such as the HALO Trust, Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) and MAG.5 One objective of the survey was to produce a
map of the contamination including affected infrastructure — in addition to
an inventory of suspected hazardous areas with some insight into the
reliability of data and priority clearance for each site.
Surveys went beyond a mine focus, however, by including data vital to
support operations and to assist other organisations plan their assistance
programmes in war-torn countries. Surveys also included the recording of road
and bridge conditions, GPS fixes of road vehicle wrecks and ambush sites,
plotting roads on maps that otherwise did not exist and descriptions of security
and safe access roads to accompany mine data.
In some cases survey teams specifically identified spot tasks6 that were
added to lists that could be easily followed up by mobile explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) teams. Furthermore, a list of high priority tasks was suggested
by survey teams on completion of provinces. In the majority of cases the
implementing organisations of SHA-focused surveys were demining NGOs
that also had clearance capacities in-country. This enabled the realisation and
integration of clearance activities in the wake of surveys.
Many surveys, however, suffered from a lack of field testing of survey
instruments, poor quality assurance in both fieldwork and database entry (if
indeed databases were used) and, most importantly, a severe lack of
information management in order to analyse data, present findings and
integrate results with all relevant stakeholders.
Although improvements have occurred, there remains potential for
addressing some of the weaknesses in these types of projects today. The
surveys are, however, cheap and relatively short in duration and have served
as a critical tool for clearance organisations, particularly those which actually
received the data.
For comparison with later surveys, the HALO Trust level 1 general survey
of 1993-94 in Mozambique had a total duration of six months (four months
fieldwork) and a budget of US$395,000.7 The LIS conducted by Canadian
International Demining Corps (CIDC) in 1999-2001,8 however, took
approximately two years (17 months’ fieldwork) with a budget of
US$2,272,000.9
In countries in the immediate aftermath of conflicts the only survey
methodology that is normally relevant is the SHA-focused survey. In Angola
in the late 1990s surveys were undertaken on behalf of agencies such as the
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World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) where priorities were not based on some community
impact theme — but were simply targeted at supporting refugees or internally
displaced persons (IDPs) where route access for repatriation of displaced
populations was a priority and where sites had to be selected for temporary
IDPs camps or distribution points for food.
Surveys in the wake of ceasefire agreements, such as the Kosovo
Emergency Survey, can suffer from lack of informants at community level as
many people remain displaced from their homes.10 Even where present,
however, informants may be reluctant to reveal data, particularly regarding
the location of mines, which may be considered a military issue. As stability
and faith in a lasting peace increases, informants talk more confidently about
the mine threat, although some mined areas may still remain off limits for
discussion, such as active military installations and sensitive border regions.
Certain national surveys may not therefore have full national coverage of
sensitive areas or parts of the country poorly served by infrastructure or
where security concerns existed at the time of the survey operations.
Coordination with national authorities, mine action centres, peace-keeping
forces, local military, the United Nations and other NGO organisations is
vital for survey work in order to raise awareness among stakeholders and to
gain assistance from such bodies to implement the project. Experiences have
been mixed, but to operate in an isolated fashion restricts access to potentially
valuable information and may exclude vital assistance such as air support
which is rarely budgeted but essential in many survey settings.
In addition to community meetings, survey teams actively source
information from the military, police, hospitals, utility companies, road
maintenance offices, missionaries, UN, NGOs and local authorities.
Depending on the survey, it may be that more systematic and detailed
approaches are undertaken when security situations improve and access
within a country increases. This is reflected in the term general mine action
assessment — and the nature of an emergency or former level 1 survey
usually requires follow-up teams to do technical reconnaissance to plan
for large clearance tasks. At some stage there may also be a socio-economic
survey, such as the LIS.
Socio-economic aspects of both communities and the individual mined
areas affecting them are not excluded from non-technical, SHA-focused
surveys, although information is not always collected in a clear and easily
accessible fashion. Almost from the outset of surveys, however, victim
numbers, blockage types and ordnance details have been recorded — these
are the only three elements that actually contribute to the community impact
score used today in the LIS. Furthermore, these data have been mostly available
for each minefield and thus potentially yields a far greater resolution and
relevance for prioritising SHA for clearance than only a community impact
score.
Impact data were not always collected in such a systematic fashion — or
analysed in relative impact terms (with the exception of victim numbers) and
operational considerations for clearance were involved to a greater extent in
the decision making process. As donor scrutiny on criteria for demining task
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selection grew during the 1990s the focus on impact as a means to select priority
sites grew. Yet the potential for generating an impact score for each minefield,
or indeed a community, for a level 1 survey was never realised (even though
this would be quite straightforward with a few minor adaptations to the
questionnaire).
One source of confusion is that much of these impact activities remain
under a survey title of general survey or even level 1 (general) surveys. NPA,
for instance, took steps from the mid-1990s to improve their standard
approach11— to include greater socio-economic considerations, even including
some approximate cost-benefit analysis of potential clearance activities. This
has culminated in a concept of task impact assessment (TIA),12 which has a
clear objective of evaluating potential impact and benefit from the demining
activity as part of the task selection criteria. This focuses on a SHA rather
than a community and thus, of course, has greater resolution and addresses
some of the spurious results that can sometimes be generated from the LIS
community ranking process.
Landmine impact survey (LIS)
After the signing of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in December
1997 it became clear that that the scope and impact of the worldwide landmine
problem needed to be better defined. In the spring of 1998, at two meetings
sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) and
hosted by Handicap International/Belgium, a group of interested parties,
composed of survey operators, UN and donors, started to develop a
collaborative plan for the Global Landmine Survey (GLS).13
A smaller Survey Working Group (SWG) agreed to lead the project and
appointed VVAF to create a Survey Action Center (SAC) and to serve as its
fiduciary and management body. The SAC was tasked with coordinating LIS
worldwide, gaining donor support and providing technical assistance. At the
end of 2001 SAC became a legal entity outside VVAF.
“The objective of a landmine impact survey is to facilitate the
prioritisation of human, material, and financial resources supporting
humanitarian mine action at the national, regional, and global level,
through the collection and analysis of socio-economic data.”14
LIS projects use a common database — IMSMA — and collect data through
a standard approach defined in the LIS protocols. Survey operations are
observed by a UN Quality Assurance Monitor who follows the survey process
and provides a report on the basis of which the UN decides whether or not
to “certify” the survey process.15
The LIS approach pays less attention to the actual location and the mapping
of mine contamination than the emergency or the former level 1 general
surveys but more on the evaluation of landmine impact on communities. This
is achieved through participatory community interviews that capture
knowledge of landmine contamination as perceived by the community.
One of the principal objectives of the LIS is to provide a ranking of
communities based on the severity of mine impact and hence the suggested
allocation of mine action resources. Indicators of community impact are
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combined into an index — the Impact Score — that is
sensitive to three elements of the mine problem:
1. the nature of the contamination (whether
landmines or UXO or both);
2. the type of land that the contamination is
affecting (e.g. agricultural, housing, forest,
etc.);
3. the number of recent victims (accidents
occurring within the last 24 months).
The results of a LIS provide data to improve
planning for operations, including guidelines for the
targeting of mine action resources to communities.
LIS reports are produced and accompanied by a CD-
ROM with an electronic copy of the report, other
documentation and, in some cases, a copy of the full content of the IMSMA
database.
SAC has formed links with Cranfield Mine Action in the UK to assist mine
action centres in developing strategic plans, using software such as Freeway
that accesses the survey database and allows data manipulation and assistance
in exploring various strategic planning options.
The introduction of the LIS approach has been the most significant event in
the development of surveys in mine action. Several projects previously focused
on community impact as the primary theme but there had been no standardised
approach to the methodology. The LIS provides a “brand name” that is
recognised as a product that emphasises careful planning, training, pre-testing
of survey tools, pilot testing of survey capacities and quality assurance of the
survey process through the presence of a UN monitor.
The LIS approach, however, is not without its critics and a shift in focus to
the socio-economic impact of landmines on communities has taken place at
the expense of geographic data (mapping) that
is present in SHA-focused surveys. The lack of
a national map in LIS that shows the
distribution of reported physical contamination
— and illustrates mined roads and other
contaminated features that may go beyond the
confines of a single community — is puzzling
to some stakeholders.
The limitations of the impact score itself
have also come under close scrutiny,
principally due to the strong influence that
“recent victims” have on this composite index
and the fact that the numeric extent or degree
of the impacts are not considered (although no
better alternative has been proposed that can
be incorporated in such a rapid assessment).
For example, of the 69 communities listed from
the most contaminated province in Thailand — Sa Kaeo — all the high impacted




community interview: “How many victims have there been in the last 24
months?”
The important issue is that end users understand the inherent limitations in
the LIS system and also that the impact relates only to communities. The
standard methodology cannot realistically capture socio-economic impact of
contaminated infrastructure, which in some countries may represent the most
pressing concern. Yet, irrespective of the debates, the LIS has made a
considerable impact on the mine action community.
Modified impact approach — Kosovo
The Kosovo modified level 1 impact survey was not a survey in the sense
of gathering knowledge from local inhabitants. Rather, it was characterised
by pulling together information from various sources and integrating it into
a decision-making process. Impact evaluations and decisions were not based
on landmine impact scores and the final report did not follow the LIS
framework.
The conflict in Kosovo occurred over a relatively short time when much
of the population was displaced and as a result the major source of information
shifted from local informants to external sources. It was a precedent-setting
incidence where US (NATO) authorities turned over their bombing records,
and extensive mine information was available from KFOR which had received
records from the Yugoslav Army.16 It was also a situation where the main
donors of mine action (US and many of the NATO countries) were party to
the conflict.
The project is particularly significant in the development of surveys and
databases not only because it was a watershed for using geospatial tools to
compile existing data with external data sources but it was the first time that
there was clear linkage between ceasefire negotiation conditions and the
follow-on relief and reconstruction efforts.
The arrangement whereby information management interests could
prepare prior to deployment and then gain access to records in a close
collaboration with US-led coalition forces repeated itself in Afghanistan and
then again in Iraq.
Technical surveys
As the field of demining has developed it has became progressively
apparent in almost all clearance programmes that the majority of operational
time is spent on the clearance of land that is not in fact contaminated. This is
a reflection of lack of confidence in operational planning due to the irregular
fashion in which mines are typically found, of the poor quality of information
that is available on the location of the contamination and of the stringent
safety procedures employed.
The concept of technical surveys, according to the 1997 definition,
addressed the problem of poor information by reducing large danger areas
reported by level 1 surveys into more representative plots of contamination.
One of the methods outlined in various SOPs was the use of manual deminers
as a breaching tool into suspected minefields — a process that would confirm
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the presence of mines and exclude large areas of previously suspected land
from the need to be cleared. Indeed, the concept of marking defined boundaries
of the contaminated areas and then having the opportunity to set aside well-
defined packages of land for later clearance (thereby containing the problem)
was a very attractive idea and one that was advocated widely.
Unfortunately, in most scenarios such an approach relied heavily on the
notion that mines actually existed in dense, well-defined areas. It is now well
documented that, for most areas where mines have been removed, this remains
a myth. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, of the 18,000 “minefield”
records received from warring fractions, 60 per cent of indicated sites
contained fewer than ten mines.17 In other countries the random nature of
low density minefields has been even more prolific and it was difficult for
some clearance operators to imagine that breaching lanes could be an effective
method of confidently defining boundaries of highly irregular contamination.
In order to gain the confidence required to erect warning markings or to
define the limits of contamination for later clearance, most scenarios required
such extensive exploration that it was questioned whether such resources
were justifiably deployed and used at a site unless that site was a priority for
clearance anyway. This was even further debated when large resources such
as mechanical flails, mine-protected vehicles, dogs and manual deminers were
deployed for long periods when other higher priorities had to delayed. It
became apparent that, in many situations, organisations were more likely to
undertake area reduction activities at a site that had been prioritised for
clearance and thus the technical surveys were just an integrated component
of an actual clearance task.
Figure 3. Illustration of a process where general information on suspected
contaminated areas (shown on left as circles) is better defined by a more focused
investigation using technical staff (shown on right as polygons)
 © VVAF
Irrespective of the content of published survey standards, the technical survey
as an activity has always been subject to debate. Objectives and implementation
approaches have largely been a function of the nature of the mine contamination
in a particular setting and the preferences and working procedures of a
particular organisation. The concept of the former level 2 (technical) survey
sounded reasonable, particularly for operators in areas such as Afghanistan or
northern Iraq who could understand the concept of regular minefields and
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where relatively successful technical survey and marking teams had operated
for many years.18 But clearance operators in other regions, particularly in Africa,
had rare examples where they could visualise an effective application of the
level 2 survey approach: thus stand-alone technical surveys according to the
level 2 protocols have not been common.
The technical survey as defined in IMAS is not equivalent to the old level 2
surveys, as has been claimed in some recent literature. There is a considerable
difference between an activity that requires technical capacity to clearly define
boundaries of contamination and one that just requires technical skills to be
present to better prepare and design a clearance plan. Technical surveys, as
now described in the literature, may indeed include some breaching lanes
into the suspected area but reference to defining boundaries through technical
area reduction as an objective has been removed. The general trend has been
to introduce LIS as an important tool in the GMAA. The LIS tool lacks technical
components and has reinforced the need to follow up priority areas with persons
with technical knowledge — but not necessarily technical equipment resources.
Some have questioned the logic of introducing a new survey step between
initial assessments such as impact surveys and actual demining task.19 In
reality, however, the IMAS simply reinforce the activity of reconnaissance
missions that most organisations operated to investigate potential sites for
clearance anyway.
A complete list of outputs expected from the IMAS technical survey is set
out in IMAS 08.20. In summary, however, the activity provides a detailed
technical and topographical investigation of known or suspected hazardous
areas with a primary aim of collecting sufficient information to more accurately
define the clearance requirement, including: the depth of clearance, the local
soil conditions and the vegetation and topographic characteristics. Such
information ahead of clearance operations allows better task planning in terms
of resources needed, timeframes for the clearance and a better evaluation of
estimated clearance costs against anticipated benefits. A technical input into
priority setting is also vital since high priority sites, as defined by other impact
parameters, may simply be dismissed when operational factors are considered.
The survey of features such as roads, electricity pylons and pipelines is
not directly addressed in impact or technical surveys in IMAS but there is
little doubt that they can affect socio-economic development more than most
isolated area tasks. This is particularly so in a country such as Angola where
the crippling of the country’s infrastructure is a major hindrance to the process
of normalisation.
In order to survey roads appropriately and to plan clearance projects based
on a knowledge of the road condition, vegetation cover, state of bridges and
to access informants who may exist along the course of a disused road, either
low-level air reconnaissance must be conducted or, preferably, a ground
assessment in a mine-protected vehicle. Physical reconnaissance by vehicle
and a recording of the road in conjunction with a sampling programme followed
by remote explosive sensing analysis20 is an extremely valuable method of
providing technical input to plan expensive road clearance tasks.
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Evolution of post-clearance “survey” activities
Post-clearance documentation
The concept of providing clearance maps and reports to local authorities or
other recipients of the land released from demining operations has evolved
considerably over the course of the development of demining. Typically, site
clearance in the early days was only documented in terms of square metres
cleared and numbers and type of ordnance removed and destroyed — and
even these records are not available for many programmes.
The concept of constructing a detailed map of the clearance site (formally
known as level 3 surveys) and having a formal handover of cleared land to
beneficiaries was not considered a priority unless the opportunity was to be
used to gain publicity or to signal closure of the project for the deminers and
local population. Normally demining organisations were keen to redeploy
clearance capacities to new sites quickly and to keep pace with work demands.
Post-clearance documentation has developed as part of the general increase
in professionalism within mine action and the introduction of more
accountability into activities that surround demining. However, a particular
focus on post-clearance procedures was prompted by recurring events in
several programmes:
1. Accidents occurring in or around the “clearance” site after the
departure of teams. Without clear records it was difficult to prove
whether the accident had taken place in the area cleared or close to its
perimeter, especially when vegetation had grown back or land was
cultivated.
2. Confusion among recipients about what land had been cleared and
what had not.
3. Later expansion of previous sites or new activities in close proximity
to old tasks.
4. Criticism that land cleared remained idle and was not used for its
intended purpose. Frustrations were mounting from land that was
not being used as intended. Some organisations introduced pre-
clearance paperwork where beneficiaries outlined what the land was
going to be used for and when it would be used. This post-clearance
documentation activity was then a required step to hand over land
formally and to signal that the task was complete.
5. Rise in commercial contracts and donor requirements. The increase
in the number of commercial companies involved in humanitarian
demining introduced standard practices from the commercial sector.
The requirement for documentation was also a greater donor concern
with commercial contractors than had previously been the practice
with NGOs.
6. Mine action authorities’ requirements to keep a record of all clearance
activities. Post-clearance documentation is now a comprehensive
activity requiring the inclusion of:
task identification numbers;
clearance specifications — area and depth;
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copy of the technical survey conducted prior to the clearance (if
available);
licenses and paperwork of the clearance organisation showing
accreditation;
survey of equipment used and procedures followed during the
clearance task;
quality assurance activities undertaken and specifications;
post-clearance inspection reports;
map of site cleared with turning points and a table of mines and
UXO located and destroyed;
accident reports during clearance, if applicable;
a formal declaration from the demining organisation that the area
has been cleared to the specifications stated; and
formal recognition of, and signature for, receipt of area to acknowledge
and understand the final status of the land.
Today, post-clearance documentation is understood as a vital
component of the overall demining process and has developed into a
comprehensive activity described in IMAS 08.30, where land may not be
formally recognised as cleared until this documentation is complete. Post-
clearance documentation as a process is widely understood for large clearance
tasks, but in most programmes it is not fully implemented (i.e. according to the
full list of documentation) nor is it considered applicable to smaller site clearance
and isolated EOD tasks.
The process of official handover of land helps clarify the ownership of the
residual risk and the legal responsibilities and accountability of the donor,
the national mine action authority and the demining organisation. The local
community is encouraged to participate and community liaison officers are
tasked to ensure that the local population is fully aware of clearance activities
and implications for the community. Recipients of land typically walk through
cleared areas and are shown where ordnance has been removed to raise
confidence in the task and ensure that clearance boundaries and marking
systems are understood. A further activity termed post-project review (PPR)
is recommended in the IMAS to identify lessons learned during the completed
task. How often this is formally implemented is questionable.
Though the concept of post-clearance documentation developed with the
level 3 map concept, most practitioners did not consider this a survey activity
in the sense that survey teams arrived and mapped the clearance site. Maps
were, in most cases, a neat copy of the supervisor’s site progress map on the
last day of operations. Much of the literature does not mention level 3 surveys,
and now with the change of terminology and the emphasis of the official
documents into the process, it is likely that post-clearance documentation
may not be further considered part of the “survey” portfolio of mine action
activities but rather associated with “demining” activities.
Post-clearance evaluation
A particularly disastrous NGO clearance project in Africa involved an entire
village of some 50 families who had fled during the conflict and had been
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forced to relocate to another site some kilometres away. In the aftermath of the
hostilities an expensive clearance project was undertaken to clear mines and
UXO from the original village at the request of the local authorities. When it
came to the time for the displaced villagers to move back — a day the demining
organisation wanted to promote with great fanfare — the villagers changed
their minds and said that they now preferred to stay at their new location as it
far better suited their needs!
Although steps are taken to safeguard demining investments, it remains
very difficult to guarantee that land once cleared will be used as intended.
Many of the mistakes of the past involve land that has cost considerable sums
of money to clear and which is simply not in use — or where land is being used
for a purpose other than that originally stated. Such incidents make a mockery
of a selection process for demining prioritisation if the principal reasons that
identified a site for clearance do not materialise.
The worst examples are where there has been some deception about land
ownership and the beneficiaries of a clearance task are exposed as the
community leader who originally tabled the priority or senior military officers.
Indeed, most long-term programmes have at least a short list of clearance
mistakes that they do not readily publicise.
There has been an increasing trend towards greater donor scrutiny and
the more efficient allocation of expensive mine clearance resources. This has
happened in parallel with clearance operators realising that not all their
activities were successful and that there was a need to assess past clearance
projects. These tasks needed to be evaluated not in terms of square metres or
ordnance cleared but in terms of what activities the clearance operation had
actually facilitated. Were these in line with initial expectations and was the
whole project a successful investment?
Originally the evaluation activity was informally called a level 4 survey
(as it represented a logical final stage in the survey process that existed at the
time); it is now referred to as post-clearance evaluation even though it still
has no formal definition or reference to it in the IMAS.
Post-clearance evaluation can either be undertaken internally by the
clearance organisation or externally by a mine action authority or contractor
for the donor. It is not widely employed as a routine activity, but, where
implemented, post-clearance evaluation generally focuses on the larger and
more costly demining tasks completed. Post-clearance evaluation should not
be confused with post-project review referred to in the IMAS, which is focused
more on identifying lessons learned during the undertaking of clearance
operations than on an analysis of the impact of the clearance some time after
a task has been completed.
In most instances, the post-clearance evaluation does not expose the
extreme examples of clearance disasters outlined above because land is actually
used for the purpose intended. However post-clearance evaluation gives an
opportunity to analyse the decision-making practices of the organisation
because factors such as full operational costs — previously unknown — can
now be evaluated against the follow-on activities that can be themselves
observed and appraised. Such surveys not only ensure that priority setting
employed by an organisation is appropriate but can identify problems that
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are faced by communities in transforming the land available into a sustainable
outcome.
Unfortunately it is not always straightforward to do a cost-benefit analysis
of a clearance task against follow-on activities as it is difficult to assign a
monetary value to human life, or to the value of the accident risk reduction
of the area cleared. Furthermore, projections are required well into the future,
as benefits of the released land are felt over many years. There are lessons to
be learned from embracing the broader development approaches to
monitoring and evaluation21 but to date there has been only limited work in
mine action to fully use these approaches for initial priority setting and
evaluation.
In recent years a number of mechanisms have been put in place to try
to safeguard demining investments and reduce the incidence of project
failures. One key step has been the introduction in some programmes of
pre-clearance contracts between the demining organisation and the
identified beneficiaries. In these documents, which are countersigned by
the competent authorities, the recipients of the land outline in some detail
the plans for the cleared areas, with timelines. There is also provision for
clarification of ownership of the land.
Another approach that has been implemented with some success for large
clearance sites is to release land in a “step by step” process. In this case,
packages of land are provided to beneficiaries who have to show that
development plans outlined in the pre-clearance contract are implemented.
Failure to do so suspends operation of the full project.
Accuracy and reliability of non-technical survey data
“What intrigues me about surveys is that each and every one is virtually
discounted by someone as soon as it is done — and this includes surveys
conducted internally within a mine clearance programme by technicians
for technicians. Surveys are sitting ducks for criticism — it is almost
inevitable that the next person who picks up a survey report will either
be privy to better information or will conduct a more detailed investigation
and expose all the inaccuracies of the initial work … perhaps what’s
important here is the fact that someone has actually been tasked to go
back to this place. If the site revisited is actually a priority … shouldn’t
this be the indicator of success?”22
In some instances landmines or UXO are visible and can be observed directly
by survey staff. Normally, however, survey teams depend on informants as the
means of collecting data. Both LIS and emergency surveys therefore rely on the
assumption that informants will be available at the time of the survey and that
the informants actually know what they are talking about.
Furthermore, it is assumed that survey methodologies are well designed
and capable of capturing the required information; that field staff are able to
record the data on questionnaires precisely and that data are transferred to
databases, entered correctly, then analysed and presented in an appropriate
fashion. If one considers that the objects of investigation — landmines — are
usually by their very nature “hidden” and that projects on a national scale
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only allow rapid community assessments, it is clear that there are limitations to
conducting a non-technical survey and considerable room for error. The accuracy
and reliability of data that some stakeholders seem to expect is simply
unachievable.
The reality is that primary assessments have inherent weaknesses and the
details of the geographic location of SHAs or levels of community impact
recorded should not, in most cases, be taken as absolute but rather as
guidelines for follow-up activities. Although shortfalls exist, the GMAA
collates data and goes some way towards defining the mine problem in a
country, providing confidence for strategic planning and assisting the effective
framework in which to target mine action resources. This is key to a successful
mine action programme.
Hazard-focused surveys
The quality of data from rapid hazard-focused assessments varies. At one
extreme there will be situations where a single item of UXO or piles of UXO
exist, or where mines have been carried into a community and a survey officer
is able to stand over the objects and take a GPS fix, record details of informants,
mark the item(s) with a warning sign and take a photograph. Similarly there
will be situations during a rapid assessment where there are mines reported
in an area that is well defined. For instance, an isolated paddy field surrounded
by well cultivated land where the survey officer is able to walk around the
site and map the perimeter of the contamination. He or she may even be able
to make some rough cost-benefit estimate of a clearance task, based on the
area that is blocked and comparing it with the productivity of surrounding
agricultural land.
Furthermore, consider a situation where a bridge at a river crossing may
be mined to protect it from sabotage. In this setting the survey officer may
have an excellent viewing point from the safety of the bridge over the
suspected area where he or she may be able to record information from their
vantage point — such as visible mines or tripwires, evidence of trench systems
or remains of animals — that may suggest the presence of contamination and
increase the reliability of their report. There will also be some control of at
least two boundaries of the contaminated areas defined by the road and the
river. There may be some agricultural land that encroaches on the bridgeheads
but which stops abruptly where the ground is observed to be overgrown. In
this situation simple mapping exercises can define the limits of the
contaminated area quite well.
This is not rocket science, as some critics have claimed. There are many
situations during a national survey where excellent control of the limits of
landmine contamination can be achieved without a detector and without
exposing survey officers to unnecessary risk. Where feasible, this is the
goal of a SHA-focused survey that attempts to provide an inventory of
SHAs with the best definitions that can be achieved within existing
constraints.
There are more examples: mines around the bases of electricity pylons,
mines around a well or on the summit of a well-defined hill. In such cases the
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geographic data on the location of the contamination is fairly reliable as these
features tend to be on maps and can be highlighted with a suitable buffer zone
to increase the confidence of the hazardous area being recorded. In a case where
a road, railway or pipeline is mined, it may not be feasible to determine the
exact position of mines along the course of the feature, but it may be possible to
highlight sections that are not in use and between which the suspected mines
are confined. In all these examples, simple mapping skills, some basic
understanding of mine-laying strategies and a little common sense can go a
long way in recording a fairly accurate picture of the contamination.
At the other extreme, information on the location of contaminated areas or
the sites of accidents can be unhelpfully vague. Such instances are where
informants swing their arms in a general direction of some expansive pasture
land saying that an accident happened some time ago “over there” (arm
swinging), but there is really no reliability at all on the location of the incident,
when it occurred, or whether any appreciable threat still remains. Should
this be recorded?
A further example is where hunters use mines for killing animals in forested
areas by placing tripwires across paths frequented by game. Once in a while a
hunter doesn’t come home and his knowledge of the mine traps is gone forever.
In such instances there can be an extremely low density of mines over large
expanses of forest where there is some risk of a mine accident involving a
member of the community. Survey teams may mark on a map the boundaries of
the forest and just record the area as low risk. This probably seems appropriate,
but if it is included in the database and not understood in context, this one site
could hugely inflate the total area of SHAs recorded and considerably influence
area clearance calculations for strategic planning purposes.
The tendency has been for survey officers to record any potential threat,
however minimal. This is their job. The onus must, in part, be on end users to
understand that the database contains a fair amount of “noise” and that over
time this should be removed as new information arrives during the ongoing
process of the GMAA. Some SHA-focused surveys have tried to address
poor reliability and accuracy concerns by the use of two simple fields in the
questionnaires: reliability and accuracy, which have tick boxes rated high,
medium or low. This may not be very scientific but at least it flags a concern
that decisions should not be based on this particular data alone.
The provision of archive data and combat records that provide details of
minefields and of airstrikes can be extremely helpful in assisting initial survey
assessments sites. This is particularly applicable in recent conflicts where
combat activities have been relatively straightforward and the accuracy of
records is of high quality.
On the other hand, for older and more complex conflicts that have occurred
over several years or decades ago, records can be confusing and in several
instances have been more of a hindrance than a help. For instance, the limited
minefield records provided by government forces in Mozambique at the end
of the civil war were particularly confusing. Maps did not have appropriate
scales or an indication of orientation (meaning a “North” reference), nor could
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GMAAs are also not designed well to cope with mapping expansive
UXO contamination, such as found in Viet Nam or Laos. Most survey
approaches are designed to deal with discrete mine sites or target zones —
basically packages of contamination around features that can be more or
less mapped and defined. Where blanket bombing occurs there is no real
definable edge to the contamination and ordnance may be several metres
deep. In this survey environment traditional approaches have considerable
limitations.
One easy way for surveys to be discredited is where spurious coordinates
recorded for SHA are entered in a database and, when plotted, relocate
minefields onto other continents or move them into oceans. This is not good
for instilling confidence in the datasets but has been a recurring problem for
surveys since their inception. Prior to 2001 accuracy of GPS meant that
readings could easily move mined sites from one side of a road to another
due to the inherent inaccuracies of the system at the time (~100m). Perhaps
less excusable were instances where GPS units had not been calibrated
correctly or where there was a failure to ensure that they were consistent
with the maps in use.
The most significant contribution to poor geographic control, however, has
been the lack of quality assurance in various stages of data transfer. Where
coordinates were misread or inaccurately recorded by survey officers, errors
remained undetected. Similarly much of the blame may be given to data entry
staff who may lose concentration and occasionally type long series of numbers
into a database incorrectly.
Unfortunately, databases are not like cashpoint machines that inform you
when the number is incorrect. Rigorous quality assurance mechanisms must
be employed routinely in survey work and there has definitely been a lack of
it in the history of mine action surveys.
Assuming that coordinates of a contaminated area are recorded accurately,
the advantage of the SHA as a focus for survey methodology over LIS is that
a minefield generally does not move. Therefore, correctly recorded sites in
SHA-focused surveys stay relevant over time, and, in theory, if there is a
return to conflict the additional contamination data only top up the existing
database. This is not always the case with impact surveys that represent more
of a snapshot. Over time more accidents can occur, livelihoods may change
and communities may adapt — altering the impact that landmines have on a
community.
In sum, geographically focused surveys, such as emergency and general
surveys, produce a range of data quality and reliability. Some are excellent,
some are hopeless, but this should be expected due to the limitations of the
methodology, the timeframes, the challenging survey environments and the
nature of the contamination. Although there remain considerable areas for
improvement — especially in regard to quality assurance and possibilities for
allocating an impact score for a minefield — the real challenge lies in the ability
of end users to understand the vulnerability of data in some reports and the
precision of data in others.
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Accuracy of landmine impact surveys
The LIS questionnaire captures a broad spectrum of community-based
information and minefield data to support the calculation of the landmine
impact score and to assist later data analysis. Community facts, such as
population numbers and available services, are typically obtained from the
head of the community or other appropriate official. Information on mines
and their impact are acquired from a community interview after which there
is a further chance to clarify some of the SHA information during an inspection
of the reported areas of contamination.
The LIS has several quality assurance steps in place to safeguard data as it
moves from the field to a data entry point which is normally at a mine action
centre. Similar to SHA-focused surveys, however, most of the key data is
provided through informants and the quality of data hinges to a great extent
on the knowledge of these informants.
In time, one of the defining components of the impact score, recent victims,
will change, as will the opportunities and constraints facing the mine-affected
community. There is therefore a limited shelf life for some of the key data
from a LIS, although this may be longer than some would suspect (assuming
there is no regression to conflict). This is a result of the LIS attempting to
identify communities that are impacted severely by landmines and to use
these communities as a priority for targeting mine action resources.
It may be fair to assume that the accident location of new victims that
occur after a survey has been completed will more or less coincide with the
high impacted communities already identified, since these are probably located
in the vicinity of heavily contaminated areas. Although there may be some
jostling for position at the bottom of the high impact category, the most affected
communities are likely to remain close to the top of the table for a considerable
time after the completion of an LIS. Whether it is correct, however, to assign
such a considerable influence to “recent victims” in the scoring mechanism is
debatable.
Spurious impact scores are usually a result of multiple accidents occurring
at one time or where many blockages are credited to a community by several
minor sites of suspected contamination. It is therefore recommended that,
after the completion of an LIS, the paperwork for all the highly impacted
communities in a database be reviewed to wean out obvious spurious
communities.
Excluding the “recent victim” component of the impact score, the magnitude
of the score is indifferent to the size of the suspected minefield, the number
of minefields or indeed the number of persons affected. In other words the
impact score does not measure very well the numeric extent or the degree of
the impacts. Consider the following example:
“a farmer finds one mine in a corner of his orchard yet is still perfectly
able to harvest 95 per cent of his fruit trees; his discovery will make the
same contribution to the overall score as would happen if mines put out
of operation the entire non-irrigated crop land in his community.”23
This is a weakness that should be understood. The impact score does little
to analyse the possible benefits of demining, as it provides little illumination
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on the economic benefits that would occur from clearance activities. And the
focus of the LIS is on communities — it does little if anything to evaluate
contamination of mines on infrastructure. In some countries this may be of no
consequence but in others where infrastructure is crippled by mines, this may
be where demining activities should be targeted. Effective clearance would
establish access to markets and supporting the free movement of people — as
well as connecting and expanding services and utilities. In such cases, the
standard LIS methodology would not appreciably capture the most important
mine action priority in the country.
This is perhaps the greatest limitation of the LIS approach in specific
countries where the infrastructure really is the key to the socio-economic
development — being interwoven with the interests and aspirations of
communities.
The LIS is also not capable of mapping the contamination along linear
features with much accuracy, especially where the scale of a mined feature is
beyond the size of a community. Even within the community the geographic
control is weak. At present, the IMSMA representation of suspected minefields
from standard LIS provides only circles whose areas are equivalent to the
area of blockage reported by the community. This is true even if the suspected
area of contamination contains elongated features such as a road, a railway,
a riverbank, pipelines, electricity pylons or borders.24
Figure 4. Example of the geographic limitations of LIS data seen along
the Thai-Cambodia border illustrating the possibilities of repositioning
the circles as data are collected in the field.
Note: SHA problems as represented by IMSMA could be partially addressed in the field by the use of
a targeting function of the GPS. This would provide a better geographic representation of the actual
contamination on the ground where hatched circles are shifted to a new position shown by the
orange circles. This however does little to help the geographic problems of representation of linear
features that cannot be adequately represented as a circle (e.g. a road). Hatched irregular polygons
along the border represent a fairly accurate picture of the distribution of contaminated areas of land.
The hatched circles represent the corresponding area that is stored in IMSMA and which would be
displayed on GIS. In most cases the circles do not overlap with the actual location of contamination on
the ground. Furthermore, some circles overlap even when they represent different SHAs.
© VVAF-SAC/NPA
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These circles are projected forward of the viewing point and rarely cover the
minefield – if indeed they overlap at all. The potential for overlap will be a
function of the distance that the SHA is away from the viewing point, the shape
of the SHA, its area and the location of the community centre in relation to both
the SHA and the viewing point. Currently, if the location data from LIS in
IMSMA is plotted there is a danger that circles representing different mined
areas are superimposed even when the reported details from informants clearly
define distinct areas. In other words it is incorrect to represent location data of
SHA from LIS on topographic maps as it suggests that the areas are geo-
referenced, which they are not.
The LIS approach does not claim to capture geographic data with much
accuracy so this is not a failing of the objectives of the survey approach. But
stakeholders should understand that there will not be a map provided at the
end of a LIS project that geographically represents the spatial relationship
between communities and mine contamination. Some argue that LIS staff are
not technically qualified to map contamination and that representation of
contamination as polygons may be misinterpreted by some stakeholders.25
But incorporating an appropriate mapping component into the LIS that would
allow the mapping of linear features26and capture elements of contamination
along affected infrastructure would require a significant change to LIS
protocols and an extension of the training period.27
Perhaps a good compromise may be for LIS field staff to learn to use
the “targeting” function of a GPS, which would enable the circle to be
projected from the viewing point into a location that better represents the
contamination.
There have been some attempts to address the lack of geographic control
and the extent of contamination features in some countries by various
adaptations. In Thailand, for instance, a core component of the survey
approach was to map the mined areas where possible and to represent them
as polygons within IMSMA. This was particularly necessary due to the linear
mined features along sections of borders of Thailand which could not be
realistically represented by circles.
Furthermore, LIS methodologies run into similar problems as SHA-focused
surveys with regard to the nature of widespread low-density UXO
contamination, as in Viet Nam or Laos, since the LIS is designed to evaluate
the impact of discrete areas of contamination that create a “blockage” or
otherwise impact a community. In addition, deeply buried contamination
may have no immediate impact on a purely agriculture-based community
today but there are clear socio-economic implications as a country develops
and buildings are erected and roads and other infrastructure are improved
(as in Viet Nam today). The dangers that populations are exposed to and the
considerable costs of clearance must be factored into construction activities.
A final consideration with regard to LIS methodology is that the process
only recognises those instances where humans interact with mines. It can
not capture data on mined areas that are remote from human activity and so
must be updated as populations move into areas contaminated by mines.
Examples of such population relocation include resettlement of the
displaced, population movement due to construction of roads or railways,
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and movement brought about by pressure on land resources. Stakeholders
must therefore remember that an LIS does not provide an inventory of mined
areas in a given country, rather it shows where mines affect people at a
given time.
The illustration of some examples here that challenge the LIS approach
has exposed some of the concerns raised in regard to the methodology.
However, there are limited alternatives to impact calculations and most
practitioners feel relatively comfortable with community designations of high,
medium and low impact as a framework for further developing mine action
priorities. But limitations of the approach must be appreciated by end users
for decision making purposes. There are significant dangers in blindly




There is a need for a greater focus on incorporating survey results into the
activities of potential end users — in order to maximise benefits from survey
projects. In the wake of national surveys, for instance, the transfer of survey
information to the IMSMA database is often considered the end-goal of the
project, but it is the activities that follow that define the success of the project.
Greater effort should be placed on the integration of survey information into the
activities of stakeholder groups through organised presentations, workshops,
training and dissemination of tailored data. Where appropriate, survey results
can also be used for strategic planning where the strengths and weaknesses of
the data are fully understood.
Survey methodology — potential developments
The General Mine Action Assessment, according to the IMAS, is a
continuous process that includes a range of approaches throughout the life of
a programme. Countries considered to be severely affected by landmines, such
as Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia, have seen a host of assessments and
surveys during the history of their mine action programmes. Potential
adaptations of survey methodology and approach could save costs, reduce
project timeframes, improve survey products and focus on the real mitigation
activities of mine action: clearance, marking, MRE and survivor assistance.
There are weaknesses in approaches of both hazard-focused and impact
surveys. Both can benefit from a more deliberate attempt at integrating their
findings. Better quality assurance procedures in emergency surveys could be
introduced and impact surveys could be adapted to capture impact associated
with blocked infrastructure. If it is indeed necessary to undertake additional
surveys it may be possible to avoid full duplication by retrofitting existing
information into the new format, allowing only new data fields to be
addressed. If surveys have followed a common gazetteer or use IMSMA as a
mutual database then the possibilities of this are greater.
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In addition to emergency surveys with socio-economic components, there
may, at the other extreme, be more comprehensive surveys that correlate aspects
of landmine and UXO contamination with information bodies from other  sectors
— using data that has a focus on agriculture, land use or poverty mapping.
Agricultural surveys, for instance, could supply values of land productivity
that would better support cost-benefit models for demining sites that have a
defined land use potential. Database and GIS efforts for mine action could be
shared with other sectors during post-conflict rehabilitation with diverse
information-gathering bodies expanding the potential for data analysis in mine
action. VVAF, for instance, hopes that the landmine/UXO survey in Viet Nam
will be a model for combining survey data with external data on alleviating
poverty.
Survey-related technologies
During the development of landmine surveys
since the late 1980s, projects have benefited from
advances in technologies, particularly in the fields
of GPS and digital photography. Technology will
continue to improve quality and facilitate survey
activities. A new generation of technologies is now
reaching the market with considerable implications
for future survey work.
Handheld computers are now widely available for
as little as US$800 with integrated GPS and a personal
digital assistant (PDA) version of ArcView (ArcPAD)
that can display GIS lines, points, polygons, scanned
maps and satellite images. It may be in future that
such technologies become common in survey activities.
The new generation of PDAs would reduce the need
for paper maps, enable questionnaires to be completed
electronically thus potentially downloading direct to
an IMSMA interface. This would avoid data transfer
steps such as coding sheets and data entry that
potentially introduce errors into survey results. This
type of equipment with its integrated GPS would allow
survey staff to locate themselves readily on maps, reduce the skill requirements
for mapping and help see the end of spurious minefield positions that are in the
middle of oceans.
The ultimate aerial survey device that would confidently locate the positions
of mines in varying terrains and conditions and thus see the end to
conventional mine survey is however some way off. Considerable research
has been done for airborne mine detection devices using an array of sensors,
including infrared and ground penetrating radar, but the spectrum of ordnance
types, patterns of deployment and the differing field conditions that exist in
post-war situations are particularly challenging. Unfortunately the rather
strange situation where we have commonly to wait for populations to return
to their communities and to interact with landmines before we are able to
Landmine surveys
A PDA with incorporated
GPS.
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build up knowledge of the locations of ordnance and impact to target our mine
action response will continue for the foreseeable future.
Simple high-resolution aerial photography may actually be the best tool
yet to assist technical surveys, especially where access is restricted to SHA or
where thick vegetation or topography obscures the site. A bird’s-eye view of
a SHA assists area calculations, assesses vegetation cover and allows the
identification of features such as trench systems, buildings and further access
routes to support the process of planning for future clearance (and for
monitoring process of demining tasks under way).
While we wait for the ultimate airborne mine detecting sensor that would
reduce survey activities to only limited community assessments, the current
survey approaches must be further developed to improve their application
for priority setting and defining the shape of mine action initiatives.
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Endnotes
1. The generic term survey is not defined in the International Mine Action Standards.
2. For instance, level 3 surveys are not mentioned in Rae McGrath’s Landmines and
Unexploded Ordnance: A Resource Book (2000), although nearly a third of the book
relates to survey activities.
3. See www.halotrust.org.
4. See Chapter 9 for more details on information management.
5. For instance, some survey projects incorporated marking of contaminated areas as
an integrated survey task.
6. Spot task is a term used for a discrete site of contamination such as a pile of UXO
or a mine that has been left in an exposed place such next to a path or road.
7. The HALO Trust/UNOHAC (1994: 46).
8. The state of Mozambique’s infrastructure and security situation were very different
between 1994 and 2000.
9. See www.sac-na.org.
10. Surveys, in particular emergency surveys have used military liaison and
demobilised soldiers to assist information gathering.
11. NPA (1996).
12. See NPA website: www.npaid.hr/en/TaskImpact.html.
13. www.sac-na.org.
14. Survey Action Center and Mine Clearance Planning Agency (2001: 5).
15. This is a certification not of quality but only that an agreed standard process has
been followed.
16. Messick et al. (2000: 6).
17. Van der Merwe (2002: 3).
18. MAG in northern Iraq from 1992 and MCPA/UNOCHA and others in Afghanistan
from 1992.
19. Van der Merwe (2002: 3).
20. Bach and McLean (2003).
21. For more current thinking on the monitoring and evaluation of mine action
programmes see for instance GICHD/UNDP (2002: 81-96).
22. Taken from an e-mail from a mine action manager requesting anonymity.
23. GICHD/UNDP (2001: 30).
24. Rhodes (2000: 1).
25. Morete (2003a).
26. Common mined features in mine-affected countries are often elongated or linear:
roads, pipelines, electricity pylons, railways, riverbanks, borders, etc., and since they
extend beyond the boundary of a village they are difficult to capture using the LIS
methodology.
27. Adaptations to IMSMA and requirements are outlined in Engeset (2003).
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Introduction
Over the last decade there have been significant developments in the
international law governing landmines and other explosive ordnance that
contaminate the land of countries affected by armed conflict. New international
treaties have been adopted that prohibit or restrict the use of anti-personnel
mines, anti-vehicle mines, booby-traps, command-detonated munitions and
time-fused munitions. A new legal instrument has also been concluded to
deal with problems caused by “explosive remnants of war” (ERW), which
covers both UXO and AXO — abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). The work
in these areas has sought to minimise the impact of landmines and ERW on
civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarian organisations and lessen the socio-
economic burden of armed conflict on war-affected societies.
The last decade is also notable for the way in which some of these treaties
were forged. Advocacy by international organisations, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), and other actors has played a central role in raising
4 Advocacy andinternational law
Lou Maresca
Summary
Advocacy has been a major factor in achieving a comprehensive
international legal prohibition of anti-personnel mines in the
space of only a few years and has promoted the commitment of
significant resources to mine action. A side benefit has been
the promotion of the development and implementation of
international humanitarian law more generally.
Part of the success of the campaign against anti-personnel
mines was the unprecedented degree of coordination among
the variety of actors involved in advocacy activities. However,
the same level of cooperation and coordination has not been as
evident in the efforts to improve the international law on anti-
vehicle mines and cluster munitions in the context of the CCW.
These will need to be enhanced if the Protocol on Explosive
Remnants of War is to be widely ratified and effective measures
are to be adopted on other conventional weapons.
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awareness among governments and the general public of the problems caused
by mines and UXO and in mobilising support for an international response.
In the case of anti-personnel landmines, these organisations, along with a
number of supportive governments, drove the process that led to the
conclusion of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and they continue to
play an important role in the Convention’s universalisation and
implementation.1
This chapter will first provide an overview of the developments in
international law on landmines and UXO and highlight important aspects of
the advocacy that helped make them a reality. It then charts the development
and content of the major international treaties in this area and highlights the
role that advocacy played in their conclusion, drawing attention to some of
the key aspects and concerns of recent advocacy activities. The paper ends
with conclusions on lessons that may assist future advocacy efforts on the
international law governing mines and UXO.
Advocacy and mine action
There are numerous definitions of advocacy and every discipline has
sculpted the concept to suit its needs.2 In the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS), advocacy, in the context of mine action, is defined as “public
support, recommendation or positive publicity with the aim of removing, or at least
reducing, the threat from, and the impact of mines and UXO”.3 Although not
explicitly stated in the IMAS definition, one of the important goals of advocacy
in this area is to influence the positions and policies of States in relation to the
international law governing mines and UXO.4
Efforts to address the consequences of mines and UXO are not new and
there have been a number of initiatives that have sought to improve the
international rules in this area. While early advocacy involved only a few
organisations, recent efforts have mobilised a wide range of actors from a
variety of disciplines. Activities have focused on lobbying governments to
adopt new rules on mines and UXO, promoting adherence to, and
implementation of, existing treaties and encouraging action to improve the
situation of mine and UXO victims and affected communities. There have
also been extensive activities to raise awareness among the general public in
order to influence national policies in these areas.
Advocacy and the development of international law
governing landmines and UXO
Two branches of international law are relevant to mines and UXO. The
first is international humanitarian law or, as it is sometimes referred to, the
law of armed conflict. This body of law seeks to minimise the suffering arising
from armed conflict, particularly for combatants, civilians and those no longer
participating in the hostilities (i.e. the sick and wounded, prisoners of war).
As part of this effort, international humanitarian law restricts the types of
weapons that may be used in armed conflict, how they may be used and how
military operations should be conducted. It also identifies measures to reduce
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the post-conflict consequences of the fighting. Major treaties in this area include
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions.
The second branch is disarmament law. This law generally consists of
international arms control agreements that seek to limit, reduce or abolish certain
types of weapons. Unlike international humanitarian law — the primary
purpose of which is to limit the suffering caused by armed conflict —
disarmament law seeks to eliminate or reduce the proliferation of certain
weapons in order to achieve or maintain regional or international security.
Treaties in this area include the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological
Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. Disarmament law has traditionally concerned weapons
with strategic implications or so-called weapons of mass destruction.
As will be explained later, elements from both these areas of law are today
part of the rules and regulations governing landmines and UXO. However, it
is in the domain of international humanitarian law that most efforts to address
the mine and UXO problem have been concentrated and that regulations to
limit the effects of these weapons have been first developed.
From its early stages, international humanitarian law was concerned
with limiting the suffering caused by weapons used in armed conflict. One
of the first agreements in this area banned the use of a newly developed
lightweight “exploding bullet”. The 1868 St Petersburg Declaration Renouncing,
in Time of War, the Use of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight was
the first international humanitarian law agreement devoted to a specific
weapon. It had been adopted because these lightweight projectiles had the
capacity to explode upon impact with soldiers even though they were
intended for use against ammunition carts. In light of the inevitable death
such projectiles would cause, governments considered their use contrary to
the laws of humanity.5
Additional agreements on weapons were adopted in the years that
followed. In 1899, at the First Hague Peace Conference, governments adopted
a prohibition on expanding or “dum-dum” bullets.6 In 1925, they banned the
use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases” and “bacteriological methods
of warfare” in response to public outrage at the use of poison gas during the
1914-1918 war.7 Following the conclusion of these instruments, however, no
new humanitarian law treaties on weapons were developed until the
conclusion of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in
1980.
These early instruments established several principles that today regulate
all weapons used in armed conflict and underlie the discussions on mines
and UXO. These principles establish that:
parties to a conflict are restricted in the weapons they may lawfully
use;
parties to a conflict must always distinguish between civilians and
combatants and shall direct military operations only against combatants
and military objectives (the “principle of distinction”);
weapons that cannot distinguish between civilian and military objectives
shall not be used; and
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it is prohibited to use weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering.8
The principle of distinction and the prohibition on the use of weapons that
cannot make such a distinction were often cited in the efforts to ban anti-
personnel mines. Because mines are designed to be laid, left and victim-activated,
several organisations, notably Human Rights Watch,9 argued that their use
violated these fundamental humanitarian law rules. A number of militaries
argued, however, that, if used properly, mines could be employed consistent
with international humanitarian law. The adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention in 1997 has provided a more direct path to the prohibition of
these weapons but the argument remains an important issue.
The first attempt to deal with the specific problems caused by landmines
followed the 1939-1945 war. Advancements in weapons technology and
changes in the conduct of warfare exposed significant gaps in international
humanitarian law. In order to strengthen the protection afforded by the law
to civilians and combatants, States concluded the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949, which laid down new rules on the treatment of the sick and wounded
on the battlefield, the sick and wounded at sea, prisoners of war and civilians.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions did not, however, prohibit the use of specific
weapons or extensively restrict the conduct of military operations.10
Nevertheless, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) believed
that new rules in these areas were necessary and in 1954 consulted a number
of experts to discuss the development of a new international instrument
governing weaponry. The result was the Draft Rules for the Protection of the
Civilian Population from the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare (1955). These
rules sought to prohibit weapons whose consequences were “unpredictable
and uncontrollable”. Of particular concern were “delay action weapons”, which
according to a commentary published by the ICRC were unable to distinguish
between civilians and combatants and included “bombs and mines dropped from
the air and [which] have a delayed action in the sense that they explode after a given
lapse of time or when they are touched”.11
The 1955 Draft Rules stipulated that:
“The use of so-called delay action projectiles is only authorised when
their effects are limited to the objective itself.”
“Weapons capable of causing serious damage shall, so far as possible, be
equipped with a safety device which renders them harmless when they
can no longer be directed with precision against a military objective.”
The 1955 Draft Rules also identified landmines as a special concern requiring
further study. In preparing a revised version of the Draft Rules for the 19th
International Red Cross Conference held in Delhi in 1957, a new rule on
landmines was added.
“If the Parties to the conflict make use of mines, they are bound, without
prejudice to the stipulations of the VIIIth Hague Convention of 1907, to
chart minefields. The chart shall be handed over, at the close of hostilities,
to the adverse Party, and also to the authorities responsible for the safety
of the civilian population.”12
Due to concerns about the potential impact of the Draft Rules on atomic
weapons, governments took no action. As a consequence, these early proposals
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to lessen the threat of mines and UXO lay dormant and were not revisited until
a re-examination of international humanitarian law in the 1970s and the
development of the CCW.13
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
The CCW is the result of efforts to strengthen international humanitarian
law during the 1970s.14 Wars of national liberation and conflicts in Southeast
Asia highlighted changes in the nature and conduct of warfare and a
corresponding need to ensure that the law be brought up to date with these
developments. The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts was held from 1974 to 1977 under the auspices of the Swiss
government and produced two new international humanitarian law treaties,
the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.15
While the 1977 Protocols increased the protections afforded to combatants
and civilians in armed conflict, they do not include prohibitions or restrictions
on specific types of weapons. Although two expert meetings were held to
explore possible restrictions in this area, States at the Diplomatic Conference
could not agree on including such rules as part of their work. Rather than
delay progress, the Conference called for the issue to be taken up within the
framework of the United Nations.
Negotiations began under the auspices of the UN General Assembly in
1979 and concluded in 1980. The result was the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
commonly referred to as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
or simply the CCW, which was adopted in 1980, coming into force in 1983.
As its name indicates, the CCW covers “conventional” weapons. Such
weapons are not defined in the Convention itself, but are generally understood
to be weapons other than biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.
Consequently, the Convention would cover the arms possessed by most armies
and regularly used in modern armed conflict. The CCW is generally considered
to be the primary regime to regulate conventional weapons under
international humanitarian law. As of 3 November 2005, the CCW had been
ratified by 100 States, including the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council and most other military powers.
The CCW has a unique structure. The main Convention is a framework
or umbrella instrument that contains the general rules on the CCW’s
operation (e.g. entry into force, scheduling of review conferences, etc).
The rules regulating specific weapons are found in the three protocols
annexed to the framework convention. As adopted in 1980, the CCW
included a prohibition on the use of weapons designed to injure by
fragments not detectable by X-ray (Protocol I), restrictions on the use of
landmines, booby-traps and other similar devices (Protocol II), and
restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (Protocol III).
An important characteristic of the CCW is that additional protocols can be
added to deal with future humanitarian concerns. In 1995, a new protocol was
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added prohibiting the use of blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV). In 1996, the
rules in Protocol II on mines, booby-traps and other devices were amended in
response to the problems caused by anti-personnel mines (amended Protocol
II). More recently, in November 2003, a new protocol (Protocol V) was added on
explosive remnants of war.
The CCW’s rules on mines, booby-traps and similar devices
The rules on mines, booby-traps and other devices in the original version of
Protocol II are the first international regulations specifically directed at
landmines in an effort to minimise their impact on civilians.16 The Protocol
prohibits the targeting of mines, booby-traps and other devices against civilians
and the indiscriminate use of these weapons. There are also restrictions on
the use of these weapons in populated areas, except for remotely-delivered
mines, which are treated separately.17 The Protocol requires that States take
all feasible precautions to protect civilians from the effects of mines, booby-
traps and other devices.
The Protocol includes provisions on the recording of minefields, mines
and booby-traps and urges the parties to cooperate among themselves and,
where appropriate, with other States and organisations in the removal or
neutralisation of minefields, mines and booby-traps placed in position during
conflicts.
It soon became evident that the rules of Protocol II were inadequate to
stem the humanitarian problems caused by the use of mines in the 1980s and
1990s. Protocol II might have been effective if meticulously applied but that
was not the case during most of the conflicts that occurred. Wars in
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Nicaragua are just a few
examples where mines, especially anti-personnel mines, were targeted against
civilians, employed indiscriminately and widely used without any precautions
to limit civilian casualties. Medical staff from international and non-
governmental organisations began to raise the alarm about the growing
numbers of civilian casualties.
The amendment of Protocol II
In 1993, in response to pressure from organisations working in mine-
affected countries, France formally requested the convocation of the First
CCW Review Conference to address the problems caused by anti-personnel
mines. Sessions in Vienna and Geneva considered a range of proposals that
included a ban on anti-personnel mines, greater restrictions on their use,
requirements for self-destruct and self-neutralisation mechanisms and
improvements on the requirements to map and remove these devices.
Negotiations were difficult, as a number of military powers were not ready
to give up or accept far-reaching regulation of weapons that they possessed
by the millions.
Finally, on 3 May 1996, more than two years after negotiations first began,
States Parties adopted “Protocol II as amended”, also commonly referred to
as amended Protocol II. Like other decisions taken by the States Parties to
the CCW, the Protocol was adopted by consensus, but, to the disappointment
107
of many in the international community, it did not include a comprehensive
prohibition on anti-personnel mines.
Amended Protocol II strengthens many of the rules found in the original
Protocol II and includes a number of new ones. Like the original Protocol,
amended Protocol II prohibits directing mines, booby-traps and other devices
against civilians and forbids the indiscriminate use of these weapons. It also
requires parties to a conflict to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians
from the effects of these weapons and to take measures to protect peace-
keeping, humanitarian and fact-finding missions of the United Nations and
other specified organisations.
The amended Protocol also established a number of new obligations. These
include a prohibition on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices that
detonate when passed over by a metal detector and a ban on the use of self-
deactivating mines with an anti-handling device that will continue to function
after the mine has become inert. A total of 999 out of 1,000 anti-personnel
mines must self-destruct or self-neutralise within 120 days after being remotely
delivered or laid outside marked and fenced areas. The Protocol also forbids
the transfer of all anti-personnel mines to non-State actors. Importantly, and
unlike the other protocols to the CCW at the time, its application was extended
to non-international armed conflicts.
For the first time in international humanitarian law, the Protocol
established that the parties to the conflict are responsible for the mines,
booby-traps and other devices they use and stipulates that these weapons
must be cleared from a party’s territory without delay after the cessation
of active hostilities.18 For territory it no longer controls, a party must
provide technical and material assistance to the party in control of the
territory in order to facilitate the removal of the devices it laid. For all
other situations, the parties must endeavour to reach agreement among
themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and international
organisations on the provision of technical and material assistance to
remove mines, booby-traps and other devices.
The amended Protocol also established several mechanisms to monitor
implementation and compliance with its provisions. Meetings of States Parties
are held annually to review the operation and status of the Protocol. States
Parties are also required to file annual reports on the implementation measures
taken at the national level. They are also required to take all appropriate
steps, including the adoption of legislation and other measures, to prevent
and suppress violations of the amended Protocol.
These developments, however, were widely considered inadequate to
address the anti-personnel mine problem. By the end of the negotiations,
some 40 States had publicly proclaimed their support for a complete
prohibition on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti-personnel
mines. They, along with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL),
the ICRC and the United Nations, believed that amended Protocol II was
unlikely to significantly reduce the level of civilian landmine casualties. In
addition to the lack of a complete prohibition on anti-personnel mines,
criticisms of the Protocol included an ambiguous definition of an anti-personnel
mine, the Protocol’s reliance on technical solutions (i.e. self-destruct and self-
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neutralisation mechanisms) and the fact that States were permitted to delay
these requirements for up to nine years.
At the end of the CCW Review Conference the Government of Canada
issued an invitation to pro-ban States to meet in Ottawa to discuss ways to
move the international community towards a prohibition of anti-personnel
mines. This initiative, which was held in October 1996, was the first step in
the development of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.
In spite of its weaknesses, amended Protocol II entered into force on 3
December 1998. As at 14 October 2005, 85 States were party to the instrument.
While many of these States have also ratified the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention, adherence to amended Protocol II is also considered important
as it contains rules for munitions not covered by the Convention but which
are also an international concern, mainly anti-vehicle mines, booby-traps and
other devices.
A new protocol on explosive remnants of war
The Second Review Conference of the CCW was held on 10-21 December
2001. Three proposals made at the Conference were specifically directed at
mines and UXO.
The first was a proposal of the United States and Denmark, later supported
by 14 other countries, to strengthen the rules on anti-vehicle mines (referred
to as mines other than anti-personnel mines). This proposal would require
that all anti-vehicle mines be detectable and that remotely delivered mines
possess self-destruct or self-neutralisation features. These requirements were
intended to supplement the rules of amended Protocol II governing these
weapons, which were also considered to be one of the Protocol’s weak points.19
The second proposal was a call to address the problems caused by
“explosive remnants of war” (ERW). This term is generally understood to
encompass UXO and explosive ordnance abandoned by armed forces on the
battlefield. The proposal was for the adoption of a new CCW protocol
requiring the clearance of ERW, measures to facilitate the work of organisations
conducting humanitarian clearance and/or risk education, requirements to
provide warnings to civilians and preventive measures to reduce the chance
that explosive ordnance would become ERW in the first place. Work on this
issue was first proposed by the ICRC in 2000 and was quickly supported by
many States Parties.
The final proposal related to mine and UXO was a request by Switzerland
for the CCW to consider specific rules on cluster submunitions (that is,
munitions that are “clustered” within a bomb or artillery casing that opens at
a predetermined height or after a set period of time). This proposal would
require the fuzing of future submunitions to have 98 per cent reliability through
improvements to the primary fuze or through self-destruct features.20 The
ICRC also proposed improvements to international law on the use of these
weapons. It asked the CCW to consider a prohibition on the use of
submunitions in populated areas.
The Review Conference decided these proposals warranted further
consideration and established a Group of Governmental Experts to consider
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them. After holding three sessions in 2002, the Group recommended that
negotiations on a new ERW protocol should begin the following year.
Conversely, the Group recommended that further discussion was required
on anti-vehicle mines and specific measures on submunitions, as not all experts
agreed that new rules were needed in these areas.21
After five weeks of negotiations in 2003, CCW States Parties adopted the
“Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War”. This is the first multilateral treaty
to deal with the problem of UXO, other than mines, and ordnance that has
been abandoned on the battlefield.22 It requires each party to an armed conflict
to:
clear the ERW in territory they control after a conflict;
provide technical, material and financial assistance in areas they do
not control to facilitate the removal of the unexploded or abandoned
ordnance resulting from their operations. This assistance can be
provided directly to the party in control of the territory or through a
third party such as the UN, NGOs or other organisations;
record information on the explosive ordnance employed by their armed
forces and to share that information with organisations engaged in the
clearance of ERW and programmes to warn civilians of the dangers of
these devices; and
take all feasible precautions to protect civilians from the effects of ERW.
This may include the fencing and monitoring of territory affected by
ERW, and the provision of warnings and risk education.
In addition to the obligations placed upon the parties to a conflict, all
States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the marking
and clearance of ERW, risk education, and assistance for the care, rehabilitation
and socio-economic reintegration of ERW victims.
The Protocol is an important development of international humanitarian
law. However, it has several limitations. The most significant weakness is
that it will primarily apply to future conflicts and not to existing ERW
problems.23 In addition, some of the obligations listed above are qualified
with phrases such as “where feasible”. Nonetheless, the Protocol’s core
obligations and its technical annex provide a framework for dealing with the
problems of ERW after the end of an armed conflict.
Anti-vehicle mines and specific measures on submunitions were not
part of the ERW negotiations. Discussions on these issues were continuing
in 2005.
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
The development of the Convention
There was widespread dissatisfaction with the content of amended Protocol
II adopted by the First CCW Review Conference in 1996. Jody Williams, the
coordinator of the ICBL, called the instrument “a humanitarian failure” and
the ICBL declared that the amended protocol would not make a significant
difference in stemming the global landmine crisis. The ICRC declared the
results “woefully inadequate” and “unlikely to significantly reduce the level of civilian
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landmine casualties”. The then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, also expressed his deep disappointment at the failure of the
conference to adopt a ban on landmines. More than 40 States supported a ban
on the weapons during the CCW Review Conference. As it became clear that
the conference would not adopt a ban, attention soon turned to alternative
ways to end the use of anti-personnel mines.
At the close of the Review Conference, Canada announced that it would
host a meeting of pro-ban States to discuss ways to further an anti-
personnel mine prohibition. The “International Strategy Conference:
Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines” was held on 3-5 October
1996 in Ottawa. Its final declaration committed some 50 governments to
work to ensure the earliest possible conclusion of an international
agreement outlawing anti-personnel mines. At the close of the meeting
the Foreign Minister of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy, shocked a number of
States by issuing a dramatic invitation to States to return to Ottawa before
the end of 1997 to sign a treaty banning anti-personnel mines. The so-
called “Ottawa Process” was launched.
Following these developments, events began to unfold rapidly. Austria
circulated a draft text for a mine-ban convention for comments, which one of
its diplomats had begun working on towards the end of the CCW Review
Conference. In February 1997, Austria convened an expert meeting, with more
than 100 governments represented, to exchange views on the draft and to
further develop its contents.24 Following this, Germany hosted a meeting to
discuss the verification mechanisms that might be part of the convention.25
Based on the results of these discussions, Austria issued a final draft text that
would be the basis for negotiations later that year in Oslo, Norway.
In preparation for the start of formal negotiations, on 24-27 June 1997 in
Brussels, Belgium hosted the official follow-up meeting to the 1996 Ottawa
Strategy Conference, the “International Conference for a Global Ban on Anti-
Personnel Mines”. The purpose of this meeting was to galvanise international
support for the conclusion of a ban treaty and to forward the Austrian draft
text for negotiation and adoption at the forthcoming Diplomatic Conference.
The “Brussels Declaration” affirmed that the essential elements of an agreement
to ban anti-personnel mines should include:
a comprehensive ban on the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer
of anti-personnel mines;
the destruction of stockpiled and removed anti-personnel mines; and
international cooperation and assistance in the field of mine clearance
in affected countries.
A total of 97 States signed the Declaration. Political will among
governments to support a comprehensive ban treaty was clearly growing.
Formal negotiations opened in Oslo, Norway on 1 September 1997. The
Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines
was attended by 117 governments, as well as the ICBL, the ICRC, the UN
and others.26 The 89 States that had endorsed the Brussels Declaration were
recognised as full participants and were accorded the right to vote on
proposals. Other States, NGOs, international organisations and the ICRC
attended as observers and, while permitted to speak at the meeting and
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comment on developments, they did not have the right to submit or vote on
proposals or amendments to the chairman’s text.27
During the following three weeks of negotiations the Diplomatic
Conference concluded the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction.
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention was opened for signature on 3
December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. Minister Axworthy’s challenge to conclude
an instrument in one year had been met. Some 121 States signed the
Convention at the signing ceremony and, in accordance with its provisions,
the Convention entered into force six months after 40 States had submitted
instruments of ratification or accession to the UN Secretary-General, the
Convention’s depositary. In September 1998, Burkina Faso became the fortieth
State to ratify the Convention, and consequently on 1 March 1999, international
law had a new legal instrument in the effort to reduce the effects of mines
and UXO. As at 14 October 2005, the Convention had become widely ratified
with 147 States, the latest being Vanuatu, having agreed to be bound by its
provisions.
The Convention’s provisions
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention sets out to end the use of anti-
personnel mines and to reduce the threat of anti-personnel mines already in
the ground.28 At its core is Article 1 (General Obligations), which stipulates
that States Parties undertake “never under any circumstances” to use, produce,
develop, stockpile or transfer anti-personnel mines. In addition, it is prohibited
to assist, encourage or induce anyone to commit such acts. These prohibitions
apply in all circumstances. This includes situations of armed conflict, internal
disturbances and tensions, and times of peace. Anti-personnel mines cannot
be used in offence, self-defence, to protect borders or for any other reason.
A State must also destroy the anti-personnel mines stockpiles it owns,
possesses or that are otherwise under its jurisdiction or control (Article 3).
Destruction must be completed as soon as possible but no later than four
years after a State becomes a party to the Convention. States are allowed to
transfer an unlimited number of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of
destruction. They are also permitted to keep a limited number of anti-
personnel mines for training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine
destruction techniques. The number of mines retained for these purposes is
to be “the minimum number absolutely necessary”. During the negotiations this
was understood to mean hundreds or, at most, thousands, but not tens of
thousands of anti-personnel mines. Many States, believing that the weapons
are not required for training, have retained no anti-personnel mines.
Each State is required to clear all emplaced anti-personnel mines in mined
areas under its jurisdiction or control (Article 5). Clearance must take place
as soon as possible but no later than ten years after the State becomes a party
to the Convention. As a prelude to clearance, States must make every effort
to identify all mined areas in its territory and perimeter mark, monitor and
ensure the effective exclusion of civilians by fencing or other means. Given
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the difficulty some heavily mine-affected States may have in reaching the
clearance deadline, the Convention allows a Meeting of the States Parties or
a Review Conference to grant an extension of up to ten years, following a
detailed explanation of its needs by the affected State. Extensions can be
renewed subsequently.
The Convention also establishes obligations in the area of victim assistance.
Each State Party, in a position to do so, must provide assistance for the care
and rehabilitation, and socio-economic reintegration of mine victims (Article
6). This is an obligation upon all States Parties to the Convention, not only
those with mine victims or mines on their territory. Similarly, all States Parties,
in a position to do so, are also required to provide assistance for the
destruction of anti-personnel mine stockpiles, the clearance of anti-personnel
mines and mine risk education activities. Thus, mine-affected States are not
alone in their efforts to remove the threat posed by anti-personnel mines or
to relieve the suffering of victims.
The Convention provides several mechanisms to monitor the
implementation of its provisions. It requires each State Party to adopt domestic
measures, including legislation if necessary, to implement the Convention
(Article 9) and to file annual reports on the status of its implementation (Article
7). It also mandates that Meetings of States Parties be held annually for the
first five years of the Convention’s entry into force to consider any matter
related to the application and implementation of the Convention (Article 11).
Similarly, Review Conferences, the first of which was convened in November-
December 2004, were able to consider matters related to the operation and status
of the Convention (Article 12). Finally, there are mechanisms to facilitate and
clarify compliance with the Convention if there are concerns that a party may
have or may be violating its provisions (Article 8).
One of the more important means to monitor implementation is the regular
meetings of the Standing Committees established by the First Meeting of
States Parties in 1999. The Committees meet once a year since the First Review
Conference (previously they met twice a year) and were created as a process
through which to examine and discuss issues related to the Convention
between the annual meeting of States Parties. It creates a systematic
programme of work on the themes of mine clearance, victim assistance and
risk education, stockpile destruction and the status and operation of the
Convention. The Committees have proven themselves to be a dynamic process
through which States, international organisations, NGOs and others can
advance the humanitarian objectives of the Convention.
Equally important are the efforts of the ICBL to monitor the progress
made in the campaign against anti-personnel mines through its annual
Landmine Monitor Report (see below).
Advocacy and the development of international law
on mines and UXO
One of the significant images from the First Review Conference of the
CCW was the sight of advocates outside the UN in Geneva encouraging
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government delegates to adopt a ban on anti-personnel mines. Mine victims,
mine clearance personnel, humanitarian workers and NGO activists were
seen passing out leaflets, putting up posters and otherwise lobbying for a
positive result. Images of these activities appeared in newspapers and on
news broadcasts around the world. It was clear evidence of how mobilised
civil society had become on this issue. It was also an indication of how
advocacy in the development of the international law on mines and UXO had
changed since the early efforts to address the problems caused by these
weapons.
Advocacy in the early efforts
Few NGOs or similar civil-society-based associations were involved in
the development of the early international humanitarian law treaties on
weapons. It is estimated that nearly 500 NGOs with an international
presence existed in the first part of the twentieth century.29 These
organisations covered a wide range of issues such as anti-slavery, organised
labour and women’s suffrage, to name just a few.30 Although there was a
significant NGO presence on the margins of the Hague Peace Conference in
1899, their activities were generally directed at reducing military expenditures
and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes rather than “humanising”
the conduct of war through the development of restrictions on specific
weapons.31 Thus, the development of the Hague Convention IV on the conduct
of warfare on land and the declarations associated with it was largely a
governmental affair.
The ICRC’s 1955 Draft Rules were the result of consultations between the
ICRC and government experts. Several academics with expertise in law and
medicine also participated in the discussions. In preparing the revised version,
the ICRC consulted National Red Cross Societies, as it had done in preparing
the drafts of the Geneva Conventions. The absence of broader expert
involvement can perhaps be explained by the ICRC’s tradition of working
closely with governments and its sister elements of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement in the development of international humanitarian law.
Non-governmental and other organisations were slightly more involved
in the development of the CCW. The ICRC convened two expert meetings to
explore the prospects for greater regulation of conventional weapons that
may have indiscriminate effects or be unnecessarily injurious.32 The work
and proposals of these meetings formed the basis for the CCW negotiations
in 1979 and 1980. The participants included military, legal, medical and
weapons experts from more than 40 governments. Experts appointed by select
national liberation movements and representatives of the UN Secretary-
General were also permitted to attend. Along with representatives of the
National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, NGOs participated as
observers. NGOs taking part included the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, the Special NGO Committee on Disarmament, Friends of
the World Committee and the International Confederation of Former Prisoners
of War. These organisations brought an important non-governmental expertise
and perspective to the discussions.33
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Non-governmental organisations were also present at the United Nations
Conference that negotiated the CCW when it convened in 1979. Although
the main actors in the negotiations were governments, NGOs were permitted
to participate in the conference as observers and where appropriate in
meetings of its subsidiary organs. Upon invitation of the presiding officer,
NGOs were also allowed to make statements in areas of their competence.
The ICRC and agencies of the UN also attended the negotiating sessions as
observers.
Overall, the advocacy of non-governmental and international organisations
in the development of the early rules on mines and UXO was limited. Although
they participated in an expert capacity in the preparation of the CCW in the
mid-1970s and its negotiation in 1979-1980, it was not until the 1990s that
these organisations would become a major factor in the development of the
law on mines and UXO and their public advocacy activities would have a
significant impact.
The growth of advocacy: the efforts of NGOs
and international organisations in the development
of a prohibition on anti-personnel mines
As humanitarian organisations became aware of the problems caused by
anti-personnel mines, advocacy activities began to increase. The principal
developments, however, were external to the formal meetings and
negotiations. In spite of their growing involvement, NGOs were prohibited
from attending the working sessions of the CCW expert meetings and the
First Review Conference. Their participation was limited to the meetings’
public sessions where they attended as observers. Yet, in these sessions and
in the events held on the margins, the organisations advocating for a complete
prohibition on anti-personnel mines made their views known. During the
first session of the CCW Review Conference in 1995, the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines presented a petition with 1.7 million signatures
of people from around the world calling for a ban on anti-personnel mines to
the president of the conference, Ambassador Johann Molander of Sweden.
At the final public session of the CCW Review Conference in 1996, some 150
NGO representatives from 20 countries were present in Geneva as
governments concluded amended Protocol II.
The increase in NGO advocacy activities was the result of an
unprecedented strategy and coordination to mobilise civil society in
support of a complete prohibition on anti-personnel mines. Well before
the First CCW Review Conference opened, a strong and very public
international effort was under way. With the failure of the Conference to
adopt a complete ban on anti-personnel mines and the launch of the Ottawa
Process, the advocacy efforts swung into high gear. By the time the
negotiations on the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention opened in Oslo
on 1 September 1997, public and political pressures for a successful result
were significant. The death of Princess Diana, who had spoken in favour
of a ban on anti-personnel mines, brought an unprecedented amount of
media attention to the negotiations. Unlike earlier negotiations in the fields
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of disarmament or international humanitarian law, there was clearly a sense
that the world was watching.
The ICBL, the ICRC and the United Nations were the principal actors in
the advocacy efforts. Their main activities during this time are briefly
highlighted below.
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The ICBL is a coalition of NGOs which has advocated
aggressively for an international ban on the use,
production, stockpiling, sale, transfer and export of anti-
personnel mines. Formed in 1993, with some 40
organisations initially, it had grown to include more
than 1,000 member organisations by the conclusion of
the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines in 1997. National
campaigns were found on all populated continents and many were active at
the national, regional and international levels. By the time the Convention
entered into force on 1 March 1999, the ICBL truly had a global reach.
In the lead-up to the First CCW Review Conference, the ICBL was very
active in mobilising public and political opinion in support of a ban on anti-
personnel mines. 34 Early publications produced by NGOs — such as Landmines
in Cambodia: The Cowards War and After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy
of Landmines — were instrumental in highlighting the scope and nature of the
anti-personnel mine problem and became an important reference for future
work.35 Public meetings and events were held in a number of countries to
raise awareness of the problem among the general public and parliamentarians.
The ICBL also employed direct appeals, writing open letters to Heads of
State and calling for a ban on anti-personnel mines with full page
advertisements in The New York Times. The Second International NGO
Conference held in Geneva in 1995 brought together more than 110
representatives from 75 NGOs.
Once the Review Conference began delegates could not help but feel the
ICBL’s presence. In addition to the large number of activists attending the
public sessions of the Conference in Vienna (1995) and Geneva (1996) a variety
of activities broadcast their messages to conference delegates and the general
public. Activities included a simulated minefield in the hall of the UN that
delegates saw each day, a “Wall of Remembrance” with pictures of mine
victims as well as leaflets, posters, photo exhibitions, stickers and other
documentation. At the closing plenary of the Conference, the ICBL requested
one minute’s silence to remember mine victims past, present and future. A
candlelight vigil was also held.36 Such activities had never been seen before
in the development of international humanitarian law.
The failure of the CCW Review Conference to adopt a complete ban on
anti-personnel mines and the launch of the Ottawa Process gave new
opportunities for the ICBL and other organisations to press for a
comprehensive ban treaty. NGO activities continued in the lead-up to the
Oslo negotiations and the period following the conclusion of the Convention.
While governments took the lead role in organising expert meetings to
develop the structure and contents of the Convention, the ICBL was active at
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the international level in mobilising NGOs and building political will in support
of a prohibition.
Of particular importance was the 4th International NGO Conference held
in Maputo, Mozambique, on 25-28 February 1997, attended by some 450
participants from more than 60 countries and the NGO Forum held alongside
the Oslo negotiations. These meetings were instrumental in informing national
campaigns of recent developments and providing them with the tools to lobby
government officials. The meetings were also valuable vehicles through which
to expand the campaign. The Oslo meeting was attended by some 130 NGOs
and developed an NGO plan of action for the Convention’s entry into force.
In addition to the work being done at the international level, regional
and national meetings were also effective mechanisms for advocacy during
this time. Regional meetings brought together government officials from
neighbouring countries and provided a venue to discuss the regional
dimensions of the anti-personnel mine problem and the regional
implications of an anti-personnel mine ban. As militaries often viewed a
ban on anti-personnel mines as having implications for national security,
discussions with neighbouring governments were essential. In the lead-
up to the adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the
subsequent efforts to promote it, regional meetings were held in nearly
every part of the world.
National meetings were also instrumental. They allowed for broader
participation than was possible at regional or international conferences and
facilitated a frank exchange of views among government officials, military
officials, parliamentarians, academics and NGO activists and other actors. In
the lead-up to the conclusion and entry into force of the Convention, national
meetings were held in Australia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Japan, Jordan, Nepal,
Senegal, Sudan, Ukraine, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Yemen.
In parallel with these events the ICBL and the national campaigns continued
to use dramatic displays to bring attention to its cause and remember the
victims of anti-personnel mines. Some of the memorable events include the
“shoe pyramid” used to symbolise the limbs lost to anti-personnel mines, a
clock registering another victim every 20 minutes, simulated minefields for
people to walk through and a bell-ringing campaign in more than 30 countries
at the Convention’s entry into force.
The ICBL’s activities continued after the entry into force of the Convention.
Through meetings, conferences and public events, it has played an important
role in the efforts to universalise the Convention. As mentioned above, it has
also taken a lead role in monitoring its implementation. The ICBL and its
national member campaigns have made important contributions to the
intersessional work on mine clearance, victim assistance and risk education,
stockpile destruction and the status and operation of the Convention. In
addition, the Landmine Monitor has become a main source of information on
adherence to and implementation of the Convention and the success of efforts
to address the anti-personnel mine problem.
Unlike the CCW process, NGOs were permitted to contribute to the
substantive development of the text of the Convention. ICBL representatives
participated in the range of experts’ meetings to prepare the Convention and
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in all the sessions of the negotiations. One ICBL participant in these meetings
noted that this was the first time that NGOs had been given official status in
international negotiations of an arms control or humanitarian law treaty.37
The ICRC
As mentioned above, the ICRC was closely associated with
the early efforts to minimise the dangers of landmines to
civilian populations. Since its founding in 1863, the ICRC has
worked to develop the humanitarian rules applicable in armed
conflict and is widely recognised as the “guardian” of
international humanitarian law. States have often given the
ICRC a mandate to prepare the drafts of humanitarian law
treaties as the basis for international negotiations.
Similar to its earlier role in the development of the CCW, the ICRC was
active in the preparations for the First CCW Review Conference. It was invited
to participate in the government experts’ meetings preparing the Conference
and to submit a report on mines and other issues on the basis of its field
experience and expertise in international humanitarian law.38 During the Review
Conference the ICRC participated as an observer and commented formally and
informally on the issues and proposals which emerged. It also submitted its
own proposals for States Parties and experts to consider.39
The ICRC was also very active outside of the CCW context during this
time. It organised a series of expert seminars on anti-personnel mines between
1993 and 1995. One of the most important was the ICRC Symposium on
Anti-Personnel Mines held in Montreux, Switzerland, in April 1993. The
meeting brought together for the first time experts in military strategy, the
development and production of mines, international law, surgery,
rehabilitation and mine clearance. Participants included NGOs advocating
a complete ban on anti-personnel mines. The report of this meeting was sent
to all governments and became an important source of reference for the ICRC,
NGOs and others in their future activities.40 The meeting also marked the
start of a loose cooperation between the ICRC, the
ICBL and other organisations and experts working
on the anti-personnel mine issue.
Subsequent ICRC meetings and documents also
made important contributions to the efforts to ban anti-
personnel mines. In 1995, in cooperation with the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the ICRC
organised meetings in Africa to encourage African
States to participate in the CCW Review Conference
and to work towards a ban on anti-personnel mines.41
Particularly useful was its 1996 study examining the
military effectiveness of anti-personnel mines in 26
armed conflicts. Its findings, supported by 55 military
officers, concluded that the military utility of anti-
personnel mines was limited and was far outweighed
by the weapon’s humanitarian consequences. It went on to say that “their
prohibition and elimination should be pursued as a matter of utmost urgency by
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governments and the entire international community.”42 As the military utility of
anti-personnel mines was an important issue in discussions with military
officers, these were valuable findings for the advocacy efforts.
Four days before the first meeting of governmental experts to prepare the
CCW Review Conference, the ICRC publicly called for a total ban on anti-
personnel mines. This was followed by ICRC’s decision to launch — for the
first time in its history — a media campaign to mobilise public opinion and
political will for the stigmatisation of anti-personnel mines and for increased
commitments to victim assistance and mine clearance.43 The ICRC believed
that a strong public reaction would increase the political will of governments
to support a ban treaty and alleviate the suffering of mine victims. It had
never before used such “public” methods in its efforts to develop international
humanitarian law.44
The ICRC continued its advocacy and was active at many levels following
the disappointing results of the CCW Review Conference. It was keenly involved
in the work to develop the text of Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,
commenting on the various draft texts and proposals in the experts’ meetings
in the Oslo negotiations. It also prepared and disseminated a broad range of
campaign materials and specialist and layman’s publications on the
humanitarian costs of landmines and the legal, medical, rehabilitative aspects
of the landmine problem.
The ICRC also used regional and national meetings to garner support for
a comprehensive ban treaty and the Ottawa Process. Following the First CCW
Review Conference it organised or assisted regional meetings in the
Philippines (for military officers) and Zimbabwe (for members of the Southern
African Development Committee). It also organised a national seminar on
landmines in Managua, Nicaragua.
In parallel with its media campaign, the ICRC also facilitated media
coverage of the situation in mine-affected countries. Journalists, of both the
electronic and print media, were received at ICRC delegations and transported
to mine-affected areas to speak with local residents about their situation.
They also visited ICRC medical treatment centres and rehabilitation clinics
and were put in touch with other humanitarian organisations working in the
area. Many articles, stories and documentaries resulted from such visits,
further increasing the public exposure to the issue and the scale of the
problem.45
This unprecedented ICRC advocacy reflected how determined it was to
pursue the total elimination of anti-personnel mines.
The United Nations
Along with the ICBL and the ICRC, the United Nations also
made important contributions to the development of a ban on
anti-personnel mines. It expressed support for a ban prior to
the start of the experts’ meetings preparing the First CCW
Review Conference. Even though the UN Secretary-General is
the depositary of the CCW, he noted in 1994 that “the best and
most effective way” to solve the global landmine problem was a
complete ban on all landmines.46 The UN also issued yearly
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reports (1994-1996) on national moratoriums adopted by States on the export of
anti-personnel mines and urged those States which had not already done so to
take such measures in the lead-up to the First CCW Review Conference. A
report on the progress towards an international agreement to ban anti-personnel
mines (1997) and reports on assistance in mine action (from 1995) were also
issued. These documents, prepared in response to UN General Assembly
resolutions, helped document developments on the anti-personnel mine issue
and highlight its importance among UN departments and specialised agencies.
The study by Ms Graça Machel for the UN on the impact of armed conflict
on children (1996) was a particularly important document.47 It specifically
highlighted the dangers landmines posed to young people and called upon
governments to support a worldwide ban. It played an important role in
sensitising and galvanising the various agencies and departments of the UN
towards a ban on anti-personnel mines.
The agencies of the UN also played an important role in promoting a ban.
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) were all active in various capacities. In many instances
their country representatives lobbied the relevant ministries to support the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention or worked at the local level to empower
communities to carry out their own advocacy. A variety of reports,
publications and other materials were also produced. Representatives from
UN departments and agencies attended many of the conferences and seminars
on landmines, and participated in the First CCW Review Conference as well
as the Ottawa and Oslo meetings. Their activities have continued in the efforts
to universalise and implement the Convention.
Other international and regional organisations
Other international and regional bodies also played a role. Support for a
ban on anti-personnel mines was expressed by the Vatican Council for Justice
and Peace (1994), the Islamic Conference (1995) and the African, Caribbean,
Pacific Union Joint Assembly (1995). The Council of Ministers of the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted a resolution calling upon member
States to support a common African position in favour of a ban (1995). On the
other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the Organization of American States (OAS)
adopted a resolution establishing the Americas as a hemisphere-wide zone
free of all landmines (1996). Shortly thereafter, Caribbean States also declared
the creation of a mine-free zone (1996). These developments helped further the
political discussions and were a further indication of the depth of the support
to ban these weapons.
Key features of the advocacy on mines and UXO
A multi-dimensional role and partnership with States
One of the most striking features of the development of a ban on anti-personnel
mines was the multi-dimensional character of the advocacy campaign.
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Advocacy was undertaken by a variety of actors from an assortment of
backgrounds and disciplines. Never before had a campaign been so well
coordinated and so motivated to achieve a development of international
humanitarian law.
Equally striking was the wide range of activities used. Case studies, expert
meetings, national, regional and international conferences, public
demonstrations and mass media were used to raise awareness and promote
a ban. This was a style of advocacy much different from the early development
of international law on mines and UXO.
The following features played an important role in the campaign’s
success.
Expertise
Each major organisation involved had first-hand experience of dealing with
the problems caused by mines and UXO. The ICRC, the UN and several core
members of the ICBL had operations in war-torn countries. They witnessed, on
a daily basis, the direct effects of these weapons on individual civilians and
communities. These organisations were either clearing mines and UXO,
conducting risk education and treating and rehabilitating victims even before
such activities were enveloped under the label of “mine action.” In sounding
the alarm about the mine and UXO problem, these organisations thus brought
a credible field perspective and a distinct authority to the discussions on how
to address the problem. Their experiences changed the perception that anti-
personnel mines were a humanitarian problem and not an arms control issue.
Global reach
The ICBL, the ICRC and the UN had direct links to government capitals and
to civil society in many countries. Through its national campaigns and member
NGOs, the ICBL was able to raise awareness of anti-personnel mines at the
local level, to mobilise public opinion and to lobby government officials. As the
international community began negotiations on anti-personnel mines, the
campaigns could meet directly with government representatives,
parliamentarians and military officials to explain the ICBL’s proposals and
positions. This gave the organisation an active and nearly global reach.
The ICRC also had local operations supporting its advocacy efforts. Through
its delegations and the National Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, the ICRC could distribute documents and have its print and media
advertisements used at the national level. Many documents and
advertisements were translated into local languages. As ICRC delegations
and national societies often work closely with governments on international
humanitarian law issues, most already had a well-established dialogue with
government officials.
The UN also played an active role. UNICEF and UNHCR were particularly
active in advocating for a ban on anti-personnel mines at the regional and
national levels through their participation at seminars and conferences and in
bilateral contacts at the field level.
There was a significant coordination between these organisations in their
advocacy work. While the ICRC and the UN were not members of the ICBL,
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their activities were mutually reinforcing. Representatives of each were often
found together on the panels of meetings and conferences and they often
disseminated each other’s documentation. While they each conducted separate
dialogues with government officials there was a consistent flow of messages
that helped further the discussion and consideration of the anti-personnel
mine ban by governments.
Partnership with States
Achieving a ban on anti-personnel mines required a working collaboration
with States in order to further the issue on the international agenda. Working
closely with pro-ban organisations, States such as Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Norway, South Africa and Switzerland helped drive the process at the
diplomatic level to develop the structure and contents of the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention. Similarly, the carefully planned focus on a regional
approach (especially in Africa and Central America), supported by a cross-
regional “core group” of States, quickly and effectively built momentum
towards a ban. Thus the anti-personnel mine issue moved forward more
quickly than is generally the case in traditional disarmament or international
humanitarian law negotiations. It also showed that important humanitarian
issues can be addressed without the involvement of the most powerful
governments. States other than the world’s largest military or diplomatic
powers can establish important and widely ratified humanitarian norms,
particularly in the face of an urgent humanitarian need and with strong public
support (see further below).
Military-to-military dialogue
One of the important, yet often overlooked, elements of the campaign
against anti-personnel mines was the effective role of military-to-military
dialogue. Parallel to the public campaign in many countries was a
corresponding effort in military circles to end anti-personnel mine use. Senior
military officers, both active and retired, from combat and clearance forces,
took a lead role in these activities. Countries supporting a ban, such as Canada
and South Africa, made their officers available for advocacy activities.
Documents were developed specifically for military audiences. These
include Anti-Personnel Mines: Friend or Foe, a study on the military utility of anti-
personnel mines, written by retired Brigadier Patrick Blagden (the former UN
Expert on Mines) and published by the ICRC, and Alternatives to Anti-Personnel
Landmines, written by General Robert Gard Jr. and published by the Vietnam
Veterans of America Foundation. These and other similar materials were
widely distributed at national, regional and international conferences on anti-
personnel mines and, more specifically, at the meetings organised for military
officials.
The issues addressed in these publications included the military utility of
anti-personnel mines, the consequences of anti-personnel mines on one’s own
forces and civilian populations, and tactical and technical alternatives to anti-
personnel mines. Military-to-military dialogue was, and still is, one of the most
effective means of furthering consideration of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
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Convention among military forces, because it challenged the military case for
the retention of anti-personnel mines above and beyond the humanitarian
impact on the civilian population.
A process to promote implementation
Equally important to the norms established by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention are the formal and informal processes created to promote its
implementation. The Standing Committees provide an open and informal
forum where States Parties, NGOs and international organisations and even
non-party States can share expertise, experiences and resources on the
Convention’s key provisions and mine action more generally. This has helped
States Parties to fulfil their obligations and to prepare them to meet the
deadlines for anti-personnel mine clearance and stockpile destruction. It has
also helped keep States Parties and the international community focused on
addressing the anti-personnel mine problem in the years since the Convention
entered into force.
An annual meeting is also held by States Parties to amended Protocol II of
the CCW. This one-day event examines the overall status of the Protocol but
does not significantly examine issues related to mine action. As most of the
States Parties to amended Protocol II are also parties to the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention, many see no value in discussing similar issues in both
fora. While their participation is permitted, few NGOs and other mine action
organisations attend the annual meetings of amended Protocol II.
The Landmine Monitor Report, published annually by the ICBL, is one of
the important surveys of the progress being made on the landmine problem.
This annual report provides an independent overview of the situation in mine-
and UXO-affected countries, the ongoing mine action activities within each
country and the national positions on the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
and amended Protocol II to the CCW. For States Parties to the Anti-Personnel
Mine Convention, the report highlights the status of the instrument’s
implementation at the national level and its positions on related issues, such
as anti-handling devices and anti-vehicle mines with sensitive fuzes. The
Landmine Monitor plays an essential role in measuring the impact of the
Anti-Personnel Mine Convention and the efforts to address the problems
caused by mines and UXO more generally.
A new approach to creating rules on mines and UXO?
Several commentators have suggested that the development of the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention signals a new approach in international
relations and, in particular, in the efforts to address threats to human security.48
Following the success of the Ottawa Process, NGO coalitions were formed to
advocate on the International Criminal Court, child soldiers, and small arms
and light weapons, with varying degrees of success.49
Compared to the advocacy on anti-personnel mines, there has been
significantly less effort directed at addressing the impact caused by ERW.
From the humanitarian point of view, ERW is an equally devastating problem
— leftover ordnance causing large numbers of civilian casualties and long-
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term socio-economic consequences. In some respects, addressing the ERW
problem would seem easier than prohibiting anti-personnel mines. Unlike
anti-personnel mines, militaries have widely recognised that ERW have no
intended military utility. In addition, governments have been dramatically
sensitised to the problems caused by ERW as a result of the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention. Finally, there has not been a concerted effort to ban
any weapon in the work on ERW. Thus, ERW would seem to be a good
candidate for a strong response by the international community.
The new Protocol V recently adopted by the States Parties to the CCW is,
however, only a modest result. Many States sought stronger obligations to
minimise the post-conflict consequences of ERW. Others, however, would
not accept absolute commitments. The result is a protocol which establishes
an important framework for reducing the threat of ERW but which only
requires parties to a conflict to act “where feasible” and “where practicable”. In
addition, the Protocol’s principal rules will only apply to future conflicts and
are not meant to apply to existing ERW problems. States Parties with ERW
on their territory from past conflicts are, however, given a right to seek
assistance from other States and international organisations in order to help
them deal with the existing problem.
As mentioned above, CCW States Parties also decided to continue to discuss
the problems of anti-vehicle mines and specific regulations on cluster
munitions. While a number of States have proposed new rules on these
weapons to minimise the humanitarian consequences, there has been little
progress since these issues were placed on the CCW agenda in 2000. Several
States oppose new rules on cluster munitions and have consistently blocked
negotiations.
A number of factors may explain the modest results on ERW and the slow
approach to new rules on anti-vehicle mines and submunitions. Firstly, the
negotiations and discussions were conducted in the context of the CCW, which
takes its decisions by consensus. As a result, the texts and decisions must be
acceptable to all States Parties and are destined to be the result of compromise.
No State, even those involved in the Ottawa Process, sought to take these
issues out of the CCW.
Secondly, there was much less public pressure for strong results. Fewer
NGOs and international organisations were involved in the development
and negotiation of the ERW Protocol and the efforts to create stronger rules
on anti-vehicle mines and submunitions. Mines Action Canada, Human Rights
Watch, Landmine Action, ICRC, the UN Mine Action Service and several
other organisations have been active on these issues but, despite their efforts,
there has not been the same sense of urgency found during the campaign
against anti-personnel mines. As was highlighted by one delegate from a State
that does not want new regulations on anti-vehicle mines: “We don’t feel any
real pressure to address the issue”.
The reach of international humanitarian law:
more than just the numbers
One of the points often raised in the work to develop new rules on mines
and UXO is the need to secure the adherence of major military and diplomatic
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powers. It is widely believed in diplomatic circles that new treaties adopted in
this area must have the support of powerful countries if they are to have any
chance of becoming widely ratified and achieve their objectives. This was
regularly cited in the early pursuit of a ban on anti-personnel mines. It has also
been referred to in the work on ERW and is likely to be a consideration in the
future efforts to develop new rules on mines and UXO.
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is one example of an international
treaty that became a widely accepted international norm without the support
of a number of significant military powers. Despite this lack of support
(perhaps even as a result of it!), the Convention was quickly and widely
ratified. Within 19 months of its adoption in December 1997, the Convention
had received the 40 ratifications necessary for it to become binding
international law. Six years later, 147 States — more than three quarters of
the world’s nations — have joined the Convention.
As a result of the large number of ratifications, the prohibition on anti-
personnel mine use has become the international norm. This has had a
corresponding impact on the behaviour of States not a party to the instrument.
While States not bound by the Convention can legally use anti-personnel
mines, fewer and fewer choose to do so. As cited by the Landmine Monitor,
“the overall trend has been positive, even with respect to non-States Parties, as the
international norm against the anti-personnel mine has spread”.50 When anti-
personnel mines have been used, the ICBL and others have voiced concern
and disapproval. Thus, even though only legally applicable to States Parties,
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention has become the standard of
behaviour expected of responsible governments.
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is not the only instance where a
treaty of international humanitarian law has been widely ratified without
the support of powerful nations. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the
use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons was widely adhered to in
spite of the fact that several important countries, most notably the United
States and Japan, did not consent to be bound by the instrument. The US
eventually ratified the Protocol in 1975 — some 70 years after its adoption.
Nevertheless, the prohibition on the use of poison gas became a widely
accepted norm throughout the international community.
These examples show that instruments can become a widely accepted norm
in spite of the fact that some major military and diplomatic powers have not
adhered to them. While there is clearly a benefit in having as broad support
as possible on weapons issues, particularly in order to bind users and
producers, humanitarian rules can nonetheless develop. Universal application
of the law can be a slow process. It may take some countries decades to formally
adhere to new treaties, but, in the development of humanitarian norms, States
seeking solutions to a humanitarian problem can set the standard for the
international community.
The use of statistics in advocacy
Statistics played a prominent role in the public campaign against anti-
personnel mines. The ICBL, the ICRC and the UN used a variety of figures
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on the nature and the scope of the mine problem. These figures were often
quoted by governments and repeated in media reports. The numbers provided
an easily understood indication of the scale of the problem and captured the
attention of governments and the general public. Some of the statistics
regularly quoted included estimates that there were 35 million uncleared
mines in Afghanistan, 9–15 million in Angola, 6 million in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and 6 million in Cambodia. The worldwide problem was said
to total up to 110 million mines in the ground.
These figures became a source of controversy. There were strong objections
to these estimates by several mine clearance organisations. It was noted, for
example, that in order to lay 35 million mines in Afghanistan, Soviet forces
would have had to have emplaced 10,000 mines per day, every day of the
Soviet Union’s nine-year military involvement in the country.51 The HALO
Trust claimed that the scope of the anti-personnel mine problem in many
countries was far less than cited in the advocacy campaign documents.52
These claims had merit and many estimates were subsequently lowered.
In Afghanistan, the estimate was reduced to 10 million mines (which probably
still overstated the scale of problem). The national mine action centre in Bosnia
and Herzegovina lowered its estimate to 750,000 mines that needed to be
cleared.53 Moreover, although useful for advocacy, these figures are almost
valueless in terms of mine action. Thus, today the information coming from
countries heavily affected by mines and UXO focuses not on the number of
mines that remain uncleared but rather on the number of known minefields
and UXO locations, the number of villages and square meters affected by the
weapons, and the number of victims.54
One concern about the use of such figures was that it would undermine
funding for mine action programmes. Specifically it was asserted that the
high figures would cause donors to shy away from providing funds for
clearance activities if they perceived that such projects might need to last for
decades or even hundreds of years.55 Fortunately, such claims have not
materialised. Funding for mine action has been and remains substantial. For
calendar year 2003, Landmine Monitor identified US$339 million in mine action
funding from more than 24 donors. It appears likely that funding for 2004
increased significantly, although the convening of the First Review Conference
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the change in the exchange
rate between the dollar and the euro is probably largely responsible for that
increase.
In total, it is believed that more than US$2.5 billion has been contributed
for mine action since 1989. Advocacy has probably taken up no more than
US$50 million of this amount — a relatively meagre 2 per cent of the funds
allocated. Importantly it also notes that there has been an increase in the number
of mine/UXO affected countries reporting organised mine clearance operations.56
The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the GICHD also retains
information on the trends in funding. Tables prepared by the ISU show that
there has been no significant change in the total level of contributions to
mine action since 1998 and that the annual contributions of some significant
donors have actually increased in recent years. Similarly, the ICRC’s Special
Appeal for Mine Action has been consistently funded. The appeal, launched
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in 1999, sought to raise 100 million Swiss Francs (approx. US$80 million) over
five years for its mine risk education, victim assistance and advocacy
programmes.57
The capacity to record data on mines and UXO has improved in recent
years. With the professionalisation of mine action and the development of
survey standards and information management tools, such as the IMSMA,
organisations have better means to determine and record the extent of the
mine and UXO problem. Aware of the earlier concerns on the use of statistics,
many organisations are now much more cautious in their use of figures.
Conclusions
Advocacy has been a major factor in achieving a comprehensive
international legal prohibition of anti-personnel mines in the space of only a
few years and has promoted the commitment of significant resources to mine
action. A side benefit has been the promotion of the development and
implementation of international humanitarian law more generally.
The current definition of advocacy in the IMAS focuses on initiatives aimed
at mobilising public support to reduce the threat or consequences of mines
and UXO. However, as this chapter has highlighted, advocacy in the
development of the international law on mines and UXO has involved more
than the marshalling of public opinion. It has also encompassed the direct
lobbying of government officials and activities in coordination with NGOs,
international organisations, the ICRC and others. Much of the work in
developing the law on mines and UXO has occurred at the expert level. While
public opinion and public pressure are essential elements in influencing
government positions, it is only part of the more general advocacy effort.
Future editions of the IMAS should consider improving the definition of
advocacy. A possible definition could be as follows:
Advocacy: In the context of mine action, the term refers to actions or
activities intended to lobby for, encourage or promote the adoption and
implementation of rules and policies with the aim of removing or reducing
the threat from and the impact of mines and UXO.
This would bring the IMAS concept of advocacy closer to the way that it
is practised by NGOs, international organisations and other actors in this
area.
Consideration should also be given to broadening the reference to advocacy
and international law in the IMAS definition of mine action. Thus, the IMAS
declares that mine action includes five complementary groups of activities,
including “advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines”.58 This seems
unnecessarily narrow. A better formulation might be as follows:
Mine action includes “advocacy in favour of the prohibition and
elimination of anti-personnel mines and the promotion of the adoption
and implementation of norms, rules, policies and actions that reduce the
threat from and impact of other UXO”.
More generally, there is a need to develop a means to regularly monitor
the UXO situation globally and in specific contexts. Information on the
problem in many parts of the world is not regularly reported or disseminated.
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Thus, it is often difficult to keep abreast of developments on the nature of the
UXO problem, its human and socio-economic consequences and the
consequences of new conflicts or other factors on the ground. As work
progresses on a variety of UXO-related issues, information in these areas
would be an important contribution to ongoing advocacy work.
Such a mechanism would also be valuable for ensuring the implementation
of the new Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War. This new agreement is
more than a treaty to govern the conduct of States. It is an international
framework for mine action. In addition to the more general information on
UXO, a monitoring mechanism could chart adherence to the Protocol and
how States are altering their national and military policies. Once a conflict
has taken place, such a monitoring mechanism would be essential to report
on how the Protocol’s obligations are being executed.
The ICBL’s Landmine Monitor is an example of a mechanism that has
been effective in monitoring the progress made on landmines. It has become
an essential element in advocacy on the landmine issue. While many of its
reports provide a glimpse into the UXO problem, their primary focus is on
the policies and activities related to landmines. More detailed information
on other forms of UXO would be useful.
Consideration should be given to developing a mechanism to regularly
monitor the broader UXO problem and the work being done to address
it. Annual publications are one approach. Broadening or supporting the
work of the Landmine Monitor might so be considered. Other ideas may
include regular consultations of States and mine action professionals,
through a process parallel to the Standing Committees of the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Clearly any concepts developed need to
build upon existing efforts and not duplicate them.
In learning the lessons of the past decade, it is clear that part of the success
of the campaign against anti-personnel mines was the unprecedented degree
of coordination among the variety of actors involved in advocacy activities.
Although the main actors came from a range of disciplines, operated under
different mandates and played different roles in the advocacy work, they
nevertheless closely coordinated and supported each other’s activities.
However, the same level of cooperation and coordination has not been as
evident in the efforts to improve the international law on ERW, anti-vehicle
mines and cluster munitions in the context of the CCW. While several NGOs,
the ICRC, UNMAS and UNICEF have worked closely in these areas, other
organisations involved in the anti-personnel mine issue have been less active.59
As compared with meetings on landmines, fewer organisations have
participated in the meetings of the CCW States Parties or its Group of
Governmental Experts. In addition, the proposals on ERW and anti-vehicle
mines have not been as extensively raised in capitals by advocacy
organisations.
One explanation is that many of the relevant organisations remain focused
on the anti-personnel mine problem and the implementation of the anti-
personnel Mine Ban Convention. With the Convention’s Standing Committees,
the Meeting of States Parties and implementation work at the national level,
most organisations are fully occupied throughout the year. It is often difficult
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for them to follow developments in the parallel processes in the CCW with their
existing resources. As a result, there has been less public and political pressure
on governments for a positive result on ERW, anti-vehicle mines and cluster
munitions.
As work continues on these issues, cooperation and coordination will need
to be enhanced if the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War is to be widely
ratified and effective measures are to be adopted on anti-vehicle mines and
cluster munitions. The mobilisation of public pressure, political will and
dialogue with the armed forces will be essential parts of the advocacy work.
Greater cooperation and coordination in these areas will maximise the
effectiveness of the messages and activities. The organisation of an NGO
campaign on cluster munitions and ERW will improve the capacity for
cooperation and coordination on these issues. Formed in November 2003,
the Cluster Munitions Coalition should become an important actor and a focal
point in the advocacy efforts on these issues.
129
Endnotes
1. The full title is the Convention on the Prohibition on the Use, Stockpiling, Production,
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction, hereinafter, the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention.
2. See, for example, Terre des Hommes, What is Advocacy (www.tdhafghanistan.org/
Capitalisation%20Paper%20-%20Advocacy.pdf), 17 October 2002, which defines
advocacy (in the case of street children) as: “Liaising with and lobbying subscribers and
policy makers, including the use of public events and media coverage, regarding the violation
of rights encountered by street children and appropriate measures to counter them”. See also
The Advocacy Institute, www.advocacy.org/definition.htm.
3. International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), IMAS 04.10: Glossary of mine action
terms, definitions and abbreviations, Second Edition, 1 January 2003, Definition 3.7.
4. In addition, UNMAS, through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, has
(with varying degrees of success) been able to influence the formulation of the text of
a number of cessation of hostilities and peace agreements (e.g. Eritrea-Ethiopia,
Kosovo and Sudan) and related Security Council Resolutions, to ensure that some
wording is included to recognize: (1) the residual mine/UXO threat, (2) its potential
impact on emergency and humanitarian relief efforts, (3) the responsibility of the
Parties to assist in and facilitate the mitigation of this threat (4) their responsibility to
hand over the minefield records and related information, including (5) responsibility
to facilitate the efforts of UNMAS and its partners in the post-conflict efforts to deal
with the landmine problems.
5. Preamble to the Declaration Renouncing, in Time of War, the Use of Explosive Projectiles
under 400 Grammes Weight, concluded in St. Petersburg, entered into force 11 December
1868.
6. Declaration (IV, 3) concerning expanding bullets, The Hague, 29 July 1999. Entered
into force 4 September 1900.
7. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva 17 June 1925. The Protocol
entered into force on 8 February 1928.
8. These principles find expression in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions (see Articles 35, 48 and 51) and were repeated by the International Court
of Justice in its advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons.
9. See, for instance, Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights (1993).
10. The conduct of military operations remained regulated by Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted in 1899. It entered into
force 26 January 1910.
11. See Maresca and Maslen (2000: 16–17).
12. ICRC (1995).
13. The full legal title of this instrument is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
14. The full title is Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, hereinafter, CCW.
15. The full title of the Protocols are : Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
Advocacy and international law
130
Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges
II), 8 June 1977.
16. Article 2(3) of amended Protocol II defines “other devices” as “manually emplaced
munitions and devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote
control or automatically after a lapse of time”.
17. Article 5 of Protocol II prohibits the use of remotely delivered mines unless their
location can be accurately recorded and each mine contains a self-neutralising
mechanism so that the mine will destroy itself when it no longer serves a military
purpose.
18. Amended Protocol II, Article 3(1) and Article 10.
19. The detectability requirements of Protocol II only apply to anti-personnel mines
(Article 5). Remotely delivered anti-vehicle mines, referred to as “mines other than
anti-personnel mines” must, to the extent feasible, have a self-destruct or self-
neutralisation mechanism with a back-up self deactivation feature (Article 6(3)).
There are no such requirements on manually emplaced anti-vehicle mines.
20. CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.4.
21. CCW/MSP/2002/2.
22. The Protocol does not cover landmines as they are already dealt with by the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention and amended Protocol II of the CCW.
23. However, Article 7 of the Protocol allows States Parties with existing ERW
problems to seek assistance from other States and relevant organisations to address
the problems caused by UXO and AXO already in its territory.
24. Expert Meeting on the Text of a Convention to ban Anti-Personnel Mines, held on
12–14 February 1997 in Vienna. One-hundred and eleven governments attended as
did many NGOs, international organisations and the ICRC.
25. International Expert Meeting on Possible Verification Measures to Ban Anti-
Personnel Landmines was held in Bonn, Germany, 24 and 25 April 1997. A total of
121 States attended the meeting.
26. Other organisations included the Organization for American States, the
Organisation for African Unity and the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies.
27. See the Draft Rules of Procedure for the Conference, Rules 1 and 47.
28. For a more detailed overview of the requirements of the Convention and some of
the concerns about the clarity of its definitions and provisions see GICHD (2004d).
29. Chatfield (1997: 21).
30. Ibid.: 21.
31. Ibid.: 24.
32. Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons,
held in Lucerne, Switzerland, 24 September–18 October 1974, and Lugano,
Switzerland, 28 January–26 February 1976.
33. For one of the few non-governmental expert perspectives on these meetings see
Prokosch (1995).
34. The Chronology of the Ban Movement can be found on the ICBL’s website:
www.icbl.org.
35. Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights (1991), Roberts and
Williams (1995).
36. Williams and Goose (1998: 33).
37. Goose (1998: 278).
38. ICRC (1994).
39. Maresca and Maslen (2000: 266–326).
40. ICRC (1993).
41. Regional meetings were held in Addis Ababa, Harare and Yaounde in 1995.
131
42. ICRC (1996a).
43. Maresca and Maslen (2000: 404–406).
44. Print and television advertisements were the principal media used. A total of 12
print and four television advertisements were produced and placed throughout the
international media on a pro bono basis. It has been estimated that the media space
donated was in excess of 4,000,000 Swiss Francs (roughly US$2.6 million with a
potential audience of more than 700 million people) (Lavoyer and Maresca, 1999:
501-525).
45. Ibid.
46. UN Doc. A/49/357 of 6 September 1994.
47. UN Doc. A/51/306 of 26 August 1996.
48. L. Axworthy, “Towards a New Multilateralism” in Cameron et al. (1998: 448-
460).
49. Hubert (2000).
50. ICBL (2003: 5).
51. Maslen (2001: 20–21).
52. In Afghanistan, for example, HALO Trust asserted that there were fewer than one
million anti-personnel mines and that there were less than 500,000 mines in Angola.
See Bottigliero (2000: 50, 55).
53. ICRC (1997:5, 15). More recent information puts the number of uncleared mines
at 670,000 and 650,000 items of UXO (see ICBL, 2003: 117–118).
54. See the Landmine Monitor reports for Afghanistan (ICBL, 2003: 51–52), for Angola
(ibid.: 79) and for Cambodia (ibid.: 137).
55. Bottigliero (2000: 4).
56. ICBL (2003:21).
57. ICRC (2003).
58. IMAS 04.10, Second Edition, 1 January 2003, Standard 3.124.
59. ICBL, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action and Mines Action Canada have
consistently prepared statements for the CCW meetings and circulated to NGOs to
sign and endorse.
Advocacy and international law
132
Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges
133
Introduction
This chapter looks at the development of mine risk education (MRE), which
was previously called mine awareness. It begins by discussing the needs of
affected communities for MRE, which should be the basis of all good
programming. A review of some of the key actors in MRE precedes an
assessment of the different methodologies that have been used to date. This
leads on to a broader review of the evolution in the sector, in particular
relating to the development of community liaison. The chapter ends with
some thoughts for the future professionalisation of the discipline.
MRE is one of the five pillars of mine action. As such, it has received
substantial donor support since the inception of mine action at the end of the
1980s. Yet its effectiveness has been questioned, it has at times been poorly
understood by other mine action practitioners and only rarely has it been
well integrated within demining programmes. It is defined as: “educational
5 Mine risk education
Andy Wheatley
Summary
The MRE sector has slowly begun to professionalise — a process
marked by the development of guidelines, the introduction of training
protocols and the current development of IMAS standards
incorporating MRE. Yet, given the amount of funding made available
to MRE programmes (probably between US$10 million and US$15
million each year), it is extremely surprising that donors have not
been more insistent on being shown substantive proof of efficacy. To
date, operational efficiency and effectiveness have largely been
evidenced by questionable indicators such as the counting of outputs.
So, in seeking to coordinate and integrate with other mine action and
development intervention, MRE must do more to demonstrate its
effectiveness (and efficiency) as a means of reducing casualties. In
addition, in communities where mine clearance is being undertaken
the focus should be on MRE through community liaison, managed
and tasked as part of the clearance operation.
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activities which seek to reduce the risk of physical injury from mines /UXO by raising
awareness and promoting behavioural change, including public information
dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.”1
MRE is deemed an activity in support of mine (and UXO) risk reduction.
Risk reduction is defined by the IMAS as:
“Those actions which lessen the probability and/or severity of physical
injury to people, property or the environment … Mine risk reduction
can be achieved by physical measures such as clearance, fencing or marking,
or through behavioural changes brought about by MRE.”2
Another common characteristic is that during the 1990s MRE has typically
been a “catch-all” term for activities consisting of many different
“deliverables”. What these activities have in common is the promotion and
dissemination of safety messages to perceived “at risk” communities. This
process has undergone much refinement during the 1990s as implementing
organisations have developed a clearer understanding of the messages to be
communicated and improved the methodologies used to do so. Learning,
however, has not been uniform.
 In general, activities can be divided into three different approaches:
Public awareness: this covers the use of the mass media, posters, public
information campaigns, information dissemination in refugee camps
and so on, and is very much a one-way delivery of information, often
in emergency situations.
Education: this is (or should be) a two-way process, whether formal or
informal, allowing for the sharing of collective knowledge and building
on existing community strengths.
Community liaison: this third approach will be discussed later in the
chapter.
Helping communities at risk
Communities requiring MRE assistance can be broadly divided into the
following three groups:
those who are unaware of existence of mines/UXO and their dangers
— this group often includes children, or those who have not previously
been exposed to conflict;
those who are aware of what mines are and have some idea as to their
danger but do not know how to minimise their exposure to risk — the
uninformed; and
those who are aware of mines and what they can do, have had exposure
to information on how to minimise risks, but still practise high risk
behaviour — the intentional risk-takers.
A number of factors affect behaviour other than awareness and knowledge,
including economic necessity, social pressures and the personal attitude of
those involved. Those in the third group may include resource-poor communities
or individuals searching for water or fuel, adolescent boys tending cattle,
children tampering with mines through play or as a show of bravado, or people
attempting to defuze and remove explosive or metal casing for use/sale.
Experience to date suggests that a well-planned intervention can assist the
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rapid reduction of risk faced by these first two groups.3 The provision of detailed
and practical information specific to the threat faced in a given area has helped
reduce casualty rates — sometimes dramatically (although demonstrating
impact is a contentious issue, as discussed below). Relevant information would
include identification of mines and UXO, the promotion of safe behaviour (for
example information on areas to avoid, and recognition of formal and informal
mine marking), advice on what to do if a mine or suspicious item is encountered.
Increasingly, however, MRE practitioners have recognised the shortcomings
of such approaches in the case of the third risk-taking group. It has been
understood that promoting long-term behavioural change demands more than
just the provision of information. There must be a clear understanding as to
why risky activities are undertaken before embarking on efforts to reduce the
exposure of the target population. As such, these programmes have more in
common with HIV/AIDS prevention, anti-smoking and drink-driving
campaigns. Such programmes are difficult and require sustained support.
Accordingly, they are not necessarily feasible in all circumstances.
Further, some programmes, for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina or
Croatia, have sought to target a much wider population than simply those
directly affected by landmines or UXO. These programmes seek to inform
not only all those who may come into contact with mines, but also key opinion
formers who can be used to influence others, such as journalists, celebrities,
tourists and the public at large.4 In general, however, and notwithstanding
the basic principles of communication, programmes have tended to target
directly only those deemed most at risk.
The rationale for MRE
MRE developed from recognition that UXO and mine clearance, while
being the ultimate solution to a community’s mine problem, was also slow,
expensive and at times simply not possible or appropriate. Clearance was
often not feasible in areas of restricted access, ongoing conflict, where there
was hostility or suspicion by governing authorities to mine action initiatives,
or where a lack of funding resulted in at-risk communities not receiving the
priority they deserved.
In this context, it was quickly understood that a number of interventions
could be undertaken to reduce a community’s exposure to the threat in the
short to medium term. These centred on disseminating information to affected
communities using different educational and participatory approaches in an
attempt to increase knowledge of the dangers of mines and UXO, their typical
locations, and showing how exposure to risk can be minimised.
 As mine action has matured, changes have been instituted to reflect
improved practice regarding prioritisation, coordination, communication and
ownership of activities. A trend of the last few years, certainly among the
more established organisations, has been an evolution of MRE activities from
a narrow educational function towards one of community liaison — seeking
to develop information-gathering capacity, to share information with key mine
action stakeholders, and to assist in developing a community’s sense of
ownership of mine action.5
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In essence, MRE seeks to achieve a reduction in risk-taking behaviour and,
hopefully, also in the number of mine and UXO victims. However, it also
recognises that risk can be reduced through the use of a “toolbox” approach
using a variety of methodologies beyond pure information and education. These
include:
mine marking;
information sharing on the location and nature of threat in affected
areas;
the identification of key at-risk groups in communities;
a better understanding of how and why communities are exposed to
mines and UXO (e.g. through KAPB [Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices
and Belief]6 studies); and
the development of reporting systems (and crucially demining response
mechanisms) and specifically targeted activities in response to the needs
of individual communities.
Such a community liaison approach appears to be the way forward for
MRE (and is being applied in a growing number of projects and programmes).
It is a reflection that education in the traditional sense has often overlooked
many of these approaches and has not linked well with clearance organisations
— particularly with regard to prioritisation and the sharing of data gathered
from communities. However, as of writing too many programmes continue
to undertake inappropriate “traditional” programmes of questionable value
and impact. Further, concern remains that the IMAS standards for MRE do
not adequately capture the complexities of this process.7
The “key players”
The early 1990s saw the parallel emergence of MRE programming in a
number of countries — the majority of which still remain large programmes
today. Most activity and learning as to how MRE should be undertaken emerged
from the experience of a few key countries (most prominently, Afghanistan,
Angola, Cambodia, northern Iraq and Mozambique) — often with very different
mine threats.  In only one of these countries (Afghanistan) was the mine action
process effectively managed and coordinated by the UN.8 While there may have
been UN presence in mine action elsewhere it was the non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) who were in the main responsible for the establishment,
design and development of programmes.
Non-governmental organisations
Indeed, as with much of mine action, MRE was pioneered in the 1990s by a
small number of NGOs, most of whom developed programmes in parallel to
mine and UXO clearance. Among the NGOs involved, Norwegian People’s Aid
(NPA), Handicap International (HI, both Belgium and France) and Mines
Advisory Group (MAG) were the most prominent innovators in this sector.9
Other NGOs undertook prominent roles in specific countries — for example,
Save the Children US was a prominent partner of the Afghanistan MRE
programme from 1996, Save the Children UK gained significant MRE
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experience in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Sweden (Rädda Barnen) has
developed a number of programmes in the Middle East. However, the
involvement of other organisations was more the exception than the rule and
they rarely developed sectoral expertise in-house.
Of the three main NGOs, MAG pursued the most integrated model,
eventually seeking to incorporate MRE and clearance within the same team.
Key countries which provided important learning opportunities and thus were
crucial to the development of what became MAG’s community liaison
approach were Angola (1993), Cambodia (1992), northern Iraq (1992) and the
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos) (1994). These countries, the first in
which MAG undertook clearance and MRE activities, provided the opportunity
to develop solutions to overcome programming limitations.
Over time, MAG learned that many of the constraints to efficient
programming (limited information on the scale and scope of particular threats,
poor prioritisation, lack of clarity as to the objective to be achieved in demining
a particular area, duplication of visits to particular communities, and inefficient
use of often scarce transport resources) were eliminated or reduced by
providing their MRE teams with a wider brief — to encompass data gathering
and ongoing communication with key community representatives. In Angola,
this learning process was supported by the move by clearance personnel from
large clearance teams to the creation of small multi-skilled mobile teams,
which incorporated a community liaison element.10
NPA’s MRE programming began in Mozambique in 1993 and in Angola in
1994. In the two countries NPA undertook different educational and
information sharing initiatives, although activities increasingly evolved more
towards developing the capacity to measure the impact of particular clearance
projects on affected communities, and as such focused more on community
development and liaison initiatives rather than on MRE in the more traditional
sense. More recently, NPA has embarked on an integrated clearance
programme in Croatia designed explicitly to include mechanisms for
promoting community involvement, communication and ownership issues.
HI France has tended to run separate clearance and MRE programmes —
either MRE programmes stand alone in a country where demining is not
being undertaken, or parallel programmes are implemented within the same
country programme (for example, in Mozambique).
 HI began including community liaison teams (CLTs) in its demining
programmes from 1996, viewing the work of these teams as a sub-activity of
MRE in the larger sense — making the link between demining activities, the
community and any externally implemented MRE. CLTs gather information
useful for the demining units, inform the community about demining activities
and conduct limited mine risk education in communities in close proximity to
the demining activity. HI has been responsible for developing training and
programme management tools, applied as appropriate both to CLT operations
and to its more traditional MRE educational activities.
HI Belgium has likewise undertaken awareness initiatives since 1992 in
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with
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For most of the 1990s, and in common with many aid organisations,
communication and sharing of best practice between practitioners have not
always occurred efficiently or systematically. In part this simply reflects the
circumstances of small, overstretched NGOs where time and resources
have been at a premium, where communication from conflict-affected countries
is difficult, and where budget and time are lacking for the publication and
dissemination of “lessons learned” publications. The result is that emphasis
tended to focus on today’s problems rather than on sharing policies.
While understandable, the predictable outcome has been that many
agencies were engaged in “rediscovering the wheel” in parallel and, without
a doubt, best practice in MRE was slow to spread as a result. Indeed, for
some organisations it was difficult to share best practice between their own
programmes in different countries, let alone with external bodies. The
inevitable competition between NGOs also may have hindered the sharing
of best practice11 as NGOs — often in competition for funding — sought to
protect what they viewed as their competitive advantage.
In recent years, however, this appears to have been changing and a
concerted effort has been made to share experience more effectively. For
example, HI France has produced and widely shared implementation and
good practice guides12 and HI Belgium has published external evaluations
and recommendations for good practice emerging from its Afghanistan and
Cambodia programmes. Rädda Barnen has also produced and disseminated
a best practice guide for undertaking MRE activities with children13 and in
2001 organised the first workshop to share and develop best practice in the
use of media in MRE.14
The International Committee of the Red Cross
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) first became involved
in MRE in the mid-1990s, within the context of its broader efforts to alleviate
the suffering caused by war. Field staff, particularly doctors, who were finding
themselves treating increasing numbers of mine victims, had been encouraging
the organisation’s headquarters to consider possible preventive measures for
several years. While most of the ICRC’s efforts to stem the “epidemic of mine
injuries” were directed towards campaigning for a ban on anti-personnel
mines, some within the organisation had also recognised the need to undertake
MRE in affected countries.
The first full-scale ICRC mine and UXO programme was launched in spring
1996 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Since then, the ICRC has
conducted programmes directly, or through national Red Cross/Crescent
Societies, in some 20 countries or regions.15 Initially programmes tended to
concentrate on information collection and dissemination, sometimes including
statistics on the number of landmine victims. Over time, ICRC has come to
regard this aspect of its work as key to planning and implementing more
community-based activities that address the specific reasons for risk-taking.
Thus, posters and other one-way “small” media have been replaced by more
community engagement in the process.
ICRC has also sought to integrate better its MRE campaigns with other mine
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action activities.16 Thus, in Kosovo
in February 2000 the ICRC signed
an agreement with the Swiss
Demining Federation (Fédération
suisse de déminage — FDS) in which
the FDS would respond to the
survey, marking and defining
requests of communities identified
through ICRC MRE activities. The
ICRC has stated that it intends to
adopt this approach in future
programmes.17
As of June 2003, however, the
ICRC’s arrangement with FSD had
not been mirrored elsewhere, putting the strategy in doubt. For example, the
ICRC programme in Basra, Iraq, in early 2003 would have appeared to have
benefited from such clearance support but no plans are currently in place for
contracting FSD or any other demining organisation.
In 2005, the ICRC adopted a new, more comprehensive policy on “preventive
mine action operations”, which includes not only traditional MRE and linkages
with demining, but also other relief activities intended to reduce the need for
risk-taking among the civilian population.
The military
During the last decade, international military contingents (and sometimes
police units) have engaged in MRE presentations in several countries and
territories, including Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Cambodia, Croatia, Kosovo and Iraq. In addition, members of national military
units have undertaken MRE in Lebanon, Nicaragua and Thailand among
others.
An additional international actor has been the US. The US Army Engineer
School established the Countermine Training Support Center (CTSC) at Fort
Leonard Wood, Missouri, in April 1996. One course caters to standard army
units and offers a five-day programme of instruction in MRE techniques. The
other, which lasts two weeks, is geared to prepare American Special Forces
detachments to run a “train-the-trainer” programme in the specific country
to which they will be deployed. Both courses are said “to give US commanders
the ability to coordinate more effectively with foreign civilian and military officials
and to stress the congruence of US military countermine activities with the mores and
customs of civilians”.18
Provision of MRE training usually occurs in parallel to national or UN
coordinated efforts, outside the coordinated plan. MRE materials and
programmes are often designed in the US or a third country and are of
questionable relevance. Chris Horwood19 highlights an example of US Special
Forces Psychological Operations staff arriving in Cambodia to undertake MRE
training with pre-designed computer-based materials for introduction to
Cambodia without field testing or consultation of any kind.
Mine risk education
The civilian population in Azerbaijan is made
awareof  the dangers of anti-personnel landmines
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Most agencies recognise that the involvement of the military or police in
MRE is undertaken for the best of intentions. Perhaps the argument can be
made that in certain countries the military, whether national forces or
international peace-keeping contingents, are respected authority figures20 —
particularly to adolescent boys. As such, their word may command more
respect and therefore obedience than that of a civilian.
MRE organisations have expressed concern that flawed methodology can,
and often does, undermine the message being delivered. For example,
situations in which military MRE instructors touch or hold mines during
presentations are numerous,21 and there is also concern that soldiers in full
uniform — often armed — do not represent the best role model for
impressionable children. Presentations are often one-off deliveries of
information with little capacity to establish an ongoing link with that
community — or use the contact to develop further intelligence as to the
location and impact of mines or UXO on that population. It is partly for these
reasons that in 2000 the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC)
attempted to end the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) “soldier to child” MRE
programme in schools around the province. For it is questionable what added
value is provided by military personnel undertaking MRE when there is
already sufficient capacity in country.
The United Nations
In 1998 the United Nations adopted a new policy on mine action. The
document, entitled Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the UN Policy, stated
that “UNICEF, working in collaboration with the UN Mine Action Service, is the
UN focal point for MRE. In this capacity it will provide appropriate guidance for all
MRE programmes, liaising closely with concerned partners such as OCHA, WFP,
UNHCR, WHO and UNDP”.22 The document also outlined UNICEF
responsibilities with regard to advocacy and victim assistance programmes.
In 2000, these responsibilities were formally incorporated into UNICEF’s
Core Corporate Commitments in Emergencies,23 and during 2001 work began
on the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy, which was finally released in March
2003.24 The goal set for MRE is that “MRE needs are identified and met in an
appropriate, effective and timely manner”, while objectives highlight the need
for integration of mine action, the capacity to provide an emergency
response and the need to provide technical guidance and the promotion
of best practice.25
UNICEF had been actively involved in mine action prior to this26 although
quality and capacity has varied substantially between programmes, reflecting
the sometimes poor knowledge and interpretation of the organisation’s
mandate (as well as that of the other key players in mine action).27 While
some interventions have been successful, others have proved problematic. Until
recently mine action was not recognised as mainstream programming and was
therefore often poorly understood and resourced by country offices — a fact
tacitly admitted in the 2002-2005 Mine Action Strategy document.28
Furthermore, MRE has tended to be placed within the child protection
component of programming. This has often resulted in an over-concentration
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on programming aimed at children and insufficient attention given to other key
at-risk groups.29  UNICEF’s capacity to support or monitor implementation by
partners has thereby been impeded.
In common with many MRE programmes much focus has been placed on
undertaking direct delivery of MRE at the expense of advocacy, capacity
building and support to national governmental or NGO bodies.30 Often,
programmes have focused on the production and distribution of materials
rather than quality delivery of MRE programming and have therefore had
limited impact. While this is not unique to UNICEF, in common with many
agencies and donors it has taken a long time to learn this lesson and move
on.
Another reflection from past UNICEF programming is that there has often
been insufficient engagement with other key players — UN bodies such as
the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the UN Development Programme
(UNDP), mine action centres (where these exist), and recognised international
players such as ICRC and key NGOs. The experience in Kosovo where the
UNICEF country office chose not to fund the post of chief of MRE within the
UN’s Mine Action Coordination Centre provides a clear example of the
problems resulting from a failure to engage at an early stage. The upshot was
that UNICEF had far less influence on the evolution of the discipline and
MRE was far less integrated with mine action than is desirable.31
However, where UNICEF has focused on facilitation and coordination
there have been a number of successes. The programmes in Afghanistan,
Angola and Cambodia and the emerging programme in Iraq prove examples
of good practice and act as something of a template for future programming.
Here UNICEF has focused on facilitation rather than implementation since it
acted to add value to programming through sharing good practice, monitoring
the activities of implementing partners, assisting the creation of long-term
programming and building capacity within local structures.
In 2002, UNICEF and the ICBL established a Mine Risk Education Working
Group (MREWG), co-convened by both organisations, and made up of NGOs
and agencies engaged in MRE. It aims to bring together MRE practitioners to
better coordinate activities, share lessons learned, identify field support needs
and develop strategies to meet these. The MREWG was involved with the
development of the MRE components of the IMAS (see below).
Elsewhere within the UN structure, various agencies have touched on the
issues of landmines and MRE. For example, the study by Ms Graça Machel for
the UN on the impact of armed conflict on children includes a substantial
section on the impact of landmines. The study report noted critically that
presentations within MRE programmes “are not as effective as they need to be,
making relatively little use of techniques which are interactive … Often mine awareness
teams simply enter a community, present information and leave — an approach that
does not address the behavioural changes an affected community must make to prevent
injury.”32 This would appear a reasonable criticism and something of a
reoccurring theme regarding MRE, as discussed further below.
Two other UN agencies have mandates that impact directly on MRE issues
— namely the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations
Mine Action Service — and the United Nations Office for Project Services
Mine risk education
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(UNOPS) was responsible for MRE in its integrated mine action programme in
northern Iraq. UNDP has responsibility for addressing socio-economic
consequences of landmine and UXO contamination, as well as for developing
and supporting national and local capacity to tackle the impact of mines and
UXO in the long term. UNMAS was formed in October 1997 to serve as the UN
focal point for mine action. At the global level, it is responsible for coordinating
all aspects of mine action within the UN system. At the field level, it is responsible
for providing mine action assistance in the context of humanitarian emergencies
and peace-keeping operations. As such, the role of UNMAS includes MRE —
although recognising that the lead is taken by UNICEF.
It has been argued that given the limitations imposed on UNICEF’s MRE
function as a result of issues raised above — in particular its country offices’
confusion as to the mandate, along with concerns as to UNICEF’s capacity to
integrate its activities — there is a strong case to be made for promoting
either UNDP or UNMAS as the natural home for MRE. In 2005, the waters
were somewhat muddied by the adoption of a new UN policy on mine action
that foresaw the allocation of responsibility for mine action, including MRE,
on a country-by-country basis within the UN Country Team. It remains to be
seen whether this will lead to UNICEF’s role in MRE becoming practically
diluted.
Methodology
This section will focus on MRE methodology and content as it relates to
information dissemination and the promotion of behavioural change. It will
first review principles and lessons learned during different programming
phases and then reflect on global learning and best practice in this regard.
This will be followed by an overview of key developments.
MRE during emergency, transition and development
A consensus33 has emerged as to what can be expected as a reasonable
output in terms of MRE, reflecting learning from a variety of programmes
during the last decade and more of mine action.34
In an emergency characterised by conflict, instability and large-scale
population movements, there is general agreement that MRE can typically
only hope to communicate basic mine safety messages using mass media
techniques35 — to inform rather than to educate in the wider sense.36
Information is disseminated in a broad-brush manner, providing basic safety
messages and raising “awareness” about the threat (or suspected threat) of
mines or UXO. Such programmes, while disseminating information widely,
particularly aim to reach most at-risk groups such as refugees or the internally
displaced returning to areas of past conflict.
In a post-conflict transitional environment in which peace-keeping or peace-
building have provided a greater degree of stability and access, it is now
generally recognised that MRE initiatives should evolve further. Stability gives
greater access, and thus an ability to better determine the location, scale and
nature of the mine/UXO threat. The focus of programming can and should
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change from a public information approach to one far more focused on
community level initiatives, seeking to establish who is most at risk — and
why.37
In terms of methodology, it is generally agreed among education
professionals that participatory methods of learning are more effective than
traditional rote learning methods.38 Too often, MRE programmes have tended
to be based on presentations and lectures, in a process that is often
disempowering and usually of little educational value,39 failing thereby to
recognise how adults learn, nor taking into account the knowledge and coping
skills within the communities forced to live daily with the mine threat. Often
the members of these communities possess greater knowledge of mines and
their dangers than the self-proclaimed experts instructing them. Community-
based participatory MRE events should ideally be undertaken with small
groups — possibly disaggregated by age or gender.40
 MRE professionals have recognised that in many places, mine safety is
best achieved through promoting long-term behavioural change. Lessons
still need to be drawn from other public health and development education
campaigns, such as HIV/AIDS awareness, breastfeeding promotion and
anti-smoking initiatives. However, while this view is constantly repeated
and reiterated in MRE circles, it is difficult to point to examples of effective
campaigns, or indeed many examples of where this approach has been
effectively pursued.41
Changes are, though, being seen in MRE programming in the development
context, where the population has had to live for long periods of time with
mines and UXO.42 Some programmes often no longer demonstrate
“traditional” MRE, but rather combine this with a process of information
transfer involving a dialogue with the community about not only the landmine
threat but also wider developmental problems, and seeking possible solutions
to these.43
In situations of long-term mine and UXO impact, knowledge of mines and
their dangers tends to be high, often learned through bitter experience.
Promoting greater mine safety is often therefore a process of ongoing
negotiation with communities and in particular with sub-groups within that
community who are exposed to particular risk-taking activities. Villagers who
have lived with a threat for a long time develop coping mechanisms and try
to avoid affected areas as much as they can; in these circumstances, standard
MRE messages such as “Don’t touch!” are not useful to the community.
Accidents occur largely because of intentional risk-taking brought about by
survival pressures. The presence of mines further marginalises already
impoverished post-conflict communities to the extent that crops have to be
sown and gathered and firewood and water collected, even in cases where
the only available land is affected by mines or UXO. In effect, activities essential
for daily survival overrule the desire to avoid possible death or injury.
In this context messages must evolve from discussions and focus on
practical detailed and precise alternatives as a way of promoting the reduction
in risk-taking behaviour. A key tool in this regard is community village risk
mapping44 which can also be fed into the mine marking and prioritisation
process. In addition, as noted in the Landmine Monitor Report in 2001:
Mine risk education
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“as a result of its community focus, mine awareness/community liaison
is also well placed to identify mine survivors who have unmet needs.
Although community liaison teams should not necessarily be expected
to have technical expertise in mine survivor assistance, sometimes
amputees are not aware of the existence of prosthetics clinics, or believe
that being fitted with a replacement or even first artificial limb will be
prohibitively expensive. In such a case, the simple transfer of information
— and possibly the provision of transport — can suffice to make a world
of difference to an individual and his/her family.”45
Similarly, a broader community liaison approach can include rapid-response
“spot” explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities. In Cambodia, the focus
of MRE is now on risk reduction in the widest sense, with the traditional
information-based approach jettisoned in favour of one focusing more on
undertaking concrete steps to make a particular area safe through improved
marking and removal of known and dangerous ordnance. This approach is
aided by the fact that a team may spend many days in a village undertaking
UXO removal, proximity clearance, presentations, discussions and mapping.
Messages promoted
Clearly the detail of safety messages promoted over the last decade or
more has varied depending on country, context and the nature of the threat
— not to mention the quality of the programme itself. No two countries or
programmes will (or indeed should) promote the same mix of messages or
promote them in the same way, although there is some scope to do so in
refugee repatriations, for example, where it may be appropriate for messages
promoted in the host country to mirror those of the country of return.46
Message promotion has evolved during the 1990s, as MRE staff have
learned at least a little from education professionals and public education
campaigns. Currently there is general agreement as to the set of messages to
be promoted and, increasingly, resource material from which to draw. HI’s
framework, for example, provides a useful means of breaking down the
subject. Commonly, these messages are broken down into the following
“message groups”:
how to recognise mines and UXO;
what effects mines and UXO have, physically, psychologically, socially
and economically;
areas liable to be mined;
clues indicating possible mines or mined areas;
signs and markings indicating mine- or UXO-contaminated areas;
what to do before travelling in unknown (and therefore possibly
dangerous) areas;
what to do when a mine or suspected mine/UXO is encountered; and
what to do in case of an accident.
While this does not claim to be exclusive or exhaustive it does provide a
basic framework for MRE activities, although any actual promotion should
be preceded by as thorough and detailed a needs assessment as possible.
Many individual agencies have developed their own frameworks and
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methodologies. While for the more established agencies this will have been
developed in-house, increasingly many (particularly the newer) agencies are
following the lead developed by UNICEF,47 the GICHD48 and (particularly
with regard to programming with children) the work of Save the Children
Sweden. However, as will be seen below, the key issue to date has not been
so much the message itself but the promotion of that message that has proved
problematic.
A number of messages have, however, generated considerable controversy,
perhaps highlighting the need for flexibility in implementation. Minefield
extraction has been a particular cause for debate with considerable argument
as to the best message to promote — for example, whether someone who
finds him- or herself in a minefield should retrace footsteps out of the minefield
or stay still and shout for help. Most argue against promoting the retracing
of footsteps given the limited conditions in which it is likely that footsteps
will be visible, although in some programmes it is recognised that this may
be the best of a bad list of options.
Prodding also promotes much debate — most agencies being actively
opposed to this message. Nonetheless, it continues to be promoted in certain
agencies despite concerns as to the impractical and potentially dangerous
nature of this advice — most controversially in the Landmine and UXO Safety
Booklet produced by UNMAS and CARE.49 Likewise, advice to mark suspected
items has caused debate about balancing the need to not move about
unnecessarily (and therefore be exposed to more potential danger) versus
the need to mark suspected areas to inform others.
Ultimately, much of this debate has been of limited value. Circumstances
vary substantially and it is necessary to remember that MRE is a process of
“negotiation” with the affected community. As such, messages must be realistic
and credible if they are to be acted on. In circumstances where it is crucial to
tailor messages to the needs of one particular community the message
promoted will vary depending on circumstance and the current strategies
and requirements of that community.
Methodologies and approaches used to date
Despite evidence of some good practice developed during the course of
the 1990s, as recently as 2000 concern remained about the pedagogical basis
for much of the methodology used to implement MRE projects around the
world. The Landmine Monitor Report in 2000 echoed the criticism made by
the Machel Report four years earlier, stating that:
“Although often advertised as ‘community-based’, ‘participatory’,
‘interactive’, or employing ‘child-to-child’ techniques, it appears that
the typical mine awareness programme relies on one-way presentations
and/or mass media to get its message across.”50
Such an approach takes little notice of the skills and knowledge already
existing in the community, frequently fails to target those most at risk,
and is unlikely to have anything other than a negligible long-term impact
on casualty rates.  This is often linked to poor or non-existent needs
assessments and a consequent failure to collect the information required
Mine risk education
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for the elaboration of a comprehensive and targeted communication
strategy.51 One study found that:
“without research into the overall situation, the lifestyles and situation
of people in mine and UXO affected areas … it is not possible to design
an effective mine awareness programme. Lack of this baseline information
also makes it impossible to measure the effectiveness of the intervention.
The needs assessment and baseline information are the most commonly
neglected activities in all … programmes.”52
Indeed, needs assessments for emergency and transitional programmes
have often been overlooked as MRE organisations are required not simply to
respond but to be seen to be responding. Undertaking a needs assessment —
trying to ascertain exactly what the problem is, where, who is mainly being
hurt and why — has often been squeezed out by the demands of donors,
governments or peer organisations urging MRE agencies to not just stand
there but to “do something”, inappropriate as that “something” might be.
Once programmes develop they generate their own momentum — and once
started can rarely be turned around easily.
This reticence to undertake even “quick and dirty” assessments possibly
also reflects insecurities on behalf of MRE field staff, many of whom are
comfortable undertaking and delivering programmes but less so with the design
and the development stage. Lack of clarity as to what a needs assessment is,
and, crucially, how one should be undertaken, along with fear of criticism for
the methodology chosen or the analysis developed, may also feed this desire to
“do” rather than “analyse”. The
result is that programmes have poor
foundations, often built on
assumptions about the threat and the
causes of casualties that may not fit
with reality — resulting in seriously
flawed messages or programming.53
This process is often further
compounded by the lack of regular
community-focused monitoring and
systematic evaluations, again often
due to similar pressures. Moreover,
what monitoring does take place is
typically more focused on process
than on outcome. Few programmes to
date have demonstrated a capacity to monitor whether behavioural change has
occurred as a result of MRE programming. Clearly such monitoring is difficult
— not least in developing meaningful indicators — and also diverts often scarce
resources and management time. However, the almost complete absence of
output-oriented evaluations (as opposed to counting internal deliverables) until
the last two or three years is of serious concern and reflects poorly on the
profession (see below for further discussion of monitoring and evaluation).
 Much of the MRE resources available during the 1990s and early 2000s
have tended to be devoted to the production and dissemination of various
communications media, such as television/video, radio, posters, T-shirts, and
Leaflets explaining the dangers of mines were
distributed to children in Kosovo.
©ICRC/B. Heger
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the like. According to the the Landmine Monitor Report in 2000, as much as
US$100,000 was spent on airing MRE messages on Rwandan radio, an
astonishing amount in such a small country, particularly given the
geographically limited nature of the threat.54 A similar concern came across
in the Landmine Monitor Report in 2001, which commented caustically that:
“Carefully assessing available and traditional forms of communication
in the target groups will likely prevent a headlong rush to print posters
that may communicate little apart from the pride of the donors. Likewise,
T-shirts may be effective incentive items for awareness instructors —
and the community can always use free clothing — but their pedagogical
value is at least debatable”.55
The same report went on to comment:
“But whatever the media chosen to deliver the message, certain,
underlying principles … should apply. For instance, there appears to be
widespread agreement that programmes should resist the temptation to
adapt materials from other contexts and in any event not use materials
and media that have not been field tested prior to their active
deployment.”56
Which brings us to the issue of Superman and MRE — an example to
many of an inappropriate tool introduced as a result of importing material
with little reference to local cultural norms and with little or no field
testing. This comic is not the only failure in this regard,57 however it is
one of the most well known (and expensive) and as such provides a useful
lesson in programming.
The Superman comic was a joint venture between DC Comics and UNICEF
to be disseminated as a tool for MRE. Concerns were widely expressed as to
both its technical accuracy and cultural appropriateness. The comic book was
used in Guatemala but overall the reaction has been so universally negative
that the original version (produced for Bosnia and Herzegovina) was withdrawn
from distribution and a Spanish version was not distributed in Colombia nor a
Portuguese version planned for Mozambique. Following a detailed evaluation
it was, however, used in Kosovo58 — the evaluation concluding that it was
suitable for children in the 10-14 age group but not for 7-9-year-olds, who might
infer incorrect and dangerous messages. A controlled reading in a classroom
environment in the presence of a teacher was recommended — hardly a cost-
effective or realistic approach.
The issue of the Superman comic is not that it was a failure — mistakes
are inevitable and as such acceptable (within limits) provided lessons are
learned and similar mistakes not repeated. While it is hoped that lessons
would have been learned from the Superman experience, remarkably it would
appear that the importation of inappropriate methodologies continues. The
use of US cultural icons in promoting MRE continues, with USAID funding
a series of television public service announcements for Cambodia featuring
Bugs Bunny.59 This raises multiple concerns: about the appropriateness of
the media of delivery (TV not being widely accessible in the areas where
mines have the greatest impact),60 about not being a community-based activity
and about its use going against the principles highlighted above. As such, it
is unlikely this particular initiative will prove effective, while the prognosis
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is not good for overruling similar
interventions in the future.
 Improving communication strategies is
clearly an issue that needs greater attention.
As observed by one of the few resources
available on this topic:61
 “more than $200 million is spent every year
on mine action … Yet it is difficult to
identify any other international
humanitarian or development activity which
has devoted so little resources or attention to
its communication activities, particularly to
the critical task … of changing people’s
behaviour”.
Certainly there are few communication
specialists within the field, the result being that
the medium of delivery has been inappropriate
or blinkered: there has been a heavy dependence on the use of posters and
pamphlets, usually heavily text-dependent and therefore requiring a literate
audience. Posters are often relatively expensive, have a very short lifespan and
often are not easily understood in many cultures. Likewise there have been
many cases of radio programmes developed for areas where radio reception is
poor and radio ownership low, or broadcast in the wrong dialect. It would
appear that for most MRE campaigns insufficient attention has been paid to
issues of timing, location, delivery and medium — let alone clarity as to the
message needs of the target audience.
One reason put forward in the past for this poor communication
performance is the high number of mine action programme personnel,
particularly managers, who are recruited from the military — an institution
which values discipline, surprise and secrecy over the informality, creativity
and interpersonal skills required of a successful communicator. The result is
often that MRE communication programmes are not awarded the resources
or priority they should receive. Certainly at field level, communication,
particularly in relation to MRE messages, is still the poor relation of mine
clearance. Few mine action organisation or coordinating bodies have full-
time communication staff at field level or coherent communication components
in their work plans. This is particularly true of those countries where resources
for mine action are scarce but where the need is probably the greatest.
It would appear that MRE programmes generally need to develop greater
communication skills and thereby to elaborate much more focused
communication objectives. These should be based on a clear understanding
of what is needed, where and why, and programmes should also be more
skilled in designing messages and appropriate channels for their delivery.
Consistent with a frequent preoccupation to protect children from landmines
and UXO, “child-to-child” training entered the MRE lexicon in 1999, with a
number of organisations claiming to be incorporating “child-to-child”
methodology into their awareness programmes, most notably in Kosovo. In a
number of instances, though, it seems that the component was actually little
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more than peer education — a far cry from the participatory methodology
delineated by the Child to Child Trust in London which developed the concept.62
Yet, in a context where teaching is typically authoritarian and learning is by
rote, child-to-child techniques can be liberating and empowering both for the
children and for their teachers. There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest
that this approach also results in information being shared in the home and as
such can and has educated parents via their children.
While this section has served to critique a number of poorly-designed
programmes it should also be highlighted that well planned and
participatory programmes have been undertaken over the years. These
include HI programming in Cambodia, MAG’s work in Laos and work
being undertaken by NPA in Croatia. The ICRC implements well-thought-
out, community-level MRE programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia and Kosovo,63 among others, each with an integral data-gathering
element that assists in the national mine action coordination process. In
Kosovo, the communities themselves decide on their local MRE volunteer
whose task is to pass on valuable information to the community and also
update the regional MRE teams with relevant information on incidents or
discoveries of mines or cluster bomblets.
The use of volunteers is often problematic however. While ICRC/Croatian
Red Cross have successfully used this approach, it does have shortcomings,
usually related to volunteers seeking paid employment elsewhere and
therefore not having the time or inclination to continue with a mine action
role or seeking payment for their MRE activities. Some MRE programmes
have recognised this issue and pay a small stipend to volunteers.64
The changing environment, the UN and the growth
of the mine action centre
The changing profile of the sector
A clear trend within the MRE sector has been the increase in the number
of agencies involved, particularly since the adoption and signature of the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 1997.
Understanding has increased among those in the mainstream relief and
development sector of the impact mines and UXO play in post-conflict
rehabilitation and peace-building. For example, the first mine clearance that
took place in Mozambique was at the behest of three British relief agencies,65
which sought assistance to protect their staff and projects from the threat posed
by landmines. Since then, at least one of those agencies has developed a MRE
programming capacity of its own.66 It is clear that NGOs working in an ever
more hazardous environment are becoming increasingly aware of mines and
UXO and the dangers they represent to their own staff and those sections of the
community with whom they work. A number of those organisations — for
instance CARE, Save the Children and World Vision — have developed at least
a limited in-house capacity to undertake MRE activities.67
In addition, the mine action sector has done an effective job in breaking
down barriers to understanding the concept of MRE, its role and relevance. In
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part the MRE sector was cloaked in the black art of mystery and awe that
surrounded the clearance side of mine action. Just as clearance is increasingly
being seen as simply another form of engineering, so MRE is being seen as
community education with a particular focus. In part this process was assisted
by the “Diana effect” and the high profile the sector received in the period
surrounding the signing of the Convention. More organisations became
engaged with the sector, which has brought a greater understanding and
willingness to undertake programming.
The increased number of NGOs (and, to a lesser extent, commercial
organisations) claiming to have MRE skills and capacity would appear to also
be linked to the increased funding made available post-1997. This period saw
a proliferation of often small organisations being created, or existing relief
or development agencies “adding” an MRE dimension to their work. While
many of these organisations are professional this proliferation of organisations
has also resulted in a great number of projects of questionable quality. This
proliferation has been facilitated by donor ignorance, a limited supply of
experienced MRE professionals (resulting in a “gap in the market”) and the
limited capacity of a new industry to accredit and monitor quality control of
mine action agencies. Donor preference for funding their own national agencies
has also assisted the formation of new MRE organisations. It would appear
that mine clearance also faced similar issues. Funding now appears to be
levelling out or possibly even decreasing, although it is not yet clear if the
number of MRE NGOs has also reduced, but this seems unlikely at this stage.
An industry database listing all commercial, NGO and other MRE operators
does not yet exist. It is not clear how many organisations undertake MRE.
However, a brief review of organisations (including local and international
NGOs and Red Cross/Crescent societies) that have undertaken MRE
programming in recent years would place this figure at between 140-180.68
This does not include military units which may undertake MRE activities,
nor national bodies such as ministries of education in mine-affected countries.
However, counting the number of MRE players is of limited value as it does
not distinguish between agencies with one small regionalised project and
agencies such as the ICRC that are running multiple large-scale programmes.
The Landmine Monitor Report in 2002, for example, highlighted seven key
agencies,69 while the previous year's report highlighted eight new players70
— most of whom were active in Kosovo.
Kosovo as a watershed
Until 1999, as with mine action generally, MRE had been driven by
NGOs. The UN role was slowly becoming more influential with the
respective agencies slowly finding their way and testing their mandates.
The emergency in Kosovo came at a stage when most UN mine action
mandates had just become well established and “bedded in”. The result
was that Kosovo proved to be something of a watershed for MRE, a closing
of the gap between NGOs and the UN.
While mine action centres had been in place prior to this, Kosovo was the
first example of such a centre actively monitoring the quality of MRE
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programming, and the first case in which MRE organisations required
accreditation71 if they wished to operate within the UNMACC MRE structure.
In part this was a reflection of the sheer number of agencies, many of them new
to the field, wishing to involve themselves in MRE programming,72 which in
turn led to concerns as to the quality of programming.
Kosovo also provided the first example where MRE activities have been
guided by a mine action coordination body during an emergency start-up
phase.73 Previously, in most large country programmes, while a central
authority may have existed its capacity was generally weak.74 Programming
and priorities were determined by operational agencies and little or no quality
control capacity was established. Coordination was usually the result of
informal meetings of operational bodies, while operations were usually in
different geographical areas to minimise confusion. Programme content,
methodology, tasking and evaluation likewise were determined by the
implementing agency with little involvement of the coordinating body which
had no mandate and little capacity to oversee quality control issues.
In Kosovo, the model of coordination was loosely based on that applied
to mine clearance. First and foremost, agencies had to be accredited with the
MACC to undertake MRE in the province.75 Second, the MACC developed a
reporting system for MRE, which meant visibility of agency activity by location
and activity76 and therefore, by extension, a degree of accountability for their
actions. Further, the MACC established a series of guidelines for quality
assurance of training in various methodologies and with different target
audiences. Agencies not operating within acceptable standards were requested
to retrain their staff or to reassess the information they were promoting.
Accreditation would be withdrawn until satisfactory changes were made.
Finally a series of regular (monthly) centralised MRE meetings and (weekly)
regional mine action meetings were organised.
While far from perfect — many developments being introduced in a
piecemeal, problem-solving fashion, for example — in the context of MRE
activity to date, much of what was undertaken was revolutionary in
comparison to how MRE activities were organised and managed
elsewhere.
However, while this model did greatly improve coordination within and
between MRE organisations there remained a gulf in communication
externally — both internal to the sector (i.e. with mine action clearance and
victim assistance organisations) and externally (i.e. with non-mine-action relief
and rehabilitation agencies). In an attempt to overcome this lack of integration,
at least within mine action, the Mine Action Support Team (MAST) concept
was developed. This provided the operational link between the two aspects
of mine action and is discussed in the following section.
Also, with regard to coordination, the UN was pushing against an open
door. In 1998, the three NGOs HI, NPA and MAG had sent a letter to
UNMAS outlining a series of common principles indicating what they
believed humanitarian mine action should be and how this should be
managed. These principles included an agreement to be coordinated within
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The issue of accreditation is of interest here. Kosovo was the first time
(internationally) MRE agencies required accreditation to work alongside
the MACC system. The Kosovo experience seems to have heavily influenced
the IMAS MRE standards in this regard — the first draft being developed
shortly after the closure of the Kosovo MACC. Requiring accreditation
had many advantages — it provided a degree of quality assurance, it
ensured standardisation of messages and it promoted some element of
accountability.
But Kosovo was very different from most other mine clearance programmes
and it is unclear whether the process as envisaged by IMAS can be meaningfully
adhered to in future programmes. There is the assumption that the MACC
(or equivalent) MRE personnel are in a position to effectively assess what is
and is not appropriate, and to effectively monitor delivery. In many countries
this will often not be possible due to insecurity, lack of resources or obstructive
host governments.
Most programmes require the involvement of a local NGO or government
bodies to lead the delivery of MRE. Usually in the initial start-up phase such
agencies have little or no capacity to deliver MRE and as such do not have
training curricula or proven experience to be assessed. Additionally the mine
action centre (or equivalent body) has little sanction — certainly in the short
to medium term — to prevent an unaccredited body undertaking MRE. In
Kosovo, the MACC had some influence with donors as to how funding should
be undertaken, but even this took many months to bed in place while donors
demonstrated their capacity to coordinate between themselves.
In most emergency scenarios donor coordination is rare. Once funding
has been received there is almost no way in which a mine action centre can
prevent an unaccredited programme of MRE from being implemented
regardless of its quality — thus undermining the credibility of the whole
process. This lack of sanction may prove a debilitating stumbling block to
effective accreditation in MRE programmes elsewhere.
MRE in Kosovo — both implementation and management — was far
from perfect but it was a significant advance in terms of coordination and
the mainstreaming of an alternative MRE model. The hothouse environment
(and, crucially, the availability of funding) appears to have acted as
something of a catalyst for many players, leading to changes in content
and methodology of operations. The decision by the ICRC to contract
their own clearance capacity is an example of a radical rethink in terms of
programme direction.
Additionally, the MACC was limited by a shortage of resources and this
impacted on the MRE and public information component.77 The structure
described also took time to establish, a fact noted by the 2002 external
evaluation of the mine action programme78 which concluded that:
“the mine awareness lessons learned over the past ten years still primarily
rest with various pioneering NGOs... [T]he MACC was not in a position
to lead from day one as there was no mine awareness experience represented
within the MACC. NGOs such as the Mines Advisory Group, Handicap
International and the ICRC introduced their own community-based
approaches, grounded in years of experience. These approaches were then
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adopted by the MACC and embodied in the mine action support team
(MAST) concept.”
Integration
As highlighted by the Kosovo example, a trend to emerge strongly in recent
years has been the promotion of the desire for integration79 — a feature noted by
the Landmine Monitor Report in 2002,80 although sometimes this has been more
wishful thinking than reality. Mine action is fragmented. It is rare to find
organisations that span two, let alone all five of the pillars of mine action.81
Despite or because of this, integration has been promoted as the way forward
for effective and efficient mine action.
Key documents highlighting the desire for integration include the UNICEF
Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005,82 the UN document Mine action and effective
coordination: the UN policy,83 the Bad Honnef framework84 and the ICRC
document Towards Safer Villages.85 Yet, with few exceptions and for much of
the period under review, MRE has been poorly integrated with operational
clearance bodies. Much lip service has been paid to the important role played
by MRE, although a cynic might view this as a fear of being politically
incorrect or swimming against the prevailing political and funding current,
rather than a true belief in the added value provided by an effective MRE
programme. What is also true is that MRE practitioners have not successfully
promoted the advantages of integrated programming to those involved in
the management of mine action programmes (themselves usually from a
clearance background) nor to those undertaking mine /UXO clearance
activities.
Integration does not necessarily mean combining all activities within one
agency, but rather integrating activities to ensure a seamless service delivery.
On the issues of risk reduction, community liaison, communication and mine
clearance outreach, however, there are strong managerial arguments in favour
of this being done in-house by clearance agencies, ensuring an MRE component
to their work.86
It is important to highlight that despite the calls for integration emanating
from key documents, not all agencies agree with the current push for improved
integration, while others do not feel that MRE should receive such a high
priority. For example, to the contrary it has been stated that integrated
development
“is a concept that has been played with in the development world for
about 30 to 40 years. It is rather long of tooth. Many of the NGOs
have taken on this integrated approach as a sort of mantra. There are
better and more proven approaches. Trying to integrate all aspects
under one organization just can’t happen, and, if it does, it is under
extraordinarily high cost. We [RONCO] found, as an institution
and myself as an individual, that comments about integrated mine
action are suspect.”87
Meanwhile the HALO Trust, a prominent British clearance NGO, has
pointedly not engaged itself in MRE for much of its existence,88 while others
have gone as far as accusing MRE programmes of being inappropriate,
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wasteful, paternalistic and often culturally insensitive.89 Rae McGrath for
instance has written that
“[MRE] programmes on the scale and in the format presently
employed [1999] by many organisations are a damaging misuse of
funds that would be put to better use surveying, marking and clearing
minefields.”90
He adds that:
“The problem has not merely arisen because donors are willing to fund
these programmes, but because they provide an opportunity for many
organisations and individuals, with none of the engineering skills
necessary to respond directly to landmines, to be involved in one of the
major issues of our time.”91
While it would seem that opinion as strong as this is unusual, UNICEF
in particular has been singled out for criticism, including questions about
whether it is the most effective or logical home for mine action within the
UN family.92 However, it should be noted that, despite his stinging
criticism of MRE, Rae McGrath also states that many of these problems
stem from MRE programmes working in parallel with clearance, rather
than in an integrated manner. It is this issue of integration, referred to as
community liaison, and enclosed within MRE terminology, that will be
investigated further in the next section.
Community liaison
Integration, ownership and communication
In general, MRE is practised by two types of organisation:
specialised mine clearance organisations93 or those development NGOs
that have a mine clearance capacity; and
awareness organisations not linked to clearance activity but which
undertake programming as a result of experience and specialisation in
fields such as education, protection or similar sectoral interventions.
This distinction has been crucial to the way in which MRE has
developed, impacting as it does on organisational values, culture and
development potential. A further feature of the MRE sector is that the
number of organisations practising MRE is increasing and, within the MRE
field, there are a great many more “stand alone” MRE organisations than
there are MRE agencies linked to clearance. This section will highlight
and further unpick the developments that have lead to the rebranding and
retooling of the sector.
A common experience of mine clearance teams has been frustration or
miscommunication in dealings with the population near to areas being
demined. Examples of these frustrations include:
the theft or disappearance of minefield marking material — resulting
in delay and possibly danger to clearance teams;
local herders or farmers crossing land being cleared, resulting in delay
and possibly danger to deminers;
a community’s seeming “refusal” to use land once cleared;
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a community complaining that the “wrong” area has been prioritised for
clearance from their point of view:
staff of clearance agencies being made to feel unwelcome, or treated
with suspicion; and
a great deal of time and resources spent clearing suspect areas which
later are found not to contain mines or UXO.
Meanwhile communities have often claimed that they are:
not informed what is going on, who the deminers are working for,
who is in charge and why they are there;
not consulted about when is a convenient time of year for clearance to
start so as not to clash with seasonal use of land;
often not informed of when clearance is completed, or where clearance
has been suspended due to seasonal factors; and
not clear how land for clearance has been prioritised.
Communication has clearly been a problem during mine action and what
has become known as community liaison has developed in part to overcome
this. Improved communication has allowed mine clearance teams to work far
more efficiently due to better cooperation and intelligence from local
communities, while providing those communities with a far greater sense of
ownership and understanding as to what is being done, for whom, for how
long and why. The impact of this approach has been noted:
“... agencies that systematically build an understanding of the
communities within which they work, and who build strong relationships
with those communities, are capable of triggering change…
In other words, the extent to which an intervention will have an impact
is not only a reflection of the inherent impact of landmine removal (i.e.
accident reduction), but is also dependent on the manner in which the
intervention is conducted.”94
This reflects another aspect of community liaison: the role it can play in
contributing to priority-setting. In most mine action programmes the lack of
community-originated socio-economic data hampers all stages of operations
from planning through to operations. In many, if not most countries, priority
setting, and often clearance, has been initiated prior to the completion of a
detailed countrywide (or affected area) landmine impact survey. Community
liaison activities can and have provided an alternative means for prioritising
activity.95
Pioneered by MAG as part of the Mine Action Team (MAT) concept96 and
first formally undertaken in Luena, Angola, in April 1996, community liaison
has since been developed further by a number of organisations.97 The concept
recognises that those best equipped with skills to regularly maintain contact
with communities and to develop a relationship of trust and mutual respect
were often staff involved in MRE programming, who are typically (or should
be) trained educators.
In essence the community liaison function is a three-stage process as set
out in the text box below.
In essence, therefore, community liaison staff provide assistance to two
distinct “customer groups”: clearance personnel and those living on or near
land being cleared. The needs of community and clearance customers have
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proved to be very different depending on location and the nature of the mine/
UXO threat.981 Determining the needs of each customer, working to ensure these
needs are met and regularly revisiting these requirements are the basic building
blocks of a community liaison function.
Box 1. Community liaison: a three-stage process
1.  Pre-clearance activities
• information gathering to prioritise activities, gathered from e.g. regional
authorities, hospitals, the government, the military, NGOs;
• detailed work with representatives of all sectors of the community gathering
information on the specific nature of the threat; and
• developing a clear understanding of existing socio-economic conditions in
communities prior to organisational involvement (with a view to measuring
change) and access to land, health care, education, grazing, water, firewood,
etc.
All the above information is fed back to clearance teams to assist with
prioritisation/tasking etc.
2. During clearance
(including preparation and detailed planning phase immediately prior to clearance commencing)
• agreeing with the community details of the work: where this will start, what
it will involve, how long it is likely to take and how the community can
assist;
• providing updates and feedback on the progress of the clearance programme
with adjusted timeframes;
• actively involving the community in maintaining minefield marking signs,
and control of children and animals in and around minefield areas; and
• close liaison with relevant stakeholders on progress with the various
organisations and bodies involved.
If required, provide MRE, targeted at the most appropriate/vulnerable sectors
of the community.
3.  Post-clearance activities
• handing over land to communities indicating where it has been cleared,
and areas that still possibly present dangers;
• evaluation of work undertaken, with a view to providing feedback for future
programmes to improve impact;
• linking the community to organisations providing post-clearance support,
including assistance with the rehabilitation of resources/infrastructure in
whatever form appropriate; and
• returning to communities periodically to assess land use, and update basic
socio-economic data to assist understanding of the impact of clearance.
Two examples of the community liaison approach are highlighted in Boxes
2 and 3. The first example is that of Kosovo where the MAST concept was
introduced primarily (but not exclusively) in support of clearance organisations
in an attempt to improve the management of the mine action process.99 Here
the MACC borrowed the community liaison concept and shaped it to the
realities of the local mine/UXO threat. The final shape also reflected the
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function gaps of existing mine action players where problems of prioritisation
and post-clearance handover resulted in each clearance body being provided
with a MAST from a MRE organisation to provide the “before”, “during” and
“after” service.
Box 2. The Kosovo Mine Action Support Team (MAST) concept
The Kosovo model emerged over time when it became clear that mine clearance
and mine awareness were operating in isolation of one another with extremely
limited communication between the two. In one instance, a mine clearance
organisation had completed a technical survey on an area, no mines were
found and the area was certified clear. Some months later, however, the
community was still under the impression that there was a mine threat in the
area and the deminers were coming back. The area had been visited several
times by independent mine awareness agencies also unaware the area was
safe.
Accordingly, in 2000, guidelines were set out for the establishment of a  (MAST
for each mine or battle area clearance organisation. MRE agencies were tasked
to provide support to every clearance organisation where an integral mine
awareness capacity did not already exist. To formalise the arrangements and
to ensure all participants were aware of the degree of importance the MACC
placed on this concept, completed mine awareness arrangements were included
as part of the quality assurance and certification process of completed
clearance tasks.
The MASTs were tasked to support clearance before, during and after
operations through communication and facilitation between community and
clearance organisation. These included who would be working, where, why,
for how long and on what particular threat. It also included negotiating special
needs, such as access to vehicle tracks during working hours for quick casualty
evacuation, negotiating animal access routes to cross certain areas, and
respecting farmers’ property while working in the area. Deliberate efforts were
made to discuss with the community exactly what mine threat they faced and
what was going to be done about it.
The UNMAS/Praxis Group (2001) evaluation of the mine action programme
highlighted the success of the concept from an operational point of view. However
no evaluation was made to determine the view of clearance and mine awareness
agencies, or affected communities as to the success of this approach.
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests general satisfaction from clearance
agencies regarding an improved operating environment.
The example from Cambodia (Box 3) highlights the introduction of the
community liaison approach chiefly in support of communities as the primary
customer group. Recognition that the current system was failing mine-affected
communities led to a fundamental review of how MRE was undertaken. This
has sought to reduce the number of civilians falling victim to landmines each
year.
Each example highlights how community liaison combined with the
principles of MRE can and has resulted in a far more efficient programme,
and a far more effective service to those mine action seeks to assist.
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Box 3. Cambodian Mine Action Centre/Handicap International Belgium-
trained mine risk reduction teams
Following the end of the conflict in Cambodia, the total number of landmine
and UXO casualties decreased significantly. Despite this, there had been no
dramatic reduction in the numbers of civilian casualties since 1982 — this
figure remaining at a level higher than that recorded in 1981 and at comparable
levels for the years 1986 to 1991. This situation appeared to indicate that the
greatest contributing factor in the overall reduction of casualties recorded since
1998 had been the significant decrease in military casualties since the end of
fighting. Unfortunately, the impact of mines on the civilian population has not
decreased to the same effect.
Through investigating this anomaly Handicap International Belgium came to
the conclusion that the general organisation of mine action was not conducive
to the reduction of risk to communities. Principally, this was due to the large
size of Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) mine action teams and their
lack of mobility, and, perhaps more importantly, the lack of meaningful
community involvement in the approach being taken. In addition, available
data on mine and UXO victims was generally poorly used and was not
adequately integrated in the planning of mine action interventions.
Consequently, the capacity of clearance teams to react following an accident
and to render safe affected areas was often inadequate. Moreover, even when
information was used, the capacity to react was slow due to a need to modify
existing mine clearance resources. In the opinion of HI, there was a need to
ensure direct links between communities and mine action practitioners and to
directly target initiatives towards at-risk communities.
In 2002, HI, in collaboration with CMAC, organised the training and the
deployment of multi-skilled mine risk reduction teams in order to more
effectively prevent accidents and reduce the risk faced by communities. These
teams would undertake the following activities:
1. Community liaison, to identify the exact nature of the problem facing
particular communities and their needs in terms of mine action.
2. Proximity landmine clearance, to open up paths and access routes for
communities who are forced to enter dangerous areas to ensure their
livelihood, or otherwise conduct clearance on medium-scale tasks posing
an immediate threat.
3. The destruction of UXO, to destroy unexploded bombs, especially spot
UXO, in areas where children are identified as being at high risk of playing
with such devices.
4. Minefield survey and long-term marking of minefields, to warn people of
hazardous areas and support larger scale clearance.
5. The provision of mine and UXO awareness messages for affected
communities, where the problem is identified as a lack of knowledge —
particularly in the case of children — to prevent casualties and teach safe
behaviour.
While it is still early days, initial indications are that the teams are having a
successful impact. This represents a considerable advance on the process
previously used and may have a significant impact on the implementation of
future integrated programming in the region.
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The activities undertaken by the community liaison process are clearly crucial
to the effective implementation of all clearance programmes. Often, however,
this function has not been undertaken — a crucial obstacle to effective mine
clearance. As has been highlighted above, mine clearance undertaken with a
poor prioritisation process, limited intelligence as to the scale and nature of the
threat and a limited understanding of perceived need will be at best wasteful,
and at worst dangerous for those involved in clearance activity.
Community liaison
Increasingly it is being recognised that the community liaison approach is
the way forward for MRE operatives. For example, the Landmine Monitor
Report in 2000 stated that:
“As the mine action community begins to recognise the role of socio-
economic data and analysis in planning mine action programmes, it is
clear that mine awareness should be looking to exploit its comparative
advantages. In its capacity as a community-level initiative, mine
awareness should, in theory at least, generate a large amount of precious
quantitative and qualitative data that can help to prioritise mine clearance
and marking, identify unfulfilled needs for mine victim assistance and
provide information in support of the prohibition of anti-personnel mines
and its implementation.”100
Likewise, the new IMAS standards on MRE highlight the importance of
this aspect of the work. There is an interesting issue here, however. The past
ten years or more of mine action have shown that the majority of national
mine action coordinating bodies, whether independent mine action centres
or national government entities, have tended to view MRE as a peripheral
and poorly understood function that requires specialist educationalist input
and as a result,
“mine awareness is placed to the side so the other mine action initiatives
can proceed unhindered. This is often done because the mine action
coordinating body does not feel qualified or prepared to engage in such a
specialised endeavour: unfortunately, to leave the pursuit to others has
only reinforced its exclusion.”101
Box 1 above outlined the functions of community liaison. While it is true
that the skills profile required for community liaison activities tends to mirror
that of “classical” MRE, it does not necessarily require staff previously recruited
for MRE to undertake the community liaison function. Indeed, a skilled
community educator or public health official with no training in MRE is likely
to be able to undertake all but one of the 12 activities listed. The point is that
because MRE existed before community liaison the assumption often made is
that staff from (what used to be termed) MRE should now undertake the
community liaison activities. This does not necessarily need to be the case;
indeed this may actually damage the wider understanding of community
liaison among clearance practitioners and mine action managers.
The concern is that as long as it is MRE staff who undertake community
liaison, the many activities that this role fulfils will continue to be misunderstood
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and downgraded by the many clearance-focused personnel who fail to engage
with MRE.102 If staff were recruited for the liaison function, but tasked and
managed by the same operations cell that tasks clearance operations, it is likely
that benefits to clearance would be far more visible and quickly recognised.103
An argument could therefore be made for the separation of community liaison
teams and stand-alone MRE teams, with MRE teams only undertaking public
awareness campaigns, educational approaches (for example overseeing
national or sub-national level educational activities, media campaigns and
curriculum development), or community-based activities with communities
only in areas where mine clearance is not being undertaken. Such situations
may include working with refugee groups in preparation for return, or with
communities in mine-contaminated areas that do not have an ongoing clearance
programme.
However, in communities where mine clearance is being undertaken
the focus should be on MRE through community liaison, preferably
integrated into the clearance agency, managed and tasked as part of the
clearance operation. While this function could be undertaken by a separate
team from another agency (as was done in Kosovo), the process would be
far smoother if such teams consisted of personnel from the clearance agency
concerned.
It is recognised in management journals that in-house operations usually
aid communication (both formal and informal), ensure a more efficient
use of resources and tend to remove issues of conflicting organisational
priorities — while also increasing accountability and transparency. Relying
on contracted-in assistance (the approach used by many clearance agencies
in Kosovo) usually proves less efficient since shortfalls reported by
community liaison teams can be seen as an “attack” on the clearance
organisation, responsibility for problems is denied and more time is
required to correct operational procedures.
If such an in-house set-up is not possible then there is a need for MRE
practitioners to be far more proactive in explaining the community liaison
process and the benefits that can be derived by clearance personnel. Likewise,
clearance managers need to “sell” the process more effectively to their staff.
Community liaison staff need to remember that the mine clearance organisation
is a customer and must be treated as such. In many programmes, MRE staff
bristle at the thought of being managed by, and accountable to, clearance
organisations. However, ultimately, where clearance is being undertaken,
community liaison teams are there to “grease the wheels” and ensure activities
are undertaken as smoothly as possible. Where friction exists (with either the
community or the clearance personnel) the role of community liaison personnel
is to resolve this. If community liaison personnel are perceived as adding
little to the clearance process it is their responsibility to disprove this through
quality work .
Conclusions
The MRE sector has slowly begun to professionalise — a process marked
by the development of guidelines, the introduction of training protocols and
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the current development of IMAS standards incorporating MRE. Having said
that, given the size of the MRE industry, there has been a relative dearth of
quality information for training and programme management. The recent
development of IMAS Best Practice Guidebooks by UNICEF in partnership
with the GICHD should help to fill at least some of the gaps.
Indeed, by far the most potentially important development of recent years
has been the development of the International Mine Action Standards for
MRE. These standards are intended to replace the existing UN guidelines
and include standards on data gathering, accreditation, programme planning,
implementation, management, training, monitoring and evaluation. The MRE
standards were formally adopted in June 2004.
The standards are welcomed in that for the first time a generally supported
definition of MRE — what it is and what it is not — is codified in the document.
This alone is no small feat — and while no doubt there will be those who feel
it can be improved, by clearly highlighting the public education component
and the community liaison function in unambiguous terms it is extremely
useful. How quickly the standards will impact on practice in MRE organisations,
though, will depend to a large extent on how aware the operators are of the
standards and their implications.
Yet, given the amount of funding made available to MRE programmes, it is
extremely surprising that donors have not been more insistent on being shown
substantive proof of efficacy. To date, operational efficiency and effectiveness
have largely been evidenced by questionable indicators such as the counting
of outputs — a particular favourite being the quantity of posters printed and
the number of individuals “briefed” or “reached”.
For, as has been noted in recent years,104 factors such as mine clearance
and population movements may be responsible for a reduction in mine and
UXO casualties with no input from MRE programming. Similarly, MRE may
result in increases in casualties, or at least an increase in reported casualties,
as systems are put in place for recording these. In the same way as mine
clearance is seeking to look beyond simple quantitative measurements of
progress (such as numbers of mines and quantities of square metres of land
cleared) to assess the social and economic impact of its work on communities,
so MRE evaluations must seek to judge success on the basis of more
representative proxy indicators.
So, in seeking to coordinate and integrate with other mine action and
development interventions, MRE must also work harder to demonstrate its
effectiveness (and efficiency) as a means of reducing casualties. It can be
argued that one reason for the lack of respect at times shown for the
profession is that the sector has poorly marketed itself, including its relevance
and proof that it works. MRE, and for that matter the clearance side of mine
action as well, has been guilty of assuming funding will remain available,
and that it was more important to deliver rather than waste time in
retrospective measurement activity. This view was convenient in that it
allowed for focusing on the delivery rather than on the search for evidence
of behaviour change among the target group. It also reflected a naivety that
funding would continue. As the funding environment has become more
formalised, so MRE organisations have realised this is no longer the case
Mine risk education
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and increasingly, organisations are undertaking more meaningful
evaluations of their work.
In addition, mine action, including MRE, must improve its accountability
to the communities it serves. Completed general surveys, detailed maps of
contaminated, suspected and known cleared areas, clearance reports, etc.,
are rarely shared with communities. Where such material exists, MRE
organisations should be tasked with ensuring its regular effective
dissemination. In communities where mine clearance is being undertaken the
focus should be on MRE through the community liaison approach (preferably
integrated into the clearance agency), managed and tasked as part of the
clearance operation.
MRE in Cambodia ©ICBL
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Introduction
Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) have been killing, maiming
and injuring soldiers and civilians for many decades. Accordingly, the
provision of at least some assistance to the victims of these weapons pre-
dates modern mine action1 and will surely outlast it, because, today, the total
elimination of the explosive threat they pose remains a pipe-dream.
Yet, within and outside the mine action community, victim assistance has
too often been mired in controversy as conceptual debates have raged about
who (if anyone) should be given priority for assistance; and by whom, and
how, it should be provided. Thus, despite the promulgation in the past two
decades of new international legal obligations to support victim assistance,
programmatic interventions at field level have rarely fulfilled the promise or
matched the energetic rhetoric of assistance advocates.
This chapter, then, tries to analyse some of the key issues in the provision
of assistance to mine and UXO victims. It begins with a summary of the injuries
inflicted by mines and UXO and then discusses the estimates of the number
of victims worldwide. This first section also includes a discussion of
terminology and definition — who are the victims and is that term even
appropriate? The second section looks at the needs of victims — what do




The world has made relatively little headway in improving the
provision of assistance to mine and UXO victims, despite it being a
“pillar” of mine action. The vast majority of the affected countries
have to deal with specific needs of landmine victims while struggling
with fundamental challenges of economy, employment, health,
education, and basic human rights. The three main issues preventing
improved victim assistance in 1999 still pose a challenge today: how
to collect and share needed information on victims; how to gain
sufficient attention from donors; and how to coordinate victim assistance
activities more effectively.
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they require in order to reintegrate effectively into society? The third section
considers how far their needs are reflected in accepted norms and standards
and to what extent they have been met by existing programmes and service
providers. A fourth and final section suggests what more can be done in the
future to better address the needs of mine and UXO victims.
Who are the victims?
During armed conflict, most of those killed or injured by landmines are
military personnel but, after hostilities cease, civilians form the majority of
victims.2 Civilians at risk are the poorest and most vulnerable members of
society, such as subsistence farmers, refugees, children herding animals,
nomads and those living on the economic fringes of society.3 Poverty forces
these people to enter known minefields to find food and water, to cut wood
and graze animals; these people rely on their physical fitness for survival,
and can least afford the care necessary to treat landmine injuries or to lose
their livelihoods. In 1991, 27 per cent of patients in the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) surgical database were landmine victims: although
the analysis dates back more than a decade, strangely this data set has remained
the baseline used ever since.
The injuries inflicted by mines and UXO4
Medical experts generally agree that landmines and UXO, in particular
buried blast anti-personnel mines, inflict among the worst of all war
wounds without necessarily killing their victims. The reason is that these
weapons tend to affect the extremities of the body most severely.
Originally considered just another conventional weapon,5 it is now
understood that mines inflict a much more severe injury owing to their
specific design: “the result is specific medical needs”.6 According to Coupland
and Korver,7 “victims of anti-personnel mines present a recognisable pattern of
injury — each pattern carries its own implication for the surgeon, the blood
transfusion service and the patients’ long-term disability/prognosis”.
The ICRC, which deploys some of the world’s leading war surgeons, has
discerned three general patterns of mine and UXO injury. Pattern I injury —
the most severe — is caused by stepping on a buried anti-personnel mine. In
many cases, the amount of explosive contained in the mine is — deliberately
— sufficient to maim but not to kill its hapless victim. The blast causes traumatic
amputation of the foot or leg with severe injury to the other leg, genitalia
and arms. Based on research by the ICRC, it is estimated that roughly one in
three mine and UXO victims suffers these Pattern I injuries.8
Pattern II injuries are the result of triggering a fragmentation mine,
including a bounding or directional fragmentation mine, usually by snapping
a tripwire or by being caught in the radius of destruction that results. If the
victim is not killed immediately the wounds are similar to those caused by
any other fragmentation device, such as a hand grenade or mortar shell; such
wounds can affect any part of the body.9 Depending on how far away the
victim was at the time of the explosion, the penetration o fragmentation can
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be superficial or deep. The ICRC has found that half of all its mine and UXO
patients have suffered Pattern II injuries.
Pattern III injuries are caused by accidental detonation of a mine or item
of UXO while handling or tampering with it; they are typically seen among
deminers, those laying mines or children who play with explosive devices. In
the mid-1990s, the ICRC estimated their number at 5 per cent, based on an
analysis of its database of patients in some of the hospitals the organisation
supports (in the remaining cases, the injuries could not be classified). However,
based on injury statistics around the world, in which tampering with UXO
makes up a significant minority, and sometimes the majority, of victims, this
percentage is probably considerably higher.
The number of victims worldwide
No one knows exactly how many people are killed and injured each
year by mines and UXO,10 nor how many mine and UXO victims there are
in the world today (a widely quoted estimate for the total number of
living victims is 300,000).11 In 2003 and through September 2004, the
Landmine Monitor Report, the annual report issued by the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines, reported new landmine and UXO victims in
66 countries.12 Landmine Monitor also registered mine vctims in seven
areas that it monitors because of a significant landmine problem (Abkhazia,
Chechnya, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland and Western
Sahara).13 According to the Landmine Monitor: “While acknowledging that it
is not possible to know with absolute certainty, it is now likely that there are
between 15,000 and 20,000 new landmine casualties each year”.14 This figure
includes UXO victims and probably those killed or injured by abandoned
ordnance — AXO.
Given the global expenditure on mine action — well over one billion dollars
since the adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 1997 — this
seems a rather meagre decrease from the figures widely quoted in the early—
to mid-1990s (typically, 24,000 – 26,000).15 Although new conflicts — in
Cambodia, Chechnya, Kosovo and latterly in Afghanistan and Iraq, have
added to the totals, this does suggest that the targeting and effectiveness of
clearance and risk education has not been impressive.
Moreover, the original figures were estimates based on rather tenuous
extrapolation from data at a hospital in Afghanistan. This was at the height
of the refugee return to Afghanistan and Cambodia, which led to extremely
high levels of accidents. In Afghanistan, it was claimed that in one district
1.95 per cent of the population were killed and a further 3.5 per cent injured
by landmines in a two-year period: one in every 18 persons.16 In Cambodia,
the number of amputees was estimated at 1 in 236 people, an astonishing
figure.17 Indeed, the ICRC’s medical staff in the mid-1990s, “overwhelmed by
the ever-increasing number of civilian mine victims they had to treat”, declared that
the world was facing an epidemic of landmine injuries. Subsequently, it is
believed that the number of new mine victims declined significantly. On the
other hand, earlier estimates may have understated the total number of
victims, in particular by not fully reporting the victims of UXO.
Assistance to landmine victims
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Although today the quality of victim data is far from ideal, it has certainly
improved since the early 1990s, when data reporting — absent the ICRC’s
hospital database — was notable by its paucity. The Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) can possibly take some of the credit for
this, although most should be ascribed to greater interest in the data from
concerned organisations and donors. Often, efforts are made to disaggregate
victim data by type of munition, age and sex of victim, and sometimes even
the activity that led to the accident and the assistance subsequently provided.
In early 2003, the Landmine Monitor identified more than 8,065 new
landmine/UXO casualties.18 This included at least 1,833 children (23 per cent)
and 258 women (3 per cent). Less than 14 per cent of reported casualties were
identified as military personnel. The Landmine Monitor cautions that the
statistics do not take into account the many casualties that are believed to go
unreported, as civilians are killed or injured in remote areas away from any
form of assistance or means of communication.
Among the most affected countries in 2002 were Afghanistan, with 1,286
victims recorded; Cambodia, with 834 victims recorded (a small increase
on the previous year); Colombia, with 530 victims reported, a significant
increase (145 per cent) on 2001; Iraq, with 457 victims recorded in the
northern governorates; and Angola, with 287 victims recorded. Reliable
figures for the whole of Iraq in 2003 are not yet available, but are likely to
show a significant increase, based on the conflict in April 2003, which
included some new mine-laying, and the resultant abandoned and
unexploded ordnance.
The reported casualty rate declined in 2002 from 2001 in the majority of
mine-affected countries. Where an increase was reported in 2002 this generally
appears to be due to population movements within affected areas (Cambodia),
or to a new or expanded conflict (India and the Palestinian Occupied
Territories). In other mine-affected countries, the increase appears to be largely
the result of improved data collection: Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
the Republic of Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan and Thailand. In Chechnya and
Colombia, all three factors contributed to significantly higher numbers of
reported casualties.
The sources used to identify new casualties include databases, government
records, hospital records, media reports, surveys, assessments and interviews.
According to the Landmine Monitor, the main collectors of victim data are
the national mine action centres, the ICRC, the United Nations Children's
Fund (UNICEF) and a number of NGOs. The US-based NGOs, Human Rights
Watch and Physicians for Human Rights19 claim that NGOs only started to
collect systematic data on mine blast injuries and deaths in 1991. And most of
the information gathered at that time was medical or from hospital databases
(such as ICRC) and therefore only represents some victims/injuries and not
those who did not reach a medical facility.20
Definitions and terminology
In ordinary usage, a victim is “a person … suffering death, injury, ruin, etc., as
a result of an event, circumstance, or oppressive or adverse impersonal agency”.21 This
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is a potentially broad definition insofar as the nefarious consequences of mines
and UXO can hurt many members of society and in many and varied ways.
But instinctively, we feel that the victims of mines and UXO specifically
encompass those who are killed or injured by an explosion of such weapons,
while accepting that others will be adversely affected by its aftermath.22
Certainly, as we have already seen, the data collected by the Landmine
Monitor focus on these individuals.
This is clearly the case in extant international law. The preamble to the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention recognises the desire of States Parties
“to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including
the social and economic reintegration of mine victims”. The Convention requires
that each State Party “in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and
rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims...”. Although
the term is not defined in the Convention, the travaux préparatoires and the
scope of the obligation to provide assistance suggest that it applies solely to
the individuals hurt by landmines23 and not more broadly.24
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are rather unclear in
their definition of the term. The latest version of the IMAS Glossary (Second
Edition, 1 March 2003) states that a victim is “an individual who has suffered
harm as a result of a mine or UXO accident”.25 It appears to imply that a survivor
is a synonym but it also notes, however, that: “In the context of victim assistance,
the term victim may include dependants of a mine casualty, hence having a broader
meaning than survivor”.26 It is not clear therefore what term is applied to
individuals who are killed in a mine or UXO blast.
The ICBL appears to have had a somewhat ambivalent attitude to the
ambit of the term. On the one hand, in previous years, its annual report, the
Landmine Monitor, has referred to victims and casualties interchangeably as
those who have been killed or injured by landmines or UXO. Yet, on the
other hand, the ICBL Working Group has asserted that landmine victims are
“those who, either individually or collectively, have suffered physical, emotional and
psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental
rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilisation”.27
These are not just semantics, for the scope of the term has significant
ramifications for both the needs of “the victims” and the consequent
programmatic interventions that are required to address those needs.
Describing everyone affected by mines as a victim may be useful for advocacy
but it risks diluting the impact of the call for assistance — and the legal
obligations that apply.
However, not everyone appreciates the term victim. Indeed, the sense of
“victimisation”, in which the suffering a person has to endure as a result of a
mine or UXO blast is prolonged by social stigma and discrimination, has led
some organisations — notably the eponymous Landmine Survivors Network
— to prefer the term survivor for those who are not killed by the blast or its
immediate after-effects.28
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Meeting the assistance needs of mine and UXO victims
Several organisations have attempted to compile a comprehensive set of
requirements for the survivors of mine and UXO accidents.29 According to
the IMAS, victim assistance “refers to all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to
victims (including survivors) with the purpose of reducing the immediate and long-
term medical and psychological implications of their trauma”.30
The Landmine Monitor31 has categorised the key components in victim
assistance as being the following:
pre-hospital care (first aid and injury management);
hospital care (medical care, surgery, pain management);
rehabilitation (physiotherapy, prosthetic and assistive devices and
psychological support);
socio-economic reintegration (associational skills and vocational
training, income generation and sports);
disability policy and practice (education, public awareness, disability
laws); and
health and social welfare surveillance and research capacities (data
collection, processing, analysis and reporting).
Yet, despite some progress, the same challenges to meeting the assistance
needs of the victims, as depicted by the ICRC in 1997, still largely remain
unaddressed — poor security, lack of access, the paucity of good data, poor
coordination, political and administrative constraints, inter-agency rivalry
and lack of funding — hindering the provision of assistance. At times, the
disconnect between the rhetoric and the reality is enormous: there has been
little systematic effort to turn conceptual frameworks into practical
improvements in the well-being of mine and UXO survivors. The victim
assistance cycle looks good on paper, but it has made scant difference to the
majority of those who must live with their injuries each and every day of
their lives.
For instance, based on the estimated figure of 300,000 victims worldwide,
Jerry White32 calculated that total assistance for an individual victim would
cost US$9,820 annually over a total rehabilitation time of ten years. Holistic
victim assistance to such a large and increasing number of victims would
work out at US$3 billion. These figures are, however, highly speculative, and
even if available would not address some of the underlying problems.
Nonetheless, on the — admittedly heroic — assumption that globally one
in three mine and UXO victims is an amputee, as the ICRC found from its
analysis of patients in its hospitals, the world may have roughly 100,000
amputees whose disability results from these weapons. These amputees,
typically resulting from detonating a blast anti-personnel mine, will require
a lifetime of assistance, notably physical rehabilitation (physiotherapy and
prosthetic limbs). A number of victims may have lifelong disabilities, such as
blindness or irreversible brain damage or mental trauma. For others who
have survived a mine or UXO explosion, recovery may be slow, but it may




A victim caught in the explosion of a mine or UXO33 and who survives the
initial trauma will need urgent medical attention.34 The ICRC, which has led
the world in the care of mine and UXO victims, has developed straightforward,
practical guidelines for the care in the field of the victims of weapons of
war.35 Its basic principle is that first aid is the only appropriate care at the
point of wounding and that if any other care is given to the wounded person
it will be conditional upon the presence of a health professional with
appropriate skills and infrastructure.36 First aid involves: putting an
unconscious wounded person in the recovery position; arresting any
haemorrhage; talking to the wounded person; and protecting the wounded
person from the environment.
Blood loss — very severe in the case of blast mines — must be stemmed
with the application of a firm dressing by direct or indirect pressure. A
tourniquet is usually the most practical method, although a compress can also
be used. The tourniquet must be released regularly (roughly every 20 minutes)
otherwise infection will set in causing a higher amputation than otherwise
necessary.
Any fractured limbs should be immobilised, using a rigid or inflated splint
(or whatever is available). It is usually necessary (but not always possible
given the lack of resources in most mine-affected areas) to insert a drip and
give plasma/fluid to compensate for blood loss. Of course, pain should be
relieved in the most effective way possible.37
The next priority is to get the mine/UXO survivor to a suitably equipped
medical facility in the shortest time (and most comfortable way) possible.
According to the ICRC,38 only 25 per cent of mine victims arrive at one of
its hospitals within six hours of injury; and 15 per cent travel for more
than three days to reach the hospital.
Early evacuation from the battlefield and prompt surgical care is crucial
to saving lives and reducing disabilities. According to the Landmine Monitor,39
emergency care is particularly difficult to provide in heavily-mined areas
and evacuation to health centres is often problematic. Military personnel stand
a better chance of this than civilians due to the more frequent availability of
helicopters, teams with first aid equipment, radios and staff trained to deal
with war wounds.40
For all victims, there is a need for the basics of care, including a tetanus
vaccination, antibiotic prophylaxis and, in the case of chest wounds, a chest
drain. On average, blast mine victims need blood transfusions twice as often
as people injured by bullets or fragments and the number of units of blood
required to operate on patients with mine injuries is between two and six
times greater than that needed by other war casualties. Lack of blood is
often a problem in severely mine-impacted countries.
Surgical care
As the ICRC has often remarked,41 surgery for mine injuries can be time-
consuming and complex because the equivalent severity and degree of
contamination are rarely seen in civilian practice. Few surgeons have
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experience and skill in dealing with
such wounds.
In ICRC hospitals, 82.5 per cent
of all amputations were for victims
of landmines. The average stay in
hospital for mine injuries is 32.2
days in comparison to 18.1 days for
a bullet wound. A blast mine injury
requires an average of four
operations and 3.2 units of blood,
whereas a bullet wound requires an
average of 1.9 operations and 0.5
units of blood.42
The cost per patient per day in an ICRC hospital is US$120; therefore,
the average medical cost of a landmine patient before they have left hospital
is US$3,000-US$4,000 in total. According to one study of Cambodia,43 61
per cent of Khmer victims went into debt to pay for their medical attention,
although more recent treatment aims to be free. Already in hospital, the
process of physical rehabilitation must begin with post-operative
physiotherapy.
Physical rehabilitation
Although the perception has sometimes been otherwise, not all mine and
UXO victims are amputees. According to the ICRC, roughly one in three of
the mine and UXO patients it treats require surgical amputation of one or
more limbs. Prostheses and other assistive devices (wheelchairs and crutches,
for example) form an important part of these victims’ physical rehabilitation
and considerable efforts have been put into this area over the past decade.
The cost of prostheses and orthotics, however, still represents a hurdle to
affected populations in post-conflict societies, despite the attempts of
humanitarian organisations to provide a free service to all.
Government rehabilitation
services, on the other hand, usually
have long waiting lists and require
payment, both of which landmine
victims can ill afford. An adult’s
prosthesis needs replacing every
three to five years, and a child’s every
six months or more. For instance, a
ten-year-old child will need 25
prostheses in his or her lifetime at an
average cost of US$125 per limb,
totalling US$3,125 — a luxury for
most in developing countries.44
For reasons of cost and
sustainability, prostheses should be
able to be maintained and repaired
ICRC and Ministry of Health Orthopaedic
Centre in Tbilisi. ©ICRC/F. Friedel
Traumatic amputation of the right leg following
mine injury. ©ICRC
177
locally. The ICRC has developed
specific and appropriate




technology, which is light,
individually fitted and cheap to
repair, transport and recycle. An
amputee’s first artificial limb is
transitional; therefore there is a
need for long-term services. Ill-
fitting or poorly designed components can cause skin breakdown, infections
and the need for further surgery.45
But since not all mine and UXO survivors are amputees, the rehabilitation
of other injuries must also be addressed. Often in conflict-ridden countries,
though, physiotherapy is not widely available or is not of high quality.
Assistance for sensory-impaired victims — blind and deaf — also needs to be
provided. These services are slow to develop in post-conflict societies, but
should form an integral part of health and social services.
Another aspect of physical rehabilitation, which is gradually receiving more
attention, is pain management.
Phantom limb pain (PLP) is
especially debilitating and affects
at least 25 per cent of amputees;
this can seriously inhibit physical
rehabilitation if not treated.46
Psycho-social
rehabilitation
Victims of landmines and UXO
accidents have not only suffered
physical damage but also
psychological trauma. The very
nature of their injuries means they
have to recuperate and readjust to
life, possibly without the use of one or more of their limbs or senses. Without
sufficient or appropriate support, victims may end up begging to support
their families, experience divorce, ostracism or be excluded from schooling.
It is important for the affected individual to resume previous activities.
Psychological or psycho-social assistance to victims of severe trauma is
largely neglected, especially in post-conflict countries. There are very few, if
any state-run rehabilitation facilities in developing countries (at best, some
artificial limb-fitting centres). Psycho-social support is rarely a component of
government services and the resources for other organisations to provide
these services are lacking. Medico International47 provides some
recommendations in regard to victim assistance and economic reintegration
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through psycho-social care: listen; assess potentials
for change; use best resources available; network
and share information; provide specific care; use
sport and culture; strengthen local organisations;
and promote monitoring of the impact.
One solution widely promoted in remote rural
areas is community-based rehabilitation (CBR). Social
service providers from non-formal and formal health
and social service sectors can provide culturally
appropriate support. Survivors can be trained to
provide peer support by empathy and attentiveness.
Emphasis is placed on the value of interaction with
peers, with a focus on emotional healing and, where
possible, involvement in recreation activities and the
arts.48
Social reintegration
Psycho-social rehabilitation and recovery of self-esteem (and confidence)
are usually dependent on social reintegration.49 Unfortunately, these services
are not usually available in mine-affected countries, so NGOs implement most
of these activities, with the government limited to providing pensions.50
Victims find it difficult to get employment, or
to continue subsistence farming, or to carry heavy
loads and therefore contribute to household
income.51 Most amputees leave the hospital or the
prosthetic centre with little or no hope for the
future. In Cambodia, for instance, amputees must
be protected against discrimination or exploitation;
they have no legal protection. Buddhism preaches
inner and outer “wholeness” and excludes
amputees from becoming monks. Many amputees
drift into towns to beg, turn to petty crime or drift
into alcoholism.
According to the results of the Standing
Committee for Victim Assistance and Socio-
Economic Reintegration (SC-VASER)52
questionnaire, landmine survivors ranked
employment and economic reintegration as top
priorities (medical care came in sixth position).53
In Cambodia, 80 per cent of victims have a
prosthesis or access to physical rehabilitation and
only 20 per cent of victims are in a satisfactory economic situation.
To some extent, employment rates and lack of income may be similar to
those of the general population — but persons with disability are put at a
further disadvantage. In Kosovo, roughly 80 per cent of those interviewed of
employable age are unemployed; this matches the 80 per cent unemployment
rate for the province surveyed in Kosovo. However, mine/UXO victims
Mine victim begging in the
streets in Cambodia.
 ©ICRC
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interviewed declare they cannot work because of their disabilities and medical
problems and 60 per cent maintain their financial situation has deteriorated
since they were injured.54
In most mine-affected countries (generally post-conflict), unemployment
rates are high due to general economic problems, so instigating equal rights
and employment of victims is even more challenging. But, as the ICRC has
written,55 amputees consider that employment in victim assistance services
helps to regain their dignity as well as having a positive impact on other
amputees and combating social stigma. For example, some of the technicians
in ICRC limb-fitting centres are themselves amputees — a positive role model
for others and an obvious benefit to themselves and their families.
Programmes for social reintegration of victims aim to improve the economic
status of the disabled population through education, economic development
of community infrastructure and creation of employment opportunities.56 The
World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) has compiled a set of guidelines for socio-
economic integration of landmine survivors to help them become productive
community members and contribute to their families.57 This is crucial as, in
the absence of outside support, in many cases “a PWD [person with disability]
loses his/her status as a ‘member of the family’ and becomes gradually a ‘dependant’,
like an old person or child”.58
Victim legislation and policy
Legislation and policy aspects of victim assistance in affected countries
require considerable development. Only 32 of 71 countries reporting mine
incidents in 1999-2000 had explicit policies and/or legislation on disability.
For instance, only half of the countries of Africa and Asia-Pacific region have
disability laws. Even where policies and legislation exist, they are slow and
difficult to implement.59
Policy changes ought to enable survivors to become more fully integrated
into society’s economic and social realm — for example, through legislation
and public awareness, access to services and assistance, and a national council
on disability issues; for instance, in Cambodia, there is a national Disability
Action Council.
The role of data gathering and analysis
Objective information and data collection on victim assistance is crucial to
quantify the impact of mines/UXO on public health and reintegration systems,
on human and socio-economic development, and on the daily life of people
and communities. The first major obstacle in dealing with the problems of
mines is that data in general are lacking and without statistics and facts,
priorities cannot be established, policy articulated and programmes planned.60
In 1997, the ICRC introduced the concept of the Mines Information System
(MIS) to facilitate the collection of standardised, systematic mine accident
information for centralisation and analysis. Determining how most effectively
to use national and foreign funding and setting proper operational priorities
according to humanitarian criteria depend on systematic collection of
standardised data and a coherent analysis.61
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The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is now
the most widely used information management system in mine-affected
countries and has led to more countries collecting victim data and
generating reports based on the data.62 IMSMA provides useful information
for identifying immediate victim assistance needs but is not sufficient for
planning long-term rehabilitation and reintegration. Some consequences
of landmines are more complex to measure (than casualties) — for example,
the effects on health, nutritional levels, access to water and a community’s
economy.63
The current principle collectors of mine casualty data on an international
scale are: the national mine action centres, the ICRC, UNICEF and NGOs.64
For example, the Landmine Survivors Rehabilitation Database tracks resources
and programmes in mine-affected countries that could serve to improve the
lives of victims.65  But most individual countries/States have some capacity to
assimilate data at a national level. The Cambodian Mine/UXO Victim
Information System (CMVIS) details new casualties, monthly trends compared
to the last three to four years; location of accidents by province, district and
commune; casualty types and cause of casualty; casualty trends, by terrain
type, by population group.66
Effective dissemination of information is also essential. The Landmine
Monitor encourages State Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
to submit in its annual reporting the voluntary Form J; this specifically enables
reporting on the situation of mine victims and the status of assistance
provision.
The Mine Action Information Centre Landmine Casualty Database
Workshop67 outlined four purposes for collecting data on mine accident
victims:
1) operational mine action (survey, marking, clearance, quality assurance,
operations planning and management);
2) mine risk reduction and education;
3) victim assistance; and
4) advocacy/donor information needs/resource mobilisation.
The provision of assistance to mine and UXO victims
The context for assistance to mine victims
Intense media coverage of the mine issue has led to a “disproportionate”
concentration of interest on assistance to mine victims at the expense of victims
of other injuries, even though, globally, mine/UXO victims only represent
0.3 per cent of all wounded.68 Thus, the World Health Organisation (WHO)
and the ICRC have asserted that humanitarian assistance must not give
preference to one category of injury.69
The Kampala Declaration supports the Bern Manifesto (1998) in the non-
discrimination between mine victims and victims of other traumas or violent
situations in their medical or psychological management and their socio-
economic reintegration. The Swiss Development Corporation believes that
“assistance to victims of landmines is defined as an integrated part of assistance to all
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victims of violence and trauma and persons with disabilities” and should be integrated
into post-conflict reconstruction and development strategies, public health,
community development, conflict and violence prevention, human rights, good
governance and poverty reduction.
The need to integrate mine/UXO victim assistance into all sectors of life
does not necessarily mean cutting all links with mine action. To be sure, victim
assistance can benefit from drawing funds and donor attention to mine action
programmes for all war victims and persons with disabilities. But the question
remains as to whether mine action operators possess the professional capacity
to institute or implement successful victim assistance programmes.
Provisions for victims were extensively debated during the Oslo diplomatic
conference that adopted the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1-18
September 1997). Certain donor States were reluctant to embrace a “holistic”
approach to victim assistance, being concerned about the ramifications on
funding. Ultimately, however, their concerns were overcome or overridden.
Thus, the preamble to the Convention recognises the desire of States Parties
“to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including
the social and economic reintegration of mine victims”. Of greater legal force, Article
6 of the Convention requires that each State Party “in a position to do so shall
provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration,
of mine victims...”.
Similar obligations exist for victims of UXO and AXO (abandoned explosive
ordnance), by virtue of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War annexed to
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (the Protocol has not yet
entered into force).
Key actors and actions
According to Article 6(3) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention:
”Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the
care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration of mine
victims… Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United
Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or
institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national
Red Cross and red Crescent societies and their International Federation,
non—governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.”
The United Nations General Assembly (2001) states in Paragraph 8,
”Principle of national ownership and integration”, that “the primary
responsibility for taking action against landmines lies with the concerned state”. The
role of the government in many countries is to establish standards and to
provide technical guidance. Governments should make provisions, whether
through tax exemptions or other forms of support, to allow for private
distribution of services. And Ministries of Health are responsible for the long-
term health care and rehabilitation of all persons with disabilities. In fact, in
most post-conflict countries, with such heavy demands on meeting other needs
for primary and tertiary health care, the needs of disabled people are generally
given very low priority because national bodies do not have the technical
capacity or budget.
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The leading organisation in the treatment of war-wounded is the ICRC.
It provides or supports first aid, medical and surgical assistance for mine
victims and other war-wounded. Since 1979, the organisation has
established or supported 80 limb-fitting and rehabilitation centres in 36
countries. It has provided more than 300,000 prosthetic and orthotic devices
for amputees, more than half of whom were mine victims.70 Other significant
organisations engaged in the rehabilitation of mine and UXO victims are
international NGOs, such as Handicap International and the Vietnam
Veterans of America Foundation.
According to the 2003 Landmine Monitor Report, most countries seem to
have facilities to address some of the needs of landmine survivors. However,
the Landmine Monitor identified 48 mine-affected countries with new mine
casualties in 2002 where one or more aspects of survivor assistance were said
to be inadequate:
“Even when services exist, they are often long distances from mine-
affected areas, making them inaccessible to many survivors, are too
expensive for survivors to afford, or are bureaucratically off-limits to one
group or another.”
From the research collected in 2002-2003, several general observations
can be made:
most services are still located in urban centres, but the majority of
mine survivors are in rural areas where the concentration of mine
pollution is greatest;
the majority of resources continues to be directed towards medical
and physical rehabilitation;
the availability of assistance in psycho-social support and economic
reintegration continues to be limited;
international organisations, NGOs and UN agencies continue to play a
key role in the delivery of services to mine survivors;
local NGOs often lack the financial resources to continue programmes
after international organisations have withdrawn;
ongoing conflict and the consequent security concerns in some mine-
affected countries severely limit the ability of the government and
international agencies to provide assistance to landmine survivors;
the economic situation of many mine-affected countries remains an
obstacle to the provision of adequate assistance to landmine survivors;
the development of programmes that address the long-term needs
of landmine survivors and other persons with disability, is hampered
by the practice of some donors to only fund programmes for a limited
period of time. A commitment to long-term funding is needed to
ensure sustainability and to build local capacities to continue the
programmes;
in a positive development, more mine-affected States are now taking,
or have taken, steps to develop a plan of action to address the needs of
mine survivors, or more generally to improve rehabilitation services
for all persons with disabilities.71
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Key issues in the provision of assistance
In most instances, it is suggested that the mine action centre or the United
Nations should not be involved in direct implementation, but instead take
on a coordination role as some aspects of victim assistance are clearly outside
their professional capacity.72 MACs are not designed to take the lead role in
victim assistance, nor do they have a mandate, expertise or required resources
to do so. Under overall coordination of the national commission or
responsible ministry, any mine action organisation can make significant
contributions to care, rehabilitation and integration of landmine survivors
and victims notably in the field of data collection and dissemination,
advocacy, planning and coordination, community relations and support to
service delivery.73
The GICHD Study on the role of Mine Action in Victim Assistance  produced
six concrete recommendations. First, victim assistance was clearly a part of
mine action but situated within broader emergency and development
initiatives, and there is a necessity to define the parameters of victim
assistance so as to address the whole range of victims’ needs (to which mine
action operations can certainly contribute). Second, the MAC can act as a
field coordination centre for related sectors of victim assistance, such as: mine
risk education, employment for victims, resource mobilisation, sharing mine
victim data, use of victim data in prioritisation, coordination with relevant
actors in health and disability sectors. Third, with the exceptions of Kosovo
and northern Iraq when victim assistance fell under the auspices of emergency/
interim measures, mine action has played a small operational role in direct
service provision, as the skills and knowledge required are typically very
different. Fourth, in efforts to advocate the provision of the best possible aid,
mine action can assist in the support of long-term, sustainable funding for
victim assistance projects. Fifth, mine action operators can reinforce preventative
methods of victim assistance by placing more emphasis on mine risk education
and minefield marking. And sixth, mine action professionals should have more
access to victim assistance materials in order to be aware of the specific needs of
victims they encounter in the field.
In conclusion, the GICHD study recommends that “mine action should not
completely turn its back on victim assistance” but assume a coordination role and
in “exceptional circumstances” it “should be prepared to take an active role in the
provision of services”.74 Participants at a meeting of the Standing Committee on
Victim Assistance noted that activities of victim assistance are more related
to the field of health care than to “operational mine action”.
Mine action has historically been a very “technical”’ field of expertise, yet
it is conscientiously moving toward a more inter-disciplinary approach to
relieve all aspects of the impact of landmines and UXO on communities.75
Objective 3.9 of the UN Strategy 2001-2005 states that “All UN-supported victim
assistance activities … be integrated into broader community and public health strategies
by 2004”. This means the incorporation of social, medical, legal, legislative,
informational and psychological aspects into a national plan.76  Bailey (2003)
believes “assistance to landmine victims should be viewed as part of a country’s
overall public health and social services system”.
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The origin of funding for victim assistance reflects where support lies and
potentially can be drawn from for mine/UXO victims. Victim assistance’s
proportionate funding to other pillars of mine action is considerably less. In
1999, identifiable support for victim assistance amounted to US$28.5 million
or 11.9 per cent of total mine action funding. This figure rose in 2000 to US$29.7
million, although dropped as a proportion to 11.5 per cent of mine action
funds. In 2001, the figure dropped to US$28.7 million and rose slightly to
11.6 per cent of total funding to mine action.77 There is a considerable amount
of opacity surrounding the financing of victim assistance programmes, a task
the UN Mine Action Investment Database is trying to clarify.78
Exact figures are difficult to extrapolate, which indicates that either
States do not report on victim assistance funding separately and consider
it an integrated part of humanitarian mine action or landmine victims are
reached through bilateral development cooperation. In relation to bilateral
development cooperation, unless funding is specifically targeted at facilities
and programmes that assist people with disabilities, including landmine
victims, it is more likely that resources will be directed to other areas of
public health or development concern, leaving the disabled population at
a further disadvantage.
Guidelines on assistance to mine victims
Since its inception, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention has triggered
a number of international bodies and organisations to compile guidelines on
the formulation of assistance to mine and UXO survivors. Detailed below are
some of the major influences:
The WHO/ICRC 1997 Strategic Framework’s primary aim is to facilitate
inter-sectoral integration among assistance programmes, donors, governments
including public health and social services and non-governmental services at
national, subnational and community levels. Achieving a more balanced
distribution of resources, strengthening capacity of affected countries for
planning and execution of programmes, and encouraging sustainable, long-
term interventions are the main goals of this strategy.
Bad Honnef,79 a set of guidelines drafted by a number of mine action
NGOs for mine action programmes, lays out guidelines, based on the following
three principles for field workers, donors and campaigners: 1) participation
— appropriate involvement of those affected at all levels and from the
beginning; 2) coherence — mine action programmes embedded between
emergency relief measures and long-term development programmes; and 3)
solidarity — not promoting new dependencies. These principles should
address the needs and aspirations of those affected, be community driven,
integrated with other development activities and define social indicators in
consultation with the community.
The macro framework for victim assistance by the Swiss Government,
ICRC, UNICEF and the World Health Oranization (the 1998 Bern Manifesto),
sought to promote an integrated approach using the health sector. The
manifesto was endorsed by ten African countries in Kampala in 1997 based
on four core components:
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1) prevention (prohibition, clearance, awareness);
2) surveillance (data collection on impact and analysis);
3) injury management and care; and
4) rehabilitation (physical and psychological) to full reintegration.
This framework was subsequently elaborated into the “Maputo Strategy”,
which brings together seven principles for intervention:
1) non-discrimination of victims;
2) integrated and comprehensive approach;
3) principle of co-participation;
4) national ownership and institutional support;
5) principle of transparency and efficiency;
6) sustainable development approach; and
7) victim empowerment and rights.
At the 51st World Health Assembly in May 1998, the “concerted public health
action on anti-personnel mines” was launched, requesting UN/governmental/
international organisations and NGOs to:
1) strengthen the capacity of affected States for planning and execution
of programmes;
2) better assess the effect of injuries on health;
3) focus on mine awareness and prevention;
4) merge emergency, treatment, rehabilitation (psychosocial) with the
health service;
5) support policy and programme integrated database.
In 2003 UNMAS’s sectoral policy laid out its Guiding Principles for Victim
Assistance as: comprehensive and integrated approach; participation, capacity
building and sustainability; non-discrimination, neutrality, impartiality and
humanity; integration; and training.
Conclusions
The world has made relatively little headway in improving the provision
of assistance to mine and UXO victims, despite it being a “pillar” of mine
action. Broadly the same actors — medical centres under national ministries
of health, the ICRC, Handicap International, the Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation, to name some of the key service providers, are engaged in various
aspects of assistance, notably in physical rehabilitation.
The vast majority of the affected countries have to deal with specific needs
of landmine victims while struggling with fundamental challenges of economy,
employment, health, education, and basic human rights at the same time,
some amid internal or international conflicts or post-conflict reconstruction.80
Three main issues identified by the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance
in 1999 still pose a challenge to victim assistance today:81 how to collect and
share needed information on victims; how to gain sufficient attention from
donors, and how to coordinate victim assistance activities more effectively.
Standardised collection of data and information on mine victims would help
to prioritise efforts and resources to alleviate the problem. The world still
has much to do in repairing the many wounds of war.
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Endnotes
1. The origins of “modern” mine action are traced back to Afghanistan in the late
1980s. Advocacy for a ban on anti-personnel mines aside, however, none of the core
components of mine action — clearance, stockpiling, awareness/risk education and
assistance — were inherently new activities in and of themselves.
2. Krug et al. (1998); up to 70 per cent of post-conflict casualties are recorded as being
civilians.
3. See for instance Roberts and Williams (1995).
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Introduction
There are a number of reasons why a State might wish to destroy stockpiles
of explosive ordnance it holds: it may be as part of a disarmament process, to
implement a legal obligation, upon expiry of the weapon’s shelf life or for
reasons of safety. This chapter focuses on the destruction of stockpiles of
anti-personnel mines. It begins by looking at the challenge of stockpile
destruction and then describes some of the key actors that have been involved.
It then reviews the international legal obligations and standards that govern
the destruction of stockpiles, before assessing progress to date in
implementing the obligations set out in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention.
Since the entry into force of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in
1999, which requires States to destroy all their stockpiles of anti-personnel
mines within four years of becoming a party, stockpile destruction has become
an accepted component of mine action. Indeed, since 2000, stockpile
destruction has been considered one of mine action’s five “pillars”1
and accordingly the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), developed
under UN auspices, also address the process of stockpile destruction in some
detail.2
7 Destruction ofanti-personnel mine stockpiles
Stuart Maslen
Summary
The world has made significant inroads into global stockpiles,
estimated at more than 250 million anti-personnel mines prior to the
entry into force of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. But most
stockpiled anti-personnel mines remain outside the purview of the
Convention. China and the Russian Federation hold the bulk of these
and neither appears ready to accede to the Convention at an early
stage. There are seemingly few technical obstacles to stockpile
destruction, although there are environmental and cost considerations
depending on the type and size of the stockpile in question.
192
Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges
As the IMAS point out, although stockpiled anti-personnel mines rarely
pose an immediate threat to human life they do enable the deployment of
new minefields.3 The removal of this capability is therefore an important
factor for the continuing success of the Convention and the reduction of the
threat from landmines worldwide.4
The challenge of stockpile destruction
 No one knows exactly how many anti-personnel mines remain
stockpiled worldwide. According to the Landmine Monitor, the monitoring
arm of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), approximately
200 million anti-personnel mines were stockpiled by 67 countries in 2004.5
This contrasts with its estimate of 230 million in 2002, which is partly
explained by the claim made in 2003 by the Russian Federation that it had
destroyed nearly 17 million anti-personnel mines since 1996.6
According to the IMAS, there were traditionally five options for the logistic
disposal of ammunition and explosives. However, in the case of anti-personnel
mines, four of these options are banned by international treaty. The Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention does not permit the sale, gift or increased
use in training of anti-personnel mines, and the Convention for the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (the Oslo
Convention) has outlawed deep sea dumping.7 Therefore, the international
community is now left with destruction “as the only available option for the disposal
of anti-personnel mines”.8
Stockpiles tend to be large in quantity, but relatively small in terms of
weight and net explosive content: yet the destruction of these stockpiles can
be a complex logistic operation.9 In the context of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention, it was generally understood that a number of States would
need assistance — technical, financial and material — in order to complete
their stockpile destruction within a specific deadline. Thus, Article 6(5) of the
Convention provides that: “Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide
assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines”.
According to the Landmine Monitor, States Parties that once produced
anti-personnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK) and Zimbabwe. Others have been cited
as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and
Venezuela.10
But the overwhelming majority of global stockpiles — around 190 million
— are held by States outside the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The
largest stockpiles probably belong to China (estimated 110 million) and the
Russian Federation (estimated 50 million).11 Other States with large stockpiles
include the United States (US) (10.4 million), Pakistan (estimated 6 million)
India (estimated 4-5 million), and the Republic of Korea (2 million). Other
States not party to the Convention believed to have large stockpiles are the
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Myanmar, Syria, Turkey and Viet Nam.12
 States Parties to the Convention probably stockpile around 10 million
anti-personnel mines. Nearly half of this amount (an estimated 4.5 million) is
held by Belarus and a further 1.3 million by Serbia and Montenegro. Both of
these States acceded to the Convention in September 2003 and became States
Parties on 1 March 2004. Greece, which also became a State Party on 1 March
2004, has declared stockpiles in excess of 1 million mines. In addition, a
number of States Parties likely to have substantial stocks have not yet officially
reported their numbers, including Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Eritrea.13
The Landmine Monitor has estimated that the remaining signatories to
the Convention stockpile approximately 8.5-9 million anti-personnel mines.
Ukraine reported that it possesses a stockpile of 6.35 million. Poland has
declared a stockpile in excess of 1 million mines. In May 2002, Indonesia
revealed it has a stockpile of 16,000 anti-personnel mines. Ethiopia also likely
holds stockpiles and Brunei has acknowledged possessing anti-personnel
mines. In the view of the Landmine Monitor, the remaining signatories —
the Cook Islands, Haiti, and the Marshall Islands — are unlikely to stockpile
anti-personnel mines.14
Finally, in addition to governments, the Landmine Monitor has affirmed
that many armed opposition groups also have stockpiles of anti-personnel
mines, including in Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Kashmir, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda.15 It
is unlikely, however, that any of these have very significant stockpiles.
Key actors in stockpile destruction
Stockpile destruction is significantly different to the other four pillars of
mine action in that it has seen only minimal involvement of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), aside from the monitoring role played by the
Landmine Monitor.16 The primary role in carrying out destruction of anti-
personnel mines has been accorded to State Party militaries, normally of the
country holding the stockpiles, with a secondary role being played by
commercial companies, sometimes in another country.
The United Nations believes it has a general responsibility to encourage
and support the effective management of stockpile destruction programmes.
Thus, for example, according to the Chief of Mine Action Team at the UN
Development Programme (UNDP), stockpile destruction should form part of
each integrated mine action programme that UNDP supports.17 In addition,
the UN’s Electronic Mine Information Exchange (E-MINE),18 has a dedicated
stockpile destruction section providing technical papers, policy guidelines,
lessons learned and other relevant information. The Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) also provides technical assistance
to States requiring help with stockpile destruction.19
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International legal obligations and standards
The definition of a stockpile
A number of international legal instruments have either direct or indirect
implications for stockpiles of anti-personnel mines. However, what constitutes
a stockpile is not precisely defined in any of these instruments (although the
scope of the term in the context of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
is discussed below). The IMAS provide that in the context of mine action, the
term “stockpile” refers to a large accumulated stock of explosive ordnance.20
Stockpile destruction is defined, somewhat narrowly, as “the physical destructive
procedure towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile.”21
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),22 adopted in
1980, is a humanitarian law treaty and as such focuses on prohibiting or
restricting the use of conventional weapons. Thus, Protocol II annexed to the
CCW, which addresses mines, booby-traps and what it terms “other devices”
(mainly directional Claymore-type munitions), does not seek to regulate the
production, transfer or stockpiling of these weapons. Of more relevance is
the amended Protocol II, which was adopted by States Parties to the CCW in
May 1996.
Although Amended Protocol II does not require stockpile destruction,
potentially it has implications for national stockpiles. Thus, if a State Party is
unable or unwilling to modify an anti-personnel mine to make it compliant
with the demands of the Protocol, since the Protocol prohibits the use or
transfer of an unlawful weapon, it is likely, in practice, to destroy it. This is
particularly relevant for anti-personnel mines that do not meet the
requirements for detectability,23 or remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines
that do not meet the threshold for self-destruction and self-deactivation
reliability.24 The Amended Protocol appears to have stimulated at least a
significant portion of the stockpile destruction carried out by the Russian
Federation and the US.
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
But the greater destruction of stockpiles has been as a result of the entry
into force of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The formal title of the
Convention — the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
Article 4 – Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or
ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or
possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible
but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that
State Party.
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and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction — clearly illustrates
its relevance to the destruction of anti-personnel mine stockpiles. A number
of provisions in the Convention detail the relevant legal requirements.25
A general undertaking to destroy anti-personnel mines
Article 1 of the Convention sets out the general obligations of States Parties,
which includes paragraph 2 whereby “Each State Party undertakes to destroy or
ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention”. This provision applies to already emplaced as well as to
stockpiled anti-personnel mines. The phrase, to “ensure the destruction of”,
makes it explicit that a State Party might wish to arrange for another State or
a private company to destroy stockpiled mines elsewhere. Under Article 3 of
the Convention, transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of
destruction is specifically authorised. For example, in 2002, two German
companies destroyed mines from the Netherlands and also Taiwan (a non-
party State).26
The specific obligation to destroy stockpiles
The key article dealing with stockpile destruction is Article 4. Article 4
sets out the disarmament obligation to destroy all stockpiled anti-personnel
mines that a State Party owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction
or control. Each State Party has an obligation to destroy or ensure the
destruction of its stockpiles as soon as possible but not later than four years
after the date on which it became a party to the Convention.
What constitutes destruction?
Yet, neither “destroy” nor “destruction” is defined in the Convention. It
is clear that a variety of different methods of destruction are lawful, as Article
7(1)(f) requires reporting on the “status of programs for the destruction of anti-
personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods
which will be used in destruction”. Physical destruction techniques available range
from the relatively simple open burning and open detonation (OBOD)
techniques to highly sophisticated industrial processes. The decision to opt
for any particular technique is likely to be based on cost, safety and
environmental considerations.27
Typically, States have used the OBOD method but State practice has
included dismantling as well as physical destruction of the mine or its
components. Thus, for example, in Albania’s stockpile destruction programme,
supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): the project
costs were offset by recycling of ferrous metals (1,100 tons, from which one
company made manhole covers and another made steel reinforcing rods)
and of TNT explosives (192 tonnes, converted into about 2,000 tonnes of
ammonite explosive for construction use).28
A particular problem arises with respect to the destruction of PFM
scatterable mines (i.e. those mines, known informally as “butterfly mines”
because of their shape, that are remotely delivered), produced by the
former Soviet Union and held in large stockpiles in a number of States
Parties and signatories, notably Belarus (a Party) and the Ukraine (a
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signatory), as well as in the Russian Federation (a non-signatory). These
mines contain liquid explosive (see further below) and result in a number of
“demilitarisation hazards”.29 Likely approaches to safe destruction are
contained chamber detonation with an integrated pollution control system,
or cementation (i.e. encasing in concrete) and destruction. A company in
the Russian Federation has pioneered a cementation method30 — the
government claims that this has been a key factor in the destruction of
13.8 million PFM-1S mines (which fail to meet the self-destruction threshold
criteria set down in Amended Protocol II).
Directional fragmentation “mines” (i.e. Claymore-type devices fitted with
tripwires) are covered by Article 2 of the Convention and are therefore not
only prohibited but also legally subject to the requirements for destruction
under Article 4. States Parties have tended to implement this requirement by
reconfiguring the devices, by removing and sometimes destroying the fuzing
but leaving the devices themselves intact. The UK has reconfigured its
Claymore-type mines, which is said to have involved more than simply
removing the tripwire.
In the case of mines ostensibly categorised as anti-tank or anti-vehicle
mines but which fall under the definition of anti-personnel mine in Article 2
of the Convention because of the fuzing system they contain, they should, in
accordance with Article 1(2) and Article 4, be destroyed. In such cases,
however, a number of States Parties have simply removed or altered the
fuzing mechanism rather than destroyed the mine itself.
Jurisdiction or control – a broad concept
The interpretation of the term “jurisdiction or control” in Article 4 has
proved contentious and State practice is mixed, depending on the individual
circumstances of the State Party. For example, Norway had both jurisdiction
and control over stockpiles of US anti-personnel mines held on its territory
on behalf of NATO. It informed the US that the mines would have to be
removed by 1 March 2003 — Norway’s deadline for stockpile destruction —
having become a State Party on 1 March 1999.31 In accordance with the
provisions of Article 4, Norway should rather have destroyed the mines.
Moreover, their removal was not expressly permitted by the Convention, as
they were not being transferred for the purposes of destruction. Thus far,
however, no State Party has raised any objection.
At the other end of the spectrum, Germany, Japan32 and the UK have
stated that they have neither jurisdiction nor control over anti-personnel mines
stockpiled by the US on their territory. In May 2001, the UK stated:
“We wish to affirm that US stocks do not fall under our national
jurisdiction or control and we do not therefore have any obligations under
Article 4 … in respect of them. We have fully complied with our
obligations in respects of stocks that were under our jurisdiction or
control.”33
But, the obligation to destroy stockpiles laid down by the Convention is
potentially even broader as, depending on the circumstances, it can also be
interpreted to encompass quantities of anti-personnel mines that fall under
the jurisdiction or control of armed forces operating abroad in military
197
operations, including offensive actions and peace-keeping. Thus, an army of
a State Party that wins control of anti-personnel mine stockpiles belonging to
a non-party State is likely to be required to destroy those stockpiles as soon
as possible, even though the non-party State is not itself bound by the
Convention. It has been reported by the Landmine Monitor, for instance,
that French troops participating in the international peace-keeping force
destroyed 70,000 anti-personnel mines stored near Kabul airport in February
2002.34 It is highly likely that UK forces have come across stockpiled anti-
personnel mines in Iraq.
Lawful retention
Yet, in any case, not every single anti-personnel mine has to be destroyed.
Article 3 of the Convention allows each State Party to retain “a number of anti-
personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance,
or mine destruction techniques”, as long as the number does “not exceed the
minimum number absolutely necessary”. Thus, no maximum number is stipulated
by Article 3; nonetheless, it is difficult legally to sustain any State Party’s
decision to keep the whole of its original stockpile, ostensibly for training
and research in accordance with Article 3. In accordance with customary
international law, a treaty is to be interpreted and applied in good faith.
Furthermore, the provision has been widely interpreted by States Parties to
mean that “hundreds or thousands, but not tens of thousands” may be retained.
The deadline for completion
Each State Party undertakes to destroy stockpiles “as soon as possible but not
later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party”
(i.e., four years and six months after formally adhering to the Convention).
In applying that provision in good faith, as required by international treaty
law, a State should develop destruction plans and initiate destruction early
within the allotted time period and should not wait for the deadline to loom
large. Although each party’s destruction programme is dependent on national
resources and capacity, Australia, for instance, destroyed its entire known
stockpile of 128,161 anti-personnel mines in five days in September and
October 1999,35 only three months after it became party to the Convention.
A number of States Parties have discovered additional stocks of anti-
personnel mines,36 sometimes after ostensibly completing the destruction of
stockpiles.37 In a number of cases, mines are “stockpiled” by civilians.38 How
does this affect the deadline laid down in Article 4? As long as a State Party
has not sought to conceal stockpiles, it is to be assumed that they should
destroy any new anti-personnel mines located in stocks or caches “as soon as
possible.” They should also include full details in their next Article 7 report,
due annually to be submitted to the Secretary-General of the UN. Given
initial good faith on the part of the State Party, the identification of very
significant new stocks of anti-personnel mines should normally be considered
unlikely.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR)
has been collecting landmines and other explosive munitions for the purpose
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of destruction in what it terms “Operation Harvest”. Since Operation Harvest
began in 1998, close to 9 million rounds of ammunition, nearly 110,000 hand
grenades, 27,000 small arms, 28,000 mines and more than 24,000kg of
explosives have been collected. Destruction of all explosive devices is carried
out by SFOR.39
The International Mine Action Standards
As previously noted, stockpile destruction may relate to any explosive
ordnance contained in stockpiles, however, the IMAS focus on the destruction
of anti-personnel mine stockpiles. There are currently four standards
pertaining to stockpile destruction — one in Series 7 (07.41) dealing with the
monitoring of stockpile destruction, and three in Series 11, a series dedicated
to stockpile destruction:
11.10 – Guide for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines;
11.20 – Principles and procedures for open burning and open detonation
(OBOD) operations; and
11.30 – National planning guidelines for stockpile destruction.
Destruction techniques
According to the IMAS, the costs of demilitarisation of anti-personnel
landmines range from US$2 to US$4 each, depending on the type of mine.40
Generally, open detonation is likely to be the cheapest means to destroy
stockpiles of up to one million anti-personnel landmines, but it requires
significant knowledge of explosives engineering as the shock wave caused
by detonation may not destroy the mines but throw them out and arm
them.
Industrial-scale demilitarisation has many advantages — mechanical
disassembly, incineration in environmentally-controlled systems and the
ability to operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Its major disadvantage is
the high capital set-up costs of design, project management, construction and
commissioning. Operating costs are generally lower than OBOD (once
amortisation of the development capital is discounted), although high labour
costs in developed countries account for a large percentage of the OBOD
costs.
Notwithstanding this, OBOD can be a cheaper option, depending mainly
on the economy of scale possible. In the US, for example, average OBOD
costs are US$850 per tonne, whereas industrial demilitarisation is US$1,180
per tonne; but these costs are for all ammunition types, not just anti-personnel
mines. The IMAS also notes that salvage of metallic scrap, or explosive waste,
can result in an income stream. Some explosive fillings of anti-personnel mines
may be useful to the commercial explosive industry, while scrap steel is always
in demand.41
In many cases the development of such purpose-built demilitarisation
facilities to enable State Parties to fulfil their obligation for stockpile
destruction will be well beyond available resources and therefore may not
be a practical option. Factors such as cost, location and safety may mean that
OBOD is the only pragmatic and feasible option.
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Environmental considerations in stockpile destruction42
Concerns have been expressed as to the environmental consequences of
destroying certain mines by open detonation, both by the State holding the
stockpiles and also potential donors, which may have their national or broader
environmental legislation to consider.43 For instance, the PFM-1 scatterable
anti-personnel mine contains hydrogen chloride, the open detonation of which
may lead to unacceptable environmental pollution. One solution may be
contained detonation in a pollution control chamber as the mine cannot be
disassembled.
Traditionally the military are usually responsible for the destruction of
anti-personnel mines using OBOD techniques, while civilian companies use
industrial demilitarisation. The availability, or not, of qualified manpower
may have a significant influence on the destruction technique to be used.
Certain destruction techniques result in the production of “special” or
“hazardous” waste, which itself requires destruction or disposal in an
environmentally benign manner. This is usually done by a specialist
environmental disposal company.
In Europe, many nations have banned OBOD of all munitions — unless
there is no alternative and that it can be justified on safety grounds. This has
necessitated the construction of expensive demilitarisation facilities, hence
the requirement for the disposal of ammunition types other than anti-personnel
mines and the necessity for economies of scale if pursuing this option. The
argument about the environmental effects of OBOD is still ongoing and sound
scientific evidence has been developed to support a case that OBOD of certain
anti-personnel mine types may not be a threat to the environment. This means
that OBOD still remains a viable destruction option for anti-personnel mines
and may well be the most suitable option for regions with little or no
industrialised demilitarisation capacities.
Within the UN, all work related to the transport of dangerous goods is
coordinated by the Economic and Social Council Committee of Experts on
the Transport of Dangerous Goods, which produces the Recommendations on
the Transport of Dangerous Goods, also called the “Orange Book”. These
Recommendations and Regulations are addressed not only to all Governments
for the development of their national requirements for the domestic
transport of dangerous goods but also to other interested international
organisations.
The International Standardization Organization (ISO) 4200 series also lays
down internationally accepted standards for determining and measuring air
pollution from industrial processes. These standards will apply to any
pollution control systems used during industrial demilitarisation operations,44
but only in terms of the measurement of emissions as the standards do not
provide any guidance on what the overall emission limits should be: this
remains the responsibility of the national authority.
The only supra-national legislation that covers emissions into the
atmosphere from the incineration of hazardous waste is the European Union
Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste.45
This provides a comprehensive standard and is in use by all European Union
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countries and those countries with associate status. It does not prohibit open
detonation.
Determining the appropriate technology for stockpile destruction
According to the IMAS, there are so many inter-relational factors
involved in anti-personnel mine stockpile destruction that it is not possible
to provide “template solutions”.46 The selection of the most suitable
technique or technology by a national authority will depend primarily on
the resources available, the physical condition and quantity of the stockpile,
the national capacity and the applicable environmental and explosives
legislation.47 For instance, the stability in storage and degradation or
deterioration rates of the explosive content will influence the degree of
urgency for disposal, the type of transport that can safely be used and the
destruction methodology.
In stockpile destruction, anti-personnel mines are no different to other
types of munitions. They all contain fusing systems and high explosives so
the inherent dangers present during transport, storage, processing and
destruction are the same. For this reason, the IMAS recommends that the
stockpile destruction of anti-personnel mines should not be looked at in
isolation.
Economies of scale are likely to be an influential factor in that the more
anti-personnel mines requiring destruction, the larger the economies of scale,
and therefore the wider range of available technology. The IMAS therefore
suggests that national authorities may wish to consider anti-personnel mine
destruction on a regional basis and/or to include other ammunition in the
destruction plans, in order to achieve large economies of scale. For example,
the destruction of anti-personnel mines could be done in conjunction with
the disposal of large-calibre artillery shells. These can be used as “donor”
charges for the anti-personnel mines, to ensure that all the ordnance is
destroyed, thereby reducing the costs of serviceable explosives during open
detonation disposal operations.
Maintenance of stockpiles48
While stockpiles are awaiting destruction, they must still be stored
appropriately. Yet there are no internationally recognised standards for the
safe storage of ammunition and explosives in either military or civilian
ammunition storage areas. Regional organisations, such as NATO, do have
agreed standards49 but the safe storage of ammunition and explosives is a
national responsibility.
There are, however, basic principles for the safe storage and maintenance
of ammunition stockpiles.50 If these principles are followed, in general the
risk of an undesired explosion occurring is greatly reduced. An exception is
the risks from sabotage or war although, according to the GICHD, even in
this case, adherence to basic principles will reduce the resultant damage.
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The implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention
Progress to date
In the 10 years from 1992 to 2002, according to the Landmine Monitor,51 a
total of 69 countries destroyed some 52 million anti-personnel mines. Of these,
63 States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention destroyed 30
million anti-personnel mines. Between May 2002 and June 2003, 18 States
Parties completed the destruction of their stockpiles, eliminating a combined
total of almost 10.8 million anti-personnel mines over the course of their
destruction programmes. About 3 million mines were destroyed in 2002-2003
by States Parties, and more than 1 million by non-party States (Belarus, the
Russian Federation, Somaliland and the Ukraine).
By 2003, a total of 99 States Parties had either completed destruction of
anti-personnel mines stockpiles or declared never having a stockpile. More
than 50 States Parties had completed destruction of their stockpiles.52 Forty-
eight States Parties had officially declared not stockpiling anti-personnel
mines.53 A dozen States Parties were in the process of destroying their
stockpiles: Afghanistan, Argentina, Chile, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Guinea-Bissau, Romania, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uruguay and
Venezuela.
Four States Parties (Algeria, Bangladesh, the Republic of Congo and Kenya)
had not begun the destruction process but each has developed a plan to
destroy their stockpiles in advance of the treaty-mandated deadline. Four
States Parties will announce their plans when they submit their initial
transparency measures reports: Central African Republic, Cyprus, Timor-Leste
and São Tomé e Príncipe.
Fifteen States Parties had not officially declared the presence or absence
of anti-personnel mine stockpiles because of their failure to submit
transparency measures reports on time.54 Of those 15, those believed to
stockpile anti-personnel mines are Angola, Eritrea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Suriname and, possibly, Guinea. In addition, the deadline for
stockpile destruction has passed for three of the 15 countries: Equatorial
Guinea, Guinea and Namibia. Equatorial Guinea has stated that it does
not stockpile anti-personnel mines. Namibia claimed to only retain mines
for training and research purposes. Guinea’s stockpile status was not
known.
The first deadline for destruction
An important milestone in the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention was reached on 1 March 2003: the four-year deadline for
destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines for all countries that were
party to the Convention when it first entered into force on 1 March 1999.
According to the Landmine Monitor, it would appear that all States Parties
with a 1 March 2003 deadline met their obligation, with the minor exception
of Djibouti, which was two days late. The major issue related to Turkmenistan,
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which reported completion of destruction but also declared retention of 69,200
anti-personnel mines. The ICBL expressed its view that retention of such a
number of mines in fact meant that Turkmenistan had not fully destroyed its
stocks and that it was not keeping “the minimum number absolutely necessary”
as required by the Convention, and was therefore in violation of a core treaty
obligation.55
Turkmenistan had previously stated in its first Article 7 report in
October 2001 that there remained 761,782 anti-personnel mines from an
initial stockpile of 1.17 million. It also declared, however, that: “It will
take approximately eight years to destroy all of the stocks of anti-personnel mines.
Therefore, Turkmenistan is requesting an extension of the time allowed for the
destruction of the whole arsenal of anti-personnel mines to the year 2010.”56 No
extension to the deadline is possible under the Convention and no
reservations may be made to its provisions.
Subsequently, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Stockpile
Destruction were in contact with Turkmenistan, which indicated that it
planned to meet the deadline set down by Article 4 of the Convention and
that it had only about 250,000 mines left to destroy.57 It subsequently reported
successful completion of stockpile destruction, but stated its intention to retain
nearly 70,000 anti-personnel mines for training and research in accordance
with Article 3 of the Convention.
Mines retained for training and research
Of the 134 States Parties, 62 retain a total of more than 280,000 anti-
personnel mines for training and research purposes. Of these 62 states, five
intend to keep more than 10,000 mines. These five countries account for nearly
half of all the mines retained by States Parties. Turkmenistan alone accounts
for 25 per cent, with 69,200 mines retained. Others with very high levels are
Brazil (16,545), Sweden (16,015), Algeria (15,030), and Bangladesh (15,000).
A total of 55 States Parties have chosen not to retain any anti-personnel
mines. Of those not retaining, 13 States once stockpiled mines but have
destroyed them or are in the process of destroying them. Seventeen States
Parties have not yet declared whether they intend to retain any anti-personnel
mines.
Conclusions
The world has made inroads into global stockpiles, estimated at more
than 250 million anti-personnel mines prior to the entry into force of the anti-
personnel Mine Ban Convention. Sometimes progress has been slow, sometimes
there have even been concerns about slow timing, but generally the obligation
has been implemented in good faith.
But most stockpiled anti-personnel mines remain outside the purview of
the Convention. China and the Russian Federation hold the bulk of these and
neither appears ready to accede to the Convention at an early stage. Despite
apparently destroying many millions of stockpiled anti-personnel mines that
did not comply with Amended Protocol II, the Russian Federation has
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continued to use landmines in its ongoing military operations in Chechnya.
Getting these and other major military powers, such as India, Pakistan and
the US, to destroy their stockpiles will demand political will that has so far
proved absent.
On the other hand, the accession of Belarus to the Convention and, despite
its delay in ratifying, signature by the Ukraine, are both significant steps
forward. The path towards the elimination of anti-personnel mines appears
irreversible.
Moreover, there are seemingly few technical obstacles to stockpile
destruction, although there are environmental and cost considerations
depending on the type and size of the stockpile in question. The trials of
industrial disposal techniques for PFM scatterable anti-personnel mines,
sponsored by the European Commission, NATO and Canada, along with the
development of the cementation process by the Russian Federation, represent
useful progress towards ridding the world of the infamous “butterfly” mine,
an earlier scourge of Afghan children in particular.
Of all the aspects of mine action, stockpile destruction has seen the least
involvement of NGOs, with the bulk of the task being performed by the
military, and a secondary role played by commercial companies, especially in
Western Europe.
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8 The coordination andmanagement of mineaction programmes
Ian Mansfield
Introduction
The need for proficient coordination and management of mine action
programmes has been evident from the very beginnings of this humanitarian
and development discipline — generally agreed to be activities within
Operation Salam in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, following the Soviet
withdrawal from the country. Initial efforts to set up a national clearance
capacity by training and equipping Afghan returnees from neighbouring
Pakistan floundered as the volunteers, formed into small clearance teams,
were inadequately equipped and were left wholly unsupervised and
unsupported following their repatriation to Afghanistan. It is not known, even
approximately, how many perished or were injured during valiant efforts to
spontaneously clear the many mined areas that affected their country.
Summary
Over the last 15 years, the international community has identified
many of the requirements for successful coordination and management
of mine action programmes. Wherever there is significant
contamination or impact from mines or explosive remnants of war, a
national mine action authority and a mine action centre can play an
effective role in ensuring the proper coordination and management of
a mine action programme. These institutions should be mandated and
regulated by domestic legislation to bring clarity, coherence and
transparency to the sector.
The United Nations and its many partners can play a major role in
developing an indigenous capacity to run these institutions and thereby
to plan, direct and coordinate mine action operations efficiently in
response to the needs of affected communities, while at the same time
maintaining safety standards as high as possible, both for those
engaged in demining as well as those who will ultimately benefit from
clearance.
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Following this early setback, the United Nations, which was leading the
national reconstruction effort, rethought its approach and decided to promote
the creation of indigenous demining1 organisations — non-governmental
bodies that would ostensibly work on a contract basis to the UN for survey,
clearance and risk education (then generally referred to as mine awareness).
Thus were born the world’s first demining NGOs, and several of these
organisations continue to play a leading role today in freeing not only
Afghanistan but also other similarly blighted countries of their explosive
contamination. At around the same time, two former British military figures
decided to set up their own organisations to clear mines and UXO — leading
to the creation of the HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group.
The UN, through its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) assumed, de facto, responsibility for
the coordination and management2 of the nascent mine action programme in
Afghanistan, from its operational base in Islamabad across the border in
Pakistan. As a major study of the mine action programme in Afghanistan,
conducted in the mid-1990s, would later find: “In a political and economic
environment characterized by sporadic warfare and numerous uncertainties, UNOCHA
took the initiative of developing a mine action plan and the means for its implementation.
The basic two-tier structure which emerged makes a clear distinction between coordination
and implementation”.3 The UN would subsequently support coordination in
many other countries around the world, and even, in exceptional
circumstances, fulfil this coordination role on its own, as this chapter will
describe.
National programme coordination and management
The origin and role of the national mine action authority
and the mine action centre
In Afghanistan, UNOCHA served as a “central planning, regulatory,
coordination and resource mobilization mechanism”, contracting Afghan mine action
NGOs to undertake specific tasks such as mine awareness, surveying, mapping
and clearance. The DHA study, referred to above, concluded that:
”The Afghan institutional model is unique in that it has enabled the
development of a comprehensive mine action programme notwithstanding
the absence of a central authority and an ongoing war… The allocation
of distinct but inter-related activities such as survey, clearance and
monitoring, to different NGOs constitutes an in-built control or self-
checking system which simplifies overall management and reduces the
costs of running the programme. This institutional arrangement has
facilitated the development of a significant and impressive degree of
indigenization and operational capability which allows for diversity,
flexibility and cost-effectiveness. The programme in Afghanistan also
operates with a very small number of expatriate advisers.”4
Yet, although Afghanistan appeared to be a successful programme with
relatively good coordination and management, its lessons were not applied
in the next major humanitarian challenge for the international community:
211
Cambodia. The Cambodian mine action programme was launched in April
1992 following a negotiated settlement of its long-term armed conflict. The
UN’s peace-keeping mission, UNTAC (the UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia), had specific responsibilities for mine clearance and mine awareness
but was largely “focused on the achievement of short-term objectives geared to the
realization of immediate peace-consolidation tasks”.5
During this period, the Supreme National Council (SNC) which had been
set up by the Paris Peace Agreement, represented the “ultimate authority
concerning policy on landmines”.6 The SNC approved the creation of the
Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)7 in April 1992 and adopted its statutes
a few months later. However, “while CMAC was formally established as the
Cambodian institution mandated to address the country’s mine problem, it existed
primarily as a concept throughout the UNTAC period”.8 Furthermore, in a marked
change from what had been the case in Afghanistan, CMAC operated as both
a coordination and an implementation body for mine action,9 to the obvious
dislike of some of the other demining operators in the country. The two-tier
structure that had been employed in Afghanistan (though one that had been
driven, at least in part, by the exigencies of the situation), had been discarded
— or overlooked — in favour of a new approach.10
It was hoped that upon UNTAC’s departure, CMAC would assume
responsibility for coordination of mine action activities in Cambodia, including
the work being carried out by the Mines Clearance and Training Unit (MCTU),
which reported to the UNTAC Force Commander. Accordingly, just before
the departure of UNTAC at the end of 1993, “there was a flurry of activity to re-
arrange institutional mechanisms and to capacitate CMAC to absorb and sustain
MCTU’s activities. This resulted in a redefined and strengthened CMAC as it became
the institution responsible for planning and coordinating mine action activities in
Cambodia while simultaneously having the bulk of the capacity available in-country
for operational activities”.11 However, CMAC proved to be far too weak to
conduct its own affairs and international NGOs had to step in to provide
direct technical and financial support to prevent the institution from collapsing.
Major structural and managerial inadequacies, which the Cambodian
government, even with the support of the UN, never fully managed to rectify,
would come back to haunt the institution. The complaint among operators
was that CMAC was trying to be “both a player and the umpire”.
The story broke in the local and international press in 1999. Accusations
about corruption, nepotism and poor financial management were made against
a number of Cambodian organisations, including CMAC, and received
considerable publicity. CMAC’s donors suspended funding and called for a
proper audit of the entire funds received and demanded new accountability
for the use of funds. A 50-point list of requirements before funding would be
continued was handed over to the institution. In fact, the audit, though critical
of management practices, indicated that the disbursement of funds could be
accounted for to within a small proportion of the total funds. This small
percentage was mainly related to funds allocated to CMAC by the Royal
Government of Cambodia.12 Nevertheless, the adverse publicity that had been
generated badly damaged the image of CMAC and lowered staff morale.
According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL):
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“Concern over whether the agency would close and whether they would
have a pay packet and a job the next month was spoken of by many staff.
Relationships between UNDP and CMAC were strained and some
instances of public recriminations appeared in the media. The consequent
and probably understandable stop-start approach to funding hindered
planning”.13
By this time, however, many other mine action programmes had been
established. In Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Mozambique,
to name a few, large-scale demining programmes funded with millions,
sometimes tens of millions of dollars, were operating, often with the assistance
and support of a UN peace-keeping operation, as had been the case in
Cambodia; on other occasions, the UN Development Programme (UNDP)
took a leading role to develop the capacity of the national authorities to take
responsibility for coordinating and managing its mine action programme.
Experiences were mixed, as a landmark study of several countries attested.
In Mozambique, the UN’s initial plan “foresaw a Mozambican Mine Action Centre
which would mirror the Cambodian model: an inter-ministerial group or similar
configuration would constitute the governing authority while a mine action centre
would intervene directly and orchestrate the activities of all other involved agencies”.14
However, the plan, and the initiation of the proposed mine action programme,
encountered significant difficulties, in particular opposition from major
donors, as well as a lack of commitment from the former warring parties. In
response, the UN adjusted the institutional arrangements, having set up the
Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP), a demining body under UN project
management that brought together demobilised soldiers from both the former
government and the armed opposition group, RENAMO, working in harmony
side by side to clear mines laid during decades of bitter combat.
But at the time of the departure of the UN peace-keeping operation —
ONUMOZ — at the end of 1994 the UN and the donor community had still
not reached agreement on future institutional arrangements and how the
capacity of the Mozambican government would be developed to address the
landmine problem. By then, however, “a pragmatic arrangement of sorts had
emerged whereby Norwegian People’s Aid operated in the north of Mozambique, HALO
Trust in the centre, and … ADP in the south”.15
Indeed, as of 2004, the institutional management and coordination situation
had still to be clarified. Mine action was under the overall supervision of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which set up the National Demining Institute
(IND) in 1999, replacing the National Mine Clearance Commission that had
lost the confidence of operators and donors. A 10-year review of mine action
in Mozambique, conducted by the GICHD at the request of the UNDP office
in Maputo, identified serious deficiencies in the country’s latest five-year
action plan (2002–2006), a limited ability to plan and prioritise mine action
effectively, and a need to integrate mine action with national development.
However, the review also described Mozambique’s mine problem as a constraint
on economic development rather than a humanitarian emergency, arguably
the result of effective and well-targeted mine clearance operations.16
The GICHD’s review proposed that the government create a new
institutional framework making stronger links between mine action and
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national development plans. This would include an interministerial
Mozambican Mine Action Authority to provide the policy for and regulate
mine action, and manage linkages within the government, mine action
community and donors. It would be chaired by a minister whose
responsibilities focus on the country’s socio-economic development, with the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation serving as Deputy Chair,
responsible for Mozambique’s continued participation in the Ottawa Process.
The proposed authority would report to the Council of Ministers, which would
have final authority on policy measures intended to have government-wide
effect and for final review of draft legislation for mine action before it was
submitted to parliament.17
In Angola, following the 1992 cease-fire a recognised government was
already in place during the planning phase for the mine action programme. A
preliminary plan developed in September 1994 by the UN’s Humanitarian
Assistance Coordination Unit in collaboration with DHA declared that “a
major mine clearance programme was required if the UN was ‘to advance in a meaningful
manner its humanitarian and peace-keeping objectives in Angola.’ The plan was built
around the notion that the Angolan government was ultimately responsible and must
be assisted in acquiring the necessary expertise to deal with the long-term problems of
landmines”.18 However, the programme ran into trouble from the outset. A
review of the programme in 1996 concluded that the UN had “illustrated its
inability to learn from other programme experiences and was unable to avoid difficulties
it had encountered in other settings”.19
Subsequently, in May 1995, the Council of Ministers issued a Decree
establishing the National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices
(INAROEE)20 as a “specialized government institution responsible for coordinating
and conducting mine-removal operations” under the authority of the Minister of
Welfare and Social Reintegration.21 Again, as had been the case in Cambodia,
operators complained that INAROEE was both a player and the umpire: this
resulted in a lack of respect for the institution. In July 2001, the government
set up the Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian
Assistance (CNIDAH)22 to take over the role of regulator and coordinator of
mine action in Angola, reporting to the Council of Ministers. INAROEE was
subsequently reformed and reorganized as the National Demining Institute
(INAD) responsible only for carrying out demining operations.23
Based on a candid assessment in the mid-1990s of the UN’s support for
the development of indigenous capacities in four countries, it was
recommended to the then-focal point for mine action within the United
Nations, DHA, that in a mine-affected country the organisation should support
a two-tier structure for mine action coordination and management. This
demanded, first, that the UN, “facilitate the creation of a national mine action
authority with an appropriate mandate and composition. The purpose of a national
authority is to ensure that mine action activities have an appropriate governance body…
[It] would normally ensure that a portion of the national budget is made available
annually for the country’s mine action activities. The authority should ensure that
mine action policy is non-partisan and is in accord with humanitarian considerations
including the allocation of resources to address the mine-related problems of those who
are most vulnerable”.24
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The second tier of the management structure would be the mine action centre
or MAC:
“The core function of such a Centre is to ensure that programme activities
give effect to established policy. This necessarily involves the development
of an overall plan and ensuring that a coherent and comprehensive
approach is pursued in a safe and cost-effective manner. In line with its
central coordination responsibilities, the MAC will generally be responsible
for planning, for a central data bank on minefield information, for resource
mobilization, for monitoring, and overall programme development
including the investigation of accidents and follow up activities.»25
The report to DHA highlighted a problem with the MAC holding dual
roles of coordination and implementation, although it noted that: “The general
preference of Programme Managers, past and present, in charge of initiating and
developing Mine Action Centres was to have an operational capability under their
direct command. For the most part, MAC managers felt that they would be handicapped
by ‘having to rely on a third party’”.26 Ultimately, however, it rejected these
arguments and concluded with a strong recommendation:
“in favour of distinct coordination and implementation arrangements.
Operational activities should be undertaken by independently managed
mine action agencies (such as national and international NGOs) under
contract to the MAC. The MAC should not become directly involved in
implementation activities but retain overall control through sound
contractual arrangements. This approach puts less strain on human
resources at the centre in terms of management and control capabilities.
It is more transparent for donors and more responsive to shifting priorities
and demand as the mine problem is brought under control and the level
of activities decrease over the years. There are situations, however, where
the vertical integration approach will be the option preferred by the
national authorities. If the mine action authority and the MAC determine
to directly execute operations in the field then the central management
structure must be considerably enlarged to provide management and
logistical support to units in the field.”27
The UN accepted these recommendations, and reflected them in the first
version of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), issued in 2000.
The second edition of the IMAS, published on 1 January 2003, lays down the
following core guidance to States:
“The primary responsibility for mine action lies with the Government of
the mine-affected state. This responsibility is normally vested in a NMAA
[National Mine Action Authority,] which is charged with the regulation,
management and coordination of a national mine action programme.
The NMAA is responsible for establishing the national and local conditions
which enable the effective management of mine action. It is ultimately
responsible for all phases and all facets of a mine action programme within
its national boundaries, including the development of national mine
action standards, SOPs and instructions.”28
The IMAS also foresee the creation of a mine action centre, declaring that
a MAC
“can be established by either the NMAA, or in specific circumstances by
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the United Nations. The structure of each MAC will reflect the national
mine action plan, but in general they will be responsible for:
a) the co-ordination or planning of all mine action activities in their
area of responsibility;
b) the provision of technical advice to the NMAA;
c) the maintenance of mine action records and databases;
d) (if delegated by the NMAA), the accreditation of mine action
organizations; and
e) the investigation of mine action related accidents and incidents.”
The standard two-tier coordination and management structure (see Figure
1 – the third tier illustrated in the national structure refers to implementation through
demining and mine risk education operators) has been adopted by the governments
of many mine-affected States, though it is by no means universal. In particular,
States that have been assisted by bilateral or regional military-to-military
cooperation for the creation of a manual mine clearance capacity within the
armed forces have tended to set up a national demining office (or similar
title) within or under the direct control of the Ministry of Defence. These
countries have tended to eschew the need for a national authority, preferring
to concentrate on direct implementation of clearance activities.
However, the IMAS model remains the norm, and a number of countries
that have taken other approaches have moved to adopt, or have been
encouraged to adopt, critical features of that model. In Cambodia, for instance,
the funding crisis in 2000 that followed a collapse in donor confidence in
CMAC, led to the government setting up the Cambodian Mine Action
Authority (CMAA) and making CMAC simply an operator for demining and
mine risk education.
Likewise, in the neighbouring Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR),
UXO LAO had fulfilled a similar role to CMAC. Following its own cash-flow
problems in 2002, and under the encouragement of the UNDP, the Lao PDR
government issued a decree establishing the National Regulatory Authority,
Figure 1. National mine action structure
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which would assume responsibility for management and coordination of “UXO
action” in the country.29 This initiative, which was warmly welcomed by
donors,30 was still to come to practical fruition as of October 2005, although
the signs were encouraging. In Ethiopia, also, which had set up the Ethiopian
Mine Action Office (EMAO), following the initiation of support from the
United States, EMAO is calling for its role to be transformed by national
legislation into a formal coordination body.31
Indeed, with a view to promoting effectiveness and transparency, the UN
encourages all States to adopt national mine action legislation that mandates
and regulates the work of these key institutions;32 to date, too few States
have done so.33 A GICHD study conducted in 2002-2004 for UNDP identified
some of the main issues that should be included in such legislation.34
The role of the UN in supporting coordination
and management
In general, since the publication of the report to DHA on developing
indigenous mine action capacities, it is clear that the UN has been successful
in strengthening its efforts to support national coordination and management
of mine action. The UN’s approach to national capacity development for mine
action coordination and management is focused on three major components:
the provision of technical advisers within the national mine action
authority and/or mine action centre;
in-depth training for national staff working within these two
institutions, notably through the Senior and Middle Manager’s courses
offered by Cranfield University’s Resilience Centre and the Mine Action
Information Center at James Madison University (both through UNDP
and with the support of key donors to mine action); and
ongoing support for resource mobilisation, by facilitating relations with
mine action donors.
In rare cases, the UN (as foreseen by the IMAS) has undertaken
responsibility for national programme coordination and management directly.
In Kosovo, for example, the UN can claim a major success in effectively
coordinating the work of dozens of disparate operators over some two and
a half years, and clearing the province of the vast majority of its explosive
contamination. Similarly, in Lebanon, the UN facilitated the disbursement of
a US$50 million contribution from the United Arab Emirates that significantly
reduced the mine and UXO threat in the south of the country.
Where the UN has sometimes been rather less successful is in securing the
transition to full national ownership of a mine action programme. In the major
mine action programmes set up at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, such
as Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique, UN technical advice
for coordination and management still remains an important element of the
programme more than a decade later. Providing technical advisers to
programmes clearly has consequent and significant cost implications.
But premature handover also has risks. Thus, for example, it is generally
agreed that despite the many successes of the mine action programme in
Kosovo, the UN left too early — even another six months could have made a
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difference in the view of the former UN Programme Manager. In Azerbaijan,
however, no technical assistance is deemed necessary by the Azeri
government, and the programme is functioning autonomously.
Tools for coordination and programme management
However, the UN can also claim credit for spurring the development of key
tools for mine action programme management and coordination, notably the
IMAS and support for the development of the Information Management System
for Mine Action (IMSMA).
The International Mine Action Standards
The IMAS in force today are the result of many years of work by the UN, the
GICHD and mine action operators and actors around the world.35 International
standards for humanitarian mine clearance programmes were first proposed
in July 1996, by working groups at an international technical conference in
Denmark. Criteria were prescribed for all aspects of mine clearance, standards
were recommended and a new universal definition of “clearance” was agreed.
In late 1996, the principles proposed in Denmark were developed by a UN-led
working group and the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine
Clearance Operations were developed. A first edition was issued by the UN
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in March 1997.36
The scope of the original standards subsequently expanded to include the
other components of mine action and to reflect changes to operational
procedures, practices and norms. The standards were re-developed and
renamed as the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS); the first edition
was published in 2000 and a second edition (the current basis for the standards,
as amended) was issued in 2003.37 Individual IMAS are reviewed at least
every three years to reflect developing mine action norms and practices and
to incorporate changes to international regulations and requirements.38
 Although the concept of the IMAS has been widely welcomed at
international level, the content of every standard has not (as one might expect)
found universal support. In particular, the IMAS are criticised by some for
being a straightjacket, slowing down efforts to reduce the humanitarian impact
of mines, especially through its requirement that clearance be conducted to a
100 per cent success rate down to a stipulated depth.
In defence of the IMAS, however, it is always made clear that the international
standards should be adapted to the national context and turned into applicable
national standards. Over the past few years, a great deal of progress has been
made in many major mine action programmes in achieving this. Thus, for
example, innovative approaches to clearance, for instance using rakes in sandy
soil as occurs in Somalia or Sri Lanka, can thereby be endorsed and safety
standards maintained, without preventing their employment in relevant
circumstances. Moreover, mine clearance standards should be applied only to
mine clearance; thus, where the threat demands a battle area clearance response,
other, more appropriate standards should be applied.39
The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
IMSMA is a software-based data management tool for use at Mine Action
The coordination and management of mine action programmes
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Centre (MAC) level. It combines a relational database with a geographic
information system (GIS). It is able to provide mine action managers and
practitioners with up-to-date information management capabilities to facilitate
decision-making in the framework of mine action. The system is currently in
use in more than 80 per cent of mine action programmes around the world.40
Based on the input of field users, the system has been continuously revised
and upgraded since its initial release in the summer of 1999 (it was fielded
for the first time in Kosovo).
In 2005, the IMSMA Re-Engineering Project got underway. The aim of the
project was to develop a comprehensive update to IMSMA based on ideas
submitted by system users over the first five years of its life. This latest
version of IMSMA (V. 4.0) has been designed as a decentralised system and
will replace existing systems within the next two years. The new release
contains a fully integrated GIS based on the ESRI Arc Engine software package,
allowing users to perform interactive map-based navigation throughout the
entire content of the database.
Language-related challenges are made easier by IMSMA V. 4.0 through
the inclusion of Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish
versions of the system’s user screens, forms, error messages and other text.
The system’s data entry, review and reporting tools will also be updated to
provide for the creation of locally developed data collection forms in local
languages. Combined with a simplified custom data field creation capability
these changes will make it easier to customise the system to meet local needs.
The updated IMSMA is built around an easy-to-use core module, which is
designed to provide operations with a simple set of data collection and
reporting tools suitable for most situations. Sites with more sophisticated
operational requirements will be able to choose from a set of “plug-ins”
designed specifically for particular activities. Plug-ins are already in
development for mine risk education, victim assistance and quality assurance
activities, with others in the planning stages.41
These changes respond effectively to many of the criticisms of the IMSMA
system, but one significant obstacle — not related to the performance of the
system itself — remains. Distribution of the database and the information it
contains is dependent on the goodwill of the State that is given the system.
Sadly, not all governments have been as effective in disseminating the
information that IMSMA generates as they have at gathering it. Some data
must, of course, remain confidential, for reasons of national security or human
rights; most the data should be shared widely with all the mine action actors
that can benefit from and use it.
Challenges in coordination and programme management
In conclusion, then, over the last 15 years, the international community
has learnt — and agreed upon — many of the requirements for successful
coordination and management of mine action programmes. Central to that
learning experience has been the work of the national authorities of affected
States, the United Nations and key donors to mine action.
Wherever there is significant contamination or impact from mines, UXO
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or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), a national mine action authority and
a mine action centre can play an effective role in ensuring the proper coordination
and management of a mine action programme. These institutions should be
mandated and regulated by domestic legislation to bring clarity, coherence and
transparency to the sector.
The UN and its many partners can play a major role in developing an
indigenous capacity to run these institutions and thereby to plan, direct and
coordinate mine action operations efficiently, while at the same time
maintaining safety standards as high as possible, both for those engaged in
demining as well as those who will ultimately benefit from clearance.
Yet, despite major, generalised improvements in coordination and
management of mine action programmes around the world, significant
challenges remain. For example, the first deadlines for States Parties to the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention to clear all anti-personnel mines from
mined areas under their jurisdiction or control will elapse on 1 March 2009. It
already seems likely that a number of major mine action programmes will
not make this looming deadline in time. This presents a challenge to both the
affected countries themselves and to donors who have committed to support
host country mine action to meet their obligations.
Linked to this issue is the demand for effective strategic planning, that sets
realistic objectives maximising benefits in relation to costs. There are many
different approaches to strategic planning and no one approach is endorsed by
the IMAS. Clear, though, is the overriding obligation for any strategic plan to
respond to the assessed needs of the affected populations and not to be a supply-
driven exercise in resource distribution. One way to determine those needs has
been the landmine impact survey, already conducted in more than a dozen
countries, and potentially an important management tool.
Thus, with a clear and internally consistent strategic plan in place that
determines criteria for adjudging priorities, setting operational priorities
becomes far easier. These can then be implemented through annual work-
plans, which have helped to determine and allocate the necessary resources
efficiently.
Of course, in a country beset by difficulties resulting from many years of
bitter armed conflict, the need to confront corruption is persistent. Of course,
this is by no means the domaine réservé of mine action — all sectors of everyday
life and the economy are prone to its excesses — but given the very significant
allocation of resources to mine action (currently running at more than US$250
million per year), the demining community has an ongoing obligation to
maintain the highest standards of financial probity.
In order to sustain that level of funding, mainstreaming mine action into
development has become a rallying cry for the UN and major donors. Most
mine action funding has been from short-term and sporadic emergency
budgets, barely conducive to efficient long-term planning. A number of
countries have sought to integrate mine action within broader rehabilitation
and development efforts (significant steps have been taken by Afghanistan, for
example, to the extent that some 40 per cent of all clearance work is in direct
support of national reconstruction). But overall the picture could be brighter. If
mine action is to deserve future funding, it must do even more to demonstrate
The coordination and management of mine action programmes
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Introduction
This chapter reviews the development of mine action information
management systems over the past decade. It discusses the major themes
that have influenced the development of these systems, notably:
9 Mine action informationmanagement
Mark Yarmoshuk
Summary
The first five years of mine action information management systems
— the period before the Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) — saw the development of databases in large
programmes that had a requirement but, more importantly, the
capacity to devote significant resources to this task. These databases
were not well rounded — they focused on the particular sort of data
and reporting that were of specific interest to the individuals working
in the programme at the time and did not benefit from a wider body of
experience.
The next five years saw the development of IMSMA through three
major versions and, with the exception of the northern Iraq programme,
very little database development elsewhere. IMSMA is now the de
facto standard database for mine action. However, the balance of power
between headquarters staff and information management professionals
seems to be firmly weighted towards headquarters staff, given the
experience during the design of recent surveys. Important lessons
learned during the landmine impact survey process seem to have been
forgotten. By focusing on data rather than data use, surveys such as
the emergency survey in Iraq have degraded their effectiveness by
failing to focus on analysis.
Geographic information systems are now widely used in mine action.
For most programmes this means that they have the capability to
print maps showing the mine threat. While automated mapping is a
very modest use of the geographic tools made available by IMSMA, it
is a huge advance from what was available before and places mine
action among a very select group of GIS users in many of the countries
where it is used.
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Technological advancements in computer hardware and software: a
particular focus is made on database and geographical information
systems (GIS) development.
The databases themselves and the survey procedures which populate
them: this aspect is broadly influenced by the varying attention paid
to field v. headquarters perspectives on requirements. It also covers
the end use of the data and attempts to deploy systems to the field to
improve the use of data in mine action planning and evaluation.
Spatial data: historically this has meant maps but now encompasses
various digital products derived from photographic images, airborne
sensors or space-borne platforms.
Point positioning techniques: this is related to mapping and therefore
overlaps somewhat with the discussion on spatial data but focuses on
the collection of location data during survey activities;
Advisers, training and system documentation: this has been a major,
if perhaps somewhat hidden, cost of improving information
management capability in mine action centres.
Multi-sector cooperation: the most significant example of this has been
in humanitarian information centres.
Regional initiatives: such initiatives have been seen in southern Africa
and south-eastern Europe.
Section 1 reviews what is expected from mine action information systems
and the guidance provided by various international standards. Section 2
contains a history of information management and database technology
relevant to the development of mine action information management and
reviews the ways in which the technology has been applied in mine action
centres. Section 3 provides some background on GIS and digital mapping
prior to reviewing their use in mine action. Section 4 is about data use and
exchange — the ways in which data stored in databases are made available for
reporting and analysis. Section 5 looks at the non-technical aspects of
information management, namely the technical assistance and exchange of
best practices that build the required skills to use the relevant technologies.
Finally, Section 6 offers general conclusions.
The promise of information management
Information management has evolved into a critical element of effective
mine action. Judged by numbers of staff and technical advisers it is usually
among the largest departments of a typical mine action centre — and
sometimes it forms the core of the mine action centre. Judged by budgets
it is again among the top spenders outside of actual field clearance.
Information management spans a broad swathe, ranging from the database
administrator who doesn’t often get out of the office, to the surveyor
who doesn’t often get out of the field.
At heart, a mine action database is a record of what is known and what
has been done. It records all available information regarding threat from
explosive remnants of war (ERW) and the different activities — e.g. survey,
clearance, mine risk education (MRE) — carried out to mitigate those
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threats. Mine action information can do more than this but without these
basic elements in place further work is not possible. The database can
inform general planning by providing figures on the nature of the problem
(types of ERW, square metres affected) and, with the addition of community
impact data, can be used to prioritise mine action activities. At the
operations level it can inform managers about the progress of the work
plan and measure productivity.
Early mine action databases focused on the location of hazards. Survey
information was stored and updated to reflect clearance activities. The
requirement was quite simple and a single flat table with 20-30 fields of
information could meet the requirement. This was sometimes extended to
store progress information which could be used to report on productivity
over a period of interest. The advent of the landmine impact survey (LIS)
coincided with the development of the Information Management System for
Mine Action (IMSMA) and allowed far more complicated information
management tools to be deployed in mine action centres.
Users expect information management systems to support them in their
jobs, both in planning and reporting. A surveyor would like help in calculating
the area of the surveyed minefield and producing a high quality map. A
clearance planner would like detailed information on relevant factors, such
as soil, terrain and vegetation. A field manager for a clearance team looks for
detailed productivity information. A regional manager looks for more general
productivity information, status of assets on their current tasks and the
progress against the clearance plan. A quality assurance manager looks for
records of past inspections and compliance. At headquarters, the programme
manager wants to know if the programme’s objectives are being met and
operations planners want to know about tasks that warrant priority attention.
International bodies and donors want guidance on deciding where available
funds are best spent.
The remainder of this section will review the various means that
programmes have employed to achieve these goals, highlighting the technical
details that must be overcome along the way.
Policy documents
Mine action information management now has a lengthy history. Mine
action databases go back to 1992 and the IMSMA Field Module (FM) is into
its sixth year and third version. Although they have certainly provided an
essential service by maintaining a record of mine action activities, information
management systems have yet to live up to their promise of consistently
supporting more effective management. There remain a relatively small
number of mine action information practitioners — mainly employed by the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the
Swedish Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Demining Centre (SWEDEC), the
Swiss Ministry of Defence, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
(VVAF) and the United Nations — who rotate through the various mine
action programmes. There is little written instruction for these practitioners.
They often have backgrounds that include database and GIS skills and
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sometimes come from the military. But, for the most part, they learn the
fundamentals of mine action information management in the programme itself,
which is perhaps why there seems to be a fairly high barrier to entry into this
field.
One of the difficulties for mine action programme managers is that many
do not know what to expect from their information system. They often have
a general idea of what they would like the system to do, but this may or may
not be realistic. There is no performance-based specification they can use in
order to evaluate their information department in the mine action programme.
If the computers are running and data seem to be getting entered there is a sense
that the system is to some degree working; however, there is often a frustration
among programme managers that their information systems do not provide
them with the information they would like to have.
The most effective use of information systems in mine action has occurred
in programmes where there has been a tight integration between operations
personnel and the database section. This was clearly seen in Kosovo from
1999 through 2002 where outputs from the information system were required
by operations staff in the issuing of survey and clearance tasks. This tight
integration is often difficult to achieve due to the structure of the mine action
programme, or due to weaknesses in either the operations or database sections
(or both).
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) provide only general
guidance, in
IMAS 5.10: Information Systems (scheduled for publication in 2004
but which had still to be issued in late 2005); and
IMAS 8.10: General Mine Action Assessment, which provides a helpful
general overview of the information management cycle but is too
general to provide useful guidance to the field-based manager.
The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) sector policy on information
management1 provides a helpful general overview of how information
management should fit into the mine action programme and how it should
relate to other agencies. This policy document lays out the expected benefits
of a mine action information system:
define and analyse the landmine problem;
develop and manage appropriate mine action programmes;
assess and measure progress; and
mobilise, allocate and monitor resources.
The UNMAS policy document highlights the importance of coordination
to limit duplication of effort, standardisation of survey and reporting
structures, maintenance of metadata (data about data), securing data against
loss, data sharing and exchange, and the recording of best practices in
information management.
The wider standards community has not played a role. For example, at
least two International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards could
be applied to mine action information management to some degree, but neither
has been:
ISO 15489: Information and Documentation — Records Management.
This standard has as its goal “… [enabling] organisations to develop policies,
227
Mine action information management
strategies and programmes which will ensure that information assets have the
essential characteristics of accuracy, integrity and reliability”.2 The problems
that ISO 15489 is intended to solve are familiar to mine action
information practitioners, although they occur, perhaps, on a much
smaller scale in mine action. Corporations with tens of thousands of
documents clearly have a more complex problem than mine action
centres with a more modest document production.
ISO 19115: Geographic Information — Metadata. Metadata is data
which are stored to describe various aspects of the content, source,
accuracy and usability of other data. When using paper map products
the user assumed that the map producer — for topographical maps
this was usually a government mapping agency — was providing a
product which met an expected level of accuracy. With traditional map
products this was somewhat intuitive: no one would try to accurately
position a minefield on a small-scale provincial map printed at a scale
of 1:500,000. Instead, a map at a scale of 1:50,000 would be obtained,
where one centimetre on the map is equal to 500 metres on the ground.
With digital data it is more problematic: without metadata the user
cannot know how the data were collected and to what standards. In
mine action, this applies to base geographic data, such as roads, political
divisions, towns and so on, as well as to minefield locations. The mine
action community has yet to adopt a metadata standard for its spatial
data.
Programme life-cycles
The post-conflict, developmental and “autonomous” phases of mine action
bring with them a varying group of players, differing imperatives and widely
different challenges. These phases blend from one to the next or, as
experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, can regress back to renewed conflict.
The post-conflict phase is characterised by an unfamiliar situation, a data-
poor environment and a high level of interest by all parties in obtaining more
information. In the immediate post-conflict phase (often even during the
conflict as, for example, security permitted in longstanding conflicts in Angola
and Iraq) there is a strong interaction between the military and civilian
organisations.
Lessons learned over the last ten years, from Bosnia and Herzegovina to
Kosovo and Afghanistan and now Iraq, have resulted in a close cooperation
between the military, governments, NGOs and the UN. This cooperation is
reinforced by imperatives: military forces see benefit from humanitarian
activities and non-military actors rely on the military both directly and
indirectly for their security. Mine action players have a particularly keen
interest that military units in their vicinity are aware of their movements and
activities lest they draw hostile fire while working with explosives.
The developmental phase is characterised by more experienced managers
looking to improve resource allocation by better defining priorities.
The autonomous phase should see a refined reporting system in place
which provides the required inputs for planning and prioritisation.
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Requirements for data with respect to both content and quality, and
capabilities to collect it vary throughout the programme life-cycle. Early on
in a programme’s life (and even well into it, such as during a typical landmine
impact survey) very vague data may be collected, which becomes somewhat
persistent in the information system. Mechanisms need to be in place where
“old” data can be retired if it has outlived its utility. And yet there is a fear of
disposing of any data lest some valuable clues be lost.
In a well-developed programme, detailed clearance progress figures may
be of interest to a detailed examination of the productivity of the organisations
and methods being employed. The challenge to mine action database designers
is to meet the competing goals of a flexible system that adapts to regional
and temporal differences in requirements yet is also internationally
standardised to assist in cross-border comparisons of the mine threat and
response.
Databases and information management in mine action
Database work conjures up images of technicians carefully maintaining
computer hardware and software, and diligently making backups to safeguard
data entered into the system by droves of low skill data entry clerks.
Information management suggests that something has been done to transform
the data into valuable information which will lead decision making. In reality
there is a finer distinction between databases and information management,
and the importance of the technical aspects of the work is overshadowed by
the primacy of the processes which are used to collect, manage and use the
data which is the focus of the effort.
This section deals with mine action databases — both the data that go into
them and the software of which they are composed. It also reviews information
technology trends which have shaped the course of development of mine action
information management. The use of the data stored in the database is left for a
subsequent section.
Early mine action database systems
At least five major mine action databases preceded the IMSMA Field Module3,
and the northern Iraq MAP database was developed in parallel to it. As will be
seen later in this section the development of mine action information management
has paralleled the development of the personal computer (what is commonly
referred to as the PC: Intel-processor-based hardware running the Microsoft
operating systems, first DOS and later Windows). Without exception these
databases stored their textural data in simple table structures and had no
integrated Geographic Information System (GIS). The Cambodia database stands
out as an early example of a simple yet effective system which made the best use
of the available technology of the day. By the mid-1990s the database was
integrated with an automated mapping component that allowed links to be
established between geographical features stored in AutoCAD — a leading
application for creating engineering drawings — and attribute data stored in
their FoxPro database. In Bosnia, a separate geographical database is maintained
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in MapInfo, however it is not directly linked to their Paradox database. No early
attempts to integrate automated mapping — a precursor to GIS — at the
minefield level with the database were made in Mozambique, Angola or
Afghanistan.
Prior to IMSMA the US Army Central Command undertook to develop a
Demining Information Management System (DIMS). A hardware package,
the Demining Support System, was also developed and deployed as part of
the US Department of State demining support programme. The Demining
Support System was a militarised PC system intended to withstand difficult
environmental conditions. In reality it was prohibitively expensive and was
predominately installed in comfortable office locations. Neither of these
initiatives made a large impact at mine action programmes — DIMS was
discontinued in favour of IMSMA and the Demining Support System was
replaced by standard specification computer hardware.
The major strengths of the locally designed databases were that they exactly
matched the perceived requirement in the country. The main limitations were
that the perceived requirements were often somewhat limited and they were
susceptible to collapse if a few key personnel left the organisation. Some of
the themes related to databases which preceded IMSMA are summarised
below.
Survey contents. In locally developed systems the data collected are
exactly those which the local organisation is interested in. This point
is closely related to the next — in locally developed systems the
survey and clearance process can be exactly modelled in the database.
This suggests that most programmes by end-2003 were not
conducting field operations which completely adhere to the IMAS
standards.
Data entry workflow. Locally developed systems allowed complete
customisation of the data entry forms to focus on the elements that
were of the most interest to the programme, including extensive data
quality checks. This resulted in high quality data for a small number of
data fields, but also excluded many data fields that were considered
important among the broader community.
Decentralised use. The distributed use of a database may lead to
technical problems because changes to the same data in disparate
locations must be avoided. IMSMA’s solution has been to limit the
ability to enter or edit data to one location. This inflexible approach
does not meet the needs of many mine action programmes. In
Afghanistan, a very distributed system was established — the database
was maintained regionally, with some data entry being conducted at
the field operator level. The Afghan system relied upon communication
between database operators to ensure that data were not edited in two
locations, rather than by guaranteeing it by software design. In Bosnia,
daily synchronisations of the database are achieved between two
regional offices and the headquarters. Decentralised use remains a
weakness of IMSMA. While it can be set up to work regionally the
configuration and synchronisation process is somewhat cumbersome
and options, such as allowing a separate organisation (e.g. the
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International Committee of the Red Cross — ICRC) to maintain victim
data, are not supported.
Limited scope of system. Focused on minefields rather than
communities. The assessment of the socio-economic impact of hazard
areas on communities by recording blockages and the tight integration
of the GIS systems were underdeveloped or completely missing from
mine action information management prior to IMSMA.
Varied functional support to operations, reflecting the specific breadth
of the respective programme. Could have integrated modules for mine
risk education, victim assistance, quality assurance, field task
management and asset allocation. Only the northern Iraq MAP
information system had all these capabilities. IMSMA was not initially
designed to have such capabilities and some have been added over
time.
Influence of key personnel. Databases prior to IMSMA tended to be
very reliant on the individuals who established them. The local
databases in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique were severely
compromised by the departure of key personnel. In Afghanistan, the
mine action centre was able to continue working with the system but
limited in its ability to modify and extend it. In Cambodia and
Mozambique, the departure of international technical advisers led to
the complete collapse of the system.
The technological backdrop
All mine action databases have been installed on software running on
Microsoft operating systems using hardware based on Intel (or compatible)
processors. Mine action practitioners were early adopters of available
hardware and software. While database and GIS applications date back to
the 1960s, and many of the largest database and GIS companies have product
lines dating back to the early 1980s, professional level systems were all Unix-
based until the mid-1990s. This changed with the advancing pace of processor
speed and graphics card capabilities in the Microsoft Windows/Intel-
dominated personnel computer market.
Hardware and operating systems
The choice of the PC platform was a natural one for mine action as it
became available for a reasonable price as the discipline was developing.
Early practitioners were also database-centric: GIS was not to become a
relatively well known technology until later in the 1990s.
Database software can generally be processor- and disk-intensive for a
very large system, however, in mine action this is not necessarily the case.
Database software is certainly not graphics-intensive. This allowed early mine
action database practitioners to develop systems locally, using readily available
and relative affordable IBM compatible PCs. GIS would not be widely available
on the desktop PC until the late 1990s.
The IMSMA database has proven to require relatively fast processors
throughout its design history due to a combination of design decisions. These
factors will be discussed in more detail in the database software section below,
however the resource requirements for the IMSMA database have been a
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significant issue for mine action centres, particularly when faced with an
upgrade to a new version of the system.
GIS software tends to be processor-, graphics- and storage-intensive. The
degree to which each of these three elements is important influenced the
speed at which subsets of the GIS software toolbox became common on Wintel
systems — and became widely available to mine action centres. Again, more
detail is found below in the discussion on GIS software.
Two of the major milestones  are the debut of the IBM PC, and the Microsoft
Windows NT operating system. The emergence of the IBM PC running Microsoft
DOS in the early 1980s made database software available on an inexpensive
and portable platform. It also saw a precursor to GIS become available on the
desktop, computer-aided design (CAD): automated mapping systems based on
CAD software which drew points, lines and polygons became possible.
The emergence of Microsoft’s Windows NT and Intel’s Pentium processor in
the mid-1990s brought a combination of greatly increased processing power
and a more secure and stable Windows operating system to the desktop.
Intergraph Corporation, a major GIS and mapping software/hardware vendor,
shifted its focus from Unix to developing Windows NT-based applications
which ran on its Intergraph-branded Wintel hardware. At the time this was
a major departure from the Unix focus of major GIS and mapping software
vendors.
Database software
The most familiar database applications are relational database management
systems (RDBMS). The early market leader on the PC was Aston-Tates Dbase
software, which spawned the industry standard .dbf file format, which still
remains in broad use today. Current offerings for the desktop include MS
Access, and Corel’s Paradox. Large commercial databases are run on Oracle,
IBM DB2, or Microsoft SqlServer platforms. Many academic users choose the
open source PostgreSQL database, while many data-driven web applications
are powered by the open source MySQL database.
What these RDBMS share is a common conceptual basis for their design
and a common language to interact with data stored in them:
Relational structure. An underlying structure of a collection of tables
(or relations) which are joined together by key fields which are stored
in each pair of joined tables.
SQL. All RDBMS databases make use of structured query language
(SQL) to retrieve and update data stored in the tables. SQL has been
an ISO standard since 1987; the current ISO standard SQL99 was
published in 1999. SQL is a very easy language to become familiar with,
but quite difficult to master. What makes SQL difficult to master is its
unfamiliar three-value logic (True, False and NULL [or undefined]), and its
set-based logic.
What distinguishes between the various RDBMS databases are performance,
“scalability”, functionality, ease of use and cost. Databases designed for broad
use as part of office automation software suites focus on ease of use, whereas
large commercial databases are the purview of database professionals and
focus on performance and scalability. There are “middle ground” products
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available at no cost to the end user that are primary used by system developers
who need to store data for use in their applications but do not require the
high end functionality provided by the expensive commercial systems.
The advantages of RDBMS systems are that they help to maintain data
integrity and provide for fast transaction processing:
Data redundancy can be reduced, and consistency enhanced, through
the “normalisation” of tables. For example, rather than storing the town,
sub-district, district and province of a survey in the survey table, only
one identifier code for the town need be stored. This identifier then
relates to a town table, which relates to a sub-district table, and so on.
If district boundaries change, only the relationships between the sub-
districts/districts/provinces need be edited, rather than having to
search through all the survey records affected by the change.
Individual transactions with relational databases are faster than with
other data storage schemes — this is not very important in the context
of mine action, but is vitally important in applications such as banking
or point-of-sale data capture.
There are also significant disadvantages to RDBMS systems:
While they are very efficient for data storage, they are less convenient
for data retrieval. As one eminent member of the industry put it: “Entity
relationship models are a disaster for querying because they cannot be understood
by users and they cannot be navigated by DBMS software.”4 This means that
RDBMS systems are not appropriate for end users. The problem is that
by normalising data (breaking it into separate tables to reduce
redundancy), the end users are no longer able to look at the data in
one location; rather, views of the data must be constructed.
In IMSMA v3, for example, there are nearly 100 tables, and views can
require joins between tens of tables at a time. This is further complicated
by language translation in IMSMA — even after constructing the final
flat table view, much of the data remain in a pseudo-English coding
which needs to be translated into natural language (in IMSMA v3 this
could be English, French, Spanish or Portuguese).
But data management does not always involve database software.
Document management systems store data in its original textual form
and then allow full text search and automated indexing of the documents
contents.
Document-based data storage using a more structured form than
document management systems, but with more flexibility than
databases, is permitted by the relatively recent technology of XML.
The eXtensible Markup Language was published as a standard in 1996
and has since gained wide acceptance as a data storage format. By
using user definable tags within the document, XML adds structure
and meaning to text stored in this format. XML is being used as the
basis for mine action data exchange in the GICHD-sponsored maXML
project which will be further discussed in the Data Analysis and
Exchange section below.
Users with modest data management requirements often prefer to
work in a spreadsheet application such as MS Excel rather than RDBMS.
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A flat table of data stored in a spreadsheet can be easily edited and
searched by users not comfortable with the complexities of database
administration. It is not uncommon to find earnest professionals
maintaining “databases” of several thousand records in a single flat
spreadsheet file. Excel is very popular in mine action centres for
maintaining priority lists of minefields and monthly clearance figures.
For IMSMA v3, the IMSMA project has developed IMSMA XL as a tool
which extracts the contents of predefined IMSMA reports directly to
Excel rather than only allowing print output.
Reliance on Microsoft and ESRI software
The IMSMA project’s dependence on Microsoft Access has been inconvenient
for the developers as each successive version of Access has been accompanied
by incompatibilities with previous versions. Access 97 was entirely incompatible
with Access 2000 and mandated a new version of IMSMA. MS Access XP (2002)
was “less incompatible”, however it does not support IMSMA error-free.
IMSMA v3 was not updated to support MS Office versions after MS Office
2000, which was already three versions old by 2004.
Use of ESRI’s ArcView GIS software as the basis for the geographic display
of data in IMSMA has also been troublesome, but for different reasons. Export
restrictions to Iraq and Sudan resulted in restrictions on the use of IMSMA in
those countries.
A few computers in a central database office can be upgraded to support
the requirements of IMSMA running on the latest Microsoft and ESRI software.
But this is less reasonable a proposition for the far greater number of potential
IMSMA users outside a central IMSMA database room — e.g. in the operations,
planning and MRE departments, and in regional and site offices.
An alternative to relying on proprietary software and its uncontrollable
release cycles was offered by the open source community. The open source
software movement has been popularised by the LINUX operating system
but has significance far beyond LINUX. It embodies literally thousands of
projects.5 It is also not necessarily about free software. Open source means
that source code must be openly available,6 but many open source projects
operate as commercial ventures. Open source is as much a philosophy about
how to create software as it is a process of writing software.
Potential benefits to making the IMSMA software itself open source (as
opposed to hosting it on an open source operating system and supporting it
with open source application software) would include improving the overall
quality of the IMSMA product by subjecting the underlying programme code
to (perhaps only marginally) wider review and decreasing its dependence on
proprietary software which can compromise its usability. There are at least a
few technical advisers and mine action programme staff with a moderate
level of programming skill. When experiencing problems with the system
these users would be directly able to advise the developers of possible
solutions by reviewing the programme code. This is generally not currently
possible because the IMSMA programming code is not publicly available.
With access to the IMSMA programme code base other software development
projects in mine action or the broader humanitarian field would be able to learn
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from the experience of the IMSMA developers, and be better able to make their
software integrate into the IMSMA environment.
The development of IMSMA
The IMSMA project grew from calls for
standardisation of data collection, a desire to have a
“starter kit” ready to deploy to new mine action
centres and a desire to make information centrally
available to UNMAS. The IMSMA project is sustained
by a Swiss government donation and is managed by
the GICHD.
IMSMA advanced from screen mock-ups on
display at the April 1999 Meeting of State Parties to
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in
Maputo to a fielded system in August 1999 in
Kosovo. The combination of strong technical
support from the Swedish Rescue Services,
operations staff drawn from Western militaries familiar with using
information technology in the course of daily work and the highly integrated
mine action centre in Kosovo assisted in making a success of the first field
implementation of the system.
The first version of IMSMA was coded by a single programmer, supported
by one field support person and overseen by a project team leader at the
Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (ETHZ or Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology in Zurich) within the Center for Security Studies. A
training coordinator at the GICHD oversaw training events in Geneva supported
by field visits that combined database installation and configuration with user
training. By end-2003 the centre of activity had moved to the GICHD which
employed an IMSMA programme manager and six support staff. The
development of IMSMA had shifted to a more focused-tendered-contract
approach with well-specified design parameters and timelines.
The user interface to the IMSMA Field Module has remained virtually
unchanged from v1 to v3, as have the data entry forms. Successive versions
have focused on adding functionality — both in terms of working with the
database and in terms of the range of mine action data collected. Major
changes implemented along its development path are summarised in
Table 1.
A formal review of information management requirements for mine action
was commissioned by UNMAS and awarded to Price Waterhouse Coopers.
Field work was conducted in October and November 2001, with the final report
released in mid-2002.7 The Price Waterhouse Coopers study reported two major
observations from its field work. The first was the description of an “IT/IMS
Lifecycle Concept within Mine Action Programmes”.8 The second an influence
diagram summarising key aspects of IMSMA development on four axis —
technical, functionality, training and educational materials.
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Table 1. Summary of functionality introduced into IMSMA by version
Version
1.1c French translation User interface and data fields can be switched
to another language. Translation to French implemented.a)
1.2b Access 2000 Microsoft Access 97 and Access 2000 databases are
 incompatible, which required an IMSMA version for
Office 2000.
2.0 Tasking tool Mechanism for grouping together various objects in the
 database into one electronic folder.
Decentralised data entry Allows database to be installed regionally with mechanism
 for synchronisation with a central office.
2.2 Coordinate transformation Support for geographical coordinate transformation
between  different datums and projections.
3.0 MS SQL Server / MSDE Data storage moved from a MS Access database to a SQL
 Server / MSDE database.
M RE New form added to plan and record MRE training.
Summary reports The selection of summary reports is expanded to  number
 nearly 100.
Status and business rules An explicit status is assigned to each report stored in the
database to clearly indicate if it should be considered
 for planning survey and  clearance operations. Business
rules are added to check for status errors.
a) The translation process works by replacing all standard content – the labels on database forms and
reports as well as the data in fields which have a limited set of valid values — with translated content.
For example a data field with a limited set of predefined values such as Vegetation (the set of possible
values includes trees, shrubs, grass land) would have its contents translated in the user interface and on
reports.
Figure 1. IMSMA development timeline
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The life-cycle diagram describes four phases in the adoption of information
management resources and plots the mine action programme’s experience
against two axes:
Catalytic effects. The benefits accrued to the mine action programme
for its investment in IT/IMS [Information Technology/Information
Management System].
IT/IMS related efforts. The level of effort required — in terms of
personnel and resources — to establish and maintain the technologies
introduced.
Figure 2. Price Waterhouse Cooper graph
Price Waterhouse Coopers draws two general conclusions from Figure 2,
one general and one IMSMA-specific:
In general, the introduction of information technology requires a large
initial investment in equipment, skilled personnel, training and
adaptation of processes for little or no immediate apparent gain. Over
time the organisation benefits from the introduced technologies and
this is accompanied by a reduction in efforts required to sustain the
systems.
With regard to IMSMA this suggests that resistance to IMSMA will be
highest the further along the curve a programme sits.
This IT/IMS lifecycle will be considered again in the next section where
various IMSMA migration experiences are reviewed.
Figure 3 suggests that, to date, IMSMA development has focused on technical
aspects of the database and its functionality, and that the area which will
benefit most from new investment is in training and educational materials.
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Figure 3. Price Waterhouse Coopers influence diagram
The Price Waterhouse Coopers report succeeded in identifying the main
themes in information management and making general comments about their
current status, but failed to provide any useful detailed recommendations.
The core of the report consisted of point form notes on each of the 38
recommendations, and where detailed recommendations were made they
seemed rather unsubstantiated.
Migration to IMSMA
A significant amount of data has been imported into IMSMA in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Kosovo and Mozambique. Migration to IMSMA has partially occurred
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia as a result of landmine impact
surveys activities.
The migrations to IMSMA can be broadly categorised as either having
occurred in programmes which fit into the lower left quadrant of the Price
Waterhouse Coopers life-cycle matrix or were accompanied by a wider
programme of change which included in its scope the adoption of IMSMA.
In the programmes in the second category, it is not so much the
effectiveness of the outgoing information system that lead to resistance
to change — although programmes did not want to change to an
information system with less functionality than they were already
accustomed to — but rather the inability of the programme to
independently increase the level of effort or competence that would be
required to complete an effective IMSMA installation.
In programmes that have been running with an effective information
management system, the current caretakers of the system often would not have
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the depth and breadth of knowledge required to migrate to IMSMA due to
personnel changes. It is therefore only with an increase in information
management skills that the programme is able to adapt to the new system.
In addition to fears about lacking the capability to install and maintain
IMSMA, programme staff also worry about losing valuable data in the
transition. IMSMA does not have an easy import mechanism — and the
IMSMA project was not always proactive in providing assistance in moving
data from locally developed systems into IMSMA. Often there is an impression
that changing from a locally developed system to IMSMA will necessitate
months of manual re-entering of data into a newly installed IMSMA database.
Both local efforts and assistance from ETHZ have successfully transferred a
good deal of data into IMSMA.
Table 2. Data imports from legacy systems to IMSMA
Kosovo 1999 Dangerous areas collected by NATO prior to
establishment of MAC. Conducted by ETHZ in Zurich.
Mozambique 2000 Dangerous areas collected from 1992-2000 in two
systems. Conducted locally.
Afghanistan 2001/2002 Minefields. Conducted locally with ETHZ support on
site.
Cambodia 2002 Impact survey data which had been entered intoanother
database created for the survey. Conducted by LIS
 implementing agency, and assisted by ETHZ  in Zurich.
Iraq 2003 Complete database from N. Iraq programme. Conducted by
ETHZ in Zurich.
The GICHD conducted a series of consultant studies to assist
programmes in planning for conversion to IMSMA. In Afghanistan and
Bosnia and Herzegovina comprehensive evaluations of the existing
information management systems were conducted and then contrasted
with the IMSMA. In both cases a detailed analysis of the existing system
was presented highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. In both of these
cases the existing information systems were a strong source of pride among
the mine action programme personnel who had developed them and still
maintained them. These systems were effectively maintained by national
staff members, not international technical advisers as has been the case in
other programmes, such as Cambodia. Both GICHD studies recommended
that the existing systems be replaced by IMSMA because they lacked an
integrated geographic information system and the scope of the data being
maintained was very limited: IMSMA defines a far greater breadth of data
fields.
Landmine impact survey
The global LIS process was developed in parallel with IMSMA and, in
some ways, the success of each project helped to reinforce the other. The LIS
evolved from a desire to have objective means for distributing funding to mine-
affected countries. It heralded a shift from reporting the numbers of mines and
239
Mine action information management
Figure 4. IMSMA/LIS summary map
the physical area of minefields to discussions of community impact.
The Survey Action Centre (SAC), based in Washington, DC, owes its
existence to the Global LIS process and serves as the custodian of the survey
as well as taking a leading role in fundraising, conducting advance survey
missions and tendering of survey activities.
There has been something of a symbiotic relationship between the LIS
and IMSMA. IMSMA has facilitated and helped to ensure the
standardisation of the LIS data collection and analysis, and the LIS has
provided a solid base of data for IMSMA. In Afghanistan and Bosnia and
Herzegovina an element of the rationale to conduct the national survey was
to move the mine action programmes to IMSMA. In the map of mine-affected
countries by status of LIS and use of IMSMA (Figure 4) the broad coverage of
both of these can be seen.
A formal review of the global landmine survey process was commissioned
by the Survey Action Centre and awarded to Scanteam, a consultancy based in
Sweden with extensive experience in the humanitarian sector.9 Field visits to
five countries10 that had undergone surveys were conducted in 2003, and the
preliminary report was discussed at the Survey Working Group meeting in
October 2003. The intent of the review was to identify lessons learned regarding
the conduct of the survey, to recommend ways in with the survey results can be
made more useful and to identify means by which the survey process should be
modified.
A number of recommendations in the report address information
management issues and, while the recommendations are very general, they
provide more detail and breadth than those in the Price Waterhouse Coopers
report.
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Incorporation of existing data into the LIS
The decision to conduct an LIS has been particularly controversial in
countries with long-standing clearance programmes such as Afghanistan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and Mozambique. For mine-action-related
data many field operators expected the LIS to take the current state of
knowledge, validate it and improve upon it. Survey implementers have been
equally concerned to not have the quality of their product negatively affected
by the incorporation of untrustworthy existing datasets. The task of attempting
to assess the quality of existing data and incorporate them into the survey
methodology has been seen as too difficult and for the most part has not
been attempted. While the Scanteam review correctly identifies the
incorporation of existing data into the LIS process as an issue, it is one of the
less helpful of the report’s recommendations. It fails to suggest any new ideas
about how to progress towards the goal of balancing the requirements of
field operators (who want the most information possible) and the survey
practitioners (who value a controlled statistical analysis). All of the impact
surveys have struggled to incorporate existing data into the study.
In Mozambique, a countrywide survey had already been conducted by
the HALO Trust a few years prior to the start of the impact survey. SAC
developed a retrofit survey protocol which was used during the early planning
for the Afghan survey. In all cases, little if any use of existing mine action
data has been made during the course of LIS fieldwork due to difficulties in
obtaining existing data from field operators, the time and expense required
to train surveys in its use, and a desire from the LIS implementers not to
compromise the quality of their surveys by letting other factors influence the
community interview. For other data from non-mine action related sources,
Scanteam observes that “links and hooks” are required to assist in
incorporating LIS data with other datasets. This topic will be discussed in
more detail in the section on data analysis and exchange.
Survey data detail
The study recommends that the standard questionnaire should be reviewed
to focus on collecting only “first order” data. Other variables should only be
included if it is clear that they will be used by actors for important decisions.
This recommendation has implications on cost and data quality. There has
been a general desire to make the greatest possible use of the LIS field work
by maximising the number of questions asked during the survey.
While collecting data that are not used is expensive, the further danger is
that data that are not used are never carefully reviewed with a resultant severe
impact on quality. A general problem with all data collected in IMSMA is that
many programmes have no interest in much of the data contained in the
standard data collection forms. When the data are collected anyway to populate
an international standard database data quality can be woefully poor.
Management tools
The Scanteam study recommends that management training should focus
on what is currently in use and attempt to work from the current state of the
art. It further emphasises that capability and commitment are the keys to
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successfully introducing new management tools. This recommendation is
directed at the survey integration training provided by Cranfield Mine Action
as a standard post-survey component.
Scanteam observes that the “one-size-fits-all” strategic planning training
approach, where each mine action programme receives a standard package,
should be looked at with a view to better fitting the training to existing
processes. The capability and commitment within the mine action programme
must match the methods being introduced.
Data transfer
The study team observed difficulties in transferring IMSMA data to other
databases for use by other mine action organisations. This will also be discussed
further in the section on data analysis and exchange. The recommendations
here are again perhaps too general to be very useful. The barriers to data
exchange are rarely technical — it is now a standard capability of Microsoft
Office to export databases in XML, so no one is reliant on the Mine Action
eXtensive Markup Language (maXML) initiative to accomplish this. While maXML
will lower the bar on the technical difficulties involved, the larger barrier is
almost always a matter of national or organisational policies which restrict
data access or exchange.
Follow-on technical assistance and the cost
of maintaining the database
The Scanteam report observes that continued maintenance of the LIS data
almost always requires continued donor funding for continuing technical
assistance. In most LIS, the survey’s database personnel were more highly
paid and more skilled than the database staff at the mine action programme.
Often some of these LIS staff remain at the mine action programme following
the LIS, sometimes as part of a follow-on assistance donation with higher
salaries than normally paid by the national authority. If no salary augmentation
is available the lower pay available to them when working directly for the
national authority often makes retaining these skilled workers difficult. The
report correctly observes that this approach is unsustainable; yet this is true
of most aspects of mine action information systems — equipment, training
and software, as well as technical assistance. The suggestion that maintenance
of the data be entrusted to another government organisation, such as the
Ministry of Statistics, calls into question the utility of attempting to maintain
information systems in mine action programmes.
Field personnel fault the LIS process for not providing sufficient detail to
plan clearance operations. In particular this has focused on the way that
suspected hazard areas (SHAs) are depicted in the current LIS. The SHA is
estimated as an area lying a given distance and direction from the interview
location (or optionally from a physically closer viewing point). This obviously
leads to a very general geographic description of the SHAs and sometimes
wildly inaccurate estimates of their area.
This has, in turn, led to the depreciation of the importance of the estimated
SMA areas to such an extent that they are no longer discussed. It has also
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led to calls for perimeters to be collected where appropriate during an LIS.11
IMSMA up to v3 has not allowed this: SHAs are only shown as representative
circles. This is particularly problematic for long, narrow minefields such as
may be found for extended distances along a fence line, road, border or
natural feature.
No guidance is provided by SAC on how LIS data should be maintained
over time. If a mined area identified during the LIS is cleared, this can be
reflected in IMSMA and, in IMSMA v3, the community impact will also be
recalculated based on this clearance. However, as details of the affected
community change over time, and as more is learned about the hazard area
during technical survey, there is currently no mechanism to adjust the impact
score of the community.
Emergency survey
In the immediate aftermath of the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq,
there was a desire to conduct a rapid assessment of the mine action problem.
Such a rapid assessment would not allow for the lengthy training and long
interviews prescribed by the LIS process. In Kosovo and Afghanistan these
emergency surveys were kept relatively compact and simple. The long run-
up to the war in Iraq in early 2003 left a long planning window during which
a more elaborate emergency survey was planned.
The Emergency Survey Tool for Iraq (ESTI) was designed by a subgroup
of the Survey Working Group, and developed at UN request for the GICHD
by the IMSMA developers at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in
Zurich. It stores its data in an MS Access database, but the user interface is
a purpose-built application which integrates a mapping tool into the same
application as the data entry forms. This approach has the advantage that
the application has no outside software dependencies — all programmes
required to run the emergency survey tool are provided on the CD-ROM
without licensing costs.12 A potential advantage or disadvantage
(depending on your perspective) is that this also limits the functionality
of the application. The only database and GIS tools available were those
from the programmers. On balance this seems to be an advantage as it can
simplify the use of the system for the average user. Power users then
have the option of using any tools they desire to interact with the data
stored in MS Access.
The goal of creating an easy-to-install application requiring minimal training
was to a large extent achieved. The installation package contained all the
required software resources on one CD, including comprehensive map data
for all of Iraq. Once installed, users were able to enter data into forms that
followed the same layout as the data entry sheets. Once data were entered it
was very simple to print individual survey forms and individual survey maps.
The biggest fault of the ESTI survey is that it was developed without
regard to the LIS, and without thought of how the data would be analysed
and later incorporated into IMSMA. The intellectual starting point for this
survey seems to be the idea that a quick survey needed to be conducted
immediately following conflict, much more rapidly than an impact survey.
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What resulted from the survey design process was a bloated questionnaire
spanning seven pages populating a database with hundreds of fields.
The version of the tool finally fielded was v4.113 and included no tools to
analyse the data. Rather than be a subset of the LIS it became a superset of
LIS and the technical survey collection forms. The combination of a lack of a
migration strategy for the data into IMSMA and the absence of any analysis
framework for the data collected will severely limit the use of the data
collected during this exercise.
What seems to have gone wrong is that, rather than focusing on what
analysis was required, the survey designers looked at the broad overview of
everything that might be collected. The level of detail was overwhelming:
for example, details of the months during which there is access to the
community and dangerous areas were compiled for each of five different
categories of vehicles — a total of 30 fields of information.
The ESTI tool also caused some confusion among users. It was designed
as a tool that could be used in the field by individual survey teams to directly
enter data following the survey. This has never been the case with previous
IMSMA tools, which have always been designed to only operate in the mine
action programme, and usually by specialised users. ESTI users did not always
understand the distinction between IMSMA and ESTI, and were somewhat
dismayed by the difficulty of looking at the results of their efforts due to the
absence of analytical tools.
In the end the tool was not used as intended — in the hands of survey
teams — probably because there was little advantage seen in doing so. Central
installations were made where survey forms were collected and entered by a
few specialised operators, as has been the case with LIS data entry.
Military data sources
Data exchange between civilian mine action programmes and military
organisations occurs when ongoing military operations overlap with civilian
mine action. This has been the case in both Afghanistan and Iraq, where US-
led forces have maintained data in the Tactical Minefield Database (TMFDB),
which is part of the US Army’s Maneuver Control Systems- Engineer (MCS-
ENG).
The TMFDB, developed at the US Army Topographic Engineering Center
in Alexandria, Virginia, supports data import from IMSMA but the usefulness
of this functionality is limited by a number of factors. The army is interested
in knowing the location of obstacles and when a minefield is reported: because
all they need to know is that an obstacle exists at the reported location and
should be avoided. No effort is made to confirm information, or to collect
more detailed information at a later date. The standards for information
gathering for TMFDB are therefore very low. To then directly transfer these data
into IMSMA would introduce very suspect, and perhaps duplicate, data into
the database.
In Iraq, the data contents of the TMFDB were relatively modest (a few
thousand records) and most of the new data entered after the cessation of major
conflict consisted of the locations of improvised explosive devices. The most
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expeditious way of sharing data between military and civilian users is file overlays:
rather than importing and exporting data into and out of databases, layers of
geographic information can be exchanged and overlaid on each other in a GIS.
Minefield records detailing locations of minefields have been available in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Lebanon and have provided good information
regarding minefield locations and mine types. In Bosnia, these are sometimes
used to evaluate the quality of minefield clearance: if the record indicates
that more landmines were placed than were recovered during the clearance,
then questions are asked. This has not generally been the case in most mine-
affected countries as it is often the case that records were not kept, were of
poor quality or were not available.
Records of bomb drop locations have been provided by the US Army’s
Central Command to programmes in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. These
records were limited to cluster munitions, which are of special interest to
mine action programmes because of the high risk to civilians posed by the
significant number of unexploded sub-munitions at each strike location. Other
data have been provided in the case of Laos and Viet Nam, albeit several decades
after the end of the conflict.
Mine risk education
Mine risk education (MRE) data collection and storage was added to IMSMA
in v3 after a consultative process in 2001 led by UNICEF. Prior to this, MRE
data have been stored in extensions to IMSMA in Kosovo and the northern
Caucasus (for UNICEF programmes in Chechnya).
MRE in IMSMA v3 consists of a two-page data collection sheet, which
strives to record a broad range of MRE activities: from briefings conducted
during mine action operations (such as clearance) to specialised MRE team
briefings and media campaigns.
As has been the case in the design of other data collection sheets, more
attention was paid to the data fields to be collected than to what would be
done with the collected information. To the extent that MRE is a pervasive
activity that takes place during all other mine action operations, it could be
argued that, for some MRE activities, all that was required was a tick box
indicating that it occurred. If a limited amount of additional detail is desired,
the “one-form-fits-all” design strategy will be overwhelming: for any given
activity perhaps 60 per cent of the form will be non-applicable. It is still too
early in the deployment life of IMSMA v3 to judge how useful the MRE form
in IMSMA has been in practice.
Landmine victim data
Victim data have been an integral part of IMSMA since the first version and
have not been significantly modified over the intervening versions. On the
surface, victim data appear to be one of the easier parts of mine action data to
collect and manage — it records discrete events which happen to individuals.
But the problems in practice have been many.
Foremost among the difficulties is the variety of players involved in mine
victim data. The basis of mine victim information gathering is establishing a
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reporting network which collects information from hospitals and clinics. This
is generally conducted by the ICRC and/or an NGO involved in other aspects
of mine action. While victim reports may make their way from this collection
network to the IMSMA database at the mine action programme, this relies on
a high level of cooperation between the mine action programme and the ICRC
or NGO collecting the data.
A review of victim data collection was conducted in 2001 by James
Madison University14 and followed up by a workshop in 2002.15 The review
aimed to improve the collection of casualty data worldwide and focused
on creating a core set of data fields by comparing field data collection
from a broad selection of countries. IMSMA victim fields were compared
against eight other non-IMSMA-based casualty databases and fields were
rated on a scale of 1-5 ranging from “Essential” to “Do not collect”. The
review correctly observed that perhaps the larger problem in victim data
collection is the collection itself, rather than the specific fields of information
collected. It identified the various problems associated with collection —
secrecy, difficulty in counting victims who die without reaching a medical
facility, the variety of organisations involved, and the technical and funding
issues of running a database. Unfortunately ways in which to address
these issues were not explored.
A further complication with victim data is the way in which victims are
recorded during the LIS. The LIS collects details including the names of recent
victims — those in the past two years — and only a summary count of those
which occurred more than two years prior to the survey. A pragmatic approach
was taken by the IMSMA developers in storing LIS victim data, namely they
are stored separately from other victim data within the impact survey
document. In practice, this has meant that there is a duplication of victims in
IMSMA: a properly maintained database would have the LIS victims duplicated
in the “normal” victim reports. LIS victims are not routinely cross-referenced
with victims recorded by other means and stored in the standard IMSMA
victim container.
In most mine-affected countries the best victim databases are maintained
by ICRC (not IMSMA) which are often shared with the mine action
programme and then re-entered into IMSMA. A better implementation of
this process, not supported in IMSMA through v3, would see a satellite
installation of IMSMA at ICRC (or wherever the lead on victim collection is
located) with data exports being passed to the main IMSMA database for the
country.
An as-yet unresolved issue this raises is the maintenance of LIS impact
scores. The recent victims have a very strong influence on a community’s
impact score, which is calculated from victims collected during the LIS
and stored separately from other victim data. In the year following an
LIS the impact score should be revised, based on the moving two-year
window of recent victims. This does not occur because the main repository
of victims in IMSMA does not enter into the impact score calculation. A
simple fix is not normally possible because of the duplication between
these two sets of victims.
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Mine action accident data
The database of demining accidents (DDAS) — those which occurred during
the course of mine action as opposed to accidents among the general population
— has been maintained since 1998 by Andy Smith16 as a personal project. Mr.
Smith is a longstanding member of the mine action community whose work
has included numerous projects intended to improve the safety of deminers. By
2002, the DDAS contained details of nearly 600 accidents which occurred in
mine action programmes worldwide. The intent of the DDAS is to provide a
powerful “lessons learned” archive, which can be used to highlight the danger
of risky behaviour to deminers and trainers.
Mine accident data of this sort are also stored in IMSMA, but the detail of the
fields is different and there is no opportunity to aggregate the data globally, as
has been achieved with the DDAS. With the GICHD having taken over
stewardship of the database in 2002, it would seem appropriate to harmonise
the IMSMA demining accident form with that being used in the DDAS.
Minetype databases
The wide deployment of western militaries in mine-affected regions
throughout the 1990s — particularly in the Balkans — led to a number of
initiatives to compile information on landmine and other explosive remnants
of war hazards that they were encountering. Western militaries deployed
with NATO to Bosnia were faced with a widespread landmine problem and
were unfamiliar with the largely locally produced landmines they were
encountering. Databases of information provided to them included photos
or diagrams and details of physical characteristics such as size, colour and
material composition. This information was intended for a broad audience to
assist in identification rather than for the much more specialised audience of
specialised disposal technicians. Four of the major efforts are summarised in
Table 3.
The US Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
(NAVEODTECHDIV) developed the Ordata ordnance database to serve as
a comprehensive source of information on explosive ordnance. It was
incorporated into the IMSMA Field Module database as it was publicly
available (the SWEDEC database is not) and contains both landmine and
UXO entries. The database was incorporated “as is”, maintaining the data
structure of the original product to facilitate keeping the IMSMA version of
Ordata up to date with its current release.17
Table 3.  Mine-type databases
Database Compiler Content
Minefacts US DoD Landmines only
CFSME Canadian Military Landmines only
Ordata US Navy Landmines and
comprehensive UXO
SWEDEC Swedish Military Landmines and
comprehensive UXO
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Selecting a good set of ordnance data for use in IMSMA is a frustrating and
time-consuming task with Ordata, often resulting in confusion for data entry
staff and an almost impossible task for automated report generation. A freshly
installed IMSMA system contains no ordnance information — users must go to
the appropriate administrative screen and select ordnance for use in survey
and clearance reports. Ordata classifies ordnance into categories such as anti-
personnel and anti-tank mines, projectiles, mortars, rockets, etc. The complete
range of ordnance is reflected in literally thousands of entries, but programmes
are rarely, if ever, interested in recording the details of any ordnance beyond
mines and cluster munitions. It is very often interesting to note the exact
model of an anti-personnel or anti-tank mine — for example, a PMN-3 — but
such detailed information is rarely desired for an 82mm mortar. Furthermore,
data such as country of origin will rarely be available for entry, but must be
specified to select the appropriate Ordata entry. Data entry staff are frustrated
because they are faced with a list of several devices that vary only minutely
by details which are rarely relevant in the mine action context. Database
report writers summarising the data entered are faced with a difficult data
structure — that is just the nature of Ordata — and difficulties in summarising
by general categories (such as anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, cluster
munitions, etc.).
A better approach would have been to create a simple device table with
the most common types selected (for example anti-personnel and anti-tank
mines, cluster munitions, other ERW under 82mm diameter, and over 82m
diameter) and allow programmes to add detail as required to these general
headings.
Data quality control
Entering data into the database is never the problem. While the task of
entering hundreds or thousands of reports into a database can seem daunting,
the reality is that a single data entry operator can enter upwards of ten impact
survey forms in one day, and many shorter survey forms, such as clearance
progress reports.
The challenge is to enter high quality data into the database. In a mine
action programme far removed from field activities this can be a daunting
task. The commonly observed model of an IMSMA office being far removed
from the operations staff in a mine action programme further challenges data
quality. A problem with the storage of coordinate data in the Afghanistan
programme illustrates the data quality challenge.
Before 2001, when GICHD began working with the Afghanistan
programme toward transferring their information system to IMSMA, no
GIS system was used with the database. GIS was in use to a degree, but
only for thematic mapping at the provincial level. Detailed survey reports
were carefully prepared by field surveyors and passed to regionally based
data entry operators who also had a good understanding of field work
and were very experienced in their jobs. Detailed summaries of data
entered were prepared monthly at the national level and carefully
reviewed. It was a highly evolved and effective system for the data
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contained in the summary reports, which were mainly concerned with
elaborate area calculations.
The problem was that the system only supported the summary reports
prepared each month, and these were not a comprehensive picture of the mine
problem. When it came time to try to implement a GIS component to the database,
it was found that all the coordinate data stored was incomplete and often
inaccurately entered. Thousand of coordinates for minefields had to be manually
re-entered to support the new analysis.
This is a widely recognised problem. It was the subject of a 2002 GICHD-
sponsored meeting of mine action information practitioners at James Madison
University,18 and was one of the driving forces for the GICHD regional
coordinator approach to supporting IMSMA (support issues are the subject
of a section later in this chapter). It is widely agreed that the key to high
quality data is to only collect and enter that which is relevant and directly
applicable to the organisation which will use it. This implies that if the data are
critical to the organisation it will be regularly reviewed and when it is flawed
this will be noticed.
But this is directly at odds with two of the underlying goals of having an
information system such as IMSMA, which are:
to have standardised data available across mine action programmes —
to allow for country to country comparisons, but perhaps more
importantly, to supply analytical tools to assist programmes in using
the database as an information system (this is a topic in the next section
on data analysis); and
to maximise the value of field work — the desire here being to collect
as much data as possible during expensive field work so that a wide
cross-section of end users can benefit from the results.
There is no easy solution to the data quality problem. Data that are not
reviewed will always be of poor quality. Some simple steps for improving
the chances of storing high quality data (but often the limitations of the mine
action programme mean these do not occur) include:
tight integration of the information management staff with operations;
experienced and well-trained data entry operators who are familiar
with field survey practices; and
wide availability of the information system so that the data is actively
used.
In this section the many facets of mine action data and databases have
been presented — the hardware and operating systems they are hosted on,
the application software that provides the database functionality, and large
scale survey efforts that have put very substantial quantities of data into
them.
The quality of data stored in IMSMA databases is troubling in many
countries, but this would likely still be the case were they using any database
other than IMSMA. Indeed data quality was also generally poor in the
databases which preceded IMSMA.
The next two sections deal with the non-database element of mine action
information. In the next section the large field of geomatics is scanned for its
importance in mine action — the software tools, data, and field survey tools
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which are used to collect spatial data, show it on maps, and analyse it in
conjunction with the database. This is following by a section on reporting and
analysis.
Geographical information systems
Geographical information systems (GIS) allow users to display, maintain
and print spatially-referenced data, with map production being just one of
many benefits. They have four components, each of which requires careful
attention to create an effective system: software, hardware, data and
processes. With the exceptions of Bosnia and northern Iraq, GIS has not been
widely used in mine action outside of IMSMA, and therefore this section focuses
on GIS in the context of IMSMA. While IMSMA’s core job has been in supplying
software, field support personnel have had to address each of the four
components of a GIS to build capacity in mine action programmes.
GIS software
GIS software is processor-, graphics- and storage-intensive. Until the mid-
1990s this meant that higher priced UNIX systems remained dominant among
GIS practitioners. The result was that GIS software took much longer than
database software to come to the desktop PC, and thus a broader market.
There are perhaps three separate markets for GIS software: map
production, environmental science and business geographics.
Map production
Map production is not concerned with analysis, it just wants to take data
and present them in a final printed form. Precise layout of text — for example,
getting river names to follow the river’s curve and only appear once on each
map sheet, control of line styles and colour management — is an important
aspect of map production systems.
Intergraph Corporation dominated this market in national mapping offices
and the military during the 1980s. For lower-end users, extensions to CAD
software were marketed as Automated Mapping and Facilities Management
software (AM/FM).19 AutoCAD provided the mapping capability in the
Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) throughout the 1990s.
Environmental science
This market is interested in conducting analysis with spatial data: paper-
based presentation is a secondary consideration. ESRI has been the dominant
force in this market with its Arc/Info product. Arc/Info is a complex, expensive,
feature-rich application widely used in governments and universities. ESRI
software forms the basis of all GIS solutions implemented in IMSMA-related
software.
Business geographics
Business geographics is concerned with making business decisions: for
example, planning new retail locations by considering population distributions,
transportation infrastructure and existing retail locations. The analysis
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requirements and data standards are less rigorous than in the scientific
community and the map production standards are less rigorous than in the
mapping community.
This market was essentially created by MapInfo, which still dominates it.
MapInfo was created as a Wintel application, unlike ESRI’s Arc/Info which,
until the late 1990s, was essentially a UNIX application. MapInfo’s strength
has been its ease of use which, combined with early availability on the PC
platform, made it popular with users who were not GIS specialists.
All of the above applications are vector-based: i.e. they model the world
by representing it as points, lines and polygons. In addition to storing the
representation of features, other information, referred to as attributes, is
stored in database tables and related to the geographical features by a common
key. This model of storing the geographical feature data separately from
attribute data was adopted to improve the performance of the GIS. Specialised
proprietary data structures for the geographical data were developed by GIS
companies to allow for efficient spatial analysis.
With advances in computing power and performance of database software,
many GIS software vendors are storing spatial data along with attribute data
in databases. For example, ESRI’s ArcGIS 8 software can store its data in geo-
databases; the database used can range from MS Access to Oracle. Databases
and GIS still remain very different disciplines but trends such as this are
helping to merge them and make GIS more of a mainstream information
technology.
Along with the trend towards incorporating the spatial data into the
database, there is a parallel move towards incorporating the GIS into the end
user application. Since the mid-1990s it has been possible to purchase GIS
components that can embed GIS functionality into end user applications. The
benefit is enhanced ease of use, streamlined workflows and reduced
deployment costs. GIS objects have been used in mine-action-related
applications by Cranfield Mine Action (for northern Iraq) and the GICHD (in
the Emergency Survey Tool for northern Iraq).
Raster-based GIS is fundamentally different to vector GIS. Whereas vector
GIS models the world as a collection of points, lines and polygons, raster GIS
models the world as a picture in which features are distinguished by their
colour and form. There are two main subsets within raster GIS:
Image analysis. Usually used in conjunction with satellite imagery,
objects are classified by their physical characteristics. These include
radiometric signature (sensors record separate data for each band of
wavelengths measured), shape, size and texture. This has application
in mine action in attempts to use remote sensing techniques to identify
minefields.
Spatial modelling or spatial analysis. Raster layers are created to model
the influence of a series of factors, which are then combined to determine
their combined effects. For example, vulnerability analysis is conducted
by creating separate raster layers which represent a series of factors
which contribute to a population’s hardship — recent conflict,
landmines, drought, rural locations — assigning a weighting to each
factor and then calculating the combined result.
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Digital terrain models (DTMs) are a third type of spatial data. DTMs model
the earth’s relief by storing coordinate triplets — horizontal geographic
coordinates as well as elevation. DTMs are less widely used in demining since
they require specialised software. In addition, elevation models of sufficient
quality to support detailed analysis tend to be more expensive than other forms
of spatial data used in mine action and are less likely to be available for mine-
affected countries. Medium-scale DTMs are most often produced by digitising
contour lines off, for example, 1:50,000 scale topographic maps and then
processing them into DTMs.
Spatial data are regarded by the geomatics20 community as a key element in
a country’s infrastructure. Much as transportation infrastructure is a key
element in a manufacturing economy, spatial data are a key element in an
information economy.
Spatial data
Maps are fundamental to the presentation of mine action data and greatly
assist in survey and clearance operations. Many mine action programmes
have taken on the task of creating their own digital data for use in mapping
system and there has been considerable donor support in providing base
mapping.
The poor infrastructure in many mine-affected countries extends to
spatial data. Topographical base mapping is often old and out of date, the
underlying geodetic network — ground reference points with well known
coordinates, to which aerial photography is traditionally referenced — is
often in very poor condition and government institutions entrusted with
maintaining this infrastructure often have inadequate technical capability.
The use of global positioning system (GPS) technology overcomes one
problem in that accurate coordinates can be obtained without the use of a
physical geodetic network in place on the ground. But it also presents a
second in that many mine-affected countries do not have an established
transformation process to take spatial coordinates from what is often an
old inaccurate official system (often still in use by way of existing paper
map stocks) into a system compatible with GPS. Donor projects have
focused on developing digital map products in some mine-affected
countries: for instance, in Mozambique the same CIDA project that funded
the LIS also funded a project with the national mapping agency
DINAGECA to create a set of digital base maps for the entire country.21
The suitability of various remote-sensing image products for mine action
was investigated at the Belgian Royal Military Academy. Their PARADIS (A
Prototype for Assisting Rational Activities in Humanitarian Demining Using
Images from Satellites) project assessed the utility of various types of map
products during the course of mine action operations, from general planning
and prioritisation to survey and clearance field work. It then went on to
conduct limited field work to validate the utility to mine action of satellite
imagery at a variety of resolutions and developed a set of software tools to
assist in conducting mine-action-related tasks with images from remote sensing
platforms.
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Poor availability of high quality spatial data is a limiting factor to the effective
use of geographic information systems in developing countries. But, in many
cases, the mine action community has been a leader in the introduction of
geomatics technologies in the countries where it has been active, assisting the
development of national geomatics institutions.
Imagery
The International Institute for Geo-Information Science and Earth
Observation (ITC)22 in the Netherlands studied the use of traditional photo
interpretation methods in the demarcation of minefield perimeters. Fieldwork
was conducted in Mozambique where large scale aerial photographs were
taken; these were then transported to the Netherlands for processing and
photo interpretation. Photo interpretation is a manual process whereby a
highly experienced operator studies a detailed photograph for objects of
interest — in this case, the boundaries of a minefield. The technique was
found to be effective for minefields that had been part of a deliberate defensive
position: the interpreters were able to identify trench lines and wire fencing
not visible from the ground. This technique is most effective for well-defined
areas23 with professionally laid minefields: unfortunately, these are not the
typical case or only representing a part of a problem in an area.
Point positioning
Global positioning system
The GPS system dates back to the launch of the first satellites in 1978. In
1983, the GPS programme was declassified and in 1989 the first hand-held
GPS receiver was manufactured. In 1990, “selective availability” was activated.
Throughout the 1990s, GPS accuracy was significantly degraded by selective
availability, which deliberately introduced errors into the signal for civilian
users, limiting accuracy for most users to approximately 100 metres. On 1
May 2000, selective availability was deactivated, instantly decreasing the error
in handheld receivers by between one-sixth and one-twelfth of what it had
previously been.
Errors in GIS measurement are uniformly poorly understood in mine
action programmes. Expensive differential equipment has been deployed
with an expectation of accuracy to one metre; actual results may vary from
centimetres to tens of metres. The factors contributing to error are the
geometry of the satellites, the error in the signal itself and errors due to
the receiver and its use.
Dilutions of precision (DOPs) are determined by the geometry of the
current satellites visible above the receiver’s mask angle with respect
to the user receiver’s antenna. DOPs can be degraded (i.e. made larger)
by signal obstruction due to terrain, foliage, building, vehicle structure
and so on.
URE (user range error) is an estimate of “signals in space” errors, i.e.
ephemeris data, satellite clocks, ionospheric delay and tropospheric
delay. These errors can be greatly reduced by differential and multiple
frequency techniques. Differential correction sources include user-
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provided reference stations, community base stations, governmental
beacon transmissions, FM sub-carrier transmissions and geosynchronous
satellite transmissions.
UEE (user equipment errors) includes receiver noise, multipath, antenna
orientation, EMI/RFI. Receiver and antenna design can greatly reduce
UEE error sources, though usually at a substantial cost.24 Multipath
occurs when the GPS signal is reflected off a flat surface before reaching
the GPS receiver. It can be a large source of error when GPS is used near
structures.
Expected horizontal error for a good quality handheld GPS receiver with a
DOP of 1.5 (good conditions and no multipath) at the 95 per cent confidence
level (2.45 sigma) is approximately 7 metres.25 With differential techniques
this drops to 1 metre or less depending on the quality of equipment and the
technique employed. DOP can have severe effects on GPS positional accuracy
and is generally poorly understood by GPS users. It is a scaling factor which
describes the geometric quality of the constellation of satellites being observed.
Positioning accuracy = Dilution of precision * Measurement precision.26 In poor
conditions, it can increase to 10, which would degrade the accuracy of a
handheld receiver to 70 metres.
Differential GPS (DGPS) equipment has been used in mine action in, among
other locations, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mozambique. Care
needs to be taken in recording DGPS measurements as the maximum possible
accuracy will not always be achieved. The DGPS correction signal can be lost,
which degrades system accuracy to that of a single GPS receiver. This, coupled
with a high DOP value, can result in very inaccurate results.
As mentioned earlier a further problem associated with use of GPS is
related to the rather specialised field of geodesy. Coordinates captured using
GPS are measured with respect to a worldwide reference system which is
tied to physical points on the earth’s surface. Countries with modern geodetic
infrastructures know how to accurately convert coordinates captured using
GPS back to older systems for use with existing maps or ground monuments.
In many mine-affected countries prolonged periods of conflict have precluded
the modernisation of the geodetic networks — which can be an expensive
and troublesome process (for example, due to accuracy problems in the original
geodetic network) — and accurate transformations from GPS to local
coordinate systems are not available. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina
stands out in Europe as the only country which does not have such a
transformation officially defined.
Distance and bearing survey techniques
The wide availability and low price of high quality GPS receivers now
means that in most cases better accuracy can be obtained using non-differential
GPS than most minefield surveyors were able to obtain using distance and
bearing methods.
It is not always possible to use GPS for political and technical reasons. In
Taliban Afghanistan the use of GPS was not permitted, and in sensitive military
zones worldwide it has the potential of putting surveyors into danger. A
poor view of the sky — for example, due to obstructions from trees or physical
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relief (e.g. a mountain ridge or a drainage valley) — yields very inaccurate (+/
— 100m) or no coordinates.
Although a number of programmes, including Afghanistan and
Mozambique, have calculated minefield perimeters using compass and bearing
techniques, they have not adopted basic field survey software to assist in
adjusting and plotting survey results. There is a need for more concrete
recommendations on the technical aspects of coordinate collection during
field survey. The old UN level 2 survey standard specified that minefield
turning points should be collected to accuracy in the order of one metre, but
did not suggest practical means by which this could be achieved.
Software functionality, either within IMSMA or perhaps better in a separate
dedicated survey application, would assist field surveyors in improving the
quality and accuracy of distance/bearing field work. Comprehensive survey
software of this type is routinely used in areas such as construction and cadastre
(land parcel) survey — and the requirements of mine action surveyors are far
more modest than in these areas.
Integrated survey systems
There is a relatively long history of survey systems which integrate a GPS
with a computer for data capture. Many consumer grade GPS receivers have
a limited data capture capability, for example, allowing the user to save
coordinates and enter a short textural description. Sometime handheld GPS
will also provide a low resolution display of the result on a small LCD along
with other background data the user has previously loaded. By connecting a
GPS to a laptop computer real time position can be displayed inside a
geographic information system.
The Swedish Armed Force’s EOD and Demining Centre (SWEDEC) has
developed an integrated survey system intended for use by military EOD
teams since the mid 1990’s. This system has combined a laptop computer
running an ordnance database, a GPS receiver for point positioning, and laser
rangefinding binoculars to record points up to several hundred metres from
the operator’s position. A new version of the system has been developed
which replaces the laptop computer with a handheld computer and connects
the three components using Bluetooth technology — a short-range wireless
link.
Field trials of the SWEDEC EOD-IS-SURVEY system using the IMSMA
Technical Survey form began in 2003 and will continue during 2004. The system
pairs a handheld computer (MS Pocket PC) with the position measurement
instruments (GPS, laser rangefinding binoculars) to assist in recording
perimeters of mined areas and the details of the survey form during technical
survey.27 Technical survey data are entered directly into the handheld computer
on site in IMSMA-compatible data entry forms and then exported to maXML
format for import into the IMSMA FM. Geographic information captured
with the GPS and laser rangefinding binoculars can be visualised and edited
in a GIS running on the handheld computer.
For a survey system designed to be used during technical survey, the
absence of any discussion of the expected accuracy in the system
documentation is disappointing. The accuracy of the GPS device alone will be
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similar to that of other 12-channel standalone receivers, that is, approximately
7 metres (at the 95 per cent confidence level) under good conditions. The
accuracy of a point determined using the laser rangefinding binoculars would
be lower, limited by the accuracy of the angle measurement and the quality of
the lasing target (for example, heavy foliage can lead to uncertainty in what
target is being lased).
IMSMA supports export to ArcPad software (ArcPad is only available for
handheld computers using the MS Windows Mobile [MS Pocket PC] operating
system, not for the Palm OS), but has not provided tools to assist in handheld
computer-based data entry or edit.
The increase in quality and lower price of GPS receivers, laser rangefinding
binoculars and field-portable computer equipment will continue to make the
task of obtaining accurate minefield perimeters easier and less error prone.
GISs in use in mine action
GISs’ most obvious role in mine action is in map production. The IMSMA
software’s tight integration with ESRI’s ArcView GIS software allows users
with minimal training to produce maps showing minefield locations. The most
difficult aspect of map production in mine action centres is the initial
configuration of the various required elements — this section has served to
describe the challenges than mine action centres face in establishing a GIS
capability. Once the complete system has been configured, map production is
almost transparent to the end user.
GIS has important implications beyond mere data display and map
production. The power of GIS software is in the analytical capabilities it
affords. These require a greater deal of training and experience — both in
using the software and in analytical approaches to data analysis. A thorough
understanding of the mine action environment is also required to conduct
effective analysis of mine action data. The next section looks at ways in which
database and GIS tools are used in concert to make use of data collected by
mine action centres and field operators during survey campaigns such as
those conducted for national landmine impact surveys.
Data analysis and exchange
General reporting
Regular use of the data in the database, as already noted, is fundamental
to high data quality and ensures a return on the investment in the
hardware, software, personnel, training and processes that made the data
available. Most mine action centres provide poor access to their databases
for a combination of reasons that include physical, technical and skill-
related factors.
The software and hardware requirements for running the
applications are not always met outside of the database office. In
the case of IMSMA, users must have a relatively recent computer
(for IMSMA v3, a 2002 model with medium- to high-end
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specifications should be sufficient), MS Access 2000 (this is not
included in the MS Office, Standard Edition) and a good network
connection to the database server. The software configuration on the
client computer can take up to one hour.
Although many standard reports are now available in IMSMA v3, they
will often have to be customised to fully meet managers’ needs. This
requirement increases significantly as data collection diverges from
the standard IMSMA forms.
Data retrieval is not simple and intuitive even when using pre-
configured reports: it demands a relatively high level of computer
skill and training.
Until 2001, the IMSMA developers at the ETHZ considered their role to
be limited to providing the IMSMA Field Module as a data collection
environment. They did not want to direct users on how they would use the
system and get involved in advising mine action centres how to make use of
the data in the IMSMA database. This line of thinking held that mine action
programmes had a better sense of their information management requirements
than the developers in Zurich, and that the end user would be left to develop
solutions to their reporting and analysis needs locally.
During this period (1999-2001) there was also a concept of an IMSMA
Global Module which would hold all data contained in IMSMA Field Module
databases in a central server located in Zurich. The data on this server would
be made available via the Internet to central managers, such as those at
UNMAS. Complex and expensive data warehousing software and Internet
mapping tools were installed to power the web platform.
But, although the infrastructure was in place, there was almost no data. The
appropriateness of having detailed operational data compiled and available
from a central location was extensively debated among the UN staff at HQ
and in the field. Country programmes were not formally engaged to provide
it and interest in continuing the effort at UNMAS drifted to a more general
reporting model in which only summary data were provided on a periodic
basis. There was no decisive case for having full database detail available in
the central server, and the effort required to obtain regular updates from
each mine action programme was never expended.28
An attempt was then made within the IMSMA project to apply the data
warehousing techniques developed to summarise IMSMA data within the
Global Module to a tool which would be used directly by programmes to
analyse their data. The goal was to have an easy-to-use interface for non-
technical end users wishing to explore the contents of the IMSMA database.
The various obstacles to easy access to data, which still exist in IMSMA v3,
are the typical issues related to working with relational databases as well as
issues specifically related to IMSMA and to mine action. This effort sought to
assist the user by creating a simpler data structure from which reports could
be more easily conducted by addressing the following issues.
Flattening of the relational database structure. The collection of nearly
100 tables in IMSMA is reduced to only a few, perhaps five, from which
all analysis starts.
Translation of keys stored in the database to natural language. This
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is required for something like one-third of all IMSMA fields.
Providing meaningful summaries for area calculations. There is a desire
to compare areas stored in LIS, minefield survey, clearance and
completion reports.
Providing insight into the status of hazard areas stored in the database.
Prior to IMSMA v3 it was not readily apparent whether a hazard area
reported during an LIS was cleared during subsequent clearance
operations.
A prototype of the resultant IMSMA Analysis application was provided to
participants in the first Train-the-Trainer course in early 2002. Although the
application was never widely used in programmes, it clearly demonstrated to
the IMSMA developers the need to focus increased attention on the use of
the data stored in the database.
Individual IMSMA field data collection forms mixed data known before
the activity starts with data that are discovered during the activity. For example,
the clearance form has a perimeter which represents the perimeter prior to
clearance and progress reports which detail the course of the clearance
operation. The same data were included in both the minefield and the clearance
forms to increase the flexibility of the system: users need not use the minefield
report if they choose not to. However, this made analysis very difficult: there
was no way to know which data was correct (if they differed) in the database
and necessitated looking in both locations, as only one may be complete. To
compound the problem, some users would use the clearance form’s perimeter
fields to store the perimeter as cleared.
The new focus on data use at ETHZ led to a clear distinction between
process-related data — which refer to an activity such as a technical survey or
clearance operation — and the hazard data itself. This clear distinction between
processes and hazards is one important aspect of the IMSMA redesign process
which was undertaken in 2003.
Although it is difficult to provide a standard set of reports for all
programmes, it is possible to identify general types of reports desired. For
example, most programmes are interested in showing quantity of work by
organisation. This was difficult to do in IMSMA prior to v3 because there
was no standardisation of organisation names in the database: organisations
were entered as free text fields and spelling inevitably varied, for example,
HALO; HALO Trust; etc.
Some aspects of the relational database are always summarised in the
same way, such as the gazetteer of place names summarised in a province/
district/subdistrict hierarchy and device types summarised as anti-personnel,
anti-tank and UXO. Prior to IMSMA v3, little assistance was provided in pre-
configuring such data to streamline the building of new reports.
IMSMA Analysis was also used to replace the far more complex and
expensive technologies used for the IMSMA Global Module when the
functionality was repackaged for a mine-action-specific web-mapping product.
In late 2001, IMSMA Web Reports were developed to allow programmes to
provide a web portal to their IMSMA databases. The web reports are hosted
on the ETHZ server in Zurich, where a copy of the country’s IMSMA database
is loaded into a warehousing-style data structure. While a free service, this
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has not been aggressively adopted by programmes: thus far, only publicly
available LIS data for Chad and Yemen29 and victim data from Nicaragua30
have been made available in this format.
The simplest model for providing end users with access to relational
databases is to pre-configure standardised summary reports for them to print.
The somewhat limited selection of summary reports available in IMSMA prior
to v3 was expanded to nearly 100 in v3. While there is now a much higher
chance that there is a summary report that nearly meets the needs of a given
end user, it is still likely that specific fields of interest to a specific user
will not be available in the standard report and it remains difficult to
modify these reports.
The strings of queries which lead to the final report are complex and not
documented for mine action programme database administrators. Adding to
their complexity are filters which allow the user to limit the record returned,
for example, by report date or province. In addition, the queries which lead
to the reports are similar in intent to those which provide data to GIS themes.
However, they are implemented entirely separately, requiring users to make
complex edits in two locations to see the same information in the GIS map-
based view and the tabular summaries from the database.
In 2003, an UNMAS initiative led to the GICHD developing an IMSMA
Quarterly Reporting tool. This initiative could be seen as a replacement for
the IMSMA Global Module. Rather than attempting to gather the entire
contents of databases centrally, the approach was to collect only a quarterly
summary. The technical work for this project was again conducted by the
IMSMA development team at ETHZ. The Quarterly Reporting tool is not
widely used (if at all) due to weak commitment at UNMAS following key
changes in personnel in 2003. However, it does again demonstrate some
interesting approaches to solving the complex problem of generating reports
from IMSMA that will satisfy a wide base of users. It also uses a much-improved
user interface that is both faster and more intuitive than the IMSMA Field
Module.
The Quarterly Reporting tool is not an MS Access application like the Field
Module. Rather, it is a stand-alone compiled application31 developed within
Microsoft’s .NET environment which optionally connects to the IMSMA
database. The user builds a quarterly report by deciding first whether to use
IMSMA data or to enter all data manually. Data imported from IMSMA can
be edited within the Quarterly Reporting tool if it is found to be inaccurate.
The Quarterly Report is laid out in three sections:
Programme overview. This summarises the extent of mine/UXO
contamination, programme objectives and achievements, problems
encountered during the quarter, and organisations and assets involved
in mine action.
Impact of the problem. This summarises mine incidents and demining
accidents during the previous quarter, year and five-year periods.
Progress of mine action operations. This summarises clearance and
MRE activities over the previous quarter, year and five-year periods.
For clearance, the metrics are area (reduced/cleared/marked) and
devices destroyed. For MRE, the metrics are direct and indirect
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beneficiaries. Other Internet mapping interfaces have been deployed
using much simpler data structures and user interfaces than the IMSMA
Web Report.
The South Eastern Europe Mine Action Centre (SEEMAC, further
discussed in the section on regional initiatives) has a sophisticated
ESRI ArcIMS web server that shows the extent of the mine problem
in the SEEMAC countries. The SEEMAC GIS project has defined a
summary set of data which it collects periodically to update the
system.32
The Iraq National Mine Action Authority has a simple, web-based
interface to a variety of mine action information on its website.33 The
web interface is based on MapInfo’s MapX map component and displays
small-scale vector mapping features such as province boundaries, and
point and polygons representing hazard areas identified by the mine
action programme. Some basic attribute information is available for
the hazard features.
Data analysis
Data analysis is distinguished from reporting as being an activity that is
conducted by specialised personal on an infrequent basis. Data analysis
typically has significant resources associated with it and may be conducted
as part of a larger project.
The LIS tables in the IMSMA FM are differentiated from the rest of IMSMA
in that their content was specified by the LIS process and each field was
included for a specific reason.34Following data collection, LIS data are processed
through a series of perhaps 20 queries into three master tables:35
Community master table. This is the main table used for analysis. It
summarises most fields found in the LIS. It contains one field for each
community survey.
Victim master table. This contains more detail on victim-related
fields.
SHA master table. This contains details of the suspected hazard areas,
with one field for each suspected hazard area.
These queries were developed and maintained by the Survey Action Centre.
In fact, they have not been included as part of IMSMA until recently. While
the analysis of LIS data has been a marked success for data quality and usage
in IMSMA, there have, on occasion, been problems. For example, in IMSMA
v2 new fields were added into IMSMA to record the results of the expert
opinion data collection process. The expert opinion fields were added to the
IMSMA LIS community survey table, although, more correctly, they should
have been added to the city table, as expert opinion collection precedes
community survey and is conducted for all communities in the city table. Due
to an incomplete understanding of the intent at ETHZ the fields were added
into an inappropriate location in IMSMA and are of little use.
The three master tables summarise data found in more than 20 tables in
the IMSMA FM, and represent the use of a number of data warehousing
concepts. They take a complex relational table structure and reduce it to three
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flat tables which the end user exploits without having to be concerned with the
underlying storage data structure.
It is striking that, with such an early example of effective data use in IMSMA,
this model of data use was not earlier applied to other areas of the database. In
fact, in the last two major IMSMA-related survey content definition exercises —
for MRE and the Iraq Emergency Survey — the data fields were specified without
explicit consideration of the analysis requirement. This is backwards survey
design: the analysis requirement definition should always precede the definition
of data fields.
The procedures described above enable a social scientist to analyse the
LIS data. Following the Yemen survey, it was recognised that mine action
programmes required additional assistance in incorporating these results into
a strategic mine action plan for the country. The Survey Action Centre, the
UN and Cranfield Mine Action (CMA) developed a post-survey strategic
planning course to assist mine action programmes to integrate the results of
the landmine impact survey into national mine action plans. CMA, based at
Cranfield University, UK, provides middle and senior management training
to local staff employed at mine action centres — both at the Cranfield campus
and in the field.
The strategic planning course included the use of a software tool developed
by CMA, the first version of which was called Pathway. This strategic planning
tool assists senior mine action staff in developing resource requirements and
incorporating them into a national mine action plan — often covering a five-
year period. The various major versions of the software are summarised in
Table 4.
These tools represent a work-in-progress as CMA refined the way in
which they delivered strategic planning training and the way they chose
to interact with the LIS data stored in IMSMA. Early versions of the
software were only available to programmes in the context of the strategic
planning course, but this approach gave way to making the software freely
available from its website in 2003. Early versions of the software were
also less tightly focused on strategic planning, moving beyond developing
the strategic plan to data maintenance and operational planning. The Freeway
software, made broadly available in 2003, is strictly a strategic planning
tool which has dropped all pretence of maintaining the underlying data
on which the plan is based.
Table 4.  CMA strategic planning software
Pathway 2001 Only available as a part of the CMA strategic planning
interventions. It was not customisable; rather, it was
modified as required for each country where it was used.
Data are read from the IMSMA FM database.
Highway 2002 A derivative of Pathway that was not dependant on IMSMA
allowing the software to be used with a non-IMSMA
database in Afghanistan.
Freeway 2003 Freely distributed and available for download from the CMA
website. It has its lineage in Pathway and Freeway.
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Pathway had three main functional areas. First, it allowed the user to define
in words the programme’s strategic vision. Pathway then connected to the
IMSMA LIS data and imported a subset of data into its own data structure.
From this point on it no longer worked in conjunction with IMSMA and never
updated IMSMA. The user was able to prioritise individual suspected hazard
areas which were listed by their impacted communities in a flat table list view
and change their status to remove them from the rest of the application’s
analytical functions. This had the undesirable effect of editing IMSMA data
outside of IMSMA.
The main strategic planning functionality allowed the user to specify in
general terms what resources would be available for survey and clearance
over the planning horizon, which was specified in years. The software would
then model the resources required — in terms of numbers and cost — to
result in a “No impact” and/or “No mine problem” result. By adjusting the
resource mix the user was able to graphically observe how this affected the
desired result.
Highway’s main departure from Pathway was that it in no way linked to
IMSMA: it stood as an intermediate product between Pathway and Freeway.
Freeway removed the hazard level prioritisation capability found in
Pathway and increased the detail of the planning model. Freeway v1 does not
in any way obtain data from the IMSMA FM database.
Multi-criteria analysis is another form of data analysis that has been applied
to the strategic planning exercise, in particular in Croatia. Multi-criteria
analysis strives to make priority setting more transparent by assigning explicit
weights to discrete factors identified as being important for clearance
prioritisation.36
Multi-sectoral analysis is a particular strength of GIS software. There are
quite a number of examples of this being applied to mine action. Two well
documented activities and one less formally documented are described
here.
1. Prioritisation of dangerous areas using GIS in Kosovo
VVAF’s work in developing a prioritisation model for dangerous areas is
described in detail in their publication Decision Support for Mine Action.37 Due
to wide-scale disruption to communities, interview-based impact assessment
was not viable. In order to gauge impact, dangerous areas were assigned a
score based on their proximity to “livelihood areas”.
By gathering available data layers as well as creating new layers (for
example, classification of agricultural areas using Landsat imagery, possible
at a relatively modest level of effort for a small region such as Kosovo) an
impact model was developed. While recognising that operational factors often
carried more weight in clearance task assignment than the prioritisation
model, VVAF nonetheless concludes that it had a significant impact on the
course of mine action in Kosovo.
2. Multi-sectoral GIS analysis in Lebanon agricultural data38
Lebanon has a relatively well developed information infrastructure, which,
coupled with its small geographic area, made it appear an ideal candidate for
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the inclusion of data from non-mine-action sources into the LIS data analysis.
Much of the data available which would further illuminate “community
endowment” (for example, service and utility data such as health clinics,
hospitals and electricity) were not available with full national coverage, an
important criteria for inclusion.
The search for data sources led to only one promising data set: an
agricultural census conducted at the individual landowner level. After
protracted communications between the Ministry of Defence (with which the
LIS was partnered) and the Ministry of Agriculture, access to the data was
obtained. The resulting analysis provided an interesting sidebar to the main
LIS analysis, but again highlighted the difficulty in obtaining data from non-
mine-action sources.
3. Vulnerability analysis at Humanitarian Information Centres
UNOCHA’s (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs) Humanitarian Information Centres (HICs, further described later in
this section) include mine action data with other layers of information in a
geographical information system to create a vulnerability index which
summarise the estimated combined affect of a variety of factors on the
population during humanitarian emergencies. Data introduced into the model
ranged from the very general (trends in population movement) to the quite
general (regions affected by drought) and the detailed (land cover and
minefield locations). This approach was extensively used in Afghanistan in
2002 following the American-led war.
Data exchange
Exchanging data between mine action databases is technically very simple
but in practice is highly problematic. It is technically simple because most
databases conform to a standard data access technology called open database
connectivity. Open database connectivity allows communication between
different types of databases, so that, for example, it is possible to read FoxPro,
Paradox and SQLServer data from within MS Access.
Exchanging data is very problematic in practice because, more often than
not, the meaning of the data stored in the accessible tables is unclear. So
while it may be relatively trivial to read the data, the meaning of the data is
not explicitly described by its structure. Database tables contain fields with
short names. While this may be helpful to users who are familiar with the
database and the way in which it supports the organisation where it is used,
they are an inadequate descriptor for general use. As an example, a clearance
table may store four different representations of area: “prepared by machines”,
“cleared by demining”, “calculated from the surveyed perimeter” and
“reported during technical survey”. The way in which the user should
understand the meaning and use of these various reporting of area requires
a detailed explanation.
Importing data into IMSMA is difficult because, in addition to the data
represented on data collection sheets, IMSMA also stores data required by
the system, such as data entry operator, date entered and status information.
Other data, such as the nearest town and items of ERW, are not directly
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stored but linked to by internal codes. Furthermore, the valid content of many
fields in IMSMA is limited to a finite list.
Data export from IMSMA in all versions through v3 has been accomplished
by either saving the data to an MS Access database for distribution or
summarising the database contents in flat tables and distributing the summary
in a format appropriate for use in a GIS (ESRI Shape files).
Data import has required the painstaking design of routines specific to
the data being imported; this has been done for database conversions to
IMSMA in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Mozambique and northern Iraq. On a more
limited scale, if a list of 200 bomb strike locations has to be entered into
IMSMA Dangerous Areas, it has often been quicker to just manually enter the
data rather than design an import routine.
The mine action XML (maXML) project aims to improve the ability to import
and export data in mine action databases. It defines a neutral data structure
for mine action through which mine action databases can communicate. Rather
than having to write an import routine between all systems which would like
to exchange data, one import routine is written for each system for maXML.
Funded and managed by GICHD as part of the IMSMA project, development
work is done by FGM Inc — an American company specialising in software
systems development and integration.
The maXML project has succeeded in defining a neutral data structure
and will provide the import/export mechanisms for IMSMA. To take a practical
example, the designers of the EOD-IS-SURVEY system do not need to be
concerned with how to import data into IMSMA, rather they store the collected
technical survey data as maXML and the existing import routine is used to
bring the data into IMSMA.
A workflow for managing the direct import of survey data into IMSMA
has not yet been addressed. An opportunity must be afforded the IMSMA
database administrator prior to import and review the new survey data for
accuracy and completeness, and to ensure that they have not already been
imported previously into the database.
An added benefit of XML data exchange is that the data are self-
documenting. Descriptions of the meaning of the data (metadata) are included
in the XML file.
Multi-sector approaches
Humanitarian information centres (HICs) — established in countries during
humanitarian emergencies — are a cornerstone of the UNOCHA’s approach
to improving national, and sometimes regional, coordination during complex
emergencies. They have been an important element in sharing mine action
information with the broader humanitarian community since Kosovo. HICs
are currently operating in Afghanistan, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa,
Iraq, Liberia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone and
the Palestinian Occupied Territories.39
UNOCHA describes the general role of HICs in the following terms:40
“A space where the humanitarian community can share and access
information resources in order to improve the planning and delivery of
humanitarian assistance.
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A provider of information products and services that enable the
humanitarian community to deliver assistance more effectively, following
principles of good practice in information management.
A focal point for data collection, analysis and dissemination in support
of the provision of humanitarian assistance, developing and supporting
data standards.
A facilitator for initiatives and activities related to information
management in the field, particularly in collaboration between other
humanitarian actors in support of existing co-ordination structures.
An advocate for a culture of information-sharing in the humanitarian
community, generating awareness of good practice and making it possible
for agencies to develop common standards and practices in the field.”
Their importance for mine action information management has been both
as a source of data and as a means of distribution of mine action information:
Gazetteer maintenance. A cornerstone of sharing data is the use of a
common gazetteer of place names. HICs have generally taken on the
task of maintaining a standard gazetteer for the humanitarian
community. This standard gazetteer can then be used in IMSMA, which
ensures that other sector information can be linked to mine action data
at the community level.
Base mapping: both for use in the IMSMA GIS and as a map supplier to
mine action field operators.
Mine action information distribution. General mine action data (for
example, point locations of minefields) is provided to the HIC for
inclusion on hard-copy map products at medium to small scale (e.g.
1:250,000 and smaller), and used in spatial analysis.
Assisting the end user
Establishing and maintaining an information management system in mine-
affected countries is a challenging undertaking. There is a complex mix of
elements which must combine to achieve success. The database can not succeed
in isolation — it must have a close view of both field activities as the producers
of data and operations personnel who are the main users of the output of the
system.
A key element in providing assistance to mine action centres has been
technical advisers. Mine action has a long history of employing international
staff to provide technical assistance to programmes. Very few mine action
programmes have not had technical advisers work with them at some point
in their history. In many programmes the three key adviser positions are a
chief technical adviser who works with a national programme manager, an
operations adviser who is concerned with field operations, and an information
management adviser whose purview is the maintenance of the database and
its associated reporting procedures.
Training sessions — centralised and local — and comprehensive system
documentation accompany the IMSMA Field Module database. GICHD has
recently introduced regionally based staff as a mid-level support between
training sessions and dedicated technical advisers.
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Advisers
The focus of advisers tends to be on the technical aspects of the job rather
than the leadership, training and planning aspects that might lead to
improvements in sustainability. Advisers working in mine-affected countries
tend to be somewhat isolated and often do not benefit from lessons learned
in other programmes.
UNOPS and UNDP have placed many mine action information management
technical advisers in mine action centres. Terms of reference tend to be similar,
requiring familiarity with database and GIS software in general and IMSMA
in particular.
To help foster a community of mine action information practitioners
James Madison University hosted annual mine action information
workshops in Virginia in the US starting in 2000, and in 2003 GICHD hosted
the meeting in Geneva. Each meeting has had a central topic: Information
Management and Coordination: The Way Ahead (2000); Mine Action
Systems Interoperability (2001); Data Integrity and Reliability (2002); and
Geographical Information Systems (2003). These gatherings have drawn
both national staff and international and advisers working in mine action
programmes worldwide and have helped to spread lessons learned more
widely.
The US Army’s Fort Leonard Wood base houses the Humanitarian
Demining Training Center (HDTC), which teaches IMSMA to US Army Special
Forces teams as part of its curriculum. These teams then deploy to work with
military units involved in mine action in mine-affected countries. HDTC
activities tend to be more focused on field clearance than headquarters
activities such as information management; however they have on occasion
provided assistance related to IMSMA.
The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) has been a visible provider of
technical assistance for mine action information beginning in Kosovo and more
recently in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. Two SWEDEC staff were among the
ten or so participants in the first IMSMA Train the Trainer course in 2002.
VVAF’s Information Management and Mine Action Programme (iMMap)
has provided technical advisers and trainers to mine action programmes in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. They also had two staff among the first group
to receive the IMSMA Train the Trainer course.
Training
Starting in 1999 with the first installations of the IMSMA Field Module,
field relations staff working with the IMSMA developers at the ETHZ in
Zurich conducted field visits during the initial deployment of the software.
The field visits went far beyond merely installing the software and providing
training in its use — extending to provide assistance in the broader range of
elements required to make an effective information system. For example,
consultation would be conducted with other organisations to identify suitable
gazetteer data, and assistance was provided in identifying and configuring
digital map data to be used in the system’s GIS. The number of field relations
staff at ETHZ grew from one in 1999 to a high of five in late 2001, as the total
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staff working on the IMSMA project in Zurich grew from three to 13 over the
same period.
A major shift in the GICHD’s approach to supporting IMSMA in the field
occurred in 2002 with the introduction of regional coordinators. The concept
of IMSMA regional coordinators grew from the recognition that the greatest
barrier to effective use of IMSMA was not related to the actual software, but
rather to a lack of skills in the mine action programmes and that developing
these skills was a longer-term project not addressed by short, infrequent
courses. Regional coordinators have been designated for five regions:
Asia, based at the GICHD;
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, based at the GICHD;
Latin America, based in Nicaragua;
Middle East and North Africa, based in Lebanon; and
South and Central Africa, based in Ethiopia.
Documentation
IMSMA documentation through 2001 consisted of a User Guide, an
Administrator’s Guide, and a GIS User’s Manual. These were rewritten in
2001 to produce two expanded documents — a User Guide and an
Administrator Guide, which were made available in Adobe PDF and a compiled
HTML version on all IMSMA installation CD-ROMs. In 2002, these were
further expanded to include a Trainer’s Guide and other specialised
documentation:
Trainer’s Guide and Exercise Book. Contained training plans and step-
by-step exercises for basic and advanced user training. Provided to
participants of the IMSMA Train-the-Trainer course.
IMSMA Standards Guide. Technical document which describes the
structure of the system. Intended for software developers creating
IMSMA add-ons. Was not widely distributed but was available upon
request.
IMSMA Data Collection Guide. Detailed explanation of the contents
of each field in the database. Draft document, was made available upon
request.
IMSMA HW/SW requirements. A detailed description of the hardware
and software recommendations for IMSMA for small, medium and large
installations. Posted on IMSMA website.
In addition to the text-based materials, an attempt was made at ETHZ to
develop computer-based training. Two Macromedia Flash-based applications41
have been prepared to provide an interactive learning environment for some
of the more complex functionality in IMSMA. These tools, described below,
have been included in IMSMA installations from v3:
Entity relationship diagram explorer. This tool describes the content
of the IMSMA database and shows the relationships between its tables.
The target audience is a database administrator who must work with
the IMSMA tables directly to create new summary reports.
Decentralised data entry. This tool describes in detail the workings of
the IMSMA decentralised data entry functionality. It is intended for
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the IMSMA manager who is planning on using this functionality to better
understand its intended use and limitations.
The usability of all IMSMA documentation is limited by its poor integration
into the application. The user and administrator guides can be launched from
within IMSMA, but there are no context-sensitive features, which can make it
difficult to quickly find content. The Flash-based interactive tools are very
high quality products, but suffer from the same poor integration: they are
only available as stand-alone applications which are launched outside of the
IMSMA FM.
ETHZ has also attempted to collect lessons learned in using the system
with two initiatives:
a “lessons learned” document in compiled HTML format installed with
the IMSMA FM; this is mainly a collection of observations on using the
system by the support staff and developers at ETHZ; and
field user “lessons learned” can be posted to a message board
maintained on the ETHZ IMSMA website42; this has never been widely
used, however, and lessons learned during the course of IMSMA field
use remain for the most part undocumented.
Technical advisers employed by the UN — UNMAS, UNOPS and UNDP
— have developed a broad understanding of issues related to using IMSMA
in mine action programmes and during the course of LISs. Little information
regarding their experiences is publicly available, and there is no formal internal
information-sharing process in place.
Regional and donor initiatives
A regional effort within the Southern Africa Development Community
sought to establish a regional database in Maputo and deliver information
technology training to mine action programmes in the participating countries.
The project began in 1999, placed database hardware within the National
Demining Institute in Maputo and delivered general basic office skills computer
training to mine action programme staff. This project does not appear to still
be operating.
Canada’s International Development Agency, CIDA, delivered an
integrated package to develop mine action information management in
Mozambique. This project began in 1998 with a consultancy report43 that
recommended three parallel courses of action to create a solid base for
information management in the country:
First, the LIS, which CIDA funded.
Second, technical assistance to ADP. Three Canadian Forces advisers
were provided to the Accelerated Demining Programme to improve
field survey and information management within this clearance
programme.
Third, development of the Geomatics infrastructure. This activity began
with a consultancy report which planned the further course of action44
and resulted in all of the existing 1:50,000 topographic map sheets being
scanned and geo-registered.
Finally, the SEEMAC GIS programme provided staff positions in
participating programmes in South-Eastern Europe and assisted in the
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procurement of spatial data including Landsat imagery and new aerial
photography.
Conclusions
IMSMA is now the de facto standard database for mine action. The initial
motivation for a standardised mine action database came from the top —
managers at the UN in New York wanted standardised data worldwide to
better allocate mine action resources. This vision of centrally collecting the
contents of the databases at the international level has long since faded. The
ultimately widespread adoption of IMSMA — it is now used in over 80 per
cent of mine action programmes — was driven by individual programmes
requesting access to the system in hopes that it would improve efficiencies
but also to join an international body of practice. For the most part mine
action programmes have warmly embraced this standardisation effort.
A second motivation for the development of IMSMA was to provide a
generic mine action database suitable for deployment anywhere in the world
rather than starting anew from a blank screen each time. This vision has
largely been achieved — IMSMA is now in use in most mine action centres
worldwide and it quite literally does provide a starting point. It is often
extensively customised and used in very different ways in different
programmes to meet local requirements.
The first five years of mine action information management systems —
the period pre-IMSMA — saw the development of databases in large
programmes that had a requirement but, more importantly, the capacity to
devote significant resources to this task. These databases were not well
rounded — they focused on the particular sort of data and reporting that
were of specific interest to the individuals working in the programme at the
time and did not benefit from a wider body of experience.
The next five years saw the development of IMSMA through three major
versions and, with the exception of the northern Iraq programme, very little
database development elsewhere. As IMSMA progressed from v1 to v3 it
grew in size, complexity and capability. Important new functionality included
robust decentralised data entry, integrated coordinate transformations and
the addition of mine risk education. The only major technical change during
this period was the move to a more robust database working in the
background to better support multiple users on an office network.
The IMSMA Field Module — clearly the flagship product of the project —
has been far more successful than numerous other software tools which have
emerged from the developers at the ETHZ over the years — Global Module,
Analysis, Quarterly Reports, Web Reports, ESTI, XL. The failure of most of
these projects to be used in the field parallels the failure of many other mine
action research and development projects in Western countries. The common
factor in many of these failures is excessive attention to ideas developed in
offices in New York or Zurich at the expense of understanding user
requirements in the field.
The current course of the IMSMA project marks a sharp turn from that of
the previous five years. The GICHD’s creation of regional IMSMA
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representatives addresses one of the main points highlighted by Price
Waterhouse Coopers in their review of mine action information management.
Namely that far more attention has been given to developing the IMSMA
software than to assisting users in the field in making appropriate use of it.
Rather than relying on technical advisers — a resource many programmes
cannot afford — the GICHD has stepped forward to directly provide this service
to the users of its software.
The role of the software developers in the IMSMA design process also
looks to be very different over the next five years. Two IMSMA-related
projects are underway which are not being coded by the Field Module
developers in Zurich. The Field Module development post-version 3 was
tendered though a request for proposals in 2004, leading to the development
of a new version in 2005 by a US-based organisation. This may be a very
positive development since  it allows IMSMA development to more closely focus
on field requirements — something that has until now been inhibited by the
limited field experience of the programmers and sporadic contact with users. It
also carries with it the danger of relearning old lessons and remaking old
mistakes as the body of knowledge accumulated by the IMSMA developers
over the last five years is lost.
The balance of power between headquarters staff and information
management professionals seems to be firmly weighted towards
headquarters staff, given the experience during the design of recent
surveys. Important lessons learned during the landmine impact survey
process seem to have been forgotten. By focusing on data rather than
data use surveys such as the emergency survey in Iraq have degraded
their effectiveness by failing to focus on analysis. Fielding data collection
forms that do not have a focused intent yields poor quality data.
Geographic information systems are now widely used in mine action. For
most programmes this means that they have the capability to print maps
showing the mine threat. While automated mapping is a very modest use of
the geographic tools made available by IMSMA, it is a huge advance from
what was available before and places mine action among a very select group
of GIS users in many of the countries where it is used.
Technology assisting field data collection — such as that of the GICHD/
SWEDEC EOD-IS-SURVEY project — is an extension to the IMSMA project.
Assisting the data collector improves data quality by reducing errors in the
field and assists standardisation.
Mine action programmes do not seem to want, and perhaps do not require,
complex software to assist in planning and prioritisation. The wide variety of
management styles, relatively simple resource allocation requirements, and
the field focus of mine action managers all contribute to depreciating the
value of developing software tools focused on planning and prioritisation.
Yet there is still a feeling among many programmes managers that they are
not getting what they want from their databases. Satisfying these managers
will require efforts to simplify existing IMSMA functionality rather than
adding extensive new features to the system.
IMSMA has reduced the dependence of individual mine action programmes
on individuals to keep their mine action information systems operating. While
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the loss of a technical adviser or other key member of the programme can still be
problematic it is now much easier to obtain outside assistance — particularly
with the advent of the GICHD’s regional IMSMA representatives — and train
replacements.
The information management requirements of mine action programmes
vary widely, but a common requirement is simplicity. Enhancing ease of use
should be the mantra of an IMSMA developer. Scalability is an important
element of ease of use — functionality that is not required in a small mine
action programme should not complicate the use of basic features. Many mine
action centres require small, simple and flexible tools. It is the minority that
require a large complicated information system. A key element of getting the
database into use is improving the ability of non-database staff to directly
interact with the system. This implies that IMSMA should be easier to install,
offer a smaller client for basic use, and be more mobile.
Survey design is a key element of information management and it should
not be the sole dominion of either the policy or technical communities. There
is a healthy practice of providing wide review of new survey documents
though venues such as the Survey Working Group chaired by the Survey
Action Centre, but review is not equal to discussion and critical analysis.
More leadership on survey design practices, including a more formal recording
of best practices and lessons learned, will help to improve future survey
designs. First and foremost among these best practices is the primacy of
analysis. Field survey cannot be an unfocused data collection effort — the
data selected for collection should follow from its planned use. Too often the
process of considering how to use the data has followed its collection.
Editor's note:
Since the article was written the IMSMA system has undergone a major
redevelopment and version 4 is due to be released in late 2005. This new version
addresses many of the issues raised in the chapter.
The latest version of IMSMA is designed as a decentralised system and will
replace existing systems within the next two years. This new release is based
upon open-source dataware and is being developed using the platform
independent Java programming language. The new system will contain a fully-
integrated GIS based on the Arc Engine software package. It allows users to
perform interactive map-based navigation throughout the entire content of the
database.
This first release of IMSMA version 4 will undergo a series of pilot tests
starting in late 2005 before it is made available for general release. The new
system is designed for use by operations and management staff and contains a
number of technical improvements, which will reduce the cost of operations
and maintenance.
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Introduction
This chapter looks at capacity development in mine action, currently the
subject of a major study by the GICHD. The chapter first discusses the
definition of capacity development, before looking at efforts at capacity
development in some of the world’s major mine action programmes.




The effort to foster indigenous mine action capacities in developing
countries and economies in transition has achieved a mixed level of
success. International assistance generally has succeeded in developing
the capacities of individuals for the front-line tasks relating to mine
clearance, survey, quality assurance, medical support of clearance
operations, mine risk education and victim assistance. In most cases
where the contamination is likely to require a sustained effort,
indigenous capacity for continuing these training programmes has
also been developed.
However, capacity development of the type needed to establish new
organisations or to improve the management cadres and systems of
poorly performing organisations has been much more hit-and-miss.
In the first decade, the failures at this level of capacity development
outweighed the successes, in part because short-term emergency
thinking dominated, no successful models existed in the new field of
mine action, and most of the early programmes began in the difficult
situations of complex emergencies and failed states.
The need for better coordination within the donor arena is also one of
many frontier issues concerning capacity development of networks,
which is needed to ensure that a group of otherwise capable
organisations works effectively in concert. There is now a general
awareness of the institutions and processes required to make the
organisations within a country’s mine action arena function as a
reasonably coherent network. But much less progress has been made
concerning linkages between the mine action programme and other
arenas.
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What is capacity development?
Capacity development is a broad concept and, hence, one of those things
that everyone knows “when they see it” but finds difficult to describe. It
helps to have some introduction to the basic concepts and a common
vocabulary. In brief, capacity development refers to (i) the target entity (or
entities — individuals, organisations, etc.), which exists in (ii) a socio-cultural-
political-economic environment, (iii) the objective or type of capacity that is
to be enhanced via (iv) a process, and (v) the people or agencies pursuing the
capacity development which, in the field of international development, usually
entails partnership between one or more organisations in both the recipient
country and the international community.
These concepts of capacities within a capacity development process
operating at different levels are captured in the following definition adopted
by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC — the “official donors
club”). Capacity development is…
“…the process by which individuals, groups, organisations, institutions,
and societies increase their abilities to: (1) perform core functions, solve
problems, define and achieve objectives; and (2) understand and deal
with their development needs in a broad context and in a sustainable
manner…”.
Further, the definition defines the core capacities of an organisation,
community, sector, etc., as:
•  defining, analysing the environment or overall system;
•  identifying needs and/or key issues;
• formulating strategies to respond to or meet needs;
• devising or implementing actions; assembling and using resources effectively
and sustainably;
• monitoring performance, ensuring feedback, and adjusting courses of action to
meet objectives;
• acquiring new knowledge and skills to meet evolving challenges.”1
Many development efforts have run aground because of problems with
partnership and process. Some recipient governments — through disinterest,
bad policies, or internal conflict — proved to be weak partners. Many donors
have also proved to be poor partners by pushing their own interests or by
promoting development in a manner to increase the so-called success rate of
their projects but which overwhelmed local capacities and disenfranchised
local organisations.
The capacity development processes used (education and training plus
technical assistance based largely on the counterpart model) were often poorly
delivered because the wrong type of training was given or the international
experts did not have the required expertise or aptitudes. More fundamentally,
such approaches, which worked in post-war Europe and Japan, were simply
inadequate in more difficult environments: the tools were not up to the task
of sustainable capacity development.
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Box 1. Lessons of success and recipes for disaster
in capacity development
A comparison of successful and unsuccessful capacity-building efforts in
international development yields the following lessons of success:
Capacity is an indigenous phenomenon and its development arises principally
from local responses to changing opportunities — from learning-by-doing;
The path of capacity development is largely determined by local factors:
highly standardised plans (“blueprints”) are unlikely to be successful;
Capacity development arises from complex interactions among parties and
at different levels (national, sectoral, community, etc.) as well as within
organisations;
Capacity development can be assisted but not driven by outside agencies.a)
a) Adapted from Browne, 2002:6-7.
The lessons in Box 1 can be summarised in the following principles: (1)
local ownership; (2) flexible, long-term approaches; (3) participation of
stakeholders (those who “have a stake in” or will be affected by a planned
action); and (4) demand-led rather than supply-driven donor assistance.
Conversely, where a number of these principles are violated, we may have a
potential recipe for disaster. These principles will be used in subsequent
sections in assessing capacity building in mine action.
The failure of so many donor-funded capacity development efforts has
made practitioners more aware of the critical role of the socio-cultural-
political-economic environment within which the target entity exists, as it
determines to a large extent how well the entity will perform. For example,
well-trained individuals will not be able to achieve much if the organisation
in which they work has the wrong mandate, is badly managed or lacks the
bare minimum of resources required for proper functioning. Similarly, a
capable organisation will achieve little if other organisations with which it
needs to work in a “network”2 are incapable or unwilling to cooperate.
Accordingly, a national mine action centre might have excellent staff and
an adequate budget, but the country’s mine action programme could still
flounder if the mine action authority is riven by petty politics, if the
implementing organisations refuse to cooperate for fear of losing their direct
funding from donors, or if local political authorities steal the land from poor
households once it has been cleared. Therefore, capacity development efforts
should be based on clear-headed assessments of the broader environment,
which will often uncover glaring problems requiring parallel measures to
(ideally) address these problems directly or (at minimum) guard against the
main risks such problems create.
For just one example, some of the principal donors to the mine action
programme in Bosnia wanted most clearance contracts to be awarded via
competitive tenders and a central element of their capacity development
strategy was to help create local demining firms which would compete for
those tenders. This was a reasonable strategy but it did not factor — in the
risks posed by Bosnia’s extremely corrupt political and commercial environment
Capacity development in mine action
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that had emerged during the 1992-1995 war. No special measures were put in
place to insulate mine action from the pervasive corruption and the programme
soon was the target of many allegations that eroded donor confidence and
reduced their financial support.
Of course a “clear-headed assessment” of a country’s socio-cultural-
political-economic environment can itself be a daunting task and some tools
are needed. SWOT (strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats) and PEST
(political-economic-social-technical) analyses are widely known techniques
and are employed in the strategic planning exercises facilitated by Cranfield
University. The following capacity development framework (Figure 1) can
complement such tools to ensure important issues from each “level” (individual,
organisation, network, society) are considered and some thought is given to
both (for lack of a better term) dimensions of capacity development: the
“hardware” of entities and capabilities, plus the “software” composed of laws,
norms, cultural beliefs, and so on.3
Capacity development in the first decade
of mine action: 1989-1998
While the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has for decades
provided medical care and rehabilitation for landmine victims, and individual
initiatives to help communities cope with landmine and unexploded odnance
(UXO) contamination were undertaken by (mainly) international NGOs prior
to 1989, mine action as a distinct and large-scale humanitarian endeavour
dates from late 1989 in Afghanistan. Other large programmes that began in
the first decade were Cambodia (1991), Mozambique (1992/93), Angola (1994),
Lao PDR (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), Croatia (1996), and northern
Iraq (1997).4 International assistance was also provided — mainly through
military channels — to programmes such as Nicaragua (from 1993) and Rwanda
(1995), where the mine action was conducted primarily by the local military.
Four points need to be made when assessing the success of capacity
development efforts during this period.
1. Mine action was a new humanitarian field and proven models did not
exist for programmes on how these might best be established. As expected,
the period saw a good deal of trial and error, and heated disagreement
between the various professions and organisations that came to form the
mine action community (military, health care professions, commercial
firms, international NGOs, official donors, etc.). Initially, the various
programmes adopted quite different strategies and virtually all of them
had to adjust these one or more times as they learned what did and did
not work in that particular environment.
2. Complicating this fact, much of the landmine and UXO contamination
stemmed from fluid civil wars without established frontlines, often
waged by ill-disciplined forces that targeted civilians as much as rival
combatants but that could also (unlike civil conflicts from earlier periods)
obtain modern munitions, including landmines, from foreign
governments and weapons dealers. The result was complex patterns of
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contamination, often with few records of where the landmines were.
Thus the experience of modern armies and civil defence forces in post-
war clearance could not simply be replicated in developing and transition
countries.
3. The donor environment for mine action was very different in the early
1990s to that in the later build-up to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention. Donors came on board with support for mine action at
different times and advocated different approaches. There were no
specialist agencies with recognised mine action expertise to provide
leadership that would be accepted by other organisations involved. Even
within the UN system, no focal point was appointed until 1994.
4. Most programmes were initiated in countries that remained in, or were
just emerging from, civil wars. Some of these countries did not have
recognised governments exercising effective control over the country
and therefore the establishment of national authorities and mine action
centres was either foredoomed or required time-consuming
negotiations, in some cases with factions that did not want landmines
cleared as they were not yet committed to peace.
There were recognised successes but far more failures during this period.
The most successful programme was for Afghanistan.5 The initial plan of the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to
Afghanistan (UNOCHA)6 was to train thousands of refugees in basic demining
skills, expecting them to clear their own communities after what was expected
to be a massive repatriation following the Geneva Accords (April 1988).
However, the continuation of fighting stopped the bulk of refugees from
returning to Afghanistan and made it impossible to anticipate when a
recognised national authority would be in place to assume responsibility for
the contamination problem.
This task fell to UNOCHA, which filled the dual role of mine action
authority and the national mine action centre but balked at assuming direct
responsibility for operations. UNOCHA advanced the concept of establishing
Afghan mine action NGOs which circumvented many ponderous UN
administrative rules and promised to create an indigenous capacity that
eventually could be put at the service of a national authority. Continued
fighting meant that this transfer of authority did not take place during the
first mine action decade,7 but significant indigenous capacities were indeed
developed in terms of the thousands of trained personnel, the numbers and
sizes of capable mine action organisations and the experience garnered by
senior and middle-level managers, some of whom have since gone on to
assume key posts within the international mine action community.
A unique feature of the Afghanistan programme — and one that
demonstrates the central role UNOCHA played in both the creation of the
Afghan NGOs and their continued evolution — is that some of the NGOs
were established expressly to provide services to all other organisations within
the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA). Thus, as set out in
Table 1 above, the Mine Clearance Planning Agency conducts all surveying
and maintains the mine action data base on behalf of UNOCHA; the Mine
Dog Centre (MDC) supplies all mine detection dogs and handlers for both survey
279
and clearance; and the Monitoring Evaluation and Training Agency (META)
conducts quality assurance monitoring and evaluation of survey, clearance
and MRE activities, and operates the central training facility that offers a range
of programmes, including middle management training. These core
organisations within MAPA operate akin to a business conglomerate, with
plans and performance targets being set or endorsed by the centre but with
each of the units having a good deal of autonomy over its day-to-day operations
and core business functions (accounting, personnel management, etc.).
Table 1.  Afghan NGO partners in the MAPAa)
Afghan NGO Year established Main function
within MAPA
Afghan Red Crescent Pre-existing (MAPA partner Mine Risk Education (MRE)
Society (ARCS)  since 1991)
Agency for Rehabilitation & Pre-existing (MAPA partner Community-based
Energy Conservation in since 1997) clearance
Afghanistan (AREA)
Afghan Technical Consultants 1989 Clearance
(ATC)
Demining Agency for
Afghanistan (DAFA) 1990 (as SWAAD) Clearance
Mine Clearance and Planning 1989 Survey (plus, until 1997,
Agency (MCPA) training)
Mine Detection and Dog 1994 (the centre was Mine detection dogs
Centre (MDC)  managed by RONCO from and clearance (in conjunction
1989-93) for survey (via MCPA) with a number of NGOs).
Monitoring Evaluation and 1997 (previously was part of Training, monitoring, and
Training Agency (META)  MCPA) evaluation
Organisation for Mine 1989 (as OMA) MRE and, since 1992,
Clearance and Afghan clearance
Rehabilitation (OMAR)
a) A number of other international NGOs are MAPA partners, most of which are involved with MRE
and/or victim assistance. HALO Trust continues to conduct clearance operations.
The mine action programme in Cambodia8 began within the context of a
UN peace-building mission (UNTAC— the UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia) whose mandate specified in the Paris Agreement (October 1991)
included monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces, supervising the cease-
fire, assisting the repatriation and resettlement of refugees, and facilitating
the elections scheduled for May 1993. Mine action was placed under the
military arm of UNTAC.
With only an 18-month mandate, it focused on training and equipping
local deminers to undertake tasks in direct support of UNTAC responsibilities
(such as mine clearance from repatriation routes, refugee reception centres
and resettlement areas), gave scant attention to longer-term mine action
requirements, and had little communication with the Cambodia Mine Action
Centre (CMAC) or its governing council, which had been established by the
Capacity development in mine action
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Supreme National Council (the transitional authority until the elections) as the
national mine action centre and authority. As a result, no provisions were
made until immediately before UNTAC’s departure to create a conduit for
international funding to support continuing mine action operations or even
to transfer UNTAC mine action equipment to CMAC.
Arrangements to keep CMAC operating were cobbled in place by March
1994 but it was not until the end of that year that a Steering Committee was
established to serve as a policy forum for the government and donors. Because
no attention had been given during the UNTAC mission to training managers
or mine clearance trainers, CMAC remained largely dependent on expatriate
advisers.
An initial five-year strategy was not completed until mid-1995 and an
evaluation in December 1995 found that both strategic and annual planning
still remained weak, in part because top managers and their advisers had to
“fill-down” to address more mundane tasks in the absence of a cadre of
properly trained middle managers. Also, operations were hampered because
of delays in receiving disbursements of donor pledges to the CMAC Trust
Fund. However, by the end of 1995, CMAC was up and running, had built
significant in-house capacity for clearance and marking (to complement that
of some international NGOs) and had instituted both a decentralisation
programme to facilitate coordination with provincial authorities and
development agencies.9
The situation facing those responsible for mine action in Mozambique10
bore a number of parallels to Cambodia. The UN Operation in Mozambique
(UNOMOZ) also had a peace-building mandate although, based on problems
experienced in such situations in the past, its “… operational concept … was based
on a strong inter-relationship among the political, military, electoral, and humanitarian
components…”.11 The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) initiated
early efforts to obtain information on the nature and extent of landmine
contamination and a preliminary plan was developed by January 1993, within
three months of the start of the UNOMOZ mandate. This, however, was
referred to the Ceasefire Commission comprising representatives from the
UN and the warring parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) and became a hostage
to the tortuous negotiations in that highly politicised forum. The plan was
not approved until 11 months had passed and during this lag the UN did not
initiate certain preparatory actions such as establishing the training school.12
The plan proposed the training of demobilising soldiers to develop
indigenous capacity but centred on the short-term needs of the UNOMOZ
mission, particularly the opening of the major transportation corridors
using commercial contractors. This initiated a “feeding frenzy”13 among
some donors seeking to promote the interests of their country’s firms,
leading to challenges to the tendering process and ill-will within the
international community.
Once the successful bidder finally was selected, administrative difficulties
within the UN caused a further seven-month delay before the contract was
signed in July 1994. In the meantime, the training school opened and the UN
created the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) to employ the graduates
in clearance tasks, proposing in July 1994 that the government should eventually
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absorb this as the implementing arm of a future national MAC — a
recommendation that was roundly attacked by some donors who advocated
that clearance be left to the international NGOs14 and commercial firms already
present in the country. The government finally established the National Mine
Clearance Commission (CND in its Portuguese acronym) in May 1995, but it
had virtually no capacity and the UNDP did not get a project in place to
provide technical assistance until the passage of another year. This project
saw 85 per cent of the funds going to expatriate salaries and lacked a
counterpart strategy, with the result that little indigenous capacity building
took place.
Angola15 proved to be another sad saga, this time due largely to
bureaucratic turf battles between the UN Angola Verification Mission
(UNAVEM) and the Central Mine Action Unit (CMAO) established in 1994
by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance fielded by
DHA. As normal within peace-building missions, UNAVEM gave strong
priority to the operational requirements to meet its short-term objectives,
with little thought to long-term sustainability. UNAVEM was responsible
for training local deminers but did not coordinate with CMAO, which was
responsible for their deployment (while UNAVEM engaged commercial
contractors to clear major routes). Meanwhile, DHA administrative procedures
hamstrung CMAO. Vacancies remained unfilled for months and there was a
rapid turnover of key personnel, which destroyed continuity.
The government’s establishment of the Angolan National Institute for the
Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROEE) in May 1995 only added to the
confusion as no mention was made of UN support16 or of the respective roles
of CMAO and INAROEE. Further complications arose from the rapid turnover
of CMAO Programme Managers (four in two years, with gaps totalling six
months due to recruitment delays) and reportedly frosty relations between
this string of CMAO managers and the Director General of INAROEE. In short,
CMAO was itself in crisis for most of its existence and in no position to assist
in the development of indigenous capacity within INAROEE (which, regardless,
ignored CMAO). As was the case in Mozambique, most of the mine action
was provided by international NGOs and commercial firms.
Laos17 was the next large mine action programme that came into existence
and represented a distinctly different context. There had been no large-scale
conflict for many years and a recognised government was in place, so the
programme grew out of not a UN peace-building mission but rather the
development activities of an international NGO (the Mennonite Central
Committee), which subsequently requested Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
to assume responsibility for its risk education efforts and to initiate a clearance
project. This began in late 1994.
Discussions among the government, UNDP, UNICEF and MAG led to the
establishment of the Lao PDR UXO Trust Fund in late 1995, followed by a
decree establishing the Trust Fund Steering Committee and the Lao National
UXO Programme coordinated by UXO LAO, a semi-autonomous public
institution. In May 1996 UXO LAO commissioned a national survey —
completed the following year by Handicap International — which provided a
firmer base for planning than existed to that point in most other mine-affected
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countries.
Given the significant decentralisation in Lao PDR, coupled with poor
transportation and communication links, plans developed in advance of the
survey completion provided for coordination offices in each heavily
contaminated province. Three provincial offices were opened in 1996,
followed by four in 1997. A number of donors each “adopted” one or two
provincial programmes, allowing for a rapid expansion in geographic
coverage.
While the first implementing partners (MAG and GERBERA, a German
firm) had hired and trained local personnel and continued to manage their
provincial programmes, most new partners provided equipment and technical
advisers and worked with local personnel hired and trained by UXO LAO
(from 1996 the US provided assistance to a national training facility). UNDP
ran a programme to support capacity development in UXO LAO itself.
Meanwhile UNICEF and a consortium of international NGOs established an
awareness programme featuring community visits, the introduction of MRE
into the school curriculum and mass media (principally radio).
Toward the end of the first mine action decade, the break-up of Yugoslavia
led to two large programmes in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina18 (BiH).
These represented stark contrasts both to previous efforts to initiate national
programmes and to one another. First, these former Yugoslav Republics are
not developing countries, but rather are making the transition from socialism
to a market-based economy. Both had large numbers of skilled workers,
particularly in technical and scientific fields, and — given that Yugoslavia’s
economy had been based on the dual concepts of “market socialism” and
“self-management” — a cadre of experienced managers. Yugoslavia had also
had a large, disciplined military based on conscription, with most adult males
having at least basic training for handling landmines and other explosive
ordnance. The capacity development requirements for Croatia and BiH alike
were thus very distinct from those in most developing countries. On the
other hand, the establishment and evolution of their programmes could not
have been more different. Starting in 1996, Croatia financed its mine action
effort almost entirely from its own resources, receiving only modest assistance
from the international community.19
Also starting in 1996, in the very difficult political environment following
the Dayton Agreement, the Bosnian programme almost immediately fell into
near total dependency on the international community, whose members
proved incapable of effective coordination on mine action (and on many other
issues). Throwing money at the problem, donors began a number of large
but disjointed initiatives in 1996 and 1997, which (as discussed later in this
paper) turned a difficult problem into a debacle. Among these initiatives,
however, were a number of efforts to build capacities for mine action in the
local military, civil defence corps, firms and NGOs, making Bosnia perhaps
the most fertile laboratory for experimentation in capacity development.
Finally, starting in 1997, UNOPS developed under the Oil-for-Food
Programme a comprehensive mine action programme in northern Iraq20,
building on more limited MAG and NPA activities already underway.  The
northern Iraq Mine Action Programme (MAP) started small but grew in a few
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years to be one of the largest mine action programmes anywhere.  It developed
a large and diversified asset pool, four local demining NGOs and EOD teams,
dog teams, local mechanical contractors, MRE and an extensive victim assistance
network, with well developed national capacity which ran the programme in
2003 during the second Gulf War and was taken over as the core of the national
mine action programme when the UN programme ended. Due to the political
situation of the time, it was not easy to visit the MAP and thus it was not too
well known by those not directly involved.
The DHA report — The Development of Indigenous
Mine Action Capacities
In December 1994, the UN Secretary-General designated the Department
for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) as the focal point for landmines. In October
1996, DHA commissioned what was to prove a landmark study “to identify
the factors which affect the development of indigenous mine action capacities” and an
analysis of the role played by DHA in supporting “the initiation and evolution
of mine action activities through various stages of programme development”. The
study team undertook case studies of four countries — Afghanistan, Angola,
Cambodia and Mozambique — and published an overall report and the
individual case studies, which contained more detailed findings concerning
each of the countries.
In brief, the country findings were that Afghanistan was successful,
Cambodia had started badly but seemed to be performing better, Mozambique
had started very badly but was putting the necessary components of a proper
programme in place, and Angola was and remained a disastrous experience.
Interestingly, from this selection of countries, the UN was steadily less
successful in fostering capable mine action programmes as time went by. It
appeared the UN — and the international community — was not learning
from its past mistakes but seemed instead to be prone to more and more
damaging errors and omissions.
Common problems were: (1) a lack of proper coordination among UN
agencies including, in some cases, divided responsibility for initiating the
humanitarian mine action programme in a country; (2) failures to consult
all stakeholders when developing programme plans and (in some cases)
to develop a consensus that mine action is a humanitarian, non-partisan
activity; (3) subordinating the long-term needs, including indigenous
capacity development, to the short-term requirements of peace-building
missions; (4) extremely unresponsive administrative procedures; (5) failure
to employ expatriate experts with the skills and aptitudes needed to develop
local capacities or on properly designed assignments (for example, most
were in-kind serving military on six-month tours of duty and their tasks
and reporting requirements often were unclear); and (6) inattention to
the need for developing indigenous skills in management and in disciplines
other than landmine clearance which are needed for an integrated approach
(e.g. survey, community education for mine risk education, information
management). Another common weakness was the failure to incorporate
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a broad range of socio-economic information to allow a better
understanding of how landmine contamination adversely affects civilians
and, hence, to set proper priorities.
The study first endorsed the views that (1) mine action is a humanitarian
endeavour that is distinct from how militaries address landmine threats to
their operations, and (2) an integrated approach (comprising advocacy, mine
risk education, survey and marking, as well as clearance and stockpile
destruction) is required. These views led directly to the strong
recommendation that mine action programmes should not be subsumed into
peace-keeping/peace-building missions, which typically have a short mandate
and, understandably, focus narrowly on survey and clearance required to
ensure the safety of the international troops and the fulfilment of their
missions.
The bulk of the other recommendations related directly to the role of the
UN in support of twin objectives:
Rapid response to address the threat, which often is most acute when
peace emerges and refugees return home; and
Developing indigenous capacities as a prerequisite for a longer-term
programme that is sustainable and cost-effective.
Thus the recommendations spoke to the need for the UN to augment its
own capacity for capacity development. The report emphasised the need for
a clear UN focal point21 with a number of coordination functions (needs
assessment and preparation of a preliminary plan; resource mobilisation;
information exchange for cross-fertilisation) plus a lead role in advocacy (for
a total landmine ban and on behalf of victims), but without responsibility for
direct implementation of programmes, in large part because UN Secretariat
administrative procedures were so cumbersome that — until these were
overhauled — the only viable strategy was to circumvent them by contracting
out the work to bodies which were not bound by these procedures.22
To ensure rapid response, the report urged the UN focal point to be
proactive in (1) collecting and analysing information on the presence of
landmines,  (2) ensuring appropriate clauses concerning landmines are
included in peace agreements, and (3) organising multi-disciplinary
assessment missions to provide a basis for determining a profile for a national
programme and the nature of the assistance required. To ensure an early
start on the development of indigenous capacities as well as the proper
coordination of international assistance efforts, the UN focal point should be
proactive in the establishment of a mine action centre and the early creation
of a national mine action authority.
Thus, the report advocated a more systematic process for initiating new
programmes in a manner that would more likely result in the indigenous
capacity development. This entailed: first, better preparedness (monitoring
the use of landmines around the world); second, the early dispatch of multi-
disciplinary assessment missions; third, the early preparation of a
“programme profile” for an integrated programme (including mine risk
education). Concerning the other side of the equation — the capacity
development requirements in recipient countries — the report noted that
differences in the various mine-affected countries precluded a one-size-fits-
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all approach, but still fleshed out common requirements for integrated national
programmes. In brief, these were:
a national mine action authority responsible for setting overall policy
and good governance functions (e.g. commissioning external audits
and external evaluations) which would also appoint the head of the
national mine action centre (MAC); and
a national MAC responsible for ensuring the programme adheres to
the policies set by the national authority and specifically for:
• development of an overall plan;
• maintaining the central data base on minefields, clearance, etc.;
• establishing a system to set priorities for survey and clearance;
• resource mobilisation; and
• quality control, including regulating mine action organisations.
the national MAC should not itself undertake the operational activities
such as clearance and mine risk education, etc., but instead should
contract independent agencies such as national and international NGOs
to perform these tasks.23 (This was perhaps the report's most
controversial recommendation.)
While noting that international NGOs and firms often began operations
quicker and with less fanfare than the UN or host governments, the report
made little mention of the development of indigenous organisations (NGOs,
firms, etc.) to undertake operational tasks.
Capacity development since the DHA Report
A. Reforming the UN policy and architecture
The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities report was well received
and many of its recommendations were implemented to revamp the UN
architecture and improve its performance vis-à-vis mine action. These changes
were subsequently outlined in a new policy statement — Mine Action and
Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy24 — which confirmed that UN
support for mine action will:
be guided by the fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality,
impartiality and humanity;
take an integrated approach;
give due attention to the issues of national ownership, sustainability
and capacity-building, with the development of indigenous capacity to
be incorporated at the outset and to include the abilities to (i) develop
overall policy and direction, (ii) plan, coordinate, manage and sustain
a programme that is accountable, cost-effective and able to address
the pressing humanitarian and socio-economic impacts of contamination.
The new architecture was:
the focal point was shifted from DHA to the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which created a new UN Mine Action
Service (UNMAS).
UNDP was given lead responsibility for supporting local capacity
building “…in situations where the problem of landmines is not only a
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humanitarian emergency”.25
To improve administrative performance, UNDP and UNMAS would
contract the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to
manage the implementation of entire programmes or of key components
(such as the recruitment of technical advisers and contracting of
operational capabilities from NGOs and commercial). To this end,
UNOPS established a specialised Mine Action Unit in early 1998.26
Other UN agencies were assigned more specific roles relating to their
core mandates.27
An Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, chaired by
DPKO, was established to facilitate inter-agency coordination.
A broader Steering Committee on Mine Action, also chaired by DPKO,
was formed comprising the Inter-Agency Coordination Group plus key
non-UN partners such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).
A Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance (VTF) was
created to obtain contributions for the financing of (i) coordination of
UN Mine action, (ii) assessment missions, (iii) the initial phases of new
programmes, and (iv) bridge financing to programmes when
necessary.28
These reforms have done much to alleviate confusion over roles and
responsibilities within the UN system vis-à-vis mine action. UNMAS maintains
information on landmine use and contamination (and thus is prepared to
respond quickly to new requests) and is responsible for coordinating multi-
disciplinary assessment missions and preparing the initial programme plan.
The new policy guidelines included a model Terms of Reference for such
missions, designed to define the scope of the problem and the appropriate
response to address both urgent needs and, when required, the requirements
for a sustainable indigenous capacity.
Concerning capacity development, missions are to obtain “information
on local capacities available and mine-action activities already initiated” including
clearance, mine risk education and victim assistance activities underway.
The missions are also to collect data that could be relevant to the proposed
capacity development strategy, including the status of national
reconciliation, the commitment of various parties to support mine action
and donor views.
Overall, these changes clearly have improved the UN system’s capacity
to assess requirements, then initiate and implement programmes. The need
to keep mine action distinct from peace-keeping operations is well
recognised. The specialised mine action units in DPKO, UNDP, UNICEF
and UNOPS strengthen “institutional memory” so lessons from experience
are more likely to be reflected in amendments to policies, procedures and
operations.29 The Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action
appears to function effectively and in September 2001 developed a five-
year strategy for UN mine action activities.30
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B. Capacity development of core national capacities
Concerning standard elements in a programme profile, broad agreement
has emerged on the advantages of having (i) mine action legislation to empower
both (ii) a national authority to set overall policy and direction and (iii) a
national MAC to execute that policy by performing certain core functions
directly (developing strategic and annual plans for integrated programming,
maintaining the central data base, regulating mine action activities, including
quality assurance) while coordinating the activities of other mine action actors.
In countries receiving substantial donor support, the advantages of a formal
committee of donors for policy dialogue and coordination purposes is generally
recognised.31
It appears the performance of the UN system in supporting mine action
has vastly improved since the DHA report and, since 1998, the process of
establishing new programmes and developing indigenous capacities has been
smoother in many countries. The number of countries receiving mine action
assistance from at least one of the UN agencies has continued to grow, reaching
20 in 1999 and more than 35 in 2005. At the same time, the challenges present
in many of the “second decade” countries — measured in terms of the impact of
the contamination on civilian populations, the degree of political stability and
the existing reservoirs of local capacities — have been far more modest than in,
say, Afghanistan or Angola.32
Finally, a number of UN-assisted programmes initiated in the first mine
action decade continue to experience problems. Until the underlying political
problems in a mine-affected country are more or less resolved, the eruption
of renewed conflict can arrest capacity development and reverse years of
survey and clearance work. But the continuing problems are also due in part
to the “path dependent” nature of capacity development — once a programme
starts down the wrong path, it is very difficult to turn it around (see Box 2).
Capacity development in mine action
Box 2. History matters: the political economy of mine action reform
Research into how institutions evolve over time confirms that institutions are
“path-dependent” – that is, there is a broad range of options to choose among
when first creating a new law or some other institution, but once the institution
is established, the options for reforming it become more limited. This is because
an institution creates incentives (rewards and penalties) to which individuals
and organisations adapt, developing strategies for reaping the rewards and
avoiding the penalties. Those benefiting most from the institution will try to
defend their interests by blocking efforts to repeal or reform the source of their
benefit. In international development for example, “bad” institutions which
generate rewards captured by the wealthiest and most powerful are often
targeted by outside agencies for radical reform, but these reforms are fiercely
and often successfully stopped or watered-down, keeping the evolution of the
institution pretty much in line with its historical path. For example, the senior
military corps may be able to delay demobilisation following a war, even though
the threat justifying a large and expensive military has disappeared.
Why is it so difficult to reform an institution that benefits a few at the expense
of the many? Precisely because the benefits are enjoyed by only a few, each
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Consider Bosnia. The Dayton Agreement in 1995 established an overall
“State” government plus two “entities” — one dominated by Bosnian Serbs
and the other a federation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, itself divided
into 10 cantons. The antipathy among the leaders of the rival ethnic populations
was such that none was content to share any real power with the others. The
Constitution left the overall State government virtually powerless, with few of
the authorities that one associates with a sovereign country,33 while the
Federation government had little real authority over the cantons, most of which
were fiefdoms of either Bosnian Muslims or Croats. Above this Kafkaesque
constitution, the international community installed a High Representative with
executive authority, turning the country into a quasi-protectorate. However,
the High Representative lacked authority over one key group of actors — the
members of the international community that appointed him.
Unlike a coalition of the willing, this community was unwilling to coalesce
around any coherent strategy for mine action (or for much else). The UN
attempted to create a central MAC, but the World Bank created separate
project implementation units in the two entities. The Bank and the US State
Department decided on a clearance strategy centred on competitive tenders
for commercial firms, while the UN tried to build clearance capacity within
the MAC; UNHCR mobilised its own teams; Norway and some other donors
has a significant interest in the status quo and it is easy for the small number
of beneficiaries to organise for the protection of their common interest.
Conversely, the costs (which may be large in total) are spread across society
whose individual members each bear but a small proportion and may not even
be aware of the burden. For example, many of the military costs may be
financed by borrowing or “off budget” by companies owned by the army that
are granted, say, timber concessions, so the burden is not even apparent in
today’s taxes. Instead, the burden is shifted to the future for debt repayment
or projects to restore the environment. So, the costs may be spread over
millions of citizens, each of whom cannot readily identify what their share is.
It is not easy to organise millions of people who may not even be aware how,
or how much, a proposed reform will benefit them. Therefore, the few who reap
great benefit from the status quo can readily organise to block a reform that
would help the unorganised millions.
The same phenomenon exists with respect to organisations. At least few people
benefit a great deal from the organisation, even though it may be dysfunctional
or obsolete. They will fight vigorously any efforts to reform or eliminate the
organisation. For example, most of the early mine action programmes started
on the wrong foot, and both the strategies and the organisations created to
implement those strategies had to be reformed. The necessary changes took
years to put in effect except for Afghanistan, where the initial effort to train
“village deminers” was quickly seen as a failure. But no new organisations had
yet been established, and there was no a recognised government with which
to deal. In the unusual case of Afghanistan, there was no small group that
received large benefits from the initial strategy and that would organise to
defend the status quo.
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supported international NGOs; and the European Union (belatedly, after finding
the hundreds of deminers it had trained had no organisation to employ them)
opted for the establishment of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine
clearance capacities within the civil protection corps of both entities.
The US Defense Department launched a programme which, incredibly
given the situation and seemingly at odds with stated US policy on the
matter, featured separate initiatives to train and equip the three distinct
militaries (Bosnian Muslim, Serb and Croat) for demining. Meanwhile,
the international community repeatedly pressed Bosnian authorities to
assume responsibility for mine action in the country. A Demining Commission
was duly appointed but, in the eyes of some observers, exerted its authority
largely by funnelling donor funds to favoured clearance companies — a
perception that led to the High Representative’s dismissal of the
Commissioners in October 2000.34
Some progress has been achieved since then, albeit at a distressingly glacial
pace given the extent of the contamination problem. A new Demining
Commission was appointed in 2001 and, with the enactment of a Demining
Law in 2002, the central MAC finally was given a degree of authority over
the entity MACs. In 2003, a strategic plan was prepared, although four distinct
annual workplans must still be prepared (one each for the two entities, one
for the “inter-entity” boundary line and one for the District Brcko, which is
being directly administered by the Office of the High Representative).
Clearance costs seem to be reasonably under control, with the Slovenian
International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance in charge
of the competitive tendering process, which has dampened at least the more
lurid claims of corruption. Cost control is fostered by excess capacity:
measured in terms of registered organisations, qualified deminers or amounts
of demining equipment, prevailing funding levels employ only about one-
third the capacity at hand.
Controlling operating costs in this manner, however, comes at the price of
having tens of millions of dollars in training and equipment investments lying
idle. In short, major donors were separately engaged in micro management
and achieved micro capacity development successes: but on the macro level
the national programme floundered for want of adequate central institutions.
One result has been significant over-capacity and excessive expense.
C. Capacity development for indigenous NGOs35
As discussed earlier, UNOCHA in Afghanistan encouraged the formation
of local NGOs36 from the very early days of mine action and this has widely
been viewed as a success. Surprisingly, there have been only modest attempts
at replicating this approach. Table 2 lists the 13 local demining NGOs identified
in three countries with large and long-standing mine action programmes.
Afghanistan still accounts for almost half the total and no local demining
NGO was registered in either Mozambique or Bosnia until 1998, nine years
after the first Afghan NGOs had been formed.37
The local mine action NGOs in Afghanistan are, for the most part, robust.
Collectively they receive the bulk of the funding for mine action, most of which
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was channelled via UNOCHA until 2002 (and via UNMAS since), and
clearance costs in Afghanistan compare very favourably to those achieved by
most other large programmes. In addition, and in spite of decidedly lukewarm
support from UNOCHA, some of these NGOs have started to branch out
into other development activities within Afghanistan38 or by competing for
mine action contracts internationally.39
Neither of the local NGOs in Mozambique was assisted with its capacity
development and neither receives direct donor funding (in fact, less than
two per cent of mine action funding to that country has been directed to
either local NGOs or local firms). Still, one NGO has had regular success
competing for modest contracts issued by the mine action programme or by
construction companies. The second had been, to 2002, less successful but
was managing to survive.
In BiH, the first local mine action NGO, APM (Akcija Protiv Mina —
Action against Mines) had been created in 1998 with the assistance of
Handicap International (HI). Unlike the other demining NGOs, APM
adopted a community focus and undertook any demining activity (survey,
marking, EOD, clearance, mine risk education) required to render the target
community (usually, groups of returning refugees) secure and sustainable.
As such, it attempted to raise donations for the organisation’s overall
budget rather than taking contracts to clear a certain area for an agreed
price per square metre. It has received significant funding from donors
including Austria, Canada (the principal donor), Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland and Switzerland, and, also from UNICEF and the Open
Society Fund.
In spite of such extensive support, APM was close to moribund by the end
of 2002, in large part because its governance structure followed Yugoslavia’s
traditional “self-managed” enterprise approach. The board of directors is
composed entirely of employees who repeatedly blocked attempts by the
programme manager and HI to introduce cost-cutting measures to make the
organisation financially viable. In other words, the NGO was captured by its
employees who ran it in part to maintain their incomes.40
For some time APM had considerable flexibility to operate in this manner
because its community-focus approach was not readily summarised by easily
monitored indicators (such as cost per square metre of land cleared) so donors
had difficulty monitoring performance and kept sending good money after
bad.41 The case of APM neatly encapsulates the difficulties that can arise in
any but the most straightforward capacity development endeavour and points
strongly to donor incapacity for capacity development.
Three other local NGOs (Bosnian Muslim, Serb and Croat) were established
in 1999 with the encouragement of the then Demining Commissioners and
the US State Department, which provided start-up demining equipment and
vehicles and earmarked funding for them via the International Trust Fund
for Demining and Mine Victms Assistance (ITF). Although two of these “US”
local NGOs experienced difficulties related to their leadership,42 all three were
still operating at the end of 2002 and had track records in terms of clearance
costs and quality that exceeded those of local and international demining firms
in Bosnia.43
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The latest Bosnian demining NGO — UG ZOM— was established in 2000
by a number of decommissioned military engineers. It has not received any
funding for capacity development but has been successful in winning a steadily
increasing number of contracts and sub-contracts and appears to be a capable
organisation.
In both Bosnia and Mozambique, there are questions whether the local
demining NGOs are simply companies in disguise, seeking to benefit from
simpler start-up procedures, laxer government regulation, tax incentives and
the preference by some donors to provide grants to NGOs rather than profit-
seeking enterprises. It does appear that few if any of the local organisations
that were studied conform to the “classic” definition of an NGO (i.e. with
public good or social justice as the principal motive behind its creation and
operations). However, few if any of them adhere to the classic definition of a
profit-maximising business: rather, they appear to be somewhere in the middle
and seek to create good jobs in the midst of economies suffering from high
unemployment.44
Perhaps the most surprising fact apparent from Table 2 is that international
mine action NGOs have supported the creation of only one local NGO45 in
the countries that were studied — this in spite of the policy pronouncements
of most of the international NGO community. For example, “The Bad Honef
Framework” adopted by the ICBL states:
“mine affected people and communities have the right to shape their own
lives and … the implementation of the humanitarian action … to promote
autonomy rather than creating new dependencies is crucial.”46
“To correspond as best as possible with the needs and aspirations of affected
communities, local institutions should be supported both in establishing
themselves as well as in their work (capacity ehancement).” 47
Further, the joint Statement of Principles for Handicap International, Mines
Advisory Group and Norwegian People’s Aid includes as a core principle
“the need to support the principle of transfer of competence to the affected communities”.
This is not to say that international mine action NGOs have been bystanders
when it comes to indigenous capacity development. They have provided basic
training in mine action skills for local personnel who then worked within a
programme usually managed by expatriate staff fielded by the international
NGO. They have been important sources of innovation in mine action and have
often served as conduits for replicating innovations (such as the use of explosives
detection dogs and the use of integrated demining techniques) across
programmes. In both cases, this creates the opportunity to develop “new and
improved” local capacities.
They have also worked as a contractor to a donor or the UN, to develop
capacities within a national programme (including its MAC), usually by fielding
technical advisers. Finally, they often have worked through existing local NGOs
to provide MRE, funding, materials and advice. But they appear to have done
little in the way of facilitating the establishment of new local NGOs which
would eventually assume responsibility for the management of mine action
programmes, particularly in the field of mine survey and clearance. Why?
There appear to be a number of interrelated reasons for this apparent failure
of international NGOs to “walk the talk”. First, as the APM case demonstrates,
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the creation of sustainable local organisations is a far more difficult task than
capacity development at the individual level. It is also high- risk, as there are
numerous factors emerging from higher levels (dysfunctional task networks,
unfamiliar social norms, poor legislation and regulation) that can constrain or
even reverse hard-won progress. Typically, international NGOs have little
leverage to make local governments institute the requisite reforms in matters
such as not-for-profit law.48
The creation of sustainable local organisations is particularly difficult during
humanitarian emergencies because: (i) the urgency of the human needs is
inconsistent with flexible, open-ended approaches required for capacity
development; (ii) donors want their humanitarian aid to go directly to the
people at risk and not be diverted to “luxuries” such as local capacity
development; and (iii) the humanitarian aid tap quickly gushes forth and just
as suddenly runs dry — the initial flood of aid will overwhelm rather than
enhance the capacity of most local NGOs and any that survive may be unable
to downsize to a sustainable level during the ensuing drought once the
humanitarian crisis subsides.49
Finally, there are the incentives facing international mine action NGOs.
Mine action is the raison d’être for some of the major demining NGOs and an
important programming area for others. While most of these organisations
support the principle of local ownership and capacity development, in practice
the emergence of capable local demining NGOs could jeopardise the survival
of the international NGOs. Even when mine clearance is not the principal
activity for an NGO, vagaries in its funding may set up strong disincentives
for establishing capable local counterpart organisations.
D. Capacity development of local demining companies50
While some mine-affected countries have actively promoted the emergence
of publicly-owned local demining firms,51 there have been few explicit efforts to
develop capacities in privately-owned demining firms. Again, Bosnia offers
the greatest number of examples. In 1997, RONCO assisted with the formation
of three mine clearance firms (again, one each owned by Bosnian Muslims,
Serbs and Croats), using personnel that it had earlier trained and directly
managed on a contract with the US State Department.52 These firms first served
as joint venture partners or sub-contractors with RONCO and other
international firms bidding on clearance tenders issued through the World
Bank’s Emergency Landmine Project.53 Eventually, they were able to meet the
pre-qualification requirements (experience and financial) and could bid for
contracts in their own right.
Since then, at least nine other local firms have entered the mine clearance
market,54 only one of which appears to have ceased operations. Few if any of
these received any special capacity development assistance. Rather, they
benefited from the vast surplus of deminers trained under various donor
initiatives, while many have obtained other clearance assets (explosives
detection dogs, equipment, vehicles) brought into the country by international
firms that subsequently left the market, or have constructed their own
mechanical clearance vehicles from surplus army equipment.
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In addition, there are active rental markets for mine clearance assets, so
firms bid on contracts and, should they win, rent the necessary dogs,
equipment and, in some cases, manual demining teams from firms that
have not won bids. Many of the local firms manage other activities such
as protection services. In short, the existence of market demand in the
form of contracts issued on a competitive basis, coupled with ready access
to specialised mine action assets and the fact that demining can readily be
combined with other business lines, has induced local entrepreneurs to
establish demining firms.
The pattern has been similar in Mozambique, with the main difference
that many of the local companies were formed by foreigners with permanent
residency status or through joint ventures with foreign firms operating in the
country. Unsurprisingly, the foreigners (individuals or firms) appear to have
better access to financing and to marketing opportunities such as clearance
contracts tendered by construction firms.
In brief, in countries where the legal framework allows the creation of firms
and where there is significant funding allocated to landmine clearance, market
incentives provide sufficient inducement for entrepreneurs to establish capable
local firms for such things as mine clearance and quality inspections. Where
the competitive pressure is strong, these firms will seek market niches and
secondary rental markets will develop for factors of production (manual
demining teams, mechanical devices, dog teams, etc.) allowing firms to specialise
and, presumably, increase their productivity.
However, the experience during at least the early days of Bosnia’s
programme indicates that the attempt to introduce a competitive market for
mine clearance in a corrupt environment should be preceded by a concerted
effort to ensure a robust regulatory regime is in place. This requires strong
and accountable organisations at the heart of the mine action programme,
which in turn implies the need for far better cooperation among donors than
was present in Bosnia.
E. Capacity development of local militaries55
Support to local militaries to enhance their mine action capabilities has
always been a contentious issue, particularly in countries in, or emerging
from, conflict because such assistance might also enhance a military’s capacity
to engage in conflict. For example, the UN policy guidelines issued in 1998
stated that “training and support for mine action will not, in principle, be provided
to the militaries of mine-contaminated countries.”
However, local militaries may represent a very significant capacity that is
potentially available for mine action and, where a military is reasonably
professional and under the control of recognised authorities who are not faced
with ongoing or latent conflict, it is natural to at least consider their use in
addressing a country’s contamination. A decision to do so may also elicit
additional international support in the form of military-to-military assistance
for a country’s mine action programme. Indeed, mine clearance by the local
military, supported by training and equipment from foreign militaries, has been
a reasonably successful strategy in countries such as Nicaragua, Rwanda,
Thailand and Yemen.56
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In the light of these considerations and successful experiences, the UN soon
adopted a more pragmatic policy governing its support for military involvement
in mine action, which will now be considered should the recipient government
request it and where such support:
does not compromise the humanitarian principles of neutrality and
impartiality;
is not provided to militaries involved in open or latent conflicts;
is only provided where the mine action programme — and the military’s
activities within that programme — is under the control of civilian
authorities and is conducted in accordance with IMAS.57
When the recipient military already is well led and reasonably disciplined,
training and equipment provided by foreign militaries (with the US being most
active in this area) has been effective in enhancing their capacities for mine action.
However, outside militaries have been far less successful in fostering safe and
effective mine clearance where the indigenous military is suffering from poor
leadership, low morale and high turnover, such as often is the case during
accelerated demobilisation programmes or in countries where the economy has
been shattered by warfare and the government cannot justify or pay for armed
forces which are both large and well equipped.58 This is because, until recent times,
foreign militaries had done comparatively little to develop their capacities for
capacity development in fields outside their core mandates (traditional military
operations and, in some countries, peace-keeping and peace-building). A number
of donor countries have, however, begun new initiatives to better prepare their
own forces for non-traditional roles in mine action59 and may be more effective at
sustainable capacity development in the future.
Assessment and current frontiers
The effort to foster indigenous mine action capacities in developing countries
and economies in transition is very much a glass half-empty/half-full story.
International assistance generally has succeeded in developing the capacities
of individuals for the front-line tasks relating to mine clearance, survey, quality
assurance, medical support of clearance operations, MRE and victim assistance.
In most cases where the contamination is likely to require a sustained effort,
indigenous capacity for continuing these training programmes has also been
developed. These achievements provide benefits in particular to the successful
trainees (at least those obtaining employment).
Where the incentives are right, some of the more entrepreneurial of these
individuals will go on to establish local organisations (even though, in
competitive environments, the unlucky and incapable will cease operations).
In short, the transfer of technical skills to individuals is fairly easily
accomplished and the problems that have occurred have in the main stemmed
from coordination failures among the donors and with the government. In
the case of Angola, for example, this led to an inordinate delay in mounting
the training programmes; in Bosnia’s case, donor competition led to grossly
excessive investment in basic capacity development activities such as training
and equipping people for manual demining. A further concern is that
sometimes a notable lack of political will to address the issue exists within the
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government of an affected country.
The development of individual capacities, together with the provision of
equipment, funding and the like, is also a boon to existing organisations that
have established capacities and can absorb new responsibilities when assisted
appropriately. However, capacity development of the type needed to establish
new organisations or to improve the management cadres and systems of
poorly performing organisations has been much more hit-and-miss. In the
first decade, the failures at this level of capacity development outweighed
the successes, in part because: (i) short-term emergency thinking dominated,
(ii) no successful models existed in the new field of mine action, and (iii)
most of the early programmes began in the difficult situations of complex
emergencies and failed states.
More fundamentally, donors and the UN organisations could not muster
the extra individual and collective capacities for capacity development
required in such trying circumstances. After the excellent Development of
Indigenous Capacities study, the UN addressed many of its shortcomings,
most fundamentally by establishing the coordination structures required
to learn from experience and then to apply these lessons. There is better
understanding of the essential components of the architecture of a national
programme — comprising both organisations (national authority, MAC,
implementing partner) and institutions (mine action legislation, national
standards based on IMAS, quality assurance regime, etc.) — and the
process needed to put that architecture in place (preparedness, early
assessment mission which considers existing capacities and capacity
development requirements as well as the nature and scope of the
contamination problem and the political landscape, LISs).
Of course, such understandings are not sufficient conditions for success in
capacity development, particularly in failed States and when the political
landscape of the recipient country remains unsettled. But they do provide
points of underlying agreement that donors, when they are willing, can build
upon to mobilise their collective capacities for capacity development in a more
coherent fashion.60
Enhanced donor coordination will also be necessary in one of the frontier
issues for capacity development in mine action; the transition of mine action
programmes from donor dependence to sustained financing by the local
government. This is likely to involve downsizing of most programmes, both
to match the government’s fiscal capacity and in recognition that the most
pressing contamination priorities will have been addressed in many cases,
leaving a “residual” contamination problem (a state of affairs that was reached
in Kosovo following a short but intense clearance programme). Ideally, the
transition should not be abrupt, but the experience from other humanitarian
and development sectors that have gone out of fashion or “off the boil” suggests
that a dignified disengagement of donors is more likely to be the exception
than the rule.
The need for better coordination within the donor arena is also one of
many frontier issues concerning capacity development of networks, which is
needed to ensure that a group of otherwise capable organisations works
effectively in concert. There is a general awareness of the institutions and
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processes required to make the organisations within a country’s mine action
arena function as a reasonably coherent network (donor support groups,
steering committees, technical working groups for clearance, MRE, and the
like, plus a national strategic plan), although of course these elements are not
fully in place in all programmes and most programmes exhibit some common
weaknesses, such as failure to truly integrate MRE with the survey, marking
and clearance functions.
However, much less progress has been made concerning linkages between
the mine action programme and other arenas, as depicted by the dashed
circles in Figure 2. The links between a country programme and the
international arena have already been touched upon, but it is worth noting
some of the tentative steps taken to strengthen linkages between mine action
and (i) a country’s government arena (both national and sub-national
governments), and (ii) the local communities arena.
Two interrelated issues stand out concerning links with the government
arena. First is the extent of local funding for mine action, which in most
countries must increase dramatically if indigenous capacity is to be sustained.
To date, among mine-affected State Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention, only a few countries, such as Croatia, Jordan, Nicaragua and
Yemen, have been making significant financial contributions to mine action.
Second is the need to link with national, regional and sectoral planning
authorities so that mine action better supports a country’s development
priorities. Some pilot efforts have commenced in recent years, with the most
interesting ones addressing the links between mine action and sub-national
governments. For example:
In Cambodia, a follow-up project to the LIS provided assistance to
four provincial land use planning authorities, allowing them to access
mine action data and analyse them in combination with other spatial
and non-spatial data so mine action priorities would support land use
and physical development requirements.
In Croatia, a decision support system based on multi-criteria analysis
was used to assist mine action planning both at the county level and
for key parastatals (electrical utility, water authority).
As yet, there has been very little by way of incorporating mine action into the
national development system. In one example, an annex on demining has been
added to the draft Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP — a national
development plan with a poverty focus) prepared by Bosnia and Herzegovina.
However this annex presents the “sector plan” for mine action, serving to
inform readers about the scope of contamination and the key points from the
recent five-year mine action strategy paper. There appears to be little in the
PSRP or its Demining Annex concerning how mine action should be integrated
into the strategies for other sectors (such as agriculture, where the relevant
chapter only mentioned landmines three times and said nothing precise about
how landmine contamination constrained agricultural development) and, in
turn, how mine action planners can be informed by sectoral or national
development priorities.61
There also have been a few interesting initiatives designed to strengthen
the links between a mine action programme and those in the local community
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arena. One example is the participatory community development approach
advocated by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), based
on its work in Mozambique.62 A second and more recent initiative is the pilot
Task Assessment and Planning (TAP) effort being implemented by the Survey
Action Center and Handicap International as an extension to Bosnia’s landmine
impact survey. In this, specially trained TAP surveyors conduct follow-up
visits to communities that have been identified by the LIS as highly impacted.
The TAP team makes a rapid assessment — in conjunction with community
representatives and others — of which individual hazards affecting the
community should be addressed as a priority. Such efforts are promising,
but much remains to be learned about how best to work with actors in the
local community arena.63
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Endnotes
1. Cited in Browne (2002).
2. It sometimes is useful to distinguish between “task networks” (e.g. national
authorities and donors developing a strategy for a sustainable mine action
programme), “sectoral networks” (e.g. all the organisations supporting agricultural
development), and “area-based networks”(e.g. all the development organisations
active in a province).
3. More complete treatment of this analytical framework will be provided in the
forthcoming report from a parallel GICHD study, which focuses on capacity
development in mine action.
4. In addition, Kuwait instituted a massive programme following the Gulf war of
1991. However, its government decided to eliminate the mine threat as quickly as
possible. As such, it did not seek to augment its indigenous capacity and opted for
clearance by international companies. In a sense, Kuwait’s vast financial resources
gave the capacity to “rent“ what it required from the market.
5. This and subsequent sections on Afghanistan draws on: Eaton et al., Afghanistan
volume (1997), Van Ree et al. (2001), and GICHD (2004a).
6. Originally this was UNOCA — United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan.
7. This process has only recently started.
8. This and subsequent sections on Cambodia draw on: Eaton et al., Cambodia volume
(1997), and GICHD (2003a).
9. In February 1995, a Royal Decree confirmed CMAC status as an autonomous
Cambodian organisation.
10. This and subsequent sections on Mozambique draw on Eaton et al., Mozambique
volume (1997), Millard and Harpviken (2000), GICHD/UNDP (2001),
Appendix 3, and GICHD (2004a).
11. Eaton et al., Mozambique volume (1997: 11).
12. UNDP and UNOPS did, however, do the groundwork so that commercial tenders
for road clearance could go forward as soon as the Ceasefire Commission approved
the plan.
13. Eaton et al., Mozambique volume (1997: 17).
14. Principally, HALO Trust and NPA. Also, Handicap International was active in
mine awareness.
15. This draws on Eaton et al., Angola volume (1997),  and Craib (1996).
16. It should be emphasised that the government had never approved the plan to
create CMAO or any of the plans that CMAO subsequently produced.
17. This and subsequent sections on Laos draw on GICHD/2001 (2001),
Appendix 2.
18. This and subsequent sections on BiH draw on Paterson, “The Case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina“ in The Role of the Military in Mine Action, GICHD (2003a); and Paterson,
“The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina” in GICHD (2005a).
19. In 1996 the UNDP established a mine action centre to assist the government to
develop its own mine action centre and provide training in humanitarian demining.
Within a year the merger of the two began, and the Croatian MAC (CROMAC) came
into formal existence in early 1998, with the UNDP remaining in an advisory capacity.
20. This and subsequent sections on northern Iraq draw on UNOPS (2004).
21. In October 1997, prior to the publication of the report, the Secretary-General designated
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) as the UN focal point.
22. This was, of course, the strategy adopted successfully by UNOCHA in
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Afghanistan. Note that some UN agencies do not fall under the UN Secretariat and
can adopt their own policies and procedures.
23. This — along with the recommendation that the UN focal point should not be
involved in the direct implementation of mine action activities — is consistent with
the emerging view that governments can be “reinvented“ by the separation of
“steering“ and “rowing“ functions. In other words, higher bodies should “steer“ by
setting policy direction, monitoring progress, and making corrective changes in course
as required. These policy-making bodies should leave the “rowing” to other
organisations that specialise in the necessary operational activities.
24. This was submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and
“welcomed“ by that body in its resolution A/53/26, adopted 17 November 1998.
25. In practice, this meant that for new programmes UNDP will take the lead in
“normal situations” where there is a recognised government to deal with and there
is no ongoing conflict or peace-keeping mission, but UNMAS will take the lead in
situations such as Kosovo (which is not a country).
26. Among other things, this unit has developed a comprehensive manual for Mine
Action Programme Managers.
27. For example, UNICEF was confirmed in the lead role for mine awareness
education, and would work with UNHCR on mine awareness programmes for
refugees. The World Health Organisation would take the lead within the UN family
on victim assistance. The World Food Programme and the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs were also assigned specific responsibilities.
28. The policy states that individual trust funds should be established to provide
transparent, accountable and cost-effective financing mechanisms for long-term UN
programmes.
29. For example, UNOPS no longer simply accepts “in-kind“ contributions of military
technical advisers, but instead asks the contributing country to submit a list of
candidates whose qualifications are vetted before the selection is made.
30. United Nations mine action: a strategy for 2001-05, UN doc. A/56/448/Add.1.
31. There also appears to be a consensus among donors that the mine action centres
should not become directly involved in clearance operations, but nonetheless a number
of mine-affected countries continue to have clearance capabilities integrated into the
centre or in a parallel parastatal organisation.
32. Although places such as Somalia, Southern Sudan and (perhaps soon) the
Democratic Republic of the Congo represent as much challenge as anyone might
wish.
33. Even defence falls under the entity governments and the State government has
virtually no fiscal authority, depending on handouts from the entities and the
international community. Meanwhile, the country has no control over its monetary
policy as its Central Bank is headed by a foreigner appointed by the international
community and it is forced to operate as a currency board.
34. Another casualty of the corruption scandals appears to have been any further
interest by the World Bank in financing stand-alone mine action projects: the Bank
has decided that it lacks a “comparative advantage“ in the mine action field.
35. This section draws principally on GICHD (2005a).
36. There is some controversy whether such organisations are “true NGOs“. We will
not pursue the debate but interested readers can consult Fowler (1997), Chapter 2.
37. The first local demining NGOs were established about six years after the beginning of
mine action in Mozambique but less than two years after mine action started in Bosnia.
38. OMAR has been particularly active in pursuing such opportunities. AREA began
as a development NGO and mine action is a secondary activity for it.
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39. MCPA managed the LIS in Yemen and was slated for a contract to help the UN
create mine action NGOs in Iraq until visa problems prevented the assignment.
Other NGOs have sent survey and clearance teams to countries such as Somalia.
40. Proper legislation can impose minimum standards of governance that could
reduce — but not eliminate — the likelihood of such problems. See also Irish and
Simon (1999).
41. This was in spite of the fact that Canada (the major donor) had funded a long-
term Canadian technical adviser. The individual had a military background and
seems to have focussed mainly on safety and quality control, oblivious perhaps that
the “business“ side of the operations was seriously flawed. The crisis for APM only
came when HI — which had been the conduit of donor funding — refused to renew
its relationship and stopped sending the donor money.
42. In one case, the executive director had been implicated in the scandal that led to
the dismissal of the Demining Commissioners; in the other, the executive director
had died in 2002.
43. The cost performance is due in part to the fact that they received equipment
donations.
44. A number of the local demining firms appear to have much the same motivation.




48. Many local governments view local NGOs as anti-government organisations,
while public sector organisations such as mine action centres often see them as
potential competitors for scarce donor resources. Major donors may have some
leverage in such situations but overt manipulation of the local government runs
counter to the recipient ownership approaches being adopted.
49. See also Smillie (2001) for a discussion of the problems of developing local NGOs
in the midst of humanitarian crises.
50. This section draws principally on GICHD (2004a).
51. For example, Croatia established MUNGOS as a state-owned enterprise.
52. These three firms also had access to rent mine clearance equipment and vehicles
from the Agency for Demining and the Removal of Mines in the Territory of BiH. This
US$3 million of equipment had originally been procured by RONCO using US State
Department financing and could not be donated directly to a privately-owned
company or used to generate profits. Thus the Agency was established under the
control of the Demining Commissioners (public servants) as a repository for the
equipment. Allegations that RONCO, through the three local firms it had established,
had access to this equipment at below-market rates and thus had an advantage in
bidding for contracts was one of the issues that poisoned relations within the mine
action and donor communities in Bosnia.
53. One of the objectives of this project was to promote the entry of demining
companies — both international and national — to address the country’s
contamination problem.
54. There are also two firms that specialise in inspections on behalf of the Slovenian
Trust Fund.
55. This section draws principally on GICHD (2003a) and OECD/DAC (1998) “Civilian
and military means of providing and supporting humanitarian assistance during conflict,
comparative advantages and costs”.
56. Recurring criticisms have been that the militaries do not often use appropriate
MRE methods and that they give too much weight to their own survey and clearance
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requirements relative to civilian safety and broader socio-economic needs when
setting priorities. In addition, there is little evidence that clearance by local militaries
is less expensive than clearance by civilian organisations, even when only the
incremental costs of using the military for mine clearance are considered.
57. United Nations (1999).
58. As discussed earlier, foreign militaries have also provided extensive technical
assistance to mine action centres administered by the local government or by the UN,
using channels such as peace-keeping missions, assignment of military engineers
on an in-kind arrangement, or secondment of military personnel to fill UN positions.
This assistance proved useful for establishing basic operations during the emergency
response phase but far less effective in promoting sustainable capacity development
because the tours of duty were too short, the military personnel could perform the
technical job but lacked the skills and aptitudes to serve in an advisory capacity, and
the UN programme manager or local government officials were loathe to dismiss
unsuitable advisers because they had come“free“ from a foreign military.
59. Included in these are the Swedish EOD and Demining Centre (SWEDEC),
established in 1996 as that country’s centre of excellence for humanitarian mine
action, the Mine Information and Training Centre (MITC) in the UK, and the US
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance at Tripler
Army Medical Center (which has a broader mandate that just mine action).
60. A remaining impediment here — and one that merits further study to understand
how great this impediment is in practice — is the difficulty of UN agencies in
formulating multi-year capacity development programmes and “selling“ these to
supportive donors. Instead, most funds are solicited through annual appeals and
the UN agencies cannot truly make commitments for which they have not secured
the funding.
61. A second example is the Integrated Mine Action Development Strategy (IMADS)
intended for Mozambique. This sought to create a multi-disciplinary research and
policy unit at the MAC which would link with development planning authorities to
better align mine action with the country’s socio-economic requirements. (See GICHD/
UNDP (2001),Box 8, p. 78.) The author has not been able to learn the current status of
this initiative.
62. Millard and Harpviken (2000).
63. It also needs to be emphasised that the linkages between a mine action programme
and both the government arena and the local community arena have both
complimentary and substitution aspects. For example, if the national government
does not have the capability or desire to incorporate local concerns into its development
priorities, then the mine action programme will need somehow to obtain information
on local concerns directly from the mine-affected communities (or alternatively via,
say, NGOs working with those communities). In this case, the link with the local
communities arena serves as a substitute for the information which should be (but
which is not) coming from the government. Alternatively, where local priorities are
reasonably well reflected in government development plans, mine action needs only
complimentary input from local actors: not so much determining the priorities but
rather issues of timing, logistics, etc. The latter is a far less onerous task.
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Introduction
The preceding chapters have described the evolution of mine action. This
final chapter seeks to answer a broader, strategic question: has mine action
really made a significant, long-term difference to the lives of the people it is
trying to help? For few things in mine action cause more frustration and
misunderstanding among donors, recipient governments and programme
managers than the question: what results has the programme achieved? Study
after study has decried the fact that, while there are abundant data detailing the
number of landmines destroyed, the area of land cleared and the number of
people receiving mine risk education, there are little data allowing an assessment
of whether these achievements have enhanced the well-being of people in mine-
afflicted communities.1
This means we can assess the efficiency and safety of mine action activities
— “has the job been done right?” — but we fall short when trying to assess
the more difficult but ultimately more important questions that determine,
“has the right job been done?” These questions are:
Relevance — are the objectives set for the programme consistent with
government and donor policies, and the requirements of the
beneficiaries?
11 Is mine action makinga difference ... oravoiding the question?
Ted Paterson
Summary
Mine action programmes in heavily contaminated countries will not
be able to declare victory in the short- to medium-term. Therefore, they
need to equip themselves adequately for the long haul. This implies
something more fundamental than new tools for their tool kits: it
implies learning how to learn. This ability is required if programmes
are to assess their performance in terms of results that make a difference
to people in mine-afflicted communities, which is necessary to maintain
the support of donors and, increasingly, of host governments. Even
more critically, the ability to assess performance in terms of meaningful
results is necessary to improve such performance over time.
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Effectiveness — have we achieved the planned objectives and enhanced
the well-being of people in mine-afflicted communities?
Sustainability — will the benefits to these people and communities
last?
Impact — what are all the consequences, intended and unintended, for
better or for worse, of our mine action?2
Simply put, mine action practitioners often cannot demonstrate that they
are doing — or even aiming at — “the right job”. This deficiency will pose
ever greater problems as donors seek an accounting of the benefits generated
with their funds and as host governments try to gauge what mine action
(relative to other claims on the public purse) promises for their citizens and
for the country’s overall development.
There are numerous attempts under way to rectify this shortcoming, but
for the most part these represent only partial measures — pieces of a larger
puzzle. In fairness, the mine action puzzle is unusually complex. The
community faces the challenges that always arise when trying to focus more
tightly on results — what might be termed “garden variety” management
problems. But it also faces “exotic” challenges because many mine-afflicted
countries represent such difficult and rapidly changing environments.
This chapter devotes most attention to what some are terming “operational
mine action”; that is, demining activities (survey, clearance, and marking)
coupled with mine risk education (MRE), which together aim to reduce risks
to people in mine-affected communities and to remove the constraints imposed
by this contamination on the development.
Also, the focus is on those results intended to directly benefit the people
in mine-affected countries rather than achievements in developing indigenous
capacities for managing mine action programmes (which are covered in
Chapter 9).3 “Results” is a generic term referring to the consequences or effects
of actions we have taken. As such, when we discuss the topic of results we
need to think in terms of cause-and-effect chain reactions: our actions cause
certain effects, which in turn cause knock-on effects, and so on. Of course,
there are many different consequences arising from mine action. Some are
planned while others are unanticipated; some endure while others quickly
pass; some are good and others bad; and, of course, some are more important
than others. To avoid complete confusion, we need to use terms in a consistent
fashion (see Box 1: The language of results).
Box 1. The language of results
In this chapter, we will adhere so far as possible to the following terms and
definitions, which have evolved in the field of “results-based management” as it
has been applied in international development circles:
• Inputs: the financial, human, and material resources used by the
programme.
• Outputs: the goods (e.g. demined land) and services (e.g. mine awareness
training) which are directly produced by a project or programme.
• Outcomes (or intermediate outcomes): the short- and medium-term effects
arising from people making use of the outputs delivered by a project or
programme (e.g. increased food production from demined land).
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• Final outcomes (or impacts): the long-term and sustained effects (positive
and negative; intended or unintended) arising from a project or programme
(e.g. enhanced well-being for rural households because of better nutrition).
Source: DAC/OECD (2002).
To avoid confusion, when referring to long-term effects we will employ the term
“final outcome” rather than “impact” (which is more commonly used in the
international development field) because the mine action community uses the
word “impact” in a very general sense (similar to how RMB practitioners use
the term “results”).
In one sense, discussing the impact of mine action implies simply that we
are concerned with the consequences of mine action for people in mine-afflicted
communities. Therefore, a word of caution needs to be introduced. The author
does not wish to imply that the vast majority of those working in mine action
are not concerned with the consequences of mine action for people in mine-
afflicted communities, or that most mine action programmes are not achieving
results in terms of meeting the human needs of such people even when the
programmes do not make these aims explicit in their lists of objectives (see
Box 2: Evaluating socio-economic achievements in Kosovo). Rather, the chapter
explores the degree to which the performance of mine action programmes
can be assessed in terms of who has benefited, in what way, and by how
much?
The evidence suggests that — in spite of the widespread concern for the
well-being of people in mine-affected communities — we remain for the most
part unable to assess mine action performance in this fashion. Why?
Box 2. Evaluating socio-economic achievements in Kosovo
In late 2001 an evaluation was conducted of the UN Mine Action Programme
in Kosovo.a) The evaluators state the programme had not collected sufficient
data to analyse socio-economic achievements. At the same time, the
proliferation of funding agreements coupled with inadequate information-sharing
among donors meant that no-one had a complete record of mine action costs.
Therefore, no comparison of costs and benefits could be made as there was
no proper accounting of costs and there was no estimate of benefits at all.
However, the report was, in the main, laudatory because the programme
succeeded in achieving its main objectives of clearing virtually all the identified
hazards and transferring responsibility for dealing with the residual threat to a
local organisation.
About the same time, an “impact assessment” was conducted of the Danish
Church Aid mine action programme in Kosovo.b) The assessment team made
an excellent effort to “visualise” the “varied and complex range of social and
economic benefits” arising from the programme, and to generate a rough count
of the numbers of people who benefited directly and indirectly from various
types of mine action. The team’s assessment was that substantial socio-
economic benefits did accrue to a large number of beneficiaries. But again,
they were unable to arrive at a clear picture of the cost-effectiveness or cost-
benefit of the programme because of the “absence of critical data”.
a) The Praxis Group (2002); b) Horwood et al. (2001).
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Diagram 1. The basic results-based management (RBM) perspective
The immediate reason for this failing seems clear. Plans for mine action
programmes often do not clearly specify the results they are designed to
achieve.4 Where the intended results are provided, the list rarely is clear
concerning the target beneficiaries and the types of benefits we hope will
accrue to them. When plans do not specify these things as performance targets5
to be achieved, no provision is made during the implementation of the
programme to collect data concerning who has benefited and in what manner.
In the end, little can be said about whether the programme has delivered the
expected benefits to the intended beneficiaries.
Conversely, most mine action programmes can say a great deal about how
they have used their resources to clear landmines, train citizens, and so on —
in the apt phrase of one programme management expert, how they are
“keeping busy”. But few programmes can say who has benefited, in what
manner, and by how much — on how they are “making a difference” to
people in mine-affected communities? This distinction between keeping busy
and making a difference is central to a results-based perspective, and is
illustrated in both the Diagram 1 and in Box 3: The results of the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Box 3. The results of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The international campaign emerged in the early 1990s from a number of NGO
initiatives leading to the formation of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines coalition in 1992. It then gathered momentum as, first the
International Committee of the Red Cross and UN agencies began advocating
for a complete ban on anti-personnel mines (in 1994), and then, by 1996,
agreement was reached with a number of States to push for an immediate
ban. At the first Ottawa Conference in October 1996, 50 States committed to
work for a total ban. At a second Ottawa Conference in December 1997, 122
nations signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, to come into force
six months after its ratification by 40 nations, which was achieved in September
1998. By the end of November 2005, more than 144 countries had ratified the
treaty, with a further handful of signatories. One study summarised the
achievements quite simply: “The campaign to ban landmines has been widely
celebrated as one of the most successful examples of humanitarian
advocacy.”a)
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The distinguishing feature of any results-based approach to management
is, simply put, an overarching focus on results throughout the programming
cycle, and particularly those results of the “making a difference” variety
(which, in the mine action community, are usually termed socio-economic
impacts). Thus:
plans should specify as clearly as possible both the results a programme
is designed to achieve and how progress toward those results will be
measured;
provisions should be made to collect the data required to monitor
performance in terms of progress toward the planned results;
periodic reports to stakeholders provide information on progress
toward the intended results as well as on how funds and other resources
have been used;
evaluations should be commissioned for more thorough examinations
of what results have obtained and how the programme’s design and
management could be changed for better performance — achieving
even better results — in the future.
In many ways, results-based management is the new religion within
international development circles, and has been adopted by official donor
agencies, commercial contactors and, increasingly, NGOs — including those
active in humanitarian as well as development assistance (see Box 4 on CARE).6
Box 4. CARE International project standards
This set of standards, adopted by the CARE International Programme Working
Group in April 2002, is an excellent outline of an RBM system for humanitarian,
reconstruction and development work.
Each CARE project should:
1. Be consistent with the CARE International Vision and Mission,
Programming Principles and Values.
2. Be clearly linked to a Country Office strategy and/or long term programme
goals.
3. Ensure the active participation and influence of stakeholders in its analysis,
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes.
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4. Have a design that is based on a holistic analysis of the needs and rights
of the target population and the underlying causes of their conditions of
poverty and social injustice. It should also examine the opportunities and
risks inherent in the potential interventions.
5. Use a logical framework that explains how the project will contribute to an
ultimate impact upon the lives of members of a defined target population.
6. Set a significant, yet achievable and measurable final goal.
7. Be technically, environmentally and socially appropriate. Interventions
should be based upon best current practice and on an understanding of
the social context and the needs, rights and responsibilities of the
stakeholders.
8. Indicate the appropriateness of project costs, in light of the selected project
strategies and expected outputs and outcomes.
9. Develop and implement a monitoring and evaluation plan and system based
on the logical framework that ensures the collection of baseline, monitoring
and final evaluation data, and anticipates how the information will be used
for decision-making; with a budget that includes adequate amounts for
implementing the monitoring and evaluation plan.
10. Establish a baseline for measuring change in indicators of impact and
effect, by conducting a study or survey prior to implementation of project
activities.
11. Use indicators that are relevant, measurable, verifiable and reliable.
12. Employ a balance of evaluation methodologies, assure an appropriate
level of rigour, and adhere to recognised ethical standards.
13.Be informed by and contribute to ongoing learning within and outside
CARE.
Source: CARE Design, Monitoring and Evaluation website: www.kcenter.com/care/dme/
Diagram 2. The programming cycle: learning from experience
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The broad strategy underlying RBM is that performance will improve
progressively as the programming cycle is repeated. The success of the strategy
depends on how well we can apply the lessons of experience. Therefore,
learning is a central theme in results-based management.
This desire to improve performance in the “making a difference to people”
sense lies at the core of any results-based or performance management system.7
Among mine action practitioners however, there remains controversy over
whether their performance should be assessed in terms of socio-economic
benefits, and the next section touches on this controversy.
Mine-centred or people-centred mine action?8
“It is not for you to complete the work, but neither are you free to withdraw
from it.”9
The first decade: 1989-1998
Large mine action programmes were first established in countries in
the midst of, or just emerging from, anarchic “complex emergencies”.10
The international community responded (sometimes with a distinct lack
of enthusiasm or success) with a combination of humanitarian assistance
and peace-keeping missions. Mine action programmes often served a dual
role, being viewed both as a necessary element for the peace-keeping
mission to carry out its mandate and as a humanitarian operation, clearing
routes and resettlement areas for refugees and to enable the delivery of
humanitarian assistance.
In these emergencies, military engineers were thrown into the fray to
deal with the landmine contamination. Where peace-keeping missions were
fielded the focus for mine action centred on support to the operations of the
international forces. When mine action did address humanitarian concerns,
the people involved understood the problem principally in terms of numbers
of landmines and contaminated areas. They accorded priority to the most
heavily mined areas rather than investigating which hazards posed the greatest
danger to people and their livelihoods.11 Because not all hazards could be
cleared in the short-term, basic mine awareness training was provided to at-
risk civilians and aid workers.
The first major multi-country assessment of mine action provided a
withering critique of those programmes with a dual mandate, as the peace-
keeping contingent exercised authority over mine action (Angola, Cambodia,
and Mozambique) and humanitarian aims were accorded secondary priority.12
Instead of seeing mines as a military problem with humanitarian overtones,
the report advocated a view centred firmly on the well-being of the people
affected by landmine contamination: “Mines are first and foremost a humanitarian
concern … [which] … needs to be redefined and understood in terms of reducing the
vulnerability of people who are directly affected.”
For shorthand, we will term this the people-centred perspective, defined
as a view in which the aim of mine action is the enhancement of the well-
being of people in mine-afflicted communities. With such a perspective, the
Is mine action making a difference ... or avoiding the question?
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clearance of hazards and the destruction of landmines are seen simply as means
to an end: not as ends in themselves.
Making progress? Mine action since 1998
There has been far greater attention accorded to the socio-economic
implications of landmine contamination since the publication of the DHA
report.13 The UN adopted a people-centred perspective in its landmine policy
published in 1998, stating…”It is not so much about mines as it is about people and
their interactions with a mine-infested environment.”14 At about the same time, a
group of international NGOs active in mine action endorsed The Bad Honnef
Guidelines.15 They also advocated a people-centred focus in which “The needs
and aspirations of people affected by mines are the starting point”.
In the aftermath of these policy pronouncements, a flurry of studies was
launched to flesh-out the concept of socio-economic impact as applied to
landmine contamination.
In late 1997 the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan initiated the
Socio-Economic Impact Study (SEIS) to generate “a clear and precise picture
of the mine problem confronting civilians”.16
In 1999, the Geneva International Centre for Mine Action (GICHD)
began its multi-country study on socio-economic approaches to Mine
Action for the UNDP.17
About the same time, the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
(PRIO) started its Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC)
project in Mozambique, which has resulted in a series of publications
on community-level impacts.18
In 2000-2001 there was a spate of publications with a somewhat narrower
focus, examining the contribution mine action was making to economic
production (as opposed to the broader range of social and economic benefits).
The principal messages were that, when viewed in purely economic terms,
demining has not been a bad investment (and sometimes yielded extremely
high economic returns) so long as it was carefully targeted (see Box 5: Is mine
action a good investment?).
These studies largely focused on an analysis of the benefits accruing from
mine action (principally demining) that had already been conducted. The
research strategy was to gauge what had worked and what had not, both to
generate preliminary performance assessments of programmes in terms of
socio-economic results and to generate recommendations intended to improve
such performance through better targeting and better work processes (e.g.
more collaboration with community authorities and development agencies).
Another initiative launched in 1999 had a different, albeit complementary
objective. The Survey Action Centre, working with the Afghan Mine Clearance
Planning Agency (MCPA), conducted the first landmine impact survey (LIS)
in Yemen. An LIS is a needs assessment rather than a performance assessment:
that is, it attempts to document the scope and pattern of the contamination
problem rather than to assess how well mine action programmes have been
resolving the problems experienced by civilians in mine-afflicted communities.
Its purpose is to “facilitate the prioritizing of human, material and financial resources
313
supporting humanitarian mine action at the national, regional, and global level.” 19, 20
However, it also provides a “baseline” against which future performance can
be assessed.
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Box 5. Is mine action a good investment?
Cost-benefit studies of demining
In 2000-2001, a spate of studies were published on the economic returns of
landmine clearance.a) The general methodology is straightforward:b) cost-benefit
case studies of representative types of land and structures are done and an
estimate for the entire programme is generated by extrapolating the findings.
In general, the results have been encouraging. In Afghanistan (the most thorough
study), for example, the economic benefit of the land cleared by the mine
action programme in 1999 was estimated to be about US$46 million dollars
against a cost of about US$23 million. Thus an average of US$2 in benefits
was generated for each US$1 in costs. (There were additional benefits
stemming from the reduction in deaths and injuries, but quantifying such
benefits is a dodgy exercise.)
The very positive results estimated for clearance in Afghanistan stem from the
fact that huge amounts of valuable land had been mined (e.g. urban areas,
irrigation works, roads). Also, most agricultural crops are produced on the
small proportion of the total land close to water sources. Other countries have
different patterns of contamination and economic activity.
In Bosnia, for example, many residential areas were mined or contaminated
with UXO but there are relatively few areas of intensive agriculture and the
agricultural economy has not recovered much since the war. Therefore, the
net benefits (i.e. after clearance costs) in urban areas are very high, but those
from clearance of agricultural land are often negative.
In Laos, urban areas are for the most part free of UXO contamination and there
are three broad types of rice cultivation (the preponderant form of agriculture).
Clearance of irrigated “dry season” rice land and rain-fed “wet season” rice
land is warranted on economic grounds alone, while clearance of upland rice
growing areas is not.
There also are some countries where the costs of clearance exceed the
economic benefits for the bulk of the contaminated land. For example,
Mozambique and Angola are sparsely populated and most agriculture has low
productivity. In many areas there is ample land available, so farmers are not
forced to cultivate land they suspect. In such countries, widespread clearance
of rainfed agricultural land is not warranted on purely economic grounds, but
smaller, tightly targeted clearance of, say, water sites and irrigated crop land
might well be justified on economic grounds.
a) The first of these (Harris, 2000) was seriously flawed and not to be trusted (see Paterson,
2001). The others were GICHD/UNDP (2001), Gildestad (2001), and GICHD (2001). Note that
the study by Gildestad was subsequently revised (Byrd and Gildestad, 2001). In the revised
version, some of the estimated benefits were reduced, principally because of adjustments in
the data for cropping patterns. However, the conclusions were not significantly affected by
the revisions. The author has used the initial report because it contained slightly more detail
allowing a decomposition of costs and benefits.
b) Further detail is given in GICHD/UNDP (2001, Chapter 3).
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The picture that emerged by mid-2001 was broadly positive. Landmine
clearance seemed to be delivering results in terms of socio-economic benefits,
and the scale of these benefits appeared to outweigh the high costs assuming
clearance was carefully targeted. The LIS also provided a better method for
conducting needs assessments and, hence, for targeting the most severely
impacted communities. However, a number of issues remained unresolved.
First, it is far from clear how much of the gap between social scientists
and mine action practitioners has been bridged by this first generation of
studies. All the studies suggest that very large performance improvements
could be achieved — even in the best managed programmes — with better
targeting. However, few programmes have overhauled their systems for
determining clearance priorities and — for those which have — it remains
unclear whether better targeting has, in fact, been achieved.21
Achieving better results on the ground is not, of course, a simple task.
Each country has unique social and economic features and each mine action
programme must determine how best to gauge the varied socio-economic
benefits that might accrue from clearance operations. One problem every
programme must face is that there are many different types of socio-economic
benefits. There is no consensus on how much weight should be given to, say,
(i) economic benefits of the type highlighted in cost-benefit studies relative
to (ii) the public safety concerns which feature prominently in community
rankings derived from landmine impact surveys (LIS).22
A further complication is that most evidence concerning the socio-economic
results achieved by mine action relates to clearance operations, and most of
the quantifiable evidence concerns economic benefits. What of mine risk
education and, more broadly, reducing the numbers of deaths and injuries
from landmines and UXO?
In fact, no study has yet been able to demonstrate a correlation between
any type of mine action and a reduction in the numbers of either landmine
and UXO accidents or victims (see Box 6). For example, in the evaluation of
the UNMAS Mine Action Programme in Kosovo, the consultants noted: “It
has yet to be proven in any programme, however, that mine action interventions alone
cause a reduction in civilian casualties — many factors are believed to have an effect on
the civilian accident rate.”23
Box 6. The evidence on mine action saving lives and limbs
The human toll exacted by landmines and UXO has been well documented
and was the principal impetus behind the international campaign to ban
landmines. But what do we know about the actual contributions made by
clearance, marking and mine awareness to a reduction in the number of deaths
and disabilities? Unfortunately we know very little, at least in quantitative terms.
Take the numbers of deaths and injuries from landmines, which often rise after
the end of a conflict as refugees return along routes and to communities that
may be contaminated. The numbers of accidents then decline as people become
aware of the hazardous areas. This knowledge may come from MRE or because
minefields have been marked by survey teams, but more generally from seeing
landmines, hearing from other community members, or because some
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unfortunate person or animal has detonated a mine. Mine clearance also
makes a contribution to risk reduction, but in heavily contaminated countries
this is modest because only a tiny portion of hazardous areas can be cleared
in any one year.a)
Complicating the matter further, in at least some countries landmine accidents
result from knowingly risky behaviour because people are driven by economic
necessity.b) In other countries, the laying of new mines may be a factor in the
number of injuries as people pursue ethnic vendettas or lay mines to protect
their vacant homes, opium fields, etc. With all these factors influencing the
level and trend of accidents, it is extremely difficult to isolate which factor has
led to what portion of the decline in numbers. This could conceivably be
accomplished with abundant data of excellent quality. Unfortunately, in most
countries data on landmine accidents are incomplete and often of very poor
quality.
As a result of these complications, there is not a single study that has
demonstrated any statistically meaningful link between the numbers of landmine
accidents and any component of mine actionc) or mine action in general.
a) For example in Bosnia, the Landmine Monitor in 2002 reports that about 4,000 km2 are
suspected of contamination, while less than 5.5 km2 was cleared in 2001, slightly more than
one-tenth of one per cent of the suspected area (and perhaps only two per cent of the
“priority 1” contaminated areas)!
b) Bottomley (2001, 2003).
c) One study for Afghanistan reported a correlation between MRE and landmine accidents
(CIET, 1997). Unfortunately, it was a positive correlation, so there were more accidents in
communities that had received mine awareness training! A number of people have voiced
their concerns about the methodology used in the study.
A second conundrum is the ever-present tension between “top-down”
planning and community priorities emerging from the “bottom-up”. Where
priorities are set on the basis of responses from mine-afflicted communities,
it is difficult to know in advance what types of socio-economic benefits will
stem from such bottom-up community choices. Therefore, it is difficult to
identify indicators and design monitoring systems that adequately reflect
the varied benefits which might accrue. Without such systems, data are
unavailable for analysis, for reporting on the results being achieved and for
learning how to achieve better results in the future.
Conversely, it is relatively easy to design monitoring systems when
priorities are determined rigidly on the basis of criteria set at the top.
However, it is extremely difficult for national authorities to design systems
for setting priorities in a top-down fashion which adequately accommodate
the varied needs of mine-afflicted communities. It is even less likely that
criteria and performance indicators imposed by donors will prove to be helpful,
as Rae McGrath has often stressed: “The indicators of success set by donors rarely
match exactly those of the affected community, often totally ignore the priorities of the
indigenous authorities and may only consider overlapping interests in other sectors of
development where those projects are funded by the same donor.” 24
In fact, priority-setting requires some balance between top-down
guidelines to provide strategic direction and the flexibility to respond to
bottom-up demands. But the first generation of socio-economic studies did
Is mine action making a difference ... or avoiding the question?
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not really address how to work out an appropriate balance or how to devise
priority-setting systems that are both practical and sufficiently flexible to
accommodate community-level requirements.25 We will return later in this
chapter to the need for top-down and bottom-up balance.
Such problems reveal the gap that remains between the results which could,
in theory, be achieved and those results which, in practice, mine action
programmes can demonstrate they are achieving.
In fact — and in spite of the emergence of the people-centred perspective
and the studies that have begun to illuminate the socio-economic dimensions
of mine action — demining programmes have continued to report their
performance mainly in terms of the number of devices destroyed and the
areas of land surveyed and cleared, with scant information concerning how
many lives have been improved, by how much, and in what manner (see
Box 7: Key developments reported by the Landmine Monitor in 2003). In the case of
MRE, the numbers of training sessions and trainees are reported, but little
information is provided on the results of such training in terms of how people
have benefited (e.g. enhanced sense of security, fewer casualties).
Box 7. Key developments reported
by the Landmine Monitor in 2003
Each of the country reports in the Landmine Monitor Report begins with a brief
summary of key developments (including what are termed “results” in this
chapter). As these excerpts demonstrate, the traditional performance measures
— area cleared, devices destroyed, people trained — still feature centrally
and, for a number of countries, dominate the report.
Angola: … NGOs reported clearing more than 2.8 million square metres of
land, surveying more than 7.8 million square metres of land, and destroying
more than 5,000 mines and 13,000 UXO … 543,713 people received mine risk
education in 2002…
Azerbaijan: In 2002, two national NGOs cleared 1,118,000 square metres of
land, marked another 1,221,000 square metres for clearance, and identified
and registered another 66,352,000 square metres … 30 mine risk education
seminars were held in 12 mine-affected regions, which trained 525 medical
staff.
Croatia: Destruction of Croatia’s stockpile of 199,003 anti-personnel mines
was completed in October 2002. In 2002, Croatia returned 60.4 square
kilometres of land to the community through clearance and survey.
Laos: In 2002, 8.4 million square metres of land was cleared and 98,963
items of UXO destroyed. Mine risk education was provided in 683 villages,
reaching 160,053 people.
There are, of course, good reasons for continuing to report the traditional
performance measures for mine action, such as the landmines and areas
cleared, and the number of people trained. First, such data remain important
for assessing the efficiency of operations. Second, these data are comparatively
easy to collect and does not divert scarce resources from directly productive
activities. Third, this information underpins the quality control and assurance
function, which in turn is essential for assessing whether operations are
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providing acceptable levels of safety for both civilians and mine action
personnel.
Indeed, the problem lies not with the results being reported but with
those which are not. What the traditional measures of mine action results fail
to provide is any clear sense of how and to what degree mine action is effective
in making a difference in the lives of people in mine-afflicted communities.26
Again, many reasons have been advanced to explain why this remains the
case, including:
when a new category of endeavour emerges, such as mine action, it
takes time for a community of practitioners to form and for lessons to
be learned and applied. Mine action has been going through this learning
process (see Box 8);
Box 8. Learning how to address new development problems
Developing countries and donors are periodically confronted with new problems
such as HIV/AIDS, complex emergencies or landmine contamination. It takes
time to understand the true nature of the problem, then to formulate relevant
objectives and devise solutions for one or two countries, and finally to learn
how to adapt projects in order to replicate solutions in other countries. The
nature of this evolution is depicted below.
Is mine action making a difference ... or avoiding the question?
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In the case of mine action, the nature of the contamination problem was
poorly understood initially, many of the initial projects had unclear or conflicting
objectives, and many of the proposed solutions, implementation strategies
and technologies were inappropriate. For example, the simple application of
military demining standards and approaches was found to be unsuitable for
“humanitarian mine action”.
the learning process has been inhibited as mine action programmes
have been financed largely through emergency aid channels, which impose
short planning horizons (usually, up to a year) and may prohibit spending on
“luxuries” such as applied research to accelerate the learning process.
These points reinforce the essential role of learning how to perform well
and how to improve performance over time. However, few people in the
mine action community are trained in the social sciences. They do not know
how to plan for or how to identify and make sense of socio-economic benefits.
A comparison of two studies that attempted to quantify the economic benefits
resulting from the Afghanistan clearance programme provides a concrete
example of the scale of this problem. The two studies arrived at remarkably
different conclusions with completely different implications relating to policies
and priorities (see Box 9: Same programme, different benefits?).
Box 9. Same programme, different benefits?
Two studies of Afghanistan’s Mine Action Programme
In late 1997, the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) initiated the Socio-
Economic Impact Study (SEIS)a) in a first attempt to quantify the social and
economic effects of both landmine contamination and clearance operations.
MCPA published the final report in December 1999. This was well received,
but donors had questions regarding the methodologies used to analyse the
survey data and how the quantitative estimates of benefits (expressed in dollar
terms) were derived. Accordingly, the World Bank engaged an international
economist supported by an Afghan statistician to conduct another study
(SIMAAb)) using cost-benefit analysis.
Both studies concluded that the mine action programme was delivering
substantial socio-economic benefits, but similarities ended there. The SEIS
study concluded that almost 70 per cent of total benefits stemmed from
livestock production (largely from grazing land), with crops produced on
agricultural land accounting for less than five per cent of the benefits. The
SIMAA study concluded the exact opposite was true, with the bulk of benefits
coming from crop production and very little from livestock production.
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Note: Graze+ = SEIS figure for “grazing areas + livestock products” (p. 3), and SIMAA
data for “economic loss of livestock” (Table 8.9, p. 40 plus author’s own calculations)
Obviously, the two studies carry remarkably different implications for
determining clearance priorities. The impression given by the SEIS report is
that clearance of grazing land is very worthwhile because of the importance
of livestock production. The conclusion of the SIMAA study, using more rigorous
methods for economic analysis of the data, is that clearance of grazing land
is rarely warranted. In point of fact, grazing land has accounted for about 30
per cent of all land cleared in Afghanistan.
Sources: a) MCPA (1999:3); b) Bjorn Gildestad (2001), various tables & authors own
calculations.
Note: The SIMAA Report was subsequently revised and issued in December 2001 as: Byrd
and Gildestad, The Socio-Economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis (available from the World Bank’s website for its Afghanistan programme). In the
revised version, some of the estimated benefits were reduced, principally because of
adjustments in the data for cropping patterns. However, the conclusions were not significantly
affected by the revisions.
Learning to deliver results
The crux of the issue: how much to invest in learning?
Landmine and UXO contamination creates three main problems for civilian
populations:
1. the risk of an accident leading directly to the loss of life or limb;
2. contamination and suspected contamination (collectively, hazards)
block access to resources that may be important to people’s traditional
livelihoods, making them more vulnerable to other risks (drought,
disease, crop failure, and so on) or, in extreme cases, forcing them to
engage in extremely risky behaviour to use the resources in spite of
the hazards (see Box 10): Taking risks to survive);
3. hazards constrain investments intended to improve the future well-
being of households, communities and countries.
Box 10. Taking risks to survive
In recent decades, social science researchers have devoted increased attention
to the relationships between poverty and vulnerability. In brief, many households
slip in and out of poverty (or, in a more pronounced form, absolute deprivation)
for a variety of factors, and efforts to fight poverty should include measures to:
(i) reduce the sources of vulnerability (often termed “shocks”) and (ii) increase
the capacities of households to cope with shocks. Such coping mechanisms
are often termed “survival strategies”, which can be analysed at the level of
individuals, households, communities, etc.
For example, landmine hazards which block access to a resource represent
a shock to any household that previously used that resource. Household survival
strategies could include migration to another community, doing without the
resource by using other household assets more intensively, using political
Is mine action making a difference ... or avoiding the question?
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influence to get the hazard cleared, and so on. At the extreme, when access
to vital resources is blocked and no alternative survival strategies are viable,
households might take matters into their own hands and attempt to regain
access to the resource (e.g. by clearing contamination or trying to find a path
through the hazard). Undoubtedly, such a survival strategy is risky. However, it
may be the least risky strategy available!
Ruth Bottomley (2003: 9-10) captures these concepts succinctly in her report
on “village demining” in Cambodia:
“Humanitarian mine action has tended to focus on the notion of absolute
risk, seen in terms of injuries sustained through contact with landmines
… However, for many villages the risk posed by mines is only one of the
many risks with which they live, which gives them little choice but to see
the mine risk as relative to other risks. The risk of not being able to feed
a family or to secure land can sometimes only be addressed through
undertaking a high-risk activity such as mine clearance. The objective of
villagers is to somehow balance the multitude of risks they face in order
to survive.”
The implication of such analysis is that mine action programmes need to do
more to understand household capabilities and the various risks they face
including, but not restricted to, landmine contamination.
In their efforts to address these problems, mine action managers face two
principal constraints. First (in common with managers everywhere) they have
a resource constraint which makes it virtually impossible to eliminate all
hazards in the short- to medium-term. Second, they lack information
concerning (i) where accidents are most likely to occur, (ii) how people create
their livelihoods27 and (iii) what plans are being made for future investments.
In other words, mine action managers lack information on the precise nature
of the three main problems that landmines create for civilians.
The resource constraint forces choices to be made, setting priorities to
identify which hazards will be addressed first (and by what type of actions)
and which left for later. The information constraints mean managers do not
have the information required to identify the right priorities in terms of
delivering the most socio-economic benefits per dollar.
This creates a fundamental dilemma: what proportion of the scarce
resources available should be diverted from direct mine actions and invested
in acquiring information about the nature of the problem and the way mine
action can best address it? Reasonable people will have reasonable differences
of opinion on this question and, of course, much depends on the actual situation
prevailing in a country. For example, when the scale of the contamination is
reasonably well known and manageable with the resources at hand and, at
the same time, the population is in flux so the social and economic features
we could observe today will change significantly over the short- to medium-
term, the costs of obtaining much socio-economic data may outweigh the
benefits. Data gathered today about the status of the population will have a
limited “shelf-life” because the population is unsettled and, regardless, the
problem can be solved before the population re-establishes a peacetime economy.
Kosovo may be as close as we will come to this situation. The extent and
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nature of the contamination was reasonably well known from combatants’
records, and was manageable given the influx of mine action organisations
and funding. Also, we knew little about Kosovo’s socio-economic features.28
More importantly, however, the conflict led to large-scale migration and
widespread social and economic disruption, and it would take years before
the situation settled down. Therefore, the serious hazards could be dealt
with before we would learn how to incorporate detailed socio-economic
considerations when setting priorities.29 Thus, there would be little pay-off
from large investments in learning about Kosovo’s socio-economic features.
This example highlights the critical point that acquiring and analysing
information is an investment that pays off over time; other things equal, the
pay-off is higher if the contamination is greater, meaning the programme
will last longer. How long will mine action programmes last? The Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention suggests that “Each State Party undertakes to
ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, as
soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention
for that State Party.”30 (emphasis added). If all the mines will be cleared within
ten years, perhaps it’s best to get on with demining as efficiently as possible,
and not expend much on learning to deliver good results in socio-economic
terms.
But this conclusion neglects some critical facts. First, the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention deals only with anti-personnel landmines — but mine
action programmes address a broader range of “explosive remnants of war”,
including anti-tank landmines and unexploded ordnance. There is a very real
danger that lower priority would be (and, seemingly, has been in some
countries) accorded to UXO if a programme measured its achievements solely
in relation to an objective of making a country mine free, in spite of the fact
that in many countries UXO cause more civilian deaths and injuries than do
landmines. Second, the Convention seems to have set a laudable but, for
some countries, an impossible goal within a foreseeable timeframe. In such
cases, mine action would not be a means to an end but rather a means without
end!31
Some still argue that the solution is to put up more money and that
countries which have adopted the Mine Ban Convention have an obligation
to do so. But both donors and governments in mine-afflicted countries face
many pressing demands and ploughing ever more money in pursuit of the
mine-free ideal will starve other worthwhile programmes of funding and
harm many more people than are helped. Also, of course, diminishing returns
set in rapidly and costs will increase dramatically as we try to clear the
more remote and random landmines. In the words of the Programme
Manager in Kosovo, “We don’t want a thousand deminers roaming the countryside
searching for the last landmine.”
Assessing the contamination problem and the human needs
Given that, for some countries at least, there is no quick fix to the
contamination problem, hard choices will need to be made and, put simply,
more information may lead to better choices. But acquiring data costs money
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and — as is true in demining — we don’t want a thousand surveyors scouring
the country for the last bit of data.32
The logic that data have a cost as well as a benefit underlies the strategy
adopted by the Survey Action Center for landmine impact surveys. An LIS is
a systematic survey designed to provide a snapshot of the socio-economic
impact of landmines on communities. It is meant to be comprehensive, in the
sense of identifying all communities which are affected. This is a large
undertaking33and both cost and time considerations mean it would be
unfeasible to collect and verify the accuracy of all the potentially relevant
details in every community, some of which will have suffered little or no adverse
impact. Therefore, the survey focuses on a few types of data to generate a rough
picture of the landmine impact for each community — the numbers of recent
victims and the types of resources to which access is blocked by hazards. Using
a simple scoring system, communities are then broadly categorised by level of
impact: high, medium, low, and no impact.
In itself, this seems a modest result from a big undertaking. However, it
gains value if the information leads to learning, where managers make better
decisions which in turn lead to more or better targeted benefits. Unfortunately,
it appears in many cases that national authorities have not adjusted their
priorities in the light of the evidence from the LIS, suggesting that learning
how to deliver more socio-economic benefits for their citizens may not be
their principal objective.34
In some countries however, often belatedly, the output from the LIS does
appear to be influencing decision-making, particularly in terms of (1) making
officials aware of the need to reallocate resources to correspond more closely
to the geographic pattern of highly impacted communities, and/or (2)
designating highly impacted communities as priorities. For some examples
(all taken from the Landmine Monitor Report in 2003):
The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority “… has
also noted that, as of 2002, the distribution of clearance resources did not
correspond to the areas of greatest socio-economic and humanitarian need. At
the end of 2002, 63 per cent of the severe and high impact areas in Battambang,
Pursat and Siam Reap provinces received approximately 30 per cent of the
clearance capacity”.
In Yemen, “Using the results of the survey, a five-year strategic plan was
developed to clear the 14 high impact communities by 2004. By the end of 2002,
six of these communities had been cleared and declared safe.”
In Mozambique, the National Demining Institute “… produced its first
Five Year National Mine Action Plan: 2002-2006 (NMAP). The plan and its
priorities are based on the information and findings of the landmine impact
survey”.
The LIS can also pay dividends in providing a tighter focus for future
investments in learning. In Bosnia for example, a pilot project is being
conducted with highly impacted communities. Each of these communities
may be affected by a number of distinct hazards and each hazard will create
different problems in socio-economic terms. Therefore, once the LIS identifies
a highly impacted community (HIC), a second team is dispatched to conduct
a more thorough task assessment and planning (TAP) survey.35
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The TAP attempts to identify both those hazards which pose an acute risk of
an accident and those which constrain use of particularly valuable resources
(land, residences, previously well-used paths, etc.). These specific hazards
will become priorities for expensive clearance operations, while others which
pose little danger and promise few socio-economic benefits in the short-term
will be marked.
Thus, the LIS identifies the communities for which a TAP survey will be
most valuable, which means not as many scarce resources need to be spent
on the TAP process. In turn, the immediate result (or output) of the TAP is a
list of high impact hazards (HIHs). This is a potential benefit to the most affected
people in the most affected communities, but the potential is only realised (i.e.
becomes an “outcome”) if the HIHs are indeed cleared on a priority basis.
The logical chain of events leading from LISs and TAPs to learning how to
create socio-economic benefits is depicted in Diagram 4. (Note, for lack of space
the diagram does not depict final outcomes.)
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Diagram 4. Planned results from LISs and TAPs
The experience with LISs and TAPs also highlights a useful strategy for
acquiring information and progressive learning. Start with “big pieces”
providing an understanding of the problems in coarse terms and, over time, fill
in details in those areas and issues which appear to offer the greatest return in
terms of a more refined understanding of the socio-economic problems arising
from landmine contamination. The LIS deals with communities as a whole and
identifies the ones in which we need to take a closer look. The TAP then focuses
on highly impacted communities and breaks their contamination problems
down into smaller pieces (i.e. individual hazards) for a more detailed
investigation.36
Toward solutions: top-down versus bottom-up approaches
While an LIS provides a “needs assessment” we still must devise ways
to meet these needs. Indeed, meeting the human needs caused by landmine
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contamination is what constitutes results of the “making a difference”
variety.
Broadly, there are two approaches. National authorities could try to devise
a strategy for meeting the human needs and then determine priorities from
the top. The polar opposite approach would be to emphasise the capacity to
respond flexibly to priorities identified by those directly affected by the
hazards. To date, the bottom-up approaches appear to have dominated in
mine action.
Take Bosnia and Herzegovina for example.37 The international community
imposed the following set of criteria to guide mine action on the various Bosnian
governments following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement:38
humanitarian purposes, for the return of refugees and displaced persons;
economic purposes for the expansion of agricultural and grazing land
and rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.
Hazards are classified by the mine action centre into three broad categories
in the following order of priority. Note that these categories do not correspond
exactly to the criteria; specifically, there is less focus on the return of refugees
and displaced persons.
Category I: locations in regular civilian use or needed for refugees/
internally displaced persons return or needed for reconstruction and
development projects;
Category II: locations in occasional use or adjacent to Category I tasks;
and
Category III: peripheral locations.
This process results in a so-called Category I list of priorities that is at
least five times larger than can be demined with the funds available.39 It is
safe to say that the criteria established from the top provided very little
strategic direction, and other processes were employed to determine the true
priorities. Indeed, the true priorities were based almost entirely on the
rankings of municipal officials.40 In 2000, the MAC reported the following pattern
of clearance (based on planned land use):
Agriculture 19.6% Other 2.7%
Bridges 0.1% Repatriation 0.2%
Communications 0.3% Returnee housing 0.6%
Education 0.5% Roads 1.1%
Electric power 17.1% Telecommunications 0.9%
Housing 47.5% Urban 2.8%
Industry 3.9% Utilities 1.3%
Infrastructure 0.6% Water/waste management 0.7%
Natural gas/heating 0.2%
Source: ICBL (2001).
Two things are immediately apparent from this list. First, the amount of
detail makes it confusing and it is hard to discern any strategic direction.
Second, the emphasis given in the criteria to refugees and displaced persons
appears to have had little effect on the actual pattern of clearance — less than
one per cent of actual clearance was in support of “repatriation” and “returnee
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housing”. Thus, watering down the criteria imposed from the top allowed the
MAC greater flexibility to respond to the demands emerging from the bottom-
up, but then these demands were “all over the map”, without a readily apparent
focus.
It is clear that the results desired by the international community when its
members imposed the criteria for setting priorities — the return of refugees
and displaced persons — were not being achieved. But what can be said
about the results that were achieved? Very little, for two reasons. First, it is
unclear what the pattern of planned land use really added up to because of the
seeming lack of focus. Second, no one knows whether the actual use of the land
corresponded to the planned land use as reported to the MAC to justify priority
clearance. No post-clearance land use surveys were conducted because (in the
words of one MAC manager) they were “too busy getting mines out of the ground”
to check on what actual use had been made of land which had been cleared.
As is well known by now, there were widespread concerns that the priorities
identified from the bottom-up by local officials sometimes reflected private
interests rather than the public good.41 In other cases, local officials identified
priorities to advance the interests of their ethnic group and refused to request
clearance of property belonging to members of other ethnic groups. Eventually
the World Bank ended its mine clearance project early because of corruption
allegations and the original demining commissioners were removed from office
in late 2000 for conflict of interest.
The experience in Bosnia aptly illustrates the chief dangers inherent in a
strategy based predominantly on responding to bottom-up demands. These
are:
the possibility that operations will not have a coherent focus or strategic
direction;
the possibility that the priority-setting process will be hijacked to serve
the interests of local officials and elites, rather than those most in need.42
On the other hand, many of the problems created by landmine
contamination are of a local nature and residents in the affected communities
will have better
understanding of their true
needs than outsiders could
possibly possess. When
outsiders (whether national
officials, foreign advisers or




residents the results are
likely to disappoint.43
Since its nadir, the MAC in
Bosnia has gone some way to
re-establishing the credibility
of the Bosnian mine action
programme. An important
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Diagram 5. Bosnia: planned use of land
cleared in 1st half of 2003
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element of this resurrection has been the formulation of a far more coherent
strategy for delivering meaningful results. Its plan for 2003 stated “… that the
process of humanitarian demining has to be aimed at the population return”.44 In turn,
this strategy statement has resulted in tighter targeting of clearance in support
of repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.
The example of Bosnia shows that progress can be made in the space of one
or two annual planning cycles once managers turn their minds to the core
question: how will mine action make a difference to people in mine-afflicted
communities? The programme now has a strategically important focus at the
macro level — repatriation of refugees and displaced persons — and preliminary
indications are that it is making meaningful inroads in that regard. In addition,
the TAP process should help increase the likelihood at the micro level that
individual tasks will lead to worthwhile benefits to worthy beneficiaries without
undue delay.
Further progress can be expected provided the MAC initiates some form
of post-clearance land use survey to verify that land is being used by the
intended beneficiaries for worthwhile purposes and without undue delay. Of
course, such surveys are likely to uncover some surprises, particularly in a
troubled society such as Bosnia’s where elites will try to capture a
disproportionate share of the benefits and where, quite simply, little goes
according to plan. But these surveys are necessary both to understand the true
results stemming from the clearance programme and to understand the
remaining problems so that better results can be achieved in the future.
Summarising this section, the top-down versus bottom-up quandary cannot
be solved by an either-or decision; the two approaches are complementary.
Strategic direction must be formulated at the top, giving priority to certain
problems over others. But bottom—up input is required to devise the appropriate
solutions to specific problems. Further, some follow-up is necessary to assess
whether the intended benefits accrued to the intended beneficiaries, both to
reduce the danger of elite capture and to identify coordination problems (e.g.
clearing land so an NGO can dig a well, but the NGO changes its plans without
advising the clearance agency).
Working smarter, not harder
“There is nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be
done at all.”  (Peter Drucker)
What’s so hard about working smarter?
The concept that good management is all about achieving results is far from
new. It emerged concretely in the writings of Peter Drucker starting almost 50
years ago.45 However, the private sector adopted the concept first and it was not
until about 1990 that governments in most industrialised countries made
concerted efforts to introduce results-based management (RBM) to improve
performance in their public services, including their donor agencies.46 The
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)47 defines
RBM as:
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“… a broad management strategy aimed at achieving important changes
in the way government agencies operate, with improving performance
(achieving better results) as the central orientation.”48
The slow adoption of this management approach by the public sector was
due principally to the difficulty in defining and measuring “results” for public
services. Concrete statements about how an organisation is performing require
some way to measure its performance. In the private sector, a firm’s financial
“bottom line” or profitability is the ultimate goal and money provides a
convenient means for measuring achievements. RBM can be viewed as an effort
to define bottom lines for organisations such as government agencies and NGOs
for which (in the words of Drucker) “there is no bottom line”.
A sound RBM system integrates planning (what is the nature of the problem,
what results do we need to achieve to overcome that problem, and how will
we achieve those results?), prioritisation (what criteria do we use to select
those tasks that will lead to the results we are seeking?), monitoring and
evaluation (are we achieving the results we intended, and are our assumptions
holding true?) and performance improvement (what have we learned that can
help us improve planning and implementation?). The heart of this system is,
however, a means for measuring performance at different levels (output,
outcome, final outcome) because:
what gets measured gets done;
if you don’t measure results, you can’t tell success from failure;
if you can’t see success, you’re probably rewarding failure;
if you can’t see success, you can’t learn from it;
if you can’t recognise failure, you can’t correct it;
if you can demonstrate success, you can win public support.49
The trouble is that, when there is no clear bottom line, there is no simple
measure that provides an unambiguous gauge of performance. Rather, a set
of measures is required covering each stage in the “results chain” whereby
inputs allow mine action activities to produce outputs which reach beneficiaries
who use them to achieve intermediate and (ultimately) final outcomes. A
results chain, using a radio mine risk education campaign as an example, is
illustrated below:
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Diagram 7. Results chain for a mine risk education campaign
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The diagram also illustrates the fact that programme managers have a fair
degree of control in producing the outputs, but they exert progressively less
control as we move to outcomes in the short- and medium-term, and eventually
to final outcomes. First, they need to ensure the outputs reach the intended
beneficiaries and are used by those people in some worthwhile fashion or the
planned outcomes will not be achieved.
Second, as more time passes, further outcomes are influenced by a range
of factors outside the control of the programme or even its direct beneficiaries.
Therefore, planning for the achievement of intermediate and final outcomes
needs to be based on assumptions concerning these outside factors. Thus,
success in terms of making a difference depends as much on understanding
the likely influence of outside factors — so that reasonable assumptions can
be made — as it does on the efficiency and safety with which outputs are
produced.
The fact that intermediate and final outcomes are determined in part by
outside influences points to the need for monitoring systems50 that extend to the
intermediate and final outputs. Programmes need to assure themselves and
their stakeholders that what they expect to happen with the mine action outputs
is truly happening.
For example, a programme clears agricultural land on the assumption that
this land will be used for crops. If much of the land is not so used, the
assumption is faulty and some research is warranted to determine why.
Indeed, Sara Sekkenes found in Angola that “Demining land for cultivation in a
village surviving on subsistence farming provides little improvement if the farmers,
after decades of war, have no seeds and tools left. They will go hungry despite the
clearance of many hectares of productive land to a cost of maybe tens of thousands of
dollars.”51
Pitfalls to overcome
While a focus on measurable results offers distinct advantages, it also
introduces dangers. One is an over-concentration on a few indicators that are
easily measured may introduce “perverse incentives” leading to unintended
and undesirable outcomes.
A well-known example of perverse incentives comes from the field of
education. The desire to enhance education quality has led many governments
to measure school performance based on the pass rates on standardised tests
achieved by each school’s students. As a consequence, most schools “teach to
the test”, coaching their students to pass the standardised tests rather than
teaching them more fundamental skills such as critical thinking. Even worse,
some schools force their weakest students to drop out before the tests, so
their scores do not lower the school average, resulting in a poor assessment
of the school’s performance.52 The effort to measure school performance in
order to improve educational outcomes created a perverse incentive for school
administrators that led to poorer education for some students.
This phenomenon is common in mine action, particularly because
performance still is judged on too narrow a range of “keeping busy” indicators
for which data happen to be cheap and easy to collect. Measures such as
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landmines destroyed, areas cleared and the numbers of mine risk education
presentations and trainees allow assessments concerning operational
efficiency. But there is growing evidence that this narrow focus on efficiency
has created perverse incentives which are leading to less effective performance
(see Box 11 below).
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Box 11. Efficiency versus effectiveness
There is widespread confusion in the mine action field concerning the difference
between efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency compares inputs relative to
outputs, measured either in physical units (productivity) or in monetary terms
(cost efficiency). Effectiveness, however, is a measure of whether, and the
degree to which, objectives (intermediate and final outcomes) have been
achieved. Both are important because it is quite possible for a project:
• to be very efficient in producing outputs but still be completely ineffective
because those outputs do not reach or are not used by the intended
beneficiaries or customers (for example, the world’s most efficient
manufacturers of horse-drawn carriages went bankrupt after the internal
combustion engine appeared on the scene); and
• to be effective but inefficient, in which case the well-being of the intended
beneficiaries is enhanced but by less than was possible given the resources
expended. For example, military air transport was very effective in getting
humanitarian supplies to refugee camps during the Rwanda crisis, but was
4-8 times more expensive than commercial air transport and 20-24 times
more expensive than commercial trucking.a)
In fact, a thorough assessment requires a comparison of inputs (or costs) and
benefits (outcomes). Such measures are termed cost-effectiveness (when the
benefits are expressed in non-monetary terms, such as tonnes of food grown)
or cost-benefit (when the benefits are expressed in monetary terms, such as
the value of the food grown on demined land). The difference in these terms is
easily illustrated by a RBM diagram.
a) JEEAR (1996:103)
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Prime examples in which the desire for efficiency has diverted attention
from effectiveness are the reports from many countries that minefields have
been selected for clearance because they were easy to clear, allowing programmes
and individual demining organisations to report that their costs were falling.
Also, proposals in a number of countries to introduce mobile teams to clear
small hazards that are blocking vital community resources have faced fierce
resistance from “traditional” clearance organisations, who argue that these
mobile teams are inefficient.53 Undoubtedly, such teams are inefficient if
measured against the area cleared, but there is growing evidence they can be
extremely effective in enhancing the well-being of target beneficiaries.54 For
example,
“The above statistics suggest that spot task/EOD teams can be extremely
time and impact-efficient. The social impact of spot tasks is high and
very positive … Also it is significant that the majority of beneficiaries
did not express economic benefit from spot task clearance but instead
expressed high levels of social/psychosocial benefits…”55
This quotation — and the general thrust of the report from which it is
taken — also points to another problem frequently experienced as programmes
try to raise their focus to results that make a difference. Generally these
more important results are more difficult to measure.
In the example above on Danchurchaid’s programme in Kosovo, Horwood
and his co-researchers surveyed residents in communities that had benefited
from spot clearance by small teams and then conducted semi-structured
interviews with a random sample of those who completed the questionnaire.
Their findings were illuminating: 97 per cent of those polled said they had less
stress because of the spot clearance and 100 per cent said their quality of life
had improved.
These data were collected after the fact. Danchurchaid had not conducted a
baseline survey nor had its monitoring system collected such data before the
spot clearance tasks were conducted, so it is unclear how fearful of mines
and UXO the beneficiaries were before the clearance was done. Regardless,
the example shows that a little forethought can help clarify the precise nature
of these more important results (outcomes, rather than outputs), and that
cost-effective monitoring systems can be designed to gauge whether mine
actions are making a difference to people’s lives. It would be preferable if a
quantitative indicator of performance was available, and ideal if that indicator
could be expressed in monetary terms for a ready comparison against the
costs of providing the service.56 But we live in the real world and good
evidence of performance is better than no evidence at all.57The Community-
Based Risk Reduction Programme (see Box 13) provides another example in
which organisations involved in a mine action programme have taken
reasonable steps to marshal evidence concerning performance. In this case, the
project’s objectives were clearly laid out and plans provided for an early
evaluation of the pilot. This found the project was not delivering on all the
expected results, but it was generating some unforeseen benefits which could
be increased with slight modifications. Based on these findings, the
modifications have been made and there is reason to expect the project will
make a difference to the people of Cambodia.58
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Box 12. The Community-Based Mine Risk Reduction Pilot Project
(CBMRR)
In early 2001, CMAC, Handicap International Belgium, UNICEF and other
members of the Mine Awareness Working Group designed a strategy for a
more sustainable and community-oriented approach to mine risk education
in Cambodia. This was based on the concept that contamination posed two
general types of risks: (1) losses of life and limb through accidents, plus the
resulting physical and psychosocial consequences for survivors and the families
of victims, and (2) risks to livelihoods and community development, by denying
households and communities access to land and other resources. A pilot
project was formulated, with the following goal: to reduce the mine and UXO
risks for communities and individuals living in contaminated areas by developing
their capacity to fully participate in the prioritisation and planning of mine
action and using their own community resources for mine risk education.
Specific objectives were:
• to establish an effective and sustainable community-based  mine risk
reduction network of volunteers in mine/UXO-affected communities;
• to facilitate the access of mine/UXO-affected communities to appropriate
mine action activities, victim assistance programmes and community
development responses; and
• to maintain and improve a public information campaign to raise awareness
among mine/UXO-affected communities.
Critically, the pilot project provided for external evaluations of progress towards
its goal and objectives. The first took place in late 2002, only a year into the
pilot. It documented encouraging progress in some areas, problems in
others, and some unanticipated developments (chiefly that many mine action
and development bodies viewed the CBMRR chiefly as a way of obtaining
information from the villages rather than disseminating information to the
villages).
A key finding is that the villages were reporting high priority contamination
problems via their Mine/UXO Committees — but the Cambodia Mine Action
Centre is not always able to respond promptly to the requests. This in part
was due to transportation difficulties in the wet season, but in part because
insufficient resources had been allocated to support the project by responding
to requests. Without better response, community confidence in the project
may erode. As a result, the CMAC plan for 2003 states, “a new project will be
developed with the Mine Risk Reduction teams. These small and multi-skilled
teams will be deployed in support to the CBMRR program. The teams will be
used for risk reduction and quick response to small tasks identified by the
communities”.
Source: Project Development Group (2003); CMAC, Integrated Work Plan 2003.
Mine risk education is a good illustration of another type of performance
measurement problem. We expect to see a decline in the numbers of deaths
and injuries from landmine accidents following the delivery of MRE in a
community. However, deaths and accidents also tend to decline in
communities that receive no MRE as residents become more familiar with
where the contaminated areas are, as they develop alternatives to using
Is mine action making a difference ... or avoiding the question?
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those areas (e.g. clearing new crop land or paths around the contamination),
and so on. So accidents decline in communities that have received MRE and
in those that have not. Can we attribute any portion of the decline in the first
community to MRE? Perhaps, if we had evidence that the decline in accidents
was systematically faster in communities that received MRE. Unfortunately,
we rarely have evidence that we can be confident of because the data on
landmine victims are often incomplete and, regardless, we rarely know
whether the two sets of communities are even comparable in terms of socio-
economic factors and, more fundamentally, contamination risk. For example,
if MRE is well targeted, it presumably is being delivered to the most
vulnerable communities. In this case we might find the numbers of accidents
in communities receiving MRE has remained higher than those having no
MRE, but we could not safely conclude that MRE is not working. This is
termed the “attribution problem” — we cannot attribute the results observed
to the actions of the programme.59
There is another problem common to most programmes, including mine
action. Progress toward many of the most important objectives cannot be
assessed for some time. For example, technical advisers are often fielded
with a dual mandate to get something up-and-running (say, teams for
explosive ordnance destruction or EOD) and to develop indigenous capacities
to keep it working in the long term. Whether EOD teams are trained and
deployed on schedule is quite apparent, but it takes time to determine whether
indigenous capacities have been developed to manage those teams effectively,
particularly when the technical adviser is still on hand to provide advice and
prevent egregious errors. So the adviser’s success in establishing the EOD teams
can be monitored when still on the job, but the success in developing indigenous
EOD supervision and management skills will only be apparent some time after
the adviser has departed.
Failure to take reasonable steps to address this type of problem implies
that performance can only be measured against indicators which show
measurable changes in the short-term. In our technical adviser example, this
creates incentives for an adviser to focus mainly on establishing the EOD
teams even at the expense of developing indigenous capacities (which
ultimately is of more importance). When such incentives abound, it should be
no surprise that the results are disappointing. In point of fact, poor
performance of technical advisers in developing indigenous “mid- and high-
level” capacities is a phenomenon that has drawn comment in virtually every
evaluation conducted of mine action programmes.60
Standing still is not an option
It should be clear that it is not a trivial task to demonstrate that a programme
is performing well in terms of making a difference to the lives of people in
mine-afflicted communities. But such an effort pays dividends in terms of
bolstering support for the programme and learning to improve performance
over time. And these dividends multiply over time.
One further spur to action needs mention: if mine action programmes do not
come to grips with how to set performance targets and to document the results
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they are achieving in terms of enhancing the well-being of their target
beneficiaries, they will have no credible defence when and if negative
consequences of mine action come to light. In Cambodia, for example, allegations
arose in April 1999 concerning falsified payroll records in the Mine Action
Centre (CMAC). This led to a string of further scandals culminating in claims
that the agency was clearing land for military commanders, logging firms and
a former leader in the Khmer Rouge. As it had not set clear performance targets
in terms of, say, the numbers of poor households that would benefit, CMAC
was not collecting and reporting data about who the ultimate beneficiaries
were and had little evidence to demonstrate whether most of the cleared land
went to poor peasants. The perception quickly spread that abuse was the norm.61
Mine action organisations operating in Cambodia have since begun to document
and report on the end-use of land they have cleared62 but tremendous damage
was done to CMAC’s reputation and to the level of donor support to Cambodia’s
mine action programme.
There are twin morals to this and similar tales. If programmes do not
clarify what results they are aiming for in terms of what benefits will reach
which beneficiaries for what purposes — and then monitor, document, and report
on their achievements of these beneficial results — then: (i) only the bad
results can be reported, and (ii) bad results are more likely because
opportunists will take advantage of lax monitoring.
Conclusions
Mine action programmes in heavily contaminated countries will not be able
to declare victory in the short- to medium-term. Therefore, they need to equip
themselves adequately for the long haul. This implies something more
fundamental than new tools for their tool kits: it implies learning how to
learn. This ability is required if programmes are to assess their performance
in terms of results that make a difference to people in mine-afflicted
communities, which is necessary to maintain the support of donors and,
increasingly, of host governments. Even more critically, the ability to assess
performance in terms of meaningful results is necessary to improve such
performance over time. Accordingly:
1. Mine action programmes in heavily contaminated countries should:
provide for a comprehensive needs assessment (such as a landmine
impact survey) to provide a coarse-grain picture of how contamination
is impacting communities throughout their country — the assessment
should be regularly updated as the situation changes, including due to
advancing work of mine action;
provide for more targeted surveys of heavily impacted regions and
communities to provide progressively more detail pictures of how
contamination is impacting communities, households, and
individuals.
2. Plans for all programmes and projects in heavily contaminated countries
should:
specify objectives at the intermediate and final outcome levels, and set
performance targets for each to clarify the results they aim to achieve;
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specify relevant performance indicators for each result or, where it is
unclear what indicators should be used or where data on an indicator
are lacking, outline the concrete steps that will be taken to rectify such
omissions within the period covered by the plan;
incorporate a clear plan for monitoring the results achieved during
implementation, and for reporting these results to host governments,
donors, and other stakeholders;
provide for periodic evaluations.
3. All mine action programmes should initiate a system of post-clearance
surveys to determine whether the land and facilities cleared are (i) being
used (ii) in the expected manner (iii) by the intended beneficiaries and (iv)
without undue delays.
4. The international mine action community should establish an action research
network to promote learning about the social and economic dimensions of
landmine contamination and of mine action, with a particular focus on
narrowing the gap between social scientists and mine action practitioners,
by:
identifying common problems and emerging issues affecting major mine
action programmes;
recommending issues that warrant study because of their practical
potential for improving the results being achieved by mine action
programmes;
promoting the rapid dissemination of key findings from studies,
evaluations, pilot projects and other action research activities designed
to generate new information about the interaction between people and
landmines;
recommending new pilot projects to accelerate the practical application
of key findings generated by research and evaluations.
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OAU Organisation of African Unity
OBOD open burning and open detonation
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMAR Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation
ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PARADIS Prototype for Assisting Rational Activities in Humanitarian




PDA personal digital assistant
PEST political-economic-social-technical
PLP phantom limb pain
Glossary of terms and acronyms
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PPE personal protective equipment
PPR post-project review
PRIO Peace Research Institute, Oslo
PRSP poverty reduction strategy paper
RBM results-based management
RDBMS relational database management systems
RDX cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine
R&D research and development
REST remote explosive scent tracing
SAC Survey Action Center
SC-VASER Standing Committee for Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic
Reintegration
SEEMACC South Eastern Europe Mine Action Coordination Centre
SEIS Socio-Economic Impact Study (Afghanistan)
SFOR Stabilisation Force
SHA suspected hazardous area
SNC Supreme National Council
SOP standing operating procedure
SQL structured query language
SRSA Swedish Resource Services Agency
SWEDEC Swedish Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Demining Centre
SWG Survey Working Group
SWOT strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats
TAP task assessment and planning
TEA thermal energy activity
TIA task impact assessment
TMFDB tactical minefield database
TNMA Technical Notes for Mine Action
TNT trinitrotoluene
TQM total quality management
UEE user equipment errors
UN United Nations
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs to Afghanistan
UNOMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
URE user range error
UXO unexploded ordnance
VVAF Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
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VTF Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance (UN)
WAAS wide area augmentation system
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
WRF World Rehabilitation Fund
Glossary of terms and acronyms
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British Army that ended with the rank of Brigadier. He set up the original
United Nations mine action office, worked as a consultant for the World
Bank, the European Union and others, was the Technical Director of the
GICHD, and now carries out more consultancy, mostly on programme
evaluations.
Colin King served 14 years in the British Army, mostly in bomb disposal,
with operational service including the Falklands, the Gulf, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. He also led the first British army team to train Afghan
volunteers in mine clearance and bomb disposal. He was second-in-command
of the army counter-terrorist search squadron before becoming an instructor
at the British bomb disposal school. He then worked as a foreign weapons
intelligence analyst for the Ministry of Defence before commanding a Squadron
of Gurkhas in Hong Kong. Colin now runs a consultancy company undertaking
bomb disposal assessments and training in war zones all over the world,
with recent work for the British and US governments in Iraq, Lebanon and
Kosovo. He also edits reference yearbooks on mine clearance and bomb
disposal for Jane’s information group.
Rachael Mann took up a position as Research Assistant for the United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) in 2000 and
became involved in mine victim assistance research with GICHD. In 2001,
Rachael joined HALO Trust as Projects Officer and worked in Cambodia. In
2004, Rachael left HALO Trust and moved to Scotland where she is currently
Parliamentary Researcher for Lewis Macdonald MSP, Deputy Minister for
Environment and Rural Affairs.
Ian Mansfield, Operations Director at the GICHD, has spent the last 14
years working in mine action. He has been the Programme Manager for the
United Nations mine action programmes in Afghanistan, Laos and Bosnia. He
was the Mine Action Team Leader at UNDP headquarters in New York for four
years. Ian is an Australian national, and he holds a Masters of Business
Administration and a Bachelor of Civil Engineering.
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Lou Maresca is a legal adviser with International Committee of the Red
Cross. He has worked extensively on issues related to landmines and
explosive remnants of war, in particular the international humanitarian
law treaties to address the impact of these weapons.
Stuart Maslen has worked in mine action since 1993, in particular in the
fields of advocacy and mine risk education. He has worked as a consultant to
the GICHD since 1999. He holds a PhD in international law and has written a
number of publications on different aspects of mine action, including the
GICHD's Guide to Mine Action, and a commentary of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention, published by Oxford University Press in Spring 2004.
Ted Paterson has recently joined the GICHD to manage the Evaluation
Section. He has a background in international development, working with
NGOs, research and education institutes, consulting firms, and as an
independent consultant. He has been active in mine action since 1999, working
mainly on socio-economic and performance management issues. He has
degrees in business, economics, and development economics. While never
trained in demining, Ted worked five years as a zookeeper, learning to be
careful where he stepped.
Guy Rhodes, PhD, started his career in humanitarian demining in 1993
working on an emergency survey in Mozambique with HALO Trust. Since
then he has led national surveys for Norwegian People's Aid in Angola and
Thailand and was a Chief Technical Adviser for the Vietnam Veterans of
America Foundation survey in Vietnam. In addition to a broad range of survey
experience in general, technical and impact surveys he managed the NPA
mine action programme in Angola and has undertaken consultancy
assignments in various countrie, including for the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, the GICHD, the UN Development
Programme and  several NGOs.
Andy Wheatley is a freelance mine action consultant working for the
United Nations, the GICHD, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
and various NGOs, primarily focusing on mine risk education activities. His
work covers field-based and research activities, including MRE training,
monitoring and evaluation, workshop facilitation, short-term programme
support, best practice studies and programming guides. Previously he worked
for Mines Advisory Group where he was the Lao country programme director
before heading the Community Liaison Section. Prior to this, Andy worked
for ten years on emergency and post-conflict reconstruction programmes with
Save the Children Fund in Africa and Asia.
Mark Yarmoshuk has been involved in mine action information
management since 1998. As an officer in the Canadian Army he led a contingent
of three Canadian Military combat engineers who spent 15 months providing
support to technical survey teams at a landmine clearance programme in
Mozambique. After leaving the military he has worked extensively with the
IMSMA development team at ETH Zurich, and mine action programmes in
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Lebanon, and Mozambique. He
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continues to work in humanitarian information management. Mark Yarmoshuk
is a Civil Engineer (PEng, Ontario, Canada) and holds a post-graduate diploma
in Geomatics from the University of New Brunswick, Canada.
Notes on the authors
366
Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
7bis, avenue de la Paix
P.O. Box 1300
CH - 1211 Geneva 1
Switzerland




ction: Lessons and C
hallenges
Mine Action:
Lessons and 
Challenges
